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If 1 
CHAPTER  FOUR 
Mannheim  shares  with  Scheler  and  Lukäcs  an  early  concern  for  a  theory  of 
culture.  This  is  evident  from  Mannheim's  earlier  writings  such  as  the  1917 
lecture 
_. 
'Lelek  es  Kultura'  (Soul  and  Culture'), 
1 
his  review  of  Lukäcs' 
Theory  of  the  Novel  (1920),  2 
his  essay  on  the  interpretation  of  '.  world  views 
(1923),  3 
and  the  important  unpublished  essay  'Über  das  Eigenart  kultur- 
soziologischer  Erkenntnis'  (1922).  4 
Indeed  the  similarity  goes  further  than 
this.  Not  only  is  Lukäcs'  work,  and  especially  his  Heidelberger  Ästhetikim- 
portant  for  Mannheim's  early  formulations  of  the  problems  of  the  sociology 
of  culture,  as.  Markus  has  recently  shown5  but,  as  Kettler's  study  of  the 
relationship  between  Mannheim  and  Lukcäs  in  Hungary  has  demonstrated, 
the  influence  of  Lukacs  I  views  as  a  whole  was  central  to  the  young  Mannheim. 
In  relation  to  Scheler  th?  connections  are  not  so  close.  One  may  point,  for 
example,  to  the  references  which  Mannheim  makes  to  Scheler's  pre-war 
writings  in  his  unpublished  essay.  At  a  more  general  level,  the  early  writ- 
ings  of  Mannheim  -  and  this  is  again  especially  true  of  Über  das  Eigenart 
kultursoziologischer  Erkenntnis  -  betray  a  heavy  reliance  upon  a  phenomeno- 
logical  standpoint  which,  in  some  respects  at  least,  brings  Mannheim  closer 
to  Scheler..  The  phenomenology  that  Mannheim  refers  to  most,  however,  is 
that  of  Heidegger  and  not  Scheler.  Of  course,  Mannheim's  phenomenological 
position  is  also  fused  with  Dilthey's  hermeneutics  as  well  as  Lukäcs  own  early 
a  amalgam  of  these  two  traditions.  One  may  also  detect,  sometimes  very 
clearly  as  In  'Lelek  ds  Kultur',  the  fascination  which  Simmel  Is  theory  of 
cultural  alienation  had  for  Mannheim,  as  indeed  it  had  for  the  early  Lukäcs. 
In  another  direction,  the  neo-Kantian  philosophy  of  Rickert  and  Lask  is  evi- 2 
dent  in  Mannheim's  doctoral  thesis  'The  Structural  Analysis  of  Epistemology' 
(1922,  Hungarian  original  1918)  as  is,  once  again,  Lukäcs'  early  writings. 
However,  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  assume  that  these  early  formulations  of 
a  sociology  of  culture  are  concerned  only  with  a  theory  of  culture.  On  the 
contrary,  they  often  contain  the  rudiments  of  certain  central  problems  which 
Mannheim  later  developed  into  his  sociology  of  knowledge.  There  thus  seems 
little  point  in  making  the  claim,  as  Remmling  does,  that  'Mannheim  made 
the  transition  from  philosophy  to  sociology  in  1925,  when  he  published  his 
article,  "The  problem  of  a  sociology  of  knowledge".  18  Not  only  had  Mann- 
heim  by  this  time  already  developed  a  sociology  of  culture  but  he  had  also 
developed  a  number  of  themes  central  to  his  sociology  of  knowledge.  In 
i 
what  follows,  in  the  first  systematic  section  of  this  chapter,  an  attempt  will 
be  made  to  highlight  the  major  themes  of  Mannheim's  early  work  and  demon- 
strate  their  relevance  not  merely  for  a  sociology  of  culture  but  also  for  a 
sociology  of  knowledge.  Close  -attention  will  be  paid  to  Mannheim's  un- 
published  essay  not,  as  Kettler  rightly  points  out,  in  order  'to  create-any  sort 
of  mystery  about  Mannheim.  His  published  works  of  the  time  were  more 
polished  and  "professional"  and  therefore  more  modest  in  aspiration.  He 
took  greater  intellectual  risks  in  the  essays  written  for  self-clarification  and 
these  are,  accordingly,  more  self-revealing.  '9  It  is  also  within  Mannheim's 
earlier  work  that  it  is  possible  to  trace  the  important  influence  which  Lukcas 
exercised  over  Mannheim.  This  extends  not  merely  from  the  common  dis- 
cussions  in  Budapest  in  the  'Szellemkek'  group,  which  are  investigated  else- 
where  by.  Kettler,  but  also  to  Mannheim's  written  work  and  his  participation 
in  the  'Free  School  of  Human  Sciences'  in  1917.  (Mannheim's  lecture  'Soul 
and  Culture'  belongs.  to  the  lecture  series  given  under  its  auspices).  Lukäcs 3 
In  the  second  part  of  this  chapter,  attention  will  be  focussed  upon  the  explicit 
confrontation  with  problems  associated  with  the  development  of  a  sociology 
of  knowledge  and  the  attempts  to  apply  such  a  sociology  of  knowledge  to 
specific  areas.  Within  the  context  of  the  first  of  these  endeavours  belongs 
the  essay  'Historismus'  (1924),  11 
'Das  Problem  einer  Soziologie  des  Wis- 
sens'  (1925),  12 
'Ideologische  und  soziologische  Interpretation  der  geistigen 
Gebilde'  (1926)13  end  the  important  unpublished  essay  Eine  soziologische 
himself  many  years  later  indeed  went  so  far  as  to  suggest  that,  in  this  period 
'I  stood  in  a  close  relationship  to  Mannheim  when  he  was  a  student  and  he 
was,  one  might  say,  my  unofficial  academic  pupil  1.10  Thus  the  relation- 
ship  between  Mannheim  and  Lukäcs  can  be  traced  back  to  their  earlier  years 
in  Budapest.  It  remains  to  be  seen  to  what  extent  Mannheim  remained  con- 
scious  of  the  need  to  confront  Lukäcs'  work,  especially  Geschichte  und 
Klassenbewusstsein,  in  his  later  writings. 
4 
Theorie  der  Kultur  und  ihrer  Erkennbarkeit.  (Konjunktives  und  kommunikatives 
Denken) 
14- 
undated  but,  from  the  references  cited,  probably  1924  or  slightly 
later.  The  attempts  to  apply  the  sociology  of  knowledge  in  this  period  com- 
prise  Mannheim's  Habilitationsschrift  'Das  Konservative  Denken'  (written 
1925,  published  1927), 
15 
'Die  Bedeutung  der  Konkurrenz  im  Gsbiete  des 
Geistigen'  (paper  delivered  in  1928,  published  1929) 
16 
and  'Das  Problem 
der  Generationen'  (published  1928). 
17 
The  examination  of  these  essays  is 
not  intended  to  imply'that  Mannheim  had  now  turned  his  attention  exclusively 
towards  a  sociology  of  knowledge  since  the  continued  significance  of  problems 
associated  with  a  sociology  of  culture  are  still  much  in  evidence.  Rather, 
the  explicit  taking  up  of  a  sociology  of  knowledge  grows  out  of  his  earlier  con- 
cerns  and  develops  new  themes. 4 
Such  interests  must  necessarily  lead  to  a  re-examination  of  what  is  usually 
acknowledged  to  be  Mannheim's  major  German  work  Ideologie  und  Utopie, 
published  in  1929.18  This  is,  in  many  respects,  a  very  different  book 
from  Ideology  and  Utopia  which  was  introduced  to  the  English  speaking  world 
in  1936.19  The  earlier  version  -  which  had  a  major  impact  on  German  social 
thought  -  was  much  shorter,  comprising  only  three  chapters:  'Ideologie  und 
Utopie',  'Ist  Politik  als  Wissenschaft  möglich?  '  and  'Das  utopische 
Bewusstsein'.  The  original  was,  as'  we  hope  to  show,  much  more  concerned 
with  some  of  the  problems  that  appear  in  Lukäcs'  Geschichte  und  Klassen- 
bewusstsein  than  the  later  translation  suggests.  A  central  interest  in  this 
section  of  the  present  chapter  will  therefore  be  the  relationship  between  Mann- 
heim's  theory  and  critique  of  ideology  and  the  establishment  of  a  sociology 
of  knowledge.  Only  by  a  detailed  analysis  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie  will  it 
be  possible  to  account  for  the  impact  of  this  work  in  Germany,  an  impact 
which  can  hardly  be  comprehended  by  a  study  of  the  English  translation. 
Whatever  the  judgment  upon  Ideologie  und  Utopie,  it  is  certainly  apparent 
that  Mannheim  in  his  post  1929  writings  assumed  that,  along  with  others,  he 
had  successfully  established  the  sociology  of  knowledge  as  a  recognised 
discipline.  The  role  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  within  sociology  and 
the  social  sciences  as  a  whole  is  a  major  theme  of  both  his  dictionary  con- 
tribution,  'Wissenssoziologie'  (published  1931  and  now  chapter  five  of  both 
the  English  translation  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie  and  the  post-war  German 
edition), 
20 
and  his  lecture,  Die  Gegenwartsaufgaben  der  Soziologie  (deliver- 
ed  and  published  in  1932). 
21 
It  is  in  this  period  (i.  e.  roughly  1928-32) 
that  Mannheim  also  intended  publication  of  not  only  a  substantial  study  of 
Max  Weber's  sociology  but  also  a  collection  of  essays  Soziologie  des  Geistes 5 
(outline  written  1930),  as  well  as  a  briefer  study  of  contemporary  social 
thought  -  Weber,  Troeltsch,  Scheler  -  under  the  title  Zur  Denklage  der  Gegen- 
wart. 
22 
In  fact,  none  of  these  volumes  appeared  in  Germany,  though  three 
of  the  essays  which  were  to  comprise  Soziologie  des  Geistes  were  subsequent- 
ly  published  in  a  much  altered  form  as  Essays  on  the  Sociology  of  Culture  in 
1956.23  Not  only  did  Mannheim  himself  make  'a  number  of  major  revisions 
in  the  original  draft'  but  'in  order  to  make  the  meaning  and  import  of  the  ideas 
comprehensible  in  another  idiom  and  to  the  readers  of  a  different  generation 
raised  in  a  different  national  tradition,  the  editors  had  to  rethink  the  original 
text  without  distorting  the  author's  intentions'. 
24 
It  is  therefore  unfortunate- 
ly  not  possible  to  refer  to  these  essays  in  their  translated  form  as  belonging 
to  this  period. 
However,  what  we  do  have  access  to  is  the  considerable  number  of  reviews 
which  highlight  the  reception  that  Ideologie  und  Utopie  received  in  Germany. 
It  would  logically  follow  from  the  outline  of  the  present  chapter  that  some  dis- 
cussion  of  this  reception  of  Mannheim's  work  should  be  part  of  the  present 
chapter.  But  since  there  are  a  substantial  number  of  contemporary  reviews 
of  Ideologie  und  Utopie,  it  is  perhaps  more  fitting  that  they  form  part  of  the 




Kettler's  investigation  of  the  relationship  between  Mannheim  and  Lukäcs 
In  Budapest  prior  to  and,  in  part,  during  the  Hungarian  Revolution  has  shown 
that  Mannheim  was  very  much  under  the  influence  of  Lukäcs  in  this  period. 6 
Mannheim  took  part  in  the  regular  weekly  discussions  of  the  Szellemkek  group 
organised  by  Lukäcs  and  others  between  1915  and  1918.  This  group  of  i  ntel  i- 
ectuals,  cutt  off  from  contact  with  the  mass  of  the  population,  were  con- 
cerned  with  the  cultural  renewal  of  Hungarian  society.  As  one  of  the  founders 
of  this  group  relates, 
'Amongst  its  founder  members  belonged  the  intimate 
friends  of  Georg  Lukäcs:  Bela  Baläzs,  Lajos  Fülep 
and  Anna  Lesznai 
... 
Those  who  also  come  along 
were  the  younger  people  ("the  children"),  Bela 
Fogarasi,  Karl  Mannheim  and  Arnold  Hauser  ... 
Generally,  these  Sunday  discussions  were  organ- 
ised  and  dominated  by  Lukäcs;  he  put  forward  some 
topic  for  discussion  which  would  be  thoroughly  dis- 
cussed  by  the  group.  Typically  it  was  concerned 
with  a  moral  and/or  literary  problem  in  which  one  con- 
centrated  especially  upon  Dostojevski  and  German 
mystics  like  Eckart.  One  could  crudely  character- 
ize  the  political  leanings  of  the  group  as  "left 
orientated";  however,  -  it  is  more  accurate  to  poi  nt 
out  how  unpolitical  they  all  were.  In  fact  the 
group  had  more  in  common  with  g  religious  gather- 
ing  than  with  a  political  club.  ' 
The  unpolitical  and,  .  one  might  add,  unsociological  nature  of  these  discussions 
which  were  crucial  to  Mannheim's  intellectual  development  is  also  confirmed 
by  the  reminiscences  of  Arnold  Hauser  who  suggests  that 
'In  1917  Karl  Mannheim  was  uninterested  in  politics 
as  were  all  the  members  of  the  group.  The  main 
responsibility  for  this  lay  with  Lukäcs  who  was  con- 
cerned  with  Lask,  Weber  and  Jaspers  and  interested 
in  philosophy  and  religion  ever  since  he  had  returned 
from  Heidelberg  as  a  kind  of  mystic  ...  We 
never  discussed  politics  but  rather  literature, 
philosophy  and  religion.  At  that  time  no  one  was 
yet  interested  in  sociology.  '  27 
In  other  respects,  too,  Mannhei  m  had  much  in  common  with  Lukäcs.  In 
1912  Mannheim  studied  in  Berlin  for  a  year  and  attended  courses  by  Simmel 
as  well  as  later  studying  at  Freiburg  and  Heidelberg  before  returning  to  Buda- 
pest  shortly  before  the  First  World  War.  As  we  have  seen,  Lukdcs'  -early 
writings  exhibit  a  considerable  debt  to  Simmel's  theory  of  cultural  alien- V- 
7 
ation.  This  is  also  true  of  the  first  published  work  of  Mannheim,  'Lelek 
es  Kultura'  . 
In  1917,  again  probably  under  Lukäcs'  stimulus,  members  of  the  Sunday  dis- 
cus0ion  group,  Szellemkek,  founded  a  'Free  School  for  the  Geisteswissen- 
schaften  which  was  to  propagate  the  cultural-philosophical  world-view  of 
those  who,  in  Lukäcs'  words,  constituted  'an  opposition  to  capitalism  in  the 
name  of  idealist  philosophy.  What  they  had  in  common  was  the  negation  of 
positivism. 
28 
Again,  it  should  be  emphasized  that  this  'opposition  to  capital- 
ism'  was  not  always  of  an  overt  political  nature  but  lay  rather  in  its  idealistic, 
often  spiritualistic  rejection.  Amongst  those  who  gave  lectures  in  this 
'school'  were  Lukäcs,  Mannheim,  Fogarasi,  Szabo*,  Hauser,  Kodäly,  and 
Bartok.  From  the  text  of  Mannheim's  lecture  we  learn  that  only  Erwin 
Szabo  offered  a  directly  political  lecture:  'On  the  Basic  Questions  of  Marx- 
ism'.  Lukäcs  lectured  on  aesthetics,  Fogarasi  on  the  methods  ofintellect- 
ual  history,  Hauser  on  dilettantism  in  art,  Kodäly  on  the  Hungarian  folk 
4 
song  and  Bartok  on  folk  and  modern  music. 
Mannheim's  lecture  'Soul  and  Culture'  -  delivered  in  the  autumn  of  1917 
and  published  in  1918  -  was  intended  as  a  programmatic  statement  of  the 
group's  Intentions.  Its  general  tenor,  as  Markus  comments  'originates  in 
Si  mme  l  and  in  Lukäcs'  essays,  that  is  in  the  Philosophie  der  Kunst  con- 
ceived  in  the  spirit  of  these  essays,  although  the  Lebensphilosophie  ten- 
dencies  emerge  in  Mannheim  significantly  more  strongly  than  in  the  Lukäcs 
manuscripts  of  1912-141.29  The  Lukäcs  works  referred  to  here  by  Märkus 
are  part  of  his  then  unpublished  writings  on  aesthetics  completed  between 
30 
1912  and  1916  and  are  often  referred  to  by  Mannheim  in  his  later  writings. 8 
However,  much  Mannheim  may  have  been  acquainted  with  Simm9I's  work 
through  Lukacs'  reception  of  it  -  though  Mannheim  himself  attended  Simmel's 
lectures  in  1912-13  -  it  remains  true  that  the  central  theme  of  his  lecture  is 
undoubtedly  drawn  from  Simmel.  As  in  Lukäcs'  writings  from  this  period, 
Mannheim  conceives  of  the  contemporary  crisis  as  a  cultural  one.  He  argues 
that  'the  greatest  danger  in  contemporary  culture  is  that  it  grows  beyond  our 
grasp  and  makes  our  relationship  to  it  increasingly  precarious'  . 
31 
Mannheim 
develops  this  theme  in  a  manner  which  mirrors  Simmel  Is  theory  of  cultural 
alienation  and  the  opposition  between  subjective  and  objective  culture.  For 
Mannheim, 
'It  is  the  mutual  dependency  of  objective  and 
subjective  culture  which  makes  impossible 
the  existence  of  the  one'or  the  other.  Object- 
I  ve  culture  envelops  us  like  an  independent  lev- 
iathan,  yet  it  cannot  continue  to  develop  and 
maintain  its  own  existence  without  the  assist- 
ance  and  co-operation  of  individuals.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  individual  denies  his  own  ful- 
f  ilment  if  he  fails  to'regenerate  the  objective 
culture  and  constantly  appropriate  it.  '  32 
In  the  course  of  the  lecture,,  Mannheim  expands  upon  this  growing  separation 
of  objective  and  subjective  culture,  again  within  the  framework  of  a  theory 
of  culture  which  is  reminiscent  of  that  of  Simmel.  Mannheim  maintains 
that  objective  culture  is 
'the  totality  of  objectivations  of  the  mind  which, 
In  their  historical  development,  have  become  a 
human  legacy.  They  comprise  religion,  science, 
art,  the  state  and  forms  of  life.  In  contrast,  we 
speak  of  subjective  culture  when  -  as  Simmel 
correctly  observed  -  the  soul  strives  for  fulfil- 
ment  not  through  itself,  through  an  inward  move- 
ment  but  indirectly  through  these  cultural  object- 
I  vations,  that  is,  through  their  appropriation.  '  33 
Mannheim  develops  this  theory  of  cultural  estrangement  with  reference  to  the 
work  of  art  which,  though  having  its  origin  in  its  creator,  becomes  separated 9 
from  him  when  it  becomes  a  cultural  object,  such  that  'insofar  as  the  work 
becomes  a  cultural  object  and  an  independent  reality,  it  distances  itself 
from  the  soul'. 
34 
oul'  . 
34 
This  process  of  separation  is  apparent  at  every  stage  in 
the  creation  of  an  artistic  work.  One  general  attribute  of  culture,  for  example, 
is  that  is  makes  possible  continuity,  not  merely  between  generations  but  also 
with  regard  to  style.  At  the  same  time,  however,  the  continuity  of  tech- 
I 
nique  and  common  meaning  structure,  for  example,  do  not  always  coincide. 
In  such  instances,  Mannheim  argues,  this  is  the  source  of  'the  tragedy  of 
culture'.  Within  this  context,  Markus  has  argued  that  Mannheim  explicitly 
takes  over  Lukäcs'  arguments  from  his  1912-14  Philosophie  der  Kunst  as, 
for  example,  when  he  writes  that 
'Man  is  certainly  capable  of  making  the  objecti- 
fication  of  culture  -  when  it  has  completely 
estranged  itself  from  the  soul  -  remain  alive 
as  form,  of  allowing  it  to  be  observed  and  even 
of  making  it  mean  something  even  though  in  an 
inadequate  manner  ... 
The  aesthetic  mode  of 
interpretation  is  just  such  an  inadequate  inter- 
pretation  and  Lukäcs,  the  originator  of  this  whole 
theory  of  inadequate  contemplation,  constructs 
the  whole  of  aesthetics  as  a  system  of  inadequate 
'  35 
contemplation. 
Again,  however,  this  reference  to  Lukäcs  is  also  closely  bound  up  with 
Simmel  Is  theory  of  cultural  alienation.  Mannheim  argues  that  'the  whole 
dynamic  of  culture'  is  a  'process  of  cultural  over-development  and  false 
4 
development'  and  that  'it  was  Simmel  who  recognised  this  tendency  towards 
cultural  hypertrophy'. 
36 
This  'alienation  process'  extends  to  every  cultural 
sphere  and  is  acute  in  the  present  period  in  which  'the  old  forms  are  no  long- 
er  immediately  relevant  and  their  contemporaneousness  has  been  lost.  We 
feel  that,  at  the  present  time,  we  are  living  in  such  an  epoch.  1 
37 
In  such 
a  period  and  as  a  result  of  this  process  of  estrangement,  form  and  content 
also  become  alienated  from  one  another,  a  process  which  'reaches  its  highest 10 
point  in  impressionism'.  This  account  of  the  alienation  process  at  the 
cultural  level  not  only  reflects  Simmel's  theory  of  alienation  but,  in  the 
reference  to  impressionism,  even  includes  Simmel's  work  as  part  of  this 
impressionism.  Both  Lukdcs  (in  his  obituary  of  1918)38  and  Mannheim  (in 
his  unpublished  1922  essay)39recognised  very  early  the  impressionistic  stance 
of  Simmel  Is  own  world  view  and  approach  to  reality.  In  another  respect$ 
however,  the  characterisation  of  cultural  alienation  as,  in  part,  the  increasing 
irrelevance  of  older  cultural  forms  points  forward  to  Mannheim's  later  use  of 
this  notion  in  his  typification  of  ideologies  as  being  modes  of  relating  to 
reality  whose  relevance  has  now  passed.  Yet  within  the  confines  of  this 
lecture,  Mannheim  does  not  pose  the  ideological  problem  and  remains  with- 
in  an  idealist  critique  of  culture. 
This  fragmentation  of-culture  is  echoed-in  contemporary  philosophy.  Mann- 
heim  is  quite  explicit  in  stating  that  'our  world  view  is  idealistic'.  But 
it  is  also  a  world  view  which  has  rejected  philosophical  Marxism  as  'un- 
fruitful'  and  has  replaced  it  with  a  mode  of  research  'inclined  towards 
pluralism',  a  'methodological  pluralism'  that  recognizes  the  fundamental 
diversity  of  reality.  This  'methodological  pluralism'  and  a  pluralist  not- 
ion  of  reality  constitute  the  central  core  of  Mannheim's  subsequent  analysis 
of  cultural  objectifications,  including  -  much  later  -  his  analysis  of  ideal- 
ogy. 
f 
However,  as  noted  above,  Mannheim  is  not  concerned-in  this  lecture  with 
the  analysis  of  ideology.  Indeed,  one  of  the  potential  sources  of  such  a 
theory  -  Marx's  writings  -  is  seen  to  have  been  partly  superceded.  Amongst 
the  'superceded  influences'  to  which  the  group's  world  view  nonetheless  still 11 
owes  something  are  'naturalism  and  impressionism  in  art  and  Marxism  in 
sociology,  . 
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In  more  general  terms,  Mannheim  also  lists  the  work  of 
several  others  'whose  path  is  also  our  path':  Dostojevski's  world-view, 
Kierkegaard's  aesthetics,  Lask,  Zalai,  the  works  of  Ernst  and  Riegl,  modern 
French  lyrical  poetry,  especially  that  of  the  Nouvelle  Revue  Francaise,  Bar- 
tok,  Ady  and  the  Thalia  theatre  movement.  As  we  have  already  seen,  and  as 
is  confirmed  in  Lukäcs'  diaries,  many  of  these  -  especially  Dostojevski, 
Kierkegaard,  Lask,  Ernst  and  Ady  -  are  also  central  figures  in  Lukäcs'  own 
early  development  and  were  the  subject  of  discussions  in  the  'Szellemkek' 
group. 
In  the  course  of  his  summary  of  the  themes  and  contents  of  the  group's 
lectures,  Mannheim  is  more  explicit  about  his,  and  the  group's,  social  and 
philosophical  concerns.  Whereas  Mannheim  announces  that  in  his  'previous 
yearb  lectures'  he  attempted  a  structural  analysis  of  logic  which  he  wi 
develop  more  concretely  in  his  ensuing  lectures  (in  fact  the  basis  of  his 
doctoral  dissertation  awarded  in  1918  by  the  University  of  Budapest),  it  is 
left  to  others  to  develop  a  sociological  perspective  on  culture.  But  Mannheim's 
own  viewpoint  is  instructive  here.  He  asks  'whether  cultural  objectivations, 
such  as,  for  example,  the  forms  of  art,  have  some  kind  of  relationship  to 
the  social  situations,  social  classes  for  instance,  in  which  they  emerge'. 
At  this  point,  Mannheim  explicitly  refers  to  Marx's  work  and  also  to  that  of 
Lukäcs.  He  states  that, 
4 
'Marx  was  the  first  to  see  clearly  the  relationship 
between  the,  objectification  of  culture  and  the 
social  structure  and  his  starting  point  will  not 
be  superceded  here  at  all.  Certainly,  our  inter- 
pretation  of  this  relationship  is  not  that  of  Marx. 
We  reject  the  theory  of  superstructure  but  the 
problem  it  throws  up  is  -  over  and  above  Marx's 12 
solution  -  also  acute  for  us  ...  That  such 
a  starting  point  can  be  fruitful,  with  its  quest- 
ion  of  the  penetration-of  societal  forms  in  art,  41 
is  shown  by  LukäcsI  Geschichte  des  Dramas.  I 
It  can  indeed  be  argued  that  Mannheim's  early  position  vis-a-viz  a  sociology 
of  culture  did  in  fact  reject  Marx's  theory  of  superstructure  and,  as  we  shall 
see,  had  recourse  instead  to  both  a  philosophy  of  life  and  world-views  de- 
rived  from  Dilthey  and  to  phenomenology  which  Mannheim  argues  is  'the 
most  interesting  branch  of  modern  logic'.  What  is  also  apparent  from  this 
lecture  is  the  extent  to  which  Mannheim's  early  work  relies  -  and,  as  we 
shall  see,  continues  to  rely  -  upon  Lukäcs'  early  writings  on  culture  and 
aesthetics.  These  works,  such  as  the  analysis  of  modern  drama  and  the 
Heidelberg  manuscripts,  remained  important  for  Mannheim's  own  theory  of 
culture.  In  1917  its  normative  basis  was  an  optimistic  theory  of  cultural 
renewal,  a  call  to  break  down  the  alienation  of  subjective  and  objective 
culture. 
z  rý 
Mannheim's  own  contribution  to  this  series  of  lectures  was  clearly  the  draft 
for  his  Structural  Analysis  of  Epistemology,  his  doctoral  dissertation  award- 
ed  in  November  1918  by  the  University  of  Budapest.  A  version  of  this  diss- 
ertation  appeared  in  Hungarian  in  191842  and  an  extended  version  appeared  in 
German  in  1922,  by  which  time  Mannheim  had  moved  to  Heidelberg  as  a 
43 
private  scholar  supported  financially  by  his  parents.  The  later  version  of 
Structural  Analysis  of  Epistemology  makes  considerable  use  of  the  work  of 
'  Emil  Lask  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  Rickert.  Once  more,  Lukäcs'  earlier 
work  is  also  much  in  evidence,  especially  Lukäcs'  Heidelberger  Psthetik. 
44 
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In  this  work,  Mannheim  attempts 
.a 
logic  of  philosophy  in  the  sense  of  a 13 
systematization  of  philosophical  problems  and  levels  of  analysis.  It  is 
an  attempt  to  understand  and  synthesize  the  structural  diversity  of  intellectual 
endeavours  since  'every  mental)  intellectual  or  cultural  field  has  a  structure  of 
its  own'. 
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Mannheim  argues  that  in  the  past  such  an  analysis  would  have 
proceeded  in  a  Cartesian  or  Hobbesian  manner  and  explained  complex  struct- 
ures  in  terms  of  simpler  ones.  The  present  trend,  exemplified  by  an  increas- 
ing  interest  in  the  theory  of  judgement,  aims  at  explaining  simpler  structures 
in  terms  of  more  complex  ones.  In  the  course  of  his  examination  of  the  struct- 
ure  of  particular  disciplines  in  relation  to  philosophy,  Mannheim  produces  an 
argument  that  is  reminiscent  of  subsequent  formulations  by  Popper  and  esp- 
ecially  Kuhn.  Mannheim  argues  that 
'the  special  sciences,  as  long  as  they  deal  with 
their  own  topics  and  do  not  transcend  their  proper 
fields,  are  always  concerned  only  with  answerable 
"questions"  (no  matter  how  complicated  the  answers 
might  be),  rather  than  with  "problems"  properly  so 
called.  If  a  real  "problem"  does  come  up  in  a  special 
science,  '  it  always  has  to  do  with  marginal  methodolo- 
gical  aspects  of  that  science  -  with  a  difficulty  of 
procedure  which  makes  the  investigator  stop  and  re- 
flect.  And  that  already  amounts  to  philosophy:  the 
philosophy  of  the  science  concerned.  '  46 
Unfortunately  here,  as  elsewhere,  Mannheim  does  not  take  up  the  problem  of 
the  development  of  science.  Indeed  in  this  work,  Mannheim  specifically 
turns  away  from  any  formulation  that  would  lead  him  towards  his  later  relat- 
ivistic  problematic.  He  certainly  states  that  he  favours  the  kind  of  search 
for  typologies  of  structures  advanced,  for  example,  by  Dilthey  but  he  refuses 
to  take  up  the  relationship  between  a  particular  structure  and  the  empirical 
world  on  the  following  grounds: 
'The  historical  interpretation  of  a  meaningful  whole 
is  a  possible  and  necessary  task,  but  all  too  often 
the  mistake  is  made  of  trying  to  explain  the  mean- 
ing  itself  with  reference  to  the  temporal  features  of 14 
the  work  in  question  -  with  reference  to  empirical,  . 
real  factors.  If  we  seek  to  validate  or  invalidate 
meanings  by  means  of  such  factors,  we  shall  in- 
escapably  fall  into  relativism.  The  temporal  as 
such  contains  only  the  conditions  for  the  realisation 
of  the  meanings,  but  not  the  meanings  themselves, 
they  can  only  be  represented  by  means  of  a  structural 
analysis.  '  47 
Such  a  view  contrasts  markedly  with  Mannheim's  essay  on  'Historicism' 
and  with  some  of  his  subsequent  writings.  Here,  however,  Mannheim 
sharply  demarcates  his  own  position  from  that  of  historicism  since 
'hidtorical  factors  determine  only  the  material- 
i  zation  of  the  mental  content  in  question.  The 
mere  fact  that  history  beings  to  light  various  types 
of  systems  of  thought  (and  amongst  them  theories 
of  knowledge)  by  no  means  entails  a.  historicist, 
relativist  philosophy  of  truth.  '  48 
Nonetheless,  Mannheim  does  concede  that  at  the  present  time  many  are 
concerned  with  finding  'the  solution  to  the  problem  of  historicity  and  time- 
less  validity'.  One  of  these  many  was  indeed  Lukäcs  who,  in  his  He  i  de  I- 
berger  Philosophie,  specifically  devoted  a  whole  chapter  of  that  work  to 
precisely  this  problem  -  though  within  the  realm  of  aesthetics. 
49 
Mann- 
heim,  for  his  part,  holds  to  a  strict  separation  of  genesis  and  validity,  But 
In  the  course  of  his  defence  of  this  position,  he  advances  a  criticism.  of 
historicism  which  is  crucial  to  the  weakness  of  his  own  later  analysis  of 
ideologies.  He  argues  that  historicism  'flounders  helplessly  as  soon  as  it 
treats  all  historical  solutions  as  equivalent,  and  allows  the  notion  of  validity 
to  lapse'. 
50 
apse'  . 
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In  Ideologie  und  Utopie,  on  the  other  hand,  Mannheim  provides 
precisely  such  an  account  of  competing  ideologies  all  of  which  are  equally 
t  val  i  d'  . 
In  the  latter  parts  of  this  work,  Mannheim  sets  out.  to  develop  a  systematis- 
ation  of  epistemologies  and  ontologies.  With  respect  to  epistemologies,  he 15 
argues  that  'the  specific  subject-object  correlation  is  constitutive,  and  any 
epistemological  theory  is  concerned  with  the  determination  and  resolution  of 
this  correlation'.  Though  his  analysis  of  the  subject-object  relationship 
draws  upon  Lukagcs'  analyses,  Mannheim  does  not  advance  a  dialectical 
analysis  of  this  relation.  Nonetheless,  the  work  as  a  whole  testifies  to 
Mannheim's  early  concern  for  synthesizing  pluralities  of  structures  and  to 
his  belief  that  'the  presuppositions  of  knowledge  are  always  capable  of  be- 
coming  objects  of  knowledge  in  their  turn'. 
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This  meta-theoretical  quest 
is  central  to  Mannheim's  later  sociology  of  knowledge. 
On  balance,  however,  it  can  be  argued  that  Mannheim's  thesis  on  epistemology 
does  not  lead  us  into  the  central  core  of  his  sociology  of  knowledge.  In  some 
respects,  it  leads  firmly  away  from  many  of  the  problems  which  he  subsequent- 
ly  took  to  be  central  to  his  sociology  of  knowledge.  Against  this  interpret- 
ation,  it  could  be  argued  that  the  work  is  concerned  with  the  plurality  of  epis- 
temologies,  a  typology  of  epistemologies  and  an  examination  of  the  meta- 
theoretical  presuppositions  of  knowledge  -  all,  in  their  way,  potential  themes 
for  a  sociology  of  knowledge  as  conceived  by  Mannheim.  But  the  direction 
of  his  own  research  in  this  period  does  not  confirm  this  interpretation.  Rather, 
Mannheim  is  concerned  with  the  establishment  of  a  theory  of  culture,  a  theory 
of  world-views  and  a  sociology  of  culture  that  in  fact  establishes  some  of  the 
major  problematics  for  his  sociology  of  knowledge. 
S 
The  continued  concern  with  a  theory  of  culture  can  be  seen,  briefly  in  Mann- 
heim's  review  of  Lukäcs'  Die  Theorie  des  Romans  published  in  1920  -  in  fact, 
Mannheim's  first  work  to  appear  in  Germany.  In  this  review,  it  is  apparent 
that  Mannheim  is  not  yet  primarily  concerned  with  a  sociology  of  cultural 16 
forms.  That  is,  he  does  not  extract  the  sociological  significance  of  this 
work  for  a  sociology  of  the  novel  as,  for  instance,  Goldmann  has  done. 
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Rather,  he  is  concerned  to  outline  the  plurality  of  perspectives  through  which 
we  come  to  understand  a  work  and  the  attendant  problem  of  interpretation. 
Only  one  of  these  perspectives  is  the  sociological  one  and  it  is  not  at  the 
centre  of  Mannheim's  review  . 
Instead,  Mannheim  takes  up  the  diversity  of  contexts  within  which  cultural 
forms  can  be  understood  -  psychologically,  sociologically,  technically, 
stylistically,  etc.  All  perspectives  emerge  out  of  the  same  object  but  take 
up  different  sides  of  it.  As  such  they  are  to  be  sharply  distinguished  from 
one  another  since 
'all  these  diverse  modes  of  explanation  correspond 
to  diverse  logical  objects.  Just  as  the  individual 
natural  sciences  first  create-their  logical  object 
by  means  of  method,  so  also  the  object  of  the 
respective  human  science  emerges  first  in  and 
through  its  method,  through  its  viewpoint,  through 
its  approach  and  how9aver  this  subjective-functional 
correlate  of  the  changing  object.  may  be  termed. 
The  work  of  art  "as  an  experiental  complex",  "as 
a  sociological  product",  "as  a  form  of  art",  etc. 
are  inadequate  characterisations  of  these  possible 
fundamentally  divergent  logical  objects.  '  53 
This  logically  grounded  perspectivism  and  Mannheim's  insistence  on  the 
separation  of  these  approaches  not  merely  foreshadows  his  later  preoccupation 
with  relating  diverse  modes  of  interpretation  but  is  also  at  the  root  of  his 
problem  of  reconciling  diverse  ideologies,  once  this  perspectivism  has  been 
translated  onto  a  societal  level.  Mannheim  goes  on  to  treat  the  distinctions 
between  academic  disciplines  as  absolute  and  is  then  inclined  to  argue  that 
withinxthese  'diverse  logical  objects  of  the  diverse  disciplines  there  exists  a 
hierarchy'  of  perspectives.  In  this  way,  Mannheim  is  led  to  arguing  that 17 
aesthetic  objects  should  be  explained  from  above  and  not  from  below  -  namely, 
on  the  basis  of  a  metaphysics  and  philosophy  of  history  rather  than  psycholo- 
gically  or  sociologically.  This  provides  the  possibility  for  a  'deeper  kind 
of  explanation'  .  It  is  within  this  context  that  Mannheim  praises  Lukäcs' 
Theorie  des  Romans  for  its  interpretation  of  the  novel  in  terms  of  'a  higher 
standpoint',  that  of  the  philosophy  of  history.  The  review  as  a  whole  is  not 
merely  a  justification  for  this  hierarchical  perspectivism  but  is  also  a  rework- 
ing  of  the  problem  of  the  relation  between  accounts  of  cultural  forms  in 
sociological  terms  and  in  terms  of  a  philosophy  of  history  which  we  have 
already  encountered  as  a  central  problem  of  Lukäcs'  early  work.  It  comes  to 
the  fore  in  most  of  Lukäcs'  early  works  but  particularly  in  his  'Zur  Theorie 
der  Literaturgeschichte'  which  appeared  in  Hungarian  in  1910,  and  in  which 
Lukäcs  conceives  of  'the  synthesis  of  literary  history  in  a  new  organic  unity' 
as  'a  unification  of  sociology  and  aesthetics'. 
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But  in  Mannheim's  review 
of  Lukäcs'  Die  Theorie  des  Romans  and  later;  the  central  feature  of  'a 
possible  new  culture'  was,  as  Apitzsch  has  rightly  argued,  'not  the  con- 
tradictory  objectivity  itself  but  that  phenomenon  derived  from  it  as  a  "gen- 
eration  with  affinities  to  its  sense  of  life"  which  saw  itself  in  a  position  "to 
represent  objective  culture  in  a  unified  cross-section"'. 
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One  might  add 
that  at  no  point  does  Mannheim  even,  conceive  of  a  'contradictory  object- 
ivity'  or,  later,  of  contradictions  within  ideologies. 
In  the  same  year  as  Mannheim's  review  appeared,  he  moved  to  Heidelberg 
where  he  studied  with,  amongst  others,  Alfred  Weber  whose  interest  at  that 
time  centred  around  the  development  of  a  sociology  of  culture.  Weber  in 
fact  published  his  influential  article  'Prinzipielles  zur  Kultursoziologie'  in 
1920.56  It  is  instructive  to  note  here  how  much  Mannheim's  early  formu- 18 
i 
lations  of  a  sociology  of  culture  were  indebted  to  Alfred  Weber  who,  as  he 
explains  in  the  preliminary  remarks  to  his  1920  article,  had  been  concerned 
with  the  sociology  of  culture  since  1909-10.57  Later,  in  1915,  Alfred  Weber 
published  a  reply  to  a  review  by  Georg  Lukäcs  on'the  nature  and  method  of  the 
sociology  of  culture  in  which  he  briefly  advances  some  basic  themes  of  a 
sociology  of  culture  which  were  taken  over  by  Mannheim. 
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Weber  argued 
that  the  sociology  of  culture  must  commence  with  the  concept  of  culture  itself 
and  ensure  that  the  uniqueness  of  cultural  phenomena  is  not  destroyed  by  a 
subsequent  sociological  analysis.  With  reference  to  the  relationship  between 
cultural  phenomena  and  'social  aspects  of  life',  Weber  maintained  that  the 
analysis  must  remain  at  the  level  of  'a  mutual  functional  dependency'  such 
that  the  sociology  of  culture  will  'remain  not  a  causal  discipline  but  an 
evidential  discipline  IEvidenzwissenschaft) 
.'  He  cited  as  his  example  here 
Lukäcs'  sociology  of  drama.  Weber  also  refers  to  the  'plurality  of  world- 
views'  in  a  manner  which  Mannheim  himself  takes  up  in  his  1922  essay. 
Finally,  Weber  argued  that  a  sociology  of  culture  should  be  concerned  with 
the  core  of  cultural  phenomena,  with.  the  central  'life-feeling'  'Of  a  period, 
without  forgetting  that  its  qualitative  content  is  not  fully  open  to  sociological 
analysis.  I'- 
In  the  course  of  the  next  six  years,  until  his  appointment  as  a  Privatdozent 
at  the  University  of  Heidelberg  In  1926,  Mannheim  set  out  to'develop  his 
own  sociology  of  culture  and,  in  the  later  part  of  this  period,  his  sociology 
of  knowledge.  His  longest  work  on  the  sociology  of  culture  - 
Über  die 
Eigenart  kultursoziologischer  Erkenntnis  ('On  the  Nature  of  Knowledge  in 
the  Sociology  of  Culture'),  a  manuscript  of  183  pages  -  remained  unpublished. 
The  work  was  commenced  in  September  1922  and  was  probably  completed 19 
early,  1923,  before  the  publication  of  his  essay  'Beitrdge  zur  Theorie  der 
Weltanschauungsinterpretation. 
. 
It  is  an  important  study  for  several  '4 
reasons.  Firstly,  it  allowed  Mannheim  to  outline  more  freely  than  in  his 
published  works  his  attempt  to  develop  a  sociology  of  culture.  Secondly,  it 
is  the  source  of  outlines  of  several  of  his  works  in  this  period.  It  contains, 
for  example,  an  outline  of  many  of  the  themes  of  his  later  'Ideologische  und 
soziologische  Interpretation  der  geistigen  Gebilde',  not  published  until  1926) 
as  well  as  some  of  the  issues  raised  in  the  essay  on  world-views  mentioned 
above.  Thirdly,  perhaps  more  clearly  than  in  some  of  his  published  work  in 
this  period,  it  provides  us  with  a  quite  detailed  perspective  upon  Mannheim's 
I 
sociological  orientation,  especially  his  relationship  to  phenomenology. 
Unlike  his  earlier  works  in  which  the  sociological  dimension  of  culture  was 
not  seen  as  the  focal  point  of  any  interpretation  and  analysis,  this  essay  on 
knowledge  in  the  sociology  of  culture  is  concerned  with  'what  it  means  to 
submit  culture  to  a  sociological  investigation'.  From  the  very  outset, 
Mannheim  seeks  to  provide  a  phenomenological  description  of  cultural  phen- 
omena.  If  we  take  an  actual  world"visw  than  it  is  not,  viewed  sociologically, 
a  theoretical  structure  which  stands  at  its  centre, 
'rather,  at  the  centre,  there  stands  that  substratum 
of  the  life-structure  which  is  evaluated  in  "lived 
life"  as  precisely  the  ultimate  substratum.  That 
i  s,  man  does  not  merely  think  on  the  basis  of  his 
Intellectual  composition,  rather  he  also  experiences 
hierarchically,  i.  e.  there  is  constantly  at  hand  a 
largely  unreflected  "system"  of  inner-worldly  and 
environmental  objects  to  which  one  is  orientated  in 
action,  Iife  and  experience.  '  59 
Within  this  order  of  things,  some  aspect  of  sphere  is  evaluated  as  the-most 
important  and  the  other  spheres  of  life  are  organised  around  it.  There  is 
thus  a  'hierarchical  structure  of  experience'  which  is  historically  changeable. 20 
For  instance,  Mannheim  argues  that  in  the  middle  ages  this  'ultimate  value 
emphasis'  was  a  transcendental  one  which,  as  a  world-view,  constituted  a 
relatively  stable  closed  structure.  In  the  present  period,  however,  we  are 
faced  with  'a  struggle  of  cultural  spheres'in  which  that  stable,  central  world 
view  had  been  rendered  problematic  and  increasingly  disappeared.  We  are 
thus  confronted  with  a  competition  between  scientific,  aesthetic  and  ethical 
culture  in  which  no  one  of  them  alone  is  capable  of  regrouping  the  elements 
of  our  world-view.  The  individual  is  unable  to  relate  the  various  elements 
of  his  world-view  to  a  stable  centre.  Instead,  he  experiences  the  movement 
and  dynamic  of  the  historical  process.  As  Mannheim  later  argues  in  his 
'Historismus'  essay,  this  world  view  becomes  all  pervasive,  'the  real 
bearer  of  our  world-view'. 
This  historical  change  in  our  world-view  has  important  consequences  for  the 
modern  conception  of  culture.  Mannheim  highlights  six  factors  which 
characterize  this  new  conception: 
'1  The  relativisation  of  individual  cultural  spheres  viz- 
ä-vis  one  another,  such  that  the  value-emphasis 
upon  the  whole  is  absent. 
2  Consciousness  of  the  relativity  and  transitoriness 
of  every  historical  manifestation  of  cultural  phenomena. 
3  Consciousness  of  the  basically  processual  character 
of  culture. 
/ 
4  The  formative  nature  of  experience  of  cultural  phenomena 
as  such,  the  educational  ideal  f  Bi  ldungsideall. 
a  5  The  opposition  between  the  concept  of  culture  and  the 
concept  of  nature. 
6  Consciousness  of  the  social  character  of  cultural  phenomena.  160 
Each  factor,  in  its  own  manner,  is  a  persistent  theme  of  Mannheim's  work  in 
Germany.  In  his  various  analyses,  some  combination  of  these  factors  is 21 
emphasized,  whilst  at  other  times  another  combination  comes  to  the  fore. 
But  what  stands  out  from  this  characterization  of  the  changes  in  our  world- 
view  is  the  manner  in  which  it  represents  the  central  themes  of  Mannheim's 
sociology  of  culture  and  his  sociology  of  knowledge:  the  relativisation  of 
cultural  areas  (social  group  experiences;  later,  political  ideologies);  aware- 
ness  of  the  transition  of  historical  phenomena  (the  constant  search  for  a 
'dynamic'  standpoint);  the  attempt  to  grasp  social  diversity  as  a  totality 
(often  as  a  synthesis);  the  quasi-independent  role  of  culture  and  a  concern 
tit. 
with,  didactic  potential  of  the  study  (sociology  of  culture  or  sociology  of 
knowledge)  which  not  only  investigates  that  cultural  sphere  but  is,  at  the 
sameltime,  a  part  of  it;  an  assertion  of  the  differences  between  natural  and 
cultural  scientific  knowledge  (even,  later,  the  exclusion  of  natural  sicentific 
knowledge  from  social  determination);  and,  finally,  a  consistent  attempt  to 
establish  connections  (relational,  determinant,  functional,  causal  etc.  ) 
between  various  cultural  phenomena  and  the  social  milieux. 
With  respect  to  the  latter  two  factors,  Mannheim  reveals  the  basis  for  his 
distinction  between  culture  and  nature  and  a  concept  of  nature  that  is  not 
dissimilar  to  Scheler's  notion  of  'real  factors'.  Nature,  for  Mannheim, 
is  'something  that  is  completely  free  of  meaning  and  of  value,  something 
that  is  merely  the  substratum  of  possible  meaning'.  It  is  something  which 
Is  'impenetrable  by  the  intellect'  and  'value-indifferent'.  However,  the 
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more  man  becomes  conscious  of  his  historical  determination,  the  less  stable 
t 
becomes  his  conception  of  what  is  natural  and  stable  such  that 
'  in  its  expansion,  the  concept  of  culture  absorbs 
increasingly  more  and  more  and  as  a  residue 
there  remains  merely  ...  our  impulsive  life 
and  our  sensuousness,  which  is  now  termed 22 
nature,  not  as  a  result  of  its  valuation  but  rather 
as  a  result  of  its  estrangement  from  meaning 
and  its  ahistorical  nature.  '  62 
However,  unlike  Scheler,  Mannheim  does  not  take  up  this  residual  natural 
element  as  a  decisive  determining  factor  upon  culture.  Rather,  it  often 
remains  implicit  in  his  early  analysis  of  culture.  In  contrast,  the  cultural 
form  'is  experienced  as  valuable  and  not  merely  as  something  existent 
[da-seiendl.  Through  the  phenomenological  subject's  intentionality,  the 
cultural  form  is  experienced  as  valuable  and  'culture'  becomes  a  value'  . 
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Thus,  Mannheim's  notion  of  culture  is  here  grounded  in  the  phenomenological 
notion  of  intentionality  and  experience(Erlebnis)  -  though  the  latter  concept 
is  just  as  easily  derivable  from  Dilthey  as  it  is  from,  say,  Husserl.  Indeed, 
Mannheim's  phenomenology  can  be  seen  to  be  based  more  on  that  of  Held- 
egger  than  Husserl. 
Mannheim  argues  that  this  recognition  of  the  historical  nature  of  culture  and 
its  social  determination  is  itself  co-terminous  with  our  awareness  of  social 
processes  themselves.  He  suggests  that  Marx  and  his  followers  were  the 
first  'to  I  ocate  society  1n  the  economic  -sphere'  ,  to  see  the  forms  of  soc  i  at  i  on 
as  having  their  genesis  in  the  economic  sphere.  More  recently,  he  argues, 
attempts  have  been  made  by  Simmel,  Kistiakowski  and  Max  Weber  to  con- 
ceive  of  the  social  as  a  'possible  independent  conceptual  apparatus'.  Hence, 
with  the  emergence  of  sociology  as  the  study  of  society,  it  is  possible  to 
conceive  of  a  'socio-genetic'  theory  of  culture  and  thus  to  interpret  cultural 
f 
changes  'from  below  to  above'  rather  than  from  above  to  below  (Mannheim 
had  earlier  praised  Lukäcs  I  Theorie  des  Romans  for  successfully  performing 
the  latter). 23 
However,  Mannheim  points  to  a  number  of  methodological  difficulties  which 
must  be  faced  in  the  establishment  of  a  sociology  of  culture.  He  rejects  a- 
'purely  logical-methodological  I  analysis  of  the  basis  of  a  study  of  culture 
since  it  completely  overlooks  two  factors: 
'Firstly,  the  fact  (and  the  methodological  consequences 
of  this  fact)  that  the  cultural  sciences  are  themselves 
a  part  of  this  process  which  they  describe,  that  there- 
fore,  in  this  case,  the  subject  and  object  of  this  science 
ina  certain  sense  coincide.  Secondly,  the  fact  (and 
the  methodological  consequences  of  this  fact)  that 
the  subject  of  cultural  scientific  knowledge  is  not 
merely  the  epistemological  subject,  but  the  "whole 
human  being".  '  64 
Mannheim  sees  the  first  factor  as  deriving  from  Hegel,  the  second  from 
Di1  they.  If  we  accept  the  implications  of  these  two  factors  then  we  should 
not  falsify  cultural:  phenomena  by  interpreting  them  in  a  reified  manner,  by 
applying  a  methodology  analogous  to  that  of  the  natural  sciences.  We  might 
add  here  that  not  only  do  such  methodological  reflections  clearly  relate  back 
to  Hegel  and  Di  lthey,  as  well  as  to  the  early  Lukäcs,  but  that  they  point  for- 
ward  to  concerns  that  are  present  in  the  attempt  to  construct  a  dialectical- 
hermeneutical  social  science  by  Habermas  and  Apel. 
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Howev9r,  Mann- 
heim  does  not  develop  these  reflections  in  this  direction  at  this  point. 
Rather,  Mannheim  draws  different  consequences.  He  suggests  that  cultural 
phenomena  are  not  to  be  conceived  of  as  something  rigid  and  nor  is  knowledge 
of  them  to  be  viewed  as  being  static.  In  contrast,  new  cultural  "realities  are 
always  emerging  and  with  them  our  conceptions  of  them  change.  Mannheim's 
plea  is  therefore  for  a  dynamic  sociology  of  culture.  Any  attempt  to  investi- 
gate  the  constitution  of  cultural-scientific  knowledge  must  ask  'in  what  atti- 
tude  [!  instellunci]  the  total  subject  approaches  the  intellectual  reality  which 
It  wishes  to  investigate  scientifically,. 
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For  Mannheim  this  requires  that 24 
we  attend  to  the  second  factor  outlines  above,  namely,  that  the  subject  of 
this  knowledge  is  not  the  epistemological  subject  but  the  whole  human  being. 
It  follows  from  this  that  cultural  phenomena  are  'not  reified',  that  they  emerge 
within  the  cultural  process.  Furthermore,  it  follows  that  they  constitute 
themselves  '  in  the  process  of  being  experienced  CErlebtwerden  and  that 
thereby  in  their  inner  structure  they  are  projected  into  the  attitude  of  the  ex- 
periencing  human  subject.  '67  This  is  true  not  only  for  the  creative  human 
subject  but  also  for  the  person  who  seeks  to  understand  cultural  phenomena. 
In  the  latter  form,  as  'receptive  human  subjects!  we  can  seethe  diversity 
of  the  process  of  reception  and  interpretation.  A  phenomenological  typology 
of  receptive  human  subjects  has,  Mannheim  suggest,  already  been  outlined  in 
Lukäcs'  Heidelberger-  Ästhetik  with  regard  to  naive  reception,  the  essayist, 
the  aesthetician  and  the  historian. 
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Such  a  typology  necessarily  involves 
a  typification  of  concrete  human  subjects  since 
'These  types  are  to  be  taken  in  an  empirical- 
psychological  sense,  because  they  never  des- 
cribe  a  real  existing  human  subject  in  his  em- 
pirical-psychological  disposition  but  rather 
they  describe  the  constitutive,  typical  possibili- 
ties  of  conscious  access  to  intellectual  realities 
according  to  their  structural  nature.  '  69 
Mannheim  does  not  remain  content,  however,  with  'a  mere  analysis  of  the 
phenomenological  subject  of  cultural-sociological  interpretation'  but,  in  a 
Weberian  sense,  also  calls  for  an  explanation  of  cultural  phenomena  'since 
the  sociology  of  culture  is  not  merely  a  pure  understanding  of  intellectual 
forms  but  is,  at  the  same  time,  a  knowledge  of  these  forms  on  the  basis  of 
this  interpretative  approach,  . 
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At  this  level,  Mannheim  appears  to  favour 
a  neo-Kantian  analysis  of  the  methodological  problems  of  concept-formation 
and  specifically  alludes  to  Rickert's  work.  This  leads  Mannheim  to  the 
second  stage  of  his  analysis,  namely  to  the  study  of  'the  immanent  and 25 
sociological  observation  of  cultural  phenomena'  -a  study  which  prefigures 
in  many  ways  his  later  article  'Ideologische  und  soziologische  Interpretat- 
ion  der  geistigen  Gebilde'  (1926). 
Mannheim  conceives  of  sociology  as  either  the  study  of  the  development, 
organisation  and  change  in  social  life  -  sociology  as  the  study  of  society 
[Gesellschaftslehre 
-  or  as  the  study  of  the  embeddedness  of  cultural  forms 
in  social  life:  the  sociology  of  culture.  '  Society  is  a  culture-forming  factor 
. 
whose  'forms  and  forms  of  sociation  one  can  view,  in  acertain  sense,  even 
as  cultural  forms'.  Another  task  of  sociology  -  and  especially  the  sociology 
of  culture  -  is  the  investigation  of  the  role  which  I  "social-historical  reality" 
71  (Dilthey)  plays  In  the  constitution  of  cultural  forms'  .  But  both  aspects 
of  a  sociological  study  of  culture  are  closely  connected  with  one  another 
since  'cultural  forms  rise  up  out  of  social  life  and  return  back  to  it;  they  are 
one  of  the  functions  of  society;  at  the  same  time,  however,  it  is  one  of  their 
functions  to  operate  as  sociation.  1 
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Yet  for  Mannheim  these  two  types  of 
sociology  are  not  of  equivalent  status  and  are  to  be  distinguished  in  that: 
'Sociology  as  the  study  of  society  is  a  fundamental 
science.  Grundwissenschaft  ;  as  the  sociology  of 
culture  it  is  a  method,  a  vantage  point  for  the 
observation  of  a  phenomenon  which  to  a  certain 
extent  lies  outside  its  own  genuine  sphere.  1  73 
The  implication  of  this  argument  is  that  the  concept  of  culture  is  constituted 
outside  the  realm  of  sociology.  For  Mannheim  it  is  constituted  by  philoso- 
phy  and  not  by  a  scientific  methodology. 
i 
The  objects  of  the  sociology  of  culture  can  therefore  only  be  grDunded  outside 
'a  merely  methodological  approach';  they  can  only  be  grounded  phenomen- 
ologically.  Mannheim  argues  that  'we  must  have  a  pro-scientific  (ex- 26 
periential)  access  to  these  basic  phenomena'  which  are  capable  of  being 
checked  by  theoretical  study.  Thus,  the  conceptual  constitution  of  a  science 
is  not  merely  'a  reflection  of  "reality"  but  is  instead  co-determined.  We 
possess  'a  completely  atheoretical  access'  to  cultural  phenomena  insofar  as 
we  are  part  of  the  cultural  process  which  we  experience.  However,  our 
knowledge  of  these  phenomena  is  dependent  upon  our  conceptual  system, 
upon  concepts  which  are  conditioned  not  merely  by  the  pre-theoretical  phen- 
omena  but  also  by  'the  state  of  the  whole  conceptual  systematic'  and  proble- 
matic  which  we  have  developed.  Hence,  for  Mannheim,  not  only  is  a  pure 
phenomenological  description  inadequate  on  its  own  -  however  essential  it 
may 
be 
as  a  starting  point'  -  but  the  progress  of  the  human  sciences  themselves 
depends  not  merely  upon  a  'growing  or  penetrating  pre-theoretical  sensibility' 
towards  the  phenomenon  under  investigation  but  also  upon  'the  state  of  con- 
ceptual  systematization'  . 
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Viewed  from  this  second  aspect,  the  sociology  of  culture  is  a  study  which 
views  its  object  from  the  level  of  sociological  concepts.  -  This  means,  Mann- 
heim  argues,  that  the  normative  aspect  of  cultural  phenomena  is  'bracketed' 
and  treated  as  a  factual  entity.  Whereas  the  'immanent  study'  of  a  phen- 
omenon  occurs  on  the  experiential  level,  a  fuller  investigation  requires 
distance  or  detachment  so  that  the  phenomenon  can,  for  example,  be  viewed 
within  the  context  of  'the  totality  of  life  and  experience'.  Within  the  frame- 
work  of  this  distinction  between  immanent  and  non-immanent  study  of  an 
object,  Mannheim  suggests  that  a  philosophical  study  of  an  object  expresses 
its  'theoretical-immanent'  investigation  whereas  a  sociological  study  is 
'non-immanent'. 27 
This  sociological  'non-immanent'  investigation  of  cultural  phenomena  re- 
presents  an  'approach  to  the  social  functionality  of  cultural  forms',  but  one 
which  is  pre-theoretical.  Hence 
'the  subject  of  social  knowledge  is  not  only  the 
theoretical  (e.  g.  aesthetic,  etc.  )  subject  but, 
as  Dilthey  termed  it,  the  ! "whole  human  being" 
or,  as  we  shall  later  statýýt  more  specifically, 
the  social  human  being'. 
This  functionality,  Mannheim  emphasizes,  is  far  from  being  identical  with 
a  notion  of  organic  functionality.  Rather,  it  is  the  task  of  an  interpretative 
sociology  to  grasp  the  functionality  of  cultural  objectivations,  not  in  relation 
to  individual  inner  experiences  but  in  relation  to  the  social  process.  In  turn, 
this  means  relating  the  cultural  form  to  the  communal  experiential  context 
from  which  it  arose.  The  experiences  of  the  individual  cannot  be  conceived 
I 
of  as  merely  part  of  a  stream  of  individual  life.  Rather,, 
'A  large  part  of  his  total  experiences  are  shared 
with  other  individuals.  These  experiences  which 
are,  as  it  were,  at  hand  and  which  are  the  ex- 
of  individuals  within  the  same  society  periences 
and  community  must,  however,  be  structurally 
related  to  one  another  in  the  same  way  as  in  the 
case  of  the  strands  of  experience  within  an  in- 
dividual  stream  of  experience.  '  76 
Indeed,  we  are  only  fully  socialized  to  the  extent  that  we  have  'common 
stretches  of  experience'  that  we  share  with  others.  What  this  implies  for 
the  functionality  of  cultural  forms  is  that  'such  a  functionality  can  only  exist 
77 
in  relation  to  experiential  contexts'  which  are  not  merely  individual,  but  also 
social.  An  interpretative  sociology  is  therefore  concerned  with  exploring 
"  'the  functionality  of  an  intellectual  form  in  relation  to  a  communal  stream  of 
78 
ex  erp  ience'  and  not  merely,  as  in  Max  Weber's  version,  with  the  under- 
standing  of  individual  social  actions. 28 
What  Mannheim  hopes  interpretative  sociology  will  aim  towards  is  a  'social 
structure  of  consciousness',  since  'by  far  and  away  the  major  part  of  the 
experiential  constellation  of  the  individual  (even  when  apparently  isolated) 
moves  within  a  direction  that  is  perfectly  typical  for  a  group  or  for  an  epoch.  '79 
Within  such  limits,  'only  relatively  new  experiences'  can  be  incorporated 
into  the  constellation  of  the  individual's  experience,  and  within  a  given  comm- 
on  life-structure  only  a  limited  amount  of  deviation  can  be  tolerated.  However, 
all  this  does  not  mean  that  the  individual  must  be  conscious  of  the  functional 
relationship  between  his  actions  and  his  cultural,  objectifications,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  'social  stream  of  consciousness',  on  the  other.  On  the  con- 
trary,  a  state  of  naive  unreflection  is  the  most  common  attitude.  Recog- 
nition  of  this  functional  relationship,  is,  indeed,  only  likely  to  occur  'when 
groups  (e.  g.  strata,  classes  and  races  as  entities)  confront  one  another'. 
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The  theory  that  awareness  of  social  determination  only  emerges  when  con- 
fronted  with  another  group  is,  as  we  shall  see,  one  which  is  central  to  Mann- 
heim's  sociology  of  knowledge  and  indeed  to  his  theory  of  ideology  in 
Ideologie  und  Utopie. 
However,  at  this  stage  of  his  analysis,  Mannheim  seeks  to  draw  a  number  of 
Important  conclusions  from  this  analysis  of  the  functional  relationship  between 
cultural  objectiviations  and  social  experiences.  Firstly,  he  reiterates  the 
view  that  'not  only  the  object  but  also  the  knowing  subject  of  sociology  is 
the  socialized  individual  1.81  Secondly,  that  'the  socio-genetic  observation 
f 
of  cultural  forms  is  really  only  an  extension,  a  consequent  resultant  attitude, 
of  "eveday  Iife-experience",  that  it  cannot  and  should  not  readily  leave  this 
basis' 
82 
Mannheim  notes  here  that  'DIl  they  has  made  everyday  or  "general 
experience  of  the  world"  a  problem  for  philosophy.  We  see  it  in  one  of  the 29 
most  important  tasks  which  one  could  set  it,. 
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It  follows  from  this  that 
Mannheim  is  decidedly  hostile  to  all  positivistic  attempts  to  completely  free 
the  social  sciences  from  the  attitude  of  the  everyday  world.  Indeed,  Mannheim 
argues  that  a  sociology  of  culture  should  especially  attend  to  'the  phenomenon 
of  so-called  "pre-scientific  experience"  ,  to  'everyday  I  ife-experience'  . 
Furthermore,  'sociology  need  not  be  ashamed,  therefore,  of  this  origin  and 
of  this  permanent  connection  with  the  pre-scientific,  with  the  "whole  human 
being"  but  should  rather  take  up  both  of  them  in  its  presuppositions'  . 
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The 
final  conclusion  which  Mannheim  draws  from  this  analysis  is  that  'this  pre- 
theoretical  origin  of  socio-genetic  knowledge  in  no  way  implies  an  invitation 
to  be  inexact'  .  It  is  clear  from  Mannheim's  subsequent  analysis  of  the 
relationship  between  intrinsic  and  extrinsic  interpretations  of  cultural  phenomena 
that  these  pre-theoretical  origins  of  soclo-genetic  knowledge  are  only  a  start- 
ing  point  and  not  the  end  result  of  his  analysis. 
As  has  been  pointed  out  already,  Mannheim's  discussion  of  the  differences 
between  intrinsic  and  extrinsic  interpretations  of  cultural  phenomena  fore- 
shadows  the  analysis  subsequently  published  in  article  form  in  1926  except 
that  the  ideological  dimension  -  although  present  in  this  early  version  -  does 
not  receive  as  much  attention  as  in  the  later  version. 
, 
Mannheim  takes  as 
intrinsic  interpretations  those  which  are  concerned  with  an  internal  interpret- 
ation  of  work,  an  interpretation  on  the  basis  of  an  author's  ideas  and  an  in- 
terpretation  in  terms  of  another  intellectual  interpretation.  All  three  are  in- 
trinsic  interpretations  of  a  work  'because  they  are  concerned  with  the  meaning 
content  and  do  not  inquire  into  the  genesis  of  the  meaning  content'. 
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Genetic 
Interpretations  of  a  work  may  take  the  form,  amongst  others,  of  a  history  of 
ideas  interpretation,  an  individual  psychological  Interpretation  and  a  psycholo- 30 
gical  interpretation.  However,  what  particularly  concerns  Mannheim  is  the 
socio-genetic  interpretation  of  thought  since  here  it  is  the  case  that 
'not  only  law,  morality,  life-forms,  art,  religion, 
etc.  may  be  investigated  in  relation  to  their  socio- 
genetic  functionality  but  also  that  the  process  of 
thought  and  cognition,  that  the  structure  of  thought 
forms  as  well  as  the  concrete  intellectual  content 
of  an  epoch  can  be  comprehended  in  relation  to  its  socio- 
genetic  function  and  even  in  relation  to  afunctionality 
oriented  towards  several  directions:  on  the  one  hand, 
as  the  function  of  comprehensive  internal  constellat- 
ions,  as  the  function  of  the  world  view  of  respective 
individuals  and,  on  the  other,  as  a  function  of  -the  86 
striving  of  groups  for  economic  and  social  power.  ' 
However,  such  genetic  interpretations  contain  a  potential  contradiction  which 
Mannheim  highlights  with  reference  to  Marx's  argument  that  the  ideas  of 
specific  groups  in  the  production  process  are  historically  transitory  products 
of  the  relations  of  production.  Mannheim  argues  that  such  a  statement  pro- 
claiming  the  relativity  of  all  knowledge  must  also  refer  back  to  itself,  i.  e. 
that  this  statement  must  itself  be  relative.  Yet,  Mannheim  goes  on  to 
suggest  that  analogous  statements  must  be  made  in  the  sociology  of  knowledge 
'even  though  one  may  not  wish  to  trace  the  ideological  moment  in  the  last 
instance  back  to  the  relations  of  production  as  Marx  does'  . 
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That  is,  the 
.  sociology  of  knowledge  must  make  some  statement  about  the  derivation  of 
'theoretical  contexts  from  extra-theoretical  constellations'.  It  is  worth  noting 
here  that  a  common  feature  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  advanced  by  Mann- 
heim  and  Scheler  is  that  the  extra-theoretical  is  not  itself  theoretically 
apprehendable  and  therefore  acquires  an  ultimate-validity  beyond  which  theoret- 
t  ical  argument  cannot  go.  In  other  words,  Mannheim's  arguement  here  re- 
suits  in  emphasizing  a  pre-theoretical  base  of  such  massivity  that  it  cannot 
be  discussed  further  and  he  does  this  in  a  manner  analogous  to  Scheler's 
argument  concerning  the  irrational  bases  of  knowledge.  However,  it  is  also 31 
worth  observing  here  that,  in  this  work,  Mannheim  is  at  pains  to  separate 
genesis  and  validity  since 
'the  truth  or  falsity  of  a  statement  or  of  a  whole 
theoretical  sphere  can  never  be  reinforced  or 
weakened  by  a  sociological  or  other  genetic 
explanation.  How  something  has  emerged, 
what  functionality  it  may  possess  in  certain 
contexts  is  irrelevant  for  its  immanent  validity. 
At  the  same  time,  this  means  that  one  can 
never  construct  a  sociological  critique  of  know- 
ledge  or,  as  has  recently  been  asserted,  a 
sociological  critique  of  human  reason.  '  88 
This  is  an  explicit  criticism  of  Jerusalem's  positivist  attempt  to  provide  such 
a  critique. 
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But  what  is  more  important  here  is  the  fact  that  Mannheim  at 
this  stage  holds  firmly  to  the  separation  of  the  spheres  of  genesis  and  validity 
and  makes  no  bold  claims  for  a  sociology  of  knowledge.  The  sociologist  of 
culture  'brackets'  the  question  of  the  validity  of  the  knowledge  he  is  dealing 
with. 
_, 
Mannheim  is  at  pains  to  preserve  both  the  immanent  and  the  genetic  inter- 
pretation  of  cultural  phenomena.  The  structures  of  meaning  in  cultural  forms 
are  not  merely  comprehended  but  also  experienced.  This  means  that  'apart 
from  their  meaning  content,  the  experiental  context  from  which  they  emerge 
is  also  more  or  less  given  as  well  "90  Mannheim  argues  that  cultural  forms 
cannot  be  reduced  merely  to  the  one  or  the  other;  both  moments  of  compre- 
hension  and  experiencing  must  be  taken  into  account.  Although  he  does  not 
see  this  relationship  as  explicitly  dialectical,  and  although  these  moments 
1  are  conceived  within  the  framework  of  a  Lebensphilosophie  or  possibly  pheno- 
menologically,  this,  nonetheless,  is  not  too  far  removed  from  recent  dis- 
cussions  by  Apel,  for  example,  on  the  dialectical  relationship  between  re- 
U 
flection  and  engagement. 
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Mannheim  is  at  least  attempting  to  grasp  this 32 
process  of  acquisition  of  knowledge  in  a  more  sophisticated  form  than  many 
of  his  opponents  and  more  sensitively  than  he  himself  subsequently  often  did. 
Having  examined,  as  Mannheim  puts  it,  'the  intuitive  element  in  cultural- 
sociological  experience'  ,  he  now  goes  on  to  examine  the  internal  structure 
of  cultural  sociological  knowledge.  In  the  course  of  this  elucidation  of  the 
conceptual  apparatus  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge,  Mannheim  draws  upon 
the  discussion  of  world-views  which  was  about  to  appear  during  or  after  the 
writing  of  this  manuscript.  As  an  example  of  the  methodological  problems 
Involved  in  the  sociology  of  culture,  Mannheim  takes  up  the  concept  of  style  - 
both  än  aesthetic  and  a  sociological  concept.  In  this  example,  he  draws 
heavily  once  more  upon  the  early  writings  of  Lukäcs  and  specifically  upon  his 
essay  'Zur  Theorie  der  Literaturgeschichte'  published  in  Hungarian  in  1910.92 
This  early  essay  deals  with  the  concept  of  style  and  with  the  relationship 
between  a  literary  aesthetic  and  a  sociology  of  literature.  Mannheim  argues 
that  we  may  characterise  an  explanation  of  a  cultural  object  as  sociological 
if  it  'moves  back  from  the  work  to  the  experiential  context  that  lies  "behind" 
it'  .  More  precisely,  this  experiential  context  must  be  shown  to  have  a 
specific  social  character,  as  when  one  refers  to  'impressionism  as  being 
derived  from  a  self-disintegration  of  late-bourgeois  individualism'  That 
is,  the  genesis  of  cultural  objectivations  is  traced  back  to  'the  general 
structural  forms  of  human  sociation'  (Weber)  which  are  themselves  in- 
fluenced  by  their  contents  such  as  'sexuality,  breeding,  economy,  politics, 
4 
religion'  etc.  But  Mannheim  sees  a  problem  in  relating  these  'two  worlds' 
of  cultural  objectivations  and  life  experiences.  There  must  be  some 
mediating  factor  between  the  two  spheres  and  Mannheim  argues  that  it  is 
'the  world  of  the  psyche  which  creates  the  bond 33 
between  meaning  and  "social  reality".  It  is 
a  humanistic  psychology  which  forms  a  bridge 
between  the  sphere  of  validity  of  cultural 
structures  and  the  forms  of  sociation.  '  94 
This  has  important  implications  for  the  socio-genetic  grounding  of  cultural 
objectivations;  Mannheim  provides  the  following  example: 
'If  one  speaks  of  bourgeois  existence  BUrgerlichkeitý, 
then  one  no  longer  means  by  this  merely  the  role  of 
a  social  class  in  the  production  and  distribution  process 
of  the  social  product  but  rather  the  experiential  contexts 
Erlebniszusammenhänge,  which  result  from  this  econ- 
omic,  social  and  historically  specifically  determinable 
position.  -  The  social  categories  referred  to  do  not  imply 
human  groups  or  concrete  individuals  but  rather,  for 
their  part,  experiential  contexts.  1  95 
Here  Mannheim  makes  explicit  the  grounding  of  his  theory  of  the  functionality 
of  cultural  objectivations.  Their  genesis  can  be  traced  back  not  to  social 
groups  as  such  but  to  the  constellation  of  their  life  experiences.  In  other 
words,  cultural  forms  have  their  social  genesis  in  structured  human  exper- 
fences  and  the  relationship  between  their  meaning  and  this  social  reality  is 
mediated  by  the  human  psyche.  Such  a  theory,  heavily  indebted  to  Dilthey 
and  perhaps  to  Simmel,  has  the  advantage  of  not  reducing  cultural  forms 
immediately  to  social  groups  and  their  position  in  the  productive  process. 
However,  it  should  be  clear  from  the  use  which  Mannheim  makes  of  the  notion 
of  experiential  context  that  this  is  no  essential  mediating  category  but  is  its- 
self,  as  it  were,  the  basis  or  the  grounding  of  cultural  objectivations. 
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Yet  Mannheim  is  more  specific  about  the  mediating  element  between  the 
"  social  and  the  intellectual  spheres.  This  mediating  factor  is  the  world-view 
[Weltanschauung]  which  Mannheim  views  as  having  been  derived  from  a  human- 
istic  psychology  and  is  character!  zed.  as  follows: 
'The  world-view  (of  an  epoch,  a  group,  etc.  )  is 
a  structurally  connected  series  of  experiential 34 
contexts  which,  as  it  were,  form  for  a  larger 
number  of  individuals,  the  common  basis  of 
their  life  experience  and  their  penetration  of 
life.,  96 
What  such  a  notion  presupposes  is  that  the  basic  experiences  cannot  emerge 
in  isolation  as  the  individual's  living  core 
[Lebenssubstratl  but  rather  the 
contents  of  these  experiences  are  shared  with  other  members  of  the  same 
group.  Secondly,  the  concept  of  world-view  presupposes  that  individual 
stretches  of  life  experience  do  not  exist  side  by  side  in  isolation  but  rather 
'they  possess  an  inner  coherence  and  thereby  constitute,  as  it  were,  a  "life- 
system"'  .  However,  this  basic  form  is  never  directly  describably;  it  can 
only  be  apprehended  through  the  'group  formations'  in  which  it  is  manifest. 
In  turn,  this  means  that  the  world-view  is  itself  apprehendable  within  the  most 
diverse  spheres  of  objectification  so  that  'one  and  the  same  world-view  of  an 
epoch  can  be  apprehended  through  its  art,  religion,  morality,  politics,  econ- 
omic  structure,  etc.  '  . 
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Each  of  those  spheres  reveals  a  different  aspect 
of  the  same  world-view.  The  social  scientist  must,  of  course,  attempt  to 
show  the  coherence  of  the  different  manifestiations  of  the  world-view.  Indeed, 
the  theoretical  achievement  of  the  sociologist  lies  in  his  'attempt  to  pene- 
trate  the  spheres  of  experiential  contexts,  which  appear  as  completely  un- 
theorizable,  in  accordance  with  their  structure  '. 
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Ultimately,  then,  the 
sociologist  of  culture  is  not  concerned  with  the  analysis  of  cultural  forms  as 
such  or  with  social  formations  but  the  analysis  of  the  structure  of  individual 
world-views,  with  reference  to  the  particular  experiential  contexts  which  gain 
4  their  coherence  in  them. 
What  Mannheim's  analysis  of  world-views  reveals  is,  once  again,  that  the 
potentially  mediating  category  of  world-view  ceases  to  be  a  mediating  cate- 35 
gory  and  becomes,  instead,  'the  common  basis'  of  individuals'  life  ex- 
perience.  As  a  cluster  of  life  experiences,  the  world-view.  is  certainly  not 
a  completely  idealist  construct;  yet  Mannheim  constantly  refuses  to  relate 
these  experiential  contexts  back  to  particular  types  of  social  relationships. 
Rather,  they  constitute  an  oscillating  basis  of  cultural  formations.  They  are 
an  oscillating  basis  since  Mannheim  is  unsure  of  their  exact  location.  World- 
views  are  both  a  coherent  manifestation  of  clusters  of  life  experience  and,  at 
the  same  time,  they  are  these  clusters.  At  this  stage  of  his  development, 
world-views  constitute,  for  Mannheim,  totalities.  The  sociology  of  culture 
is  not  concerned  with  an  explanation  of  individual  facts  in  terms  of  other  in- 
i 
dividüal  facts  but  rather  with  an  explanation  derived  from  'the  totality  (which 
one  can  term,  amongst  other  things,  a  world-view)  that  lies  behind  them'  . 
One  may  note  in  passing  here  the  potential  reduction  of  the  concept  of  totality 
to  that  of  a  world-view.  Within  a  historical  dimension  -  and  the  world-view 
of  an  epoch  must  be-  located  here  -  Mannheim  distinguishes  between  history 
and  the  analysis  of  world-views  on  the  grounds  that  'history  searches  for 
causes  whilst  an  analysis  of  world-views  searches  for  the  preconditions  under 
which  causes  can  be  effective'. 
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Hence,  a  causal  analysis  is  only  one  possible  type  of  analysis  appropriate 
to  the  sociology  of  culture.  In  general  terms,  Mannheim  sees  three  possible 
types  of  analysis  as  being  legitimate:  'Either  one  applies  the  category  of 
causality,  or  the  relationship  of  the  whole  and  the  parts,  or  that  of  function 
i 
or  that  of  "correspondence's  I. 
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Mannheim  argues  that  at  the  level  of  con- 
crete  analysis,  Marxism  utilizes  a  causal  analysis  which  reduces  the  social 
sphere,  in  the  widest  sense,  to  the  economic.  Marxism  as  a  philosophy  of 
history,  however,  works  with  the  category  of  function  so  that 36 
'Ideology  is  then  the  function  of  a  stage  of  develop- 
ment  of  the  process  of  production.  The  one  sided- 
ness  of  Marxism  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  replaces 
other  forms  of  social  aggregation  by  the  economic- 
social  forms  and  in  so  doing  it  is  not  clear  why 
the  remaining  social  formative  factors  cannot  also 
be  co-ordinated  with  ideologies.  '  101 
If  the  social  sphere  is  reduced  to  a  narrow  definition  of  the  economic  then 
this  will  lead  to  many  experiential  clusters  being  ignored.  In  contrast,  the 
analysis  of  correspondence  is  applied  to  the  analysis  of  world-views. 
These  approaches  to  the  sociology  of  culture  can,  in  turn,  be  related  to 
different  conceptions  of  the  nature  of  sociology  itself.  Mannheim  sees  three 
traditions  of  sociology  -  pure  sociology,  founded  by  Simmel  and  Tbinnes 
and  continued  by  Vierkandt,  von  Wiese  and  the  phenomenological  school; 
general  sociology,  which  procedes  empirically  and  seeks  to  establish  sociology 
as  a  generalizing  science  (Max  Weber  is  taken  as  typical  of  this  tradition); 
finally  sociology  as  the  study  of  the  historical  dynamic.  This  later  form  of 
dynamic  sociology  is  concerned  not  merely  with  historical  genesis  but  with 
the  genesis  of  meaning;  it  is  'an  individualising  type-forming  discipline'. 
In  turn,  Mannheim  suggests  that  these  different  types  of  sociology  can 
produce  different  versions  of  a  sociology  of  culture.  A  pure  sociology  of 
culture,  however,  with  its  lack  of  concern  for  the  historical  dynamic,  is  unable 
to  face  the  problems  posed  by  historicism  since 
'Historicism  has  broken  down  people's  feeling  of 
"  static  permanency  and  has  set  in  motion  the  once 
stable  world-view  in  which  each  thing  and  each 
living  entity  had  its  specific  place  accorded  by 
divine  plan.  "  Our  feeling  for  life  tells  us:  every- 
thing  could  also  be  different.  Everything  has 
become  historical 
...  The  spot  from  which  we 
previously  viewed  the  world  as  if,  from  a  stable 
standpoint  has  been  broken  down,  our  whole  self 
is  abandoned;  we  seem,  as  it  were,  to  be  suspended 37 
above  ourselves.  In  thousands  of  forms  we 
find  ourselves  again  ...  1  102 
Nor  can  this  'fundamental  homelessness  of  our  human  existence'  be  com- 
prehended  fully  by  a  general  sociology  of  culture.  One  can,  of  course,  like 
Dilthey,  provide  a  general  typology  of  world-views  but  they  can  never  be  fully 
appropriate  to  historically  changing  circumstances.  History  never  repeats 
itself  in  an  identical  manner. 
Mannheim  therefore  favours  a  dynamic  sociology  of  culture,  one  which  will 
relate  cultural  forms  to  a  dynamic  totality  and  to  historically  specific  groups 
(e.  g.  rather  than  abstract  social  agents  such  as  'negatively  privileged  strata', 
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historically  specific  social  subjects  such  as.  the  'proletariat  in  high  capitalism'). 
Such  a  sociology  of  culture  is  concerned  with  the  'total  situation'  of  social 
positions  and  world-views.  It  will  recognize  that  'within  a  single  historical 
body  not  merely  one  world-view  is  alive'  but  several;  it  will  recognise  that 
'human  beings  within  an  epoch  do  not  Ii  ve  in  the  same  time  I.  Thus,  at  the 
end  of  his  analysis,  Mannheim  is  already  moving  towards  a  concern  not 
merely  with  the  analysis  of  world-views  but  also  towards  an  attempt  to  explain 
their  historical  dynamic.  This  is  taken  up  both  in  his  essay  on  'Historismus' 
(1924)  and  his  'Das  Problem  einer  Soziologie  des  Wissens'  (1925). 
In  his  sociology  of  culture  developed  in  this  period,  Mannheim  relies  not 
merely  upon  the  phenomenological  notion  of  intentionality  but,  perhaps  more 
significantly,  upon  concepts  derived  from  Dilthey.  Already  we  can  see  the 
basis  of  Mannheim's  theory  of  cultural  knowledge  in  this  unpublished  work. 
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Central  to  this  theory  are  the  notions  of  life,  experience  and  world-view. 
History  is  viewed  as  a  dynamic  stream  of  life,  as  a  sequence  of  similar  and 38 
opposing  standpoints.  The  notion  of  existential  boundedness  (Seinsverbunden- 
heit)  that  is  so  important  in  Mannheim's  later  work  can  be  seen  to  have  its 
roots  here  in  the  theory  of  culture.  In  particular,  its  roots  lie  much  more  in 
Dilthey's  Lebensphilosophie  than  in  Marx's  theory  of  ideology.  Intellectual 
phenomena  for  Dilthey  are  objectifications  of  life;  life  is,  as  it  were,  ex- 
ternal  i  sed  In  them.  History  as  a  stream  of  life  is  the  result  of  human  ex- 
perience  whose  object  ifications  are  comprehensible  through  understanding. 
However,  the  notion  of  cultural  objectification  becomes,  in  Mannheim's  work, 
the  general  concept  denoting  superstructural  phenomena  as  a  whole.  As 
Neusüss  argues, 
'The  relationship  between  "inner"  and  "outer", 
experience  and  the  expression  of  experience 
that  Dilthey  dealt  with  as  a  theoretical  problem 
in  the  foundation  of  an  autonomous  human 
scientific  method,  is  no  longer  directly  under 
discussion  in  the  sociology  of  knowledge;  it 
takes  over,  to  a  certain  extent,  Dil  they's  con- 
siderations  as  it  finds  them  without  itself 
making  them  problematic.  '  104 
Similarly,  whereas  Dilthey's  concept  of  life  only  applies  to  the  intellectual 
world  it  applies  in  Mannheim's  work  to  the  whole  world  of  objects.  As 
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Neusüss  suggests,  'material  existence  becomes  a  "massive"  Geist'  . 
The  mediation  between  nature  and  thought,  that  in  Marx's  work  is  located  in 
labour,  is  missing  in  Mannheim's  theory  of  culture.  The  natural  world  as 
'life'  becomes  immediately  a  cultural  phenomenon.  The  mediation  between 
Iife  and  thought  is  carried  out  through  the  world-view.  Systems  of  life  with- 
In  the  historical  stream  of  life  are  given  expression  in  different  systems  of 
world  views.  These  world-views,  in  turn,  are  competing  with  one  another 
in  such  a  manner  that  there  is  no  stable  location  within  the  stream  of  life. 
Instead,  as  Mannheim  puts  It,  there  is  only  a  'fundamental  homelessness'  - 
one  that  is  later  to  become  'the  homelessness  of  the  mind.  '  In  short, 39 
Mannheim's  theory  of  culture  already  forms  the  meta-theoretical  basis  for 
his  sociology  of  knowledge  as  Neusüss  and  Lenk  have  argued. 
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If  Mannheim's  sociology  of  knowledge  is  grounded  upon  his  sociology  of 
culture  then,  zis  we  have  seen,  his  own  preference  for  a  sociology  of  culture 
is  increasingly  one  which  seeks  to  take  account  of  the  historical  dynamic. 
Hence,  a  central  theme  of  Mannheim's  work  in  this  period  is  not  merely  the 
need  for  a  theory  of  culture  which-will  incorporate  the  sociological  element 
but  also  the  centrality  of  a  historical  perspective  -  and  this,  for  Mannheim, 
is  a  historicist  perspective.  If  we  can  often  detect  in  his  work  on  the  sociol- 
ogy  of  culture  the  influence  of  Lukacs,  then  it  is  no  less  true  that  Mannheim's 
statement  of  the  historicist  problematic  is  heavily  indebted  to  the  work  of 
Ernst  Troeltsch.  A  strong  case  can  be  made  -  and  this  has,  in  part,  already 
been  made  by  Kettler  -  for  arguing  that  his  unpublished  treatise  Eine  Soziol- 
ogische  Theorie  der  Kultur  and  ihrer  Erkennbarkeit  (1924  -  possibly  1925) 
represents  'Mannheim's  effort  to  meet  the  challenge  of  Lukäcs'  "History 
and  Class  Consciousness"'107  which  appeared  in  1923.  Perhaps  slightly 
earlier,  but  still  within  the  period  in  which  Mannheim  was  attempting  to 
formulate  his  sociology  of  culture  and  sociology  of.  knowledge  in  a  more 
systematic  manner,  it  is  clear  that  Mannheim  was  attempting  to  come  to 
J  terms  with  and  work  out  the  consequences  of  Troeltsch's  monumental  survey 
Der  Historismus  und  seine  Probleme  which  appeared  in  1922.108  It  has 
already  been  shown  that  Mannheim  was  attempting  to  incorporate  the  historic- 
ally  dynamic  element  within  his  sociology  in  his  earlier  unpublished  essay  of 40 
1922.  This  process  of  incorporation  is  completed  in  his  essay  'Historismus', 
published  in  1924109  and  probably  written  in  1923.  However,  it  is  not  only 
here  that  Troeltsch  exercised  an  important  influence  upon  Mannheim's  form- 
ulation  of  a  sociology  of  knowledge.  Although  never  published,  Mannheim 
intended  to  produce  a  work  entitled  Zur  Denklage  der  Gegenwart  which  was, 
in  fact,  advertised'in  the  original  edition  of  Ideologie  Utopie  in  1929  and 
which  was  still  under  discussion  with  Mohr  Verlag  at  the  end  of  1930.110 
This  survey  of  contemporary  thought  was  to  deal  with  the  three  thinkers,  Max 
Weber,  Max  Scheler  and  Ernst  Troeltsch  who  Mannheim  took  to  be  crucial  to 
the  formation  of  contemporary  social  thought.  Elsewhere,  Mannheim  also 
argues  that  his  approach  to  the  central  problems  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie  are 
'directly  affiliated  with  the  approaches  of  Max  Weber,  Troeltsch  and  Scheler'. 
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All  this  is,  of  course,  not  to  suggest  that  Troeltsch  is  the  sole  source  of  the 
historicist  problematic.  From  his  early-writings  onwards,  it  is  also  apparent 
that  Dilthey  is  a  central  figure  in  Mannheim's  formulation  of  historically 
located  world  views  and  a  historicist  perspective.  Nonetheless,  Troeltsch's 
major  work  brought  together  the  key  figures  in  the  German  philosophy  of  history 
and  the  book  itself  was  dedicated  to  DiI  they  and  Windelband. 
In  his  own  essay  on  historicism,  Mannheim  was  not  concerned  with  working 
out  the  historical  origins  and  development  of  the  historicist-problematic  but 
with  working  out  its  implications  for  his  sociology  of  culture  and  his  sociology 
of  knowledge.  Such  a  project  is  essential  for  Mannheim  in  view  of  the  nature 
i 
of  the  historicist  perspective  since  it  is 
'an  intellectual  force  of  extraordinary  significance; 
It  is  the  real  agent  of  our  world-view,  a  principle 
`which  not  only  organizes  like  an  invisible  hand, 
the  whole  of  the  work  of  the  human  sciences  but 
also  permeates  everyday  life  ...  Our  view  of 41 
I  ife  has  already  become  thoroughly  sociological 
and  sociology  is  just  one  of  thcse  spheres  which, 
increasingly  dominated  by  the  principle  of 
historicism,  discloses  most  fully  our  new  orien- 
tation  to  life.  '  112 
As  such  it  is  'the  very  basis  on  which  we  view  the  socio-cultural  reality. 
Whereas  Mannheim  here  sees  historicism  as  the  agent 
[Träger) 
of  our  world- 
view,  he  shortly  afterwards  argues  that  it  'is  aworld"view'  and  that  'it  not 
only  dominates  our  external  and  internal  Iife  but  ...  also  our  thought'. 
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In  a  strikingly  idealist  and  contradictory  manner,  Mannheim  sees  historicism 
as  the  agent  of  our  world-view,  as  itself  a  world-view  which  dominates  us 
internally  and  externally.  Such  an  idealist  notion  of  history  lies  at  the  very 
core  of  Mannheim's  historicist  Lebensphilosophie  and  his  philosophy  of  hist- 
ory.  This  is  well-expressed  by  Lieber  when  he  suggests  that,  for  Mannheim, 
'The  historical  process  is  a  dynamic  unity  which  en- 
compasses  spirit  and  life;  since,  however,  both  - 
spirit  and  life  -  are  historical  there  exists  no  pure 
autonomy  Ansichsein)for  the  mind,  no  thought 
that  remains  undisturbed  by  the  development  and 
change  in  the  real  historical  process.  And  since, 
for  Mannheim,  on  the  basis  of  the  presupposition 
of  a  dynamic-historical  Lebensphi  losophie,  there 
exists  no  development  of  the  mind  separated  from 
existence,  so  also  there  can  be  no  non-intellectual, 
purely  natural  occurences  that  are  historically  sig- 
nificant.  The  relationship  of  superstructure  to 
base  and  vice-versa  is  reciprocal.  1  114 
.. 
Hence,  once  more,  one  looks  in  vain  for  the  location  of  this  historicist  world- 
view  -  it  permeates  our  thought  and  our  life.  As  a  'mode  of  thought  and 
living'  we  confront  it  through  our  'ability  to  experience  every  segment  of  the 
spiritual-intellectual  world  as  in  a  state  of  flux,  in  the  process  of  emergence' 
ý15 
l 
But  then  we  learn  that  it  is  not  merely  an  all-pervasive  world-view  but  also  a 
theory  [Lehre  that  is  able  'to  derive  an  ordering  principle'  within  this  flux 
by  penetrating  'the  innermost  structure  of  this  all-pervading  change' 
1  16 
Historicism  is,  then,  both  history  and  a  philosophy  of  history. 42 
As  a  philosophy  of  history,  however,  it  is  confronted  with  several  problems. 
Mannheim  seems  to  view  historicism  as,  in  part,  a  philosophy  of  the  history 
of  philosophies  which  incorporates  'old  insights'  into  the  new  more  compre- 
hensive  one.  Philosophy,  too,  is  part  of  this  flux  and  the  old  formal  cate- 
gories  of  reason  (represented'by  Kantianism)  must  give  way  to  historicism 
since  they  no  longer  accord  with  the  present  'real  historical  substratum  of 
psychic  and  intellectual  reality.  What  historicism  attempts  in  various 
spheres  is  a  synthesis  of  elements  which  is  in  accord  with  'the  changed  world 
situation'  .  Historicism  locates  various  spheres.  within  the  context  of  total- 
ities  and  is  concerned  with  their  synthesis.  In  this  respect  there  is  a  corr- 
espondence  between  historicism  and  the  changing  social  structure  which  Mann- 
heim  expresses  in  the  following  way: 
'If  the  atomizing,  sectionalizing  mode  of  thought 
may  be  regarded  as  corresponding  to  a  social  struct- 
ure  which  allowed  a  maximum  dissolution  of  social 
bonds  and  produced  an  economy  of  liberalistic,  in- 
dependent,  atomised  individual  forces,  then  the 
present  trend  towards  synthesis,  towards  the  in- 
vestigation  of  tota  li  ti  tes,  may  be  regarded  as  the 
emergence,  at  the  level  of  reflection,  of  a  force 
which  is  pushing  our  social  existence  into  more 
collectivistic  channels.  '  117 
This  motif  of  atomization  giving  way  to  synthesis  is  one  which  constantly 
recurs  later  in  Mannheim's  sociology  of  knowledge  both  in  his  essay  on  com  - 
petition  and  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie.  However,  what  concerns  us  here  is  that 
historicism,  too,  is  'bound  to  the  historico-philosophical  position  and  its 
corresponding  "life  basis"'.  This  'bond',  however,  appears  to  be  no  more 
4  than  one  of  'correspondence'  I.  Indeed  the  relationship  is  even  weaker  since 
historicism,  is,  as  we  have  seen,  a  part  of  the  $dynamically  developing 
totality  of  the  whole  psychic  and  intellectual,  life'  which  permeates  actual 
life  as  well.  It  is  both  everywhere  and  nowhere. 43 
Mannheim  evades  the  charge  that  historicism  is  a  relativistic  philosophy  by 
disposing  of  the  epistemological  problem  altogether.  By  taking  this 
'dynamically  developing  totality'  as  the  'ultimately  given',  epistemology 
will  be  replaced  by  the  philosophy  of  history  as  a  dynamic  metaphysics'. 
Historicism  is  Ia  kind  of  philosophy  which  goes  even  beyond  epistemology 
and  tries  to  secure  a  basis  for  it.  Thus,  its  systematic  place  corresponds  to 
that  of  the  "metaphysics"  of  earlier  times  '. 
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At  the  root,  of  this  'dyna- 
mically  developing  totality',  which  is  the  historical  process,  there  lies  'the 
self-unfolding  substratum  of  life  itself'..  This  substratum  of  life  is,  in  a 
sense,  the  'thing-in-itself'  which  the  historicist  must  penetrate.  But  as  a 
I 
'self-unfolding  substratum'  it  has  presumably  not  been  permeated  by  histori- 
cism.  If  this  is  the  case,  then  it  fundamentally  contradicts  Mannheim's 
original  assertions  concerning  historicism  as  a  world-view. 
At  a  different  level,  Mannheim  openly  proclaims  a  theory  of  the  historical 
variability  both  of  and  within  the  knowing  subject,  a  theory  of  'perspectivism'  . 
This  theory,  however,  applies  specifically  only  to  the  human  sciences  since 
It  is  because  the  exact  sciences  can,  in  fact, 
make  statements  into  whose  content  the  historical 
and  local  setting  of  the  knowing  subject  and  his 
value  orientation  do  not  enter,  that  one  may  here 
legitimately  construct  a  correspondingly  abstract 
subject  (free  from  historical  determination).  1  119 
In  contrast,  in  the  human  sciences,  one  must  take  account  of  Troeltsch's 
arguments  that  the  knowing  subject  is  not  contemplative  and  that  historical 
krawledge  necessitates  an  evaluative  standpoint.  In  extracting  the  conse- 
quences  from  Troeltsch's  arguments  here,  Mannheim  comes  close  to  stating, 
in  a  different  manner,  the  need  to  examine  not  merely  the  standpoints  from 
which  the  knowing  subject  sets  out  but  also  the  cognitive  interests  (though 44 
Habermas  accords  them  a  'quasi-transcendental'  status  and  Apel  a  'trans- 
cendental'  status)  which  govern  cognition.  However,  Mannheim  argues,  along 
with  Troeltsch,  that 
'historical  knowledge  is  only  possible  from  an 
ascertainable  intellectual  location  Standort], 
that  it  presupposes  a  subject  harbouring  definite 
aspirations  regarding  the  future  and  actively 
striving  to  achieve  them.  Only  out  of  the  in- 
terest  which  the  present  acting  subject  has  in 
the  pattern  of  the  future,  does  the  observation 
of  the  past  become  possible.  '  120 
This  leads  Mannheim  to  insist  upon  our  examination  not  merely  of  the 
'historical  -philosophical  (sociological)  positional  determination'  of  histori- 
cal  cnowledge  but  also  of  the  'practical  extra-theoretical  aspirations',  of  the 
'inner  circle  between  aspiration  and  cognition'.  Mannheim's  statement  of 
this  relationship  is  still  grounded  in  a  Lebensphilosophie  ontology,  in  a  notion 
of  the  extra-theoretical  as  irrational.  At  the  same  time,  however,  Mannheim 
is  aware  of  the  hermeneutic  problem  of  historical  understanding  even  though 
located  within  a  historicist  framework.  Within  a  historical  epoch,  'the 
concrete  values  which  serve  as  a  standard  have  developed  in  their  fullness  of 
meaning  organically  out  of  the  same  historical  process  which  they  have  to  help 
interpret'. 
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These  standards,  then,  are  rooted  in  'the  interpreter's  own 
"psychic-cultural"  situation'.  The  mediating  function  of  tradition  and  other 
features  of  the  hermeneutic  circle,  elucidated  by  Gadamer,  for  example,  do 
not  figure  in  Mannheim's  analysis  at  all. 
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Instead,  Mannheim,  perceiving  the  potentially  relativistic  impasse  of  per- 
spectivism,  seeks  to  preserve  a  non-relativistic  notion  of  truth  by  locating 
It  within  the  dynamic  of  the  historical  process  itself.  Here,  historicism  as 
a  world-view  enables  one  to  grasp  'the  overall  inner  meaning  of  the  historical 45 
.f 
123  transformation  process  with  the  help  of  the  category  of  "totality"'. 
Though  this  conception  may  appear  to  have  affinities  with  Lukäcs'  in  Gesch- 
ichte  und  Klassenbewusstsein  -  and  Mannheim  refers  very  favourably  to  this 
work  (p.  124  n.  1)  -  it  differs  in  at  least  two  important  respects.  Firstly, 
the  category  of  totality  is  reduced  in  Mannheim's  work  to  that  of  a  synthesis 
of  perspectives  and  trends.  Secondly,  and  associated  with  it,  is  Mannheim's 
view  that  'no  one  social  stratum,  no  one  class  is  the  bearer  of  the  total  move- 
ment;  nor  is  it  legitimate  to  assess  this  global  process  merely  in  terms  of  the 
contributions  of  one  class'  . 
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One  might  also  add  that  Mannheim  devoted 
some  considerable  space  in  this  article  to  criticizing  the  Hegelian  dialectic. 
Instead,  Mannheim's  argument  already  points  in  the  direction  of  a  synthesis 
of  world  views  and  later  of  ideologies  (at  least  of  their  valuable  elements)  in 
order  to  provide  a  contemporary  diagnosis  of  the  historical  dynamic. 
The  'Historismus'  article  represents  Mannheim's  attempt  not  merely  to  come 
to  terms  with  the  historicist  tradition,  as  developed  and  outlined  by  Troeltsch, 
but  also  to  confront  Lukäcs'  philosophy  of  history  as  presented  in  Geschichte 
und  Klassenbewusstsein.  As  has  already  been  pointed  out,  Kettler  argues 
that  this  confrontation  with  Lukdcs'  work  also  plays  a  central  role  in  his  un- 
published  Eine  soziologische  Theorie  der  Kultur  und  ihrer  Erkennbarkeit. 
125 
This  long  study,  as  its  title  suggests,  is  still  concerned  with  the  sociology 
of  culture  -  as  was  his  earlier  unpublished  treatise  -  but  it  moves  more  cer- 
tainly  in  the  direction  of  a  sociology  of  knowledge  (here  as  a  Soziologie  des 
Denkens).  It  also  contains,  more  fully  than  in  any  of-Mannheim's  other 
works,  his  own  position  vis-a-viz  the  Methodenstreit  in  the  human  sciences. 
Since  this  is  a  central  feature  of  much  of  the  discussion  in  the  sociology  of 
knowledge  in  this  period,  this  aspect  of  Mannheim's  treatise  will  be  only 46 
briefly  summarised  here.  A  fuller  treatment  of  the  role  of  the  sociology  of 
knowledge  within  the  social  sciences  will  be  provided  in  a  later  chapter. 
However,  in  order  to  outline  those  aspects  of  this  treatise  which  are  crucial 
to  Mannheim's  development  of  a  sociology  of  knowledge,  some  reference 
must  be  made  to  his  methodological  standpoint  since  it  provides  the  frame- 
work  for  his  discussion  of  a  sociology  of  culture  and  of  knowledge.  He  sees 
the  work  as  a  whole  as  a  contribution  to  the  sociology  of  thought 
CSoziologie 
des  Denkens]  and  argues  that  purely  methodological  problems  cannot  be  solv- 
ed  without  reference  to'a  sociological  orientation.  The  methodology  and  ,- 
logic  of  knowledge  proceeds  purely  immanently  and  overlooks  the  fact  that 
knowledge  takes  on  temporal  forms,  that  a  plurality  of  methodologies  exist  and 
that  the  dogma  of  supra-temporal  knowledge  has  been  chal  Ienged,  -  for  example, 
by  the  study  of  ideology.  Mannheim  argues  that  the  sociological  standpoint 
should  be  applied  in  two  areas: 
, 
in  the  self-orientation  of  the  thinking  subject 
In  relation  to  the  total  social  process  and  in  the  recognition  that'all  thought  Is 
social.  He  applies  these  axioms  at  three  levels:  firstly,  In  relation  to  the 
sociological  determination  of  methodology  (I);  secondly,  in  relation  to  a 
sociological  theory  of  understanding  and  culture  (II),  and  finally  -  though 
here  the  manuscript  is  incomplete  -  in  relation  to  the  social  genesis  of  the 
sociology  of  culture  (III),  which  he  had  earlier  examined  in  his  previous 
unpublished  essay. 
4 
In  the  first  section  on  the  sociological  determination  of  methodological  re- 
Election  -  which  Mannheim  himself  views  as  'a  historical-philosophical  and 
sociological  self-orientation' 
126 
-  he  seeks  to  establish  not  merely  the 
difference  between  the  human  and  natural  sciences  but  also  the  wider  social 47 
origins  of  these  differences.  In  contrast  to  the  neo-Kantian  distinction 
between  the  natural  and  the  human  sciences  that  is  established  at  the  level 
of  the  results  of  knowledge  -  for  Rickert,  in  particular,  at  the  level  of  con- 
cept  formation  -  Mannheim  seeks  to  introduce  an  ontological  distinction  by 
asking  whether  'the  object  of  the  natural  sciences  and  that  of  history  differ 
in  their  mode  of  existence' 
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Secondly,  one  might  utilize  the  'ontic 
distinction  between  the  world  of  nature  free  of  meaning  and  that  of  structures 
of  meaning  (culture)'.  Finally,  one  might  place  'a  further  ontic,  pre- 
methodological  question,  whether  or  not  the  cognitive  subject  stands  in  a 
completely  different  relationship  to  the  objects  of  the  cultural  sciences  than 
in  the  law-seeking  natural  sciences'. 
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Mannheim  in  fact  seeks  to  ground 
cultural  scientific  knowledge  in  'pre-scientific  modes  of  cognition'  which 
are  effective  in  everyday  life.  That  is,  he  provides  a  phenomenological  and 
Lebensphilosophische  grounding  for  this  knowledge. 
But  the  reasons  why  these  two  different  types  of  knowledge  -  natural  and 
cultural  scientific  knowledge  -  should  emerge  historically  has  very  different 
roots.  The  natural  and  cultural  sciences  not  only  develop  out  of  different 
philosophies  but  also  their  methodologies  possess  definite  presuppositions 
derived  from  different  philosophical  world-views.  Whereas  the  new  philosophy 
and  methodology  of  the  natural  sciences  was  symbolised  by  Cartesian  philo- 
sophy,  the  cultural  sciences  have  their  roots  in  'the  romantic  consciousness'. 
In  practical  terms,  the  philosophy  of  the  natural  sciences  was  rooted  in  'a 
f 
technically  orientated  interest  in  nature',  in  'a  technical  domination  of 
nature'  which  sought  to  remove  'qualitatively  conditioned  thought'  from  the 
realm  of  science  and  developed  'a  mistrust  of  all  anthropomorphically. 
associated  sources  of  knowledge'.  129 
In  the  course  of  the  establishment  of 48 
this  new  ideal  of  knowledge,  the  rational  was  seen  as  a  guarantee  for  the 
objectivity  of  knowledge  as  opposed  to  the  subjectivism  of  anthropomorphic 
knowledge.  Mannheim  indeed  argues  that  this  points  towards  'the  striving  for 
a  societalisation  of  knowledge'  in  the  natural-scientific  cognitive  ideal.  As 
such  it  favours  the  'depersonalization  and  decommunal  i  sati  on  of  knowledge', 
the  'linking  of  universal  validity  and  truth'. 
130 
This  quantification  of  the 
qualitative,  this  attempt  'to  transcend  the  concrete  historical  human  subject 
in  order  to  have  recourse  to  the  abstract  universal  human  element'  does 
provide  a  greater  degree  of  abstraction,  but  Mannheim  argues  that  it  is  an 
inappropriate  ideal  for  the  human  sciences.  This  stage  of  Mannheim's 
arguemont  anticipates,  in  some  respects,  the  views  of  Habermas  and  Apel 
in  their  attempts  to  argue  for  a  consensus  theory  of  truth  and  communities  of 
knowledge.  The  link  between  the  two  will  be  discussed  later. 
For  the  moment,  it  is  interesting  to  follow  Mannheim's  argument  on  the 
roots  of  this  new  natural  scientific  and  rationalistic  world-view  since  it 
illustrates  the  manner  in  which  he  had  been  impressed  by  Lukäcs'  discussion 
of  reification.  Natural-scientific  rationalism  may  be  'imputed'  to  the 
'capitalistic  spirit',  to  'the  spirit  of  the  emergent  bourgeoisie'.  Hence, 
there  are  strong  affinities  between  the  rationalism  of  the  modern  natural 
sciences  and  the  structure  and  rationality  of  central  aspects  of  an  emergent 
capitalist  society.  Mannheim  acknowledges  that  such  links  have  already 
been  suggested  by  Simmel,  Sombart,  Weber  and  Lukäcs  but  argues  that  all 
these  writers,  with  the  exception  of  Lukäcs,  have  failed  to  be  sufficiently 
historically  specific.  All  these  writers  assert  links  between  this  new  ration- 
al  ism  and  a  money  economy  and  commodity  structure.  Thus,  for  example, 
'Simmel  had  characterised  in  many  wäys  the  ex- 49 
perientially  changing  objects  of  the  world  which 
are  associated  with  money  forms  ...  yet  in  so 
doing  he  had  abstracted,  in  a  completely  un- 
historical  manner,  the  capitalistic  money  form 
from  its  capitalistic  background  and  imputed  the 
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characteristic  structural  change  to  "money  as  such".  ' 
Similarly  Weber  and  Sombart,  although  recognizing  that  rationalism  and 
money  calculation  existed  prior  to  capitalism,  failed  to  recognize  that  'it  is 
precisely  in  modern  capitalism  and  only  here  that  the  category  of  commodity 
becomes  a  universal  category  which  structures  the  whole  world  view'  . 
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This  and  other  passages  in  this  section  testify  not  only  to  Mannheim's 
assertion  of  the  need  for  historical  analysis  but  also  to  his  largely  Marxist 
account  of  the  relationship  between  natural  scientific  rationality  and  modern 
capitalism  -  an  account  that  he  derives  from  LukScs. 
Mannheim  indeed  accepts  Lukäcs  I  account  of  the  emergence  of  reification 
that  takes  place  through  commodity  fetishism  and  is  symbolized  in  growing 
rational  calculation.  That  is,  it  is  an  adaptation  of  Weber's  notion  of  in- 
creasing  rationalization  and  Simmel  Is  theory  of  cultural  alienation  and,  like 
Lukäcs,  Mannheim  relates  the  development  of  modern  science  to  this  process. 
Rational  calculation  and  quantification  through  commodity  production  and 
exchange  have  important  consequences  for  the  dominant  group  in  a  capitalist 
society.  The  bourgeoisie,  having  created  this  system  of  commodity  exchange 
and  rational  calculation,  transpose  these  relationships  onto  all  other  relations 
in  society.  in  particular,  any  other  mode  of  experiencing  the  world  that 
"  does  not  conform  to  this  calculable,  quantifiable  rationality  is  degraded  to 
a  subjective,  pre-scientific  status.  The  communal  subject  of  knowledge  in 
pre-capitalism  is  replaced  by  'on  the  one  hand,  the  isolated  individual  and, 
on  the  other,  the  "consciousness  as  such"  that  resides  in  him'  . 
133 
This 50 
corresponds,  Mannheim  argues,  with  the  transition  from  Gemeinschaft  to 
Gesellschaft  that  is  brought  about  by  capitalism.  Thus,  the  emergent  bour- 
geoisie  'makes  one  sphere  of  knowledge  into  the  paradigm  of  knowledge  as 
such'  and,  in  so  doing,  overlooks  the  fact  that  other  'methods  of  thought 
and  modes  of  knowledge  exist  which  differ  from  these  structural  forms'. 
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Unlike  natural  scientific  knowledge  which  abstracts  from  situations,  social 
and  political  knowledge  is  'situationally  bounded',  that  is,  it  is  located  in 
concrete  situations  and  s;.  propriated  through  modes  of  experience  that  take 
this  into  account.  In  a  sense,  it  is  'given'  by  the  'situation'.  This  is 
one  of  the  contexts  within  which  Mannheim's  subsequent'argu  ments  con- 
cerning  situationally  bounded  knowledge  mLst  be  placed--  as  part  of  an  alter- 
native  methodology  for  the  social  sciences.  It  is  intended  as  a  counterpart 
to  the  methodology  of  the  natural  sciences,  which  is  associated  with  giving 
up  a  personal  and  immediate  relationship  to  nature  in  order  to  quantify  it,  or 
to  place  it  within  an  objective  conceptual  framework.  This  approach  to 
nature  forms  part  of  the  much  wider  process  under  capitalism  of  reducing  all 
relationships  to  impersonal  abstract  ones,  of  reducing  concrete  individuals  to 
abstract  individuals  or  functions  of  general  processes.  Hence 
'the  possibility  of  the  reduction  of  all  organic 
relationships  to  the  contractual  form,  the  possibil- 
ity  of  depersonalised  wealth  and  capital  and  the 
possibility  of  enterprises  in  the  form  of  stock 
companies  is  only  attainable  through  this  new 
relationship  which  eliminates  all  that  is  qual- 
itatively  distinctive.  '  135 
Through  such  an  analysis  Mannheim  hopes  to  have  shown  'how  a  specific 
I 
rationalism  as  a  form  of  thought  belonged  to  the  "reifying"  life  structure  of 
capitalism  as  a  form  of  existence'. 
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In  contrast  to  this  dominant  form  of  rationality  and  its  associated  epistemology, 51 
Mannheim  posits  the  existence  of  a  complementary  counter-current  that  has 
been  maintained  by  'social  strata  who  were  not  incorporated  in  the  capitalist 
process  of  rational  isation  or  at  least  had  no  functional  roleCTrägerrolle'  within 
it',  and  within  the  private  spheres  of  Iife  of  those  engaged  within  the  capital- 
ist  process  of  rationalisation,  even  though  excluded  'from  the  foreground  of 
public  and  official  life'  " 
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Mannheim  recognizes,  however,  that  the 
'irrational'  sphere  of  life  -  'the  more  basic  relationship  of  human  beings  to 
one  another  and  to  things'  -  has  been  pushed  to  the  '  "periphery"  of  individual 
lifte'  and  is  to  be  located  in  traditional  strata  who  are  now  more  marginal  to 
the  new  predominantly  bourgeois  world.  It  is  in  this  context  that  Mannheim 
argues  for  the  importance  of  the  romantic  reaction  against  the  Enlightenment. 
This  provides  .  is  with  a  different  way  of  viewing  Mannheim's  concern  with 
the  romantic  movement  which  he  vas  to  take  up  in  his  Habilitationschrift  on 
conservative  thought  in  the  following  year.  This  anti  -rationalist  counter- 
current  to  the  E  nlightenment  and  to  positivism  is  seen  to  persist  in-  the 
writings  of  Nietzsche,  Dilthey,  Simmel,  Schopenhauer  and  one  of  the  two 
contemporary  currents  in  phenomenology  (Heidegger). 
As  part  of  this  tradition  and  central  to  the  formulation  of  an  alternative 
methodology,  is  the  historicist  tradition.  The  concern  for  a  delineation  of 
what  was  specific  about  historical  consciousness  led  to  the  problem  of.  under- 
standing.  Although  taken  up  later  by  Rickert  in  a  rationalistic  direction,  it 
was  Dilthey  who  showed  that 
" 
'one  cannot  solve  the  problem  of  understanding  as  long 
as  one  bases  methodology  upon  the  epistemological 
subject  and  not  the  "whole  human  being".  1  138 
Though  Dilthey  later  became  interested  in  the  phenomenological  tradition,  the 
latter  at  first  operated  with  the  notion  of  a  supra-temporal  consciousness. 52 
Dilthey  was  also  significant  in  establishing  the  analysis  of-world  views  as  a 
theoretical  task.  However,  Dilthey  was  falsely  opposed  to  sociology  as  a 
discipline,  partly  because  he  saw  only  its  negative  positivistic  side.  Some- 
what  astonishingly,  Mannheim  argues  that  Marx  saw  the  fruitful  aspect  of 
positivism  which  was  transposed  into  a  study  of  the  social  economic  processes 
underlying  ideologies.  Mannheim  indeed  interprets  Marx  as  a  kind  of  positiv- 
ist  who  amalgamated  Hegel  and  positivism. 
Within  the  same  frame  of  reference,  Mannheim  sees  the  emergence  of  the 
proletariat  and  its  world-view  as  a  further  crucial  counter  to  the  dominant 
bourgeois  rationality.  This  opposition  gives  it  certain  affinities  to  conserv- 
ative  thought  (its  opposition  to  capitalism  and  to  its  abstraction)  and  to 
irrationalism  (its  chiliastic  elements  and  its  adoption  of  Hegelian  dialectics 
which  Mannheim  also  views  as  containing  a  strong  irrational  aspect).  But  in 
so  far  as  proletarian  thought  must  penetrate  capitalist  rationality  it  is  'in  a 
certain  sense,  more  rationalistic'.  Unlike  later  work  -  especially  Ideologie 
und  Utopie  -  and  unlike  Lukäcs'  major  work,  Mannheim  does  not  develop  his 
notion  of  proletarian  thought  any  further  here  but  instead  moves  in  a  direction 
which  does,  in  fact,  anticipate  a  central  argument  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie. 
Because  these  diverse  tendencies  of  bourgeois  rationalist  thought,  anti- 
rationalist  (bourgeois)  thought  and  proletarian  thought  do  exist  historically 
and  because  Mannheim  is  intent  upon  providing  a  perspectivism  that  will  be 
able  to  grasp  historical  tendencies,  he  feels  compelled  to  call  for  a  'synthesis' 
of  these  opposing  currents.  Having  rejected  any  form  of  monism,  of  the  notion 
of  a  single  truth,  Mannheim  is  compelled  to  commence  his  analysis  with  the 
problem  of  relativism  which  'has  become  for  us  today  a  question  of  life'  . 
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Mannheim  argues  that  'the  epoch  has  its  truth'  but  that  this  truth  is  not 
immediately  given.  Rather,  it 
'is  only  possible  from  standpoints  which  are  formed 
in  history,  which  emerge  as  functions  of  history. 
However,  since  each  direction  of  thought  is  partial 
(as  are  the  social  currents  and  their  basic  intentions 
which  they  bear)  the  totality  can  only  be  grasped  in 
a  synthesis.  '  136 
Hence,  this  totality  is  to  be  grasped  'not  through  a  "leap"  out  of  history  but 
through  an  even  deeper  engagement  in  it'.  At  this  point  -  i.  e.  at  the  end  of 
the  first  section  of  Mannheim's  methodological  reflections  -  we  see  that 
Mannheim,  on  the  one  hand,  recognizes  that  there  can  be  no  knowledge  of  the 
totality  outside  history  (and  that  includes  all  positivistic  abstractions  from  it) 
and  that  it  must  come  from  greater  engagement  but,  on  the  other  hand,  he  is 
unprepared  to  push  the  contradictory  world-views  any  further  (a  task  made 
impossible  by  his  lack  of  commitment  of  any  of  them)  and  can  therefore  only 
call  for  a  synthesis  of  them.  As  yet,  the  social  location  of  this  synthesis 
Is  not  provided  but  the  argument  so  far  presented  in  no  way  contradicts  the 
subsequent  introduction  of  a  relatively  detached  intelligentsia  who  are  both 
engaged  and  detached.  However,  Mannheim  proceeds  -  in  the  longest 
section  of  the  treatise  -  to  outline  a  sociological  theory  of  understanding  and 
culture  which  not  merely  advances  his  sociology  of  culture  but  also  more 
fully  illustrates  the  extent  to  which  the  sociology  of  knowledge  is  closely  tied 
to  the  wider  context  of  the  Methodenstreit  in  the  social  sciences. 
Mannheim  pursues  his  sociological  theory  of  understanding  by  developing 
the  sociological  foundations  of  one  of  the  two  methodological  positions  he 
outlined  earlier.  The  positivistic  quantitative  tradition  culminated  in  'the 
deanthropomorphizing  of  the  results  of  knowledge',  'a  societalization  of 54 
these  results  of  knowledge',  whereas  the  qualitative  tradition  is  anthropomor- 
phic  and  culminated  in  'the  communalization  of  the  results  of  knowledge'. 
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On  the  basis  of  this  distinction,  Mannheim  seeks  to  revise  one  part  of  the 
methodology  of  historical  cognition,  namely  the  theory  of  interpretation  as  it 
affects  the  historian  or  the  sociologist  of  culture  who 
'either  seeks  to  understand  concrete  cultural  object- 
ivations  or  individual  characters  or  who  makes  it 
his  task  to  ascertain  the  contexts  of  intelligible 
relationships  between  individual  objectivations 
and  the  total  iti  tes  of  world-views  associated  with 
them,  between  social  strata  and  their  ideologies 
or  is  concerned  with  the  elaboration  of  the  con-  14,1 
tinuities  of  ideas  and  their  changes  in  function.  ' 
What  is  important  here  is  that  Mannheim  sees  the  study  of  ideology  as  part 
of  a  wider  process  of  interpretation  of  cultural  phenomena  and  not  as  in  any 
way  clashing  with  a  sociology  of  knowledge  as  in  some  of  his  later  work. 
Indeed,  when  he  speaks  of  the  existence  of  'concrete  interpretation  in  a 
specific  form  as  the  investigation  of  ideology,  as  the  sociology  of  culture', 
it  is  almost  as  if  he  ascribes  to  them  an  equal  status  within  a  theory  of  inter- 
pretation.  Yet  Mannheim  goes  further  than  this  and  argues  that,  viewed 
historically,  it  was  'only  the  new  group  of  tasks  of  the  study  of  ideology 
[which]  had  also  awakened  the  need  within  sociology  to  confront  the  problem 
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of  understanding'  .  What  is  not  clear  from  this  context  is  whether  Mann- 
heim  is  referring  specifically  to  LukIcs'  Geschichte  und  Klassenbewusstsein 
or,  more  generally,  to  the  influence  of  the  Marxist  critique  of  ideology.  It 
seems  legitimate  to  surmise,  however,  that  Mannheim  implies  both  since 
this  whole  treatise  abounds  in  the  presentation  and  confrontation  with  Lukäcs' 
account. 
The  attempt  to  examine  the  presuppositions  for  a  sociological  theory  of  under- 55 
standing  and  interpretation  takes  Mannheim  to  the  very  heart  of  the  sociology 
of  knowledge  and  his  later  concerns.  Among  the  important  themes  which  he 
examines  are:  the  subject-object  relationship  in  understanding,  conjunctive 
knowledge,  the  conjunctive  community  of  experience  and  the  role  of  language 
within  such  a  community,  collective  representations,  the  communal  subject 
of  interpretation  and  the  dynamics  of  conjunctive  knowledge.  These  will  now 
be  summarised  in  order  to  demonstrate  not  only  how  this  treatise  anticipates 
his  later  work  but  also  how  it  unwittingly  anticipates  the  recent  critiques  of 
positivism  by  Habermas  and  Apel. 
The  central  unjustified  presupposition  of  natural  scientific  methodology  is  that 
it  '  hypostat  i  zes  one  form  of  knowledge  into  knowledge  as  such'  .It  is  rooted 
In  'a  specific  type  of  existential  relationship',  in  a  calculatory  experience. 
This  particular  type  of  knowledge  'in  fact  implies  a  specific  form  not  only 
of  the  depersonalization  and  dehumanization  of  knowledge,  and  as  such  alienates 
its  objects,  but  it  also  presupposes  such  "estrangement"'. 
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This  cal- 
culatory  knowledge  not  only  implies  a  change  in  human  relationships  but  a 
change  that  accords  with  a  capitalist  society.  This  narrow  definition  of  what 
legitimately  constitutes  knowledge  -  on  which  excludes  much  of  human  know- 
ledge  -  is  symbolised  in  the  separation  of  theoretical  and  practical  activity 
a 
in  transcendental  philosophy.  Such  a  view  of  the  natural  scientific  mode  of 
cognition  not  only  reiterates,  in  many  respects,  Lukäcs'  critique  of  the  natural 
scientific  model  but  also,  like  Lukäcs,  equates  one  of  its  modes  -  positivism  - 
with  natural  scientific  knowledge  as  such. 
Nonetheless,  Mannheim  does  attempt  to  outline  a  more  general  social  theory 
of  knowledge  some  of  whose  premises  would  cover  both  natural  scientific  and 56 
human  scientific  knowledge.  He  argues  as  his  central  thesis  towards  a  socio- 
logical  theory  of  interpretation  that 
'every  cognitive  act  is  merely  a  dependent  part  of 
an  existential  relationship  between  subject  and 
object,  an  existential  relationship  which,  in  each 
case,  establishes  a  different  kind  of  communality 
and  a  correspondingly  specific  unity  between  the 
two.  '  144 
Mannheim  here  wishes  to  ground  different  types  of  knowledge  ontologically. 
He  argues  that  Kantian  philosophy  is  unable  to  examine  the  subject=object 
relationship  since  it  rules  out  the  ontological  dimension  and  since  it  seeks 
to  assert  that  knowledge  commences  with  conceptualizations.  In  contrast, 
Mannheim  suggests  that  what  is  to  be  known  involves  the  whole  of  conscious- 
ness  and  not  merely  its  theoretical  side..  The  broader  notion  of  knowledge 
involves  any  existential  taking  up  of  the  object  by  consciousness;  the 
narrower  notion  implies  conceptual  objectivation.  Within  the  context  of  the 
broader  notions  of  knowledge,  Mannheim  is  concerned  to  develop  the  basic 
presuppositions  and  features  of  human  knowledge.  In  so  doing,  he  intro- 
duces  the  concept  of  what  he  terms  'conjunctive  knowledge'  (taken  from 
von  Weizsäcker). 
Conjunctive  knowledge  is  knowledge  for  interacting  human  subjects  located 
in  the  same  existential  community.  It  is  perspectival  knowledge  which  is 
'completely  one-sided'.  Mannheim  provides  us  with  the  familiar  example  - 
used  later  in  his  work  -  of  a  landscape  seen  from  various  viewpoints  and  with 
the  example  of  the  story-teller  who  lies  behind  a  story.  Both  examples  indeed 
display  Mannheim's  extreme  preoccupation  with  the  subjective  side  of  know- 
ledge  in  the  subject-object  relationship.  This  limits  the  sphere  of  validity 
of  conjunctive  knowledge  to  those  with  whom  one  has  an  existential  relation- 57 
ship;  it  is  bounded  by  a  community  of  experience  and  its  validity  is  limited 
to  participants.  The  advantage  of  this  account  lies  in  Mannheim's  ability 
to  escape  the  individual  solipsism  of  much  traditional  epistemology  for,  he 
argues,  'the  precondition  for  self-knowledge  is  social  existence'  and  not  the 
isolated  self.  The  starting  point  of  a  social  theory  of  knowledge  must  be  - 
as  in  Scheler's  sociology  of  knowledge  -  the  'we'  relationship  which  can  be 
enlarged  from  two  people  to  a  whole  experiential  community.  Unlike  Scheler, 
however,  Mannheim  constructs  a  whole  theory  of  knowledge  upon  the  basis 
of  the  'wet  relationship  and  contrasts  this  conjunctive  knowledge  with  what 
he  terms  -  somewhat  inappropriately  -  'communicative  knowledge'  that  is 
the  aim  of  natural  scientific  methodology  and  all  who  follow  it.  Whereas 
conjunctive  knowledge  is  located  in  and  bounded  by  an  existential  community, 
communicative  knowledge  is  societalized  knowledge,  that  is,  it  aims  to  be 
universal  knowledge  that  is  unbounded  by  experiential  communities  and  per- 
spectives. 
The  contrasts  between  the  two  types  of  knowledge  can  be  illustrated  by  the 
role  of  concepts  and  language  in  conjunctive  knowledge.  Whereas  natural 
scientific  concept  formation  is  predicated  upon  'the  utopian  ideal'  of  creat- 
ing  'a  supra-temporal  conceptual  level',  concepts  and  their  meaning  in  con- 
junctive  knowledge  are  anchored  in  the  living  community  from  which  they 
emerged.  Mannheim  here  speaks  of  'the  functional  anchoredness  of  concepts 
and  thought  at  the  existential  level'.  But  the  function  of  concepts  in`con- 
0 
junctive  knowledge  is  different  from  that  in  natural  scientific  knowledge  in 
that' 
'I  ife  and,  in  particular,  life  in  the  conjunctive  realm 
of  experience,  creates  ...  concepts  not  for  the  purposes 
of  theoretical  contemplation 
...  but  rather  in  order  to 53 
continue  to  exist  in  them  and  with  them.  They 
are  the  organ  of  the  ongoing  current  of  life  and, 
at  the  same  time,  living  activity.  1  145 
That  is,  it  is  not  merely  that  they  emerge  from  life's  experiences  but  also 
return  to  that  reality  in  order  for  it  to  continue  to  exist  and  in  order  for  it  to 
be  transformed.  Though  Mannheim  quotes  Marx's  eleventh  thesis  on  Feuer- 
bach  in  this  context,  he  does  not  elaborate  on  the  transformative  function  of 
language  but  continues  to  devote  most  of  his  attention  to  its  emergence  out 
of  the  stream  of  life  experiences  in  the  conjunctive  community.  Thus,  it 
is  precisely  its  dependency  upon  its  experiential  origins  that  is  constitutive 
for  this  type  of  knowledge;  it  is  fixed  within  a  particular  community  of  ex- 
perience.  The  function  of  language  within  this  sphere  then  consists  in  the 
articulation  of  this  experience  and  its  fixing  within  specific  phases  of  the 
, 
flow  of  conjunctive  experience.  Therefore,  in  order  to  understand  conjunct 
ively  conditioned  concepts,  one  needs  to  master  'the  totality  of  this  world 
and  not  the  totality  of  an  abstract  conceptual  realm'  . 
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Whereas  general 
concepts  are  potentially  valid  for  all,  conjunctive,  historical  concepts  are 
valid  only  for  members  of  a  particular  sphere  of  experience  and  hence  'the 
accumulated  experience  in  a  historical,  conjunctive  concept  is  and  remains 
perspectival  1.  Mannheim  sees  this  conceptual  distinction  as  expressing 
the  parallel  sociological  distinctions  made  by  Täinnes  between  Gemeinschaft 
and  Gesellschaft  and  by  Alfred  Weber  between  Kultur  and  Zivilization. 
I 
Mannheim  concedes  that  it  is  possible  to  enlarge  the  community  of  ex- 
a 
perience  as  the  basis  of  conjunctive  knowledge  but  is  undecidad  whether 
It  can  be  extended  to  humanity  as  such.  He  does  argue,  however,  that  new 
generations  both  emerge  into  and  transform  the  community  of  experience. 
This  forms  the  basis  for  his  later  article  on  the  problem  of  generations  which 5y 
not  merely  conceives  of  them  as  communities  of  shared  experience  but  also 
as  co-determinants  of  social  knowledge. 
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Yet,  at  this  stage,  it  is  the 
overwhelming  dependency  of  conjunctive  knowledge  upon  'life'  and  the 
living  community  that  is  paramount.  This  dependency  testifies  to  the  strength 
of  Lebensphilosophie's  hold  over  Mannheim's  thought  which  prevents  him  from 
relating  social  knowledge  back  to  anything  more  precise  than  common  life- 
experiences,  social  strata  or  even  merely  'life'  Itself.  Precisely  how  'life 
experiences'  become  an  autonomous  determinant  of  social  knowledge  is  never 
made  clear. 
Rather,  Mannheim  persists  with  an  analysis  of  conjunctive  knowledge  that 
not  merely  anticipates  Schutz's  phenomenological  account  of  social  know- 
ledge  but  also  deals  extensively  -  and  perhaps  on  the  only  occasion  in  Mann- 
heim's  work  -  with  Durkheim's  notion  of-collective  representation.  Mannheim 
again  asserts  that  it  is  the  group  rather  than  the  individual  which  forms  the 
primary  level  of  social  knowledge  and  that  -  in  anticipation  of  Schutz  -  it  is 
likely  to  be  'a  completely  stereotyped  field  of  experience'  which  confronts 
the  individual.  The  world  of  social  reality  which  confronts  the  individual  is 
not  one  which  immediately  offers  an  infinite  range  of  possible  experiences  but 
is  already  structured  by'stereotyped  experiences,  by  ritualised  social  activity; 
by  collective  representations.  Collective  representations  form  a  part  of  con- 
junctive  experiences  but  are  more  than  structures  of  experience;  they  constit- 
ute  objectivities  that  are  supra-individual,  'even  though  only  for  members  of' 
i 
the  particular  community  of  experience.  Mannheim  suggests  that  Durkheim 
is  mistaken  in  treating  collective  representations  as  things;  rather,  they  're- 
late'  to  things  that  exist.  Similarly,  though  they  extend  beyond  the  individ- 
ual  mind,  there  is  no  single  group  individual  that  possesses  all  of  a  group's 60 
knowledge  and  there  is  no  collective  representation  that  cannot  be  realised 
through  an  individual.  Mannheim  sees  this  as  being  closely  related  to  the 
new  idealist  philosophy  of  Meinong  and  Husserl  with  its  notion  of  intentional 
objects  and  their  validity.  Mannheim  conceives  of  validity  from  two  stand- 
points,  from  standpoints  that  are  later  to  involve  him  in  considerable  diffi- 
_  culty: 
'First  of  all,  validity  means  quite  simply  a  parti- 
cular  type  of  mode  of  being;  it  is,  as  such,  an 
ontological  category.  On  the  other  hand,  how- 
ever,  in  its  expression  validity  also  implies  the 
notion  that  the  relevant  content  is  not  merely  a 
specific  mode  of  being  but  also  contains  an  im- 
perative  aspect 
[Forderungscharakter] 
, 
it  implies 
a  norm  -  namely  a  norm  confronting  all  possible 
human  subjects.  1  148 
A  statement  can  thus,  in  this  second  sense,  possess  supra-temporal  validity. 
Once  again,  however,  it  must  be  pointed  out  here  that  Mannheim  later 
neglects  the  normative  aspect  of  validity  and  concentrates  almost  entirely 
upon  validity  as  an  ontological  category.  This  conforms  well  with  his  theory 
of  the  existential  boundedness  of  thought  but  prevents  him  from  moving  in 
the  direction  of  a  discussion  of  the  normative  aspect  of  knowledge  that  has 
more  recently  been  expounded  by  writers  like  Habermas. 
"  In  relation  to  Durkheim's'  notion  of  collective  representations,  Mannheim 
argues  that  these  are  objective  in  terms  of  their  relationship  to  the  relevant 
group  but  are  not  supra-temporally  objective.  They  are  associated  with  group 
f 
existence  at  a  specific  stage  of  history.  Hence,  the  basic  difference  between 
a  theoretical  statement  and  a  collective  representation  is  that  the  former  goes 
beyond  the  soclo-historical  constellation  in  which  it  has  its  origin  whereas 
the  latter  possesses  a  functionality  precisely  for  its  constellation.  In  other 
words,  they  possess  a  documentary  meaning  as  well  as  having  an  expressive 61 
Having  examined  the  objectification  of  communal  experiences  in  conjunctive 
knowledge,  Mannheim  returns  briefly  to  the  notion  of  the  cognitive  subject  of 
this  knowledge.  Whereas  the  cognitive  subject  of  natural  scientific  method- 
ology  is  a  constructed  concept,  in  the  human,  historical  sciences  it  is  the 
whole  human  being.  Similarly,  where  we  are  concerned  with  historical  know- 
ledge,  the  cognitive  subject  is  not  a  supra-temporal  construct  ('a  conscious- 
ness  as  such  in  ourselves')  but  'the  collective  communal  subject  in  our- 
selves'  . 
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Within  this  conjunctive  realm,  there  exist  as"many  'spheres  of 
significance'  as  there  are  spheres  of  conjunctive  experience  and  'hence  each 
specific  conjunctive  experience-is  tied  to  a  specific  context  of  significance 
which  can  only  be  realised  in  a  specific  community  of  individual  ancYcollect- 
ive  experience'  . 
150 
This  dimension  of  Mannheim's  argument  prefigures  the 
later  phenomenological  account  by  Schutz  of  what  he  terms  'structures  of 
significance'. 
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In  itself,  this  should-not  be  surprising  since  both  rely 
heavily  upon  extrapolations  from  Husserl  Is  phenomenology.  More  specifically, 
we  know  that,  at  least  in  his  earlier  works,  Mannheim  was  impressed  by 
Husserl  and  especially  by  Heidegger  whose  lectures  he  had  attended  in  Freiburg. 
Unlike  Schutz,  however,  Mannheim  retains  a  notion  of  contexts  of  experience 
that  is  more  akin  to  that  of  Dilthey  than  to  Husserl  's  concept  of  the  'life- 
'  world'. 
Mannheim  introduces  what,  for  him,  is  a  central  distinction  between  know- 
ledge  within  the  natural  scientific  realm  and  knowledge  within  the  historical 
sphere.  Since  Mannheim  argues  that  the  cognitive  subject  of  natural  science 
is  a  supra-temporal  subject,  it  is  not  surprising  that  he  should  view  this 
subject  of  historical  modes  of  thought-since  it  is  rooted  in  communal  ex- 
periences  -  as  ultimately  dynamic.  Mannheim's  erroneous  view  of  the 62 
natural  sciences  (for  example,  ignoring  what  is  today  a  post-Kuhnian  common- 
place,  namely,  that  this  sphere  of  knowledge  is  also  grounded  in  communal 
experience  either  empirically,  in  the  form  of  the  scientific  community  as  in 
Kuhn  or  Popper,  or  transcendentally  as  in  Apel's  theory)  also  leads  him  to 
argue  that  changes  in  meaning  can  only  occur  in  the  cultural  sphere,  within 
'the  sphere  of  the  conjunctively  bounded  community  of  experience'  .  This 
view  certainly  strengthens  his  conception  of  historical  knowledge  as  dynamic, 
but  it  also  leads  him  to  over-emphasize  the  subjective  dimension  of  know- 
ledge  in  this  sphere  and,  correspondingly,  to  under-emphasize  this  dimension 
in  natural  scientific  knowledge  (e.  g.  the  community  of  scientists).  Thus, 
he  argues  that,  in  the  conjunctive  realm,  'change  in  the  meaning.  of  concepts 
is  anchored  in  change  in  the  collective  phenomenon  itself  ', 
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without  real- 
Ising  that,  even  at  the  time  of  writing,  the  concepts  of  space,  mass  and 
time,  for  example,  had  radically  changed  in  meaning  with  the  new  theory 
relativity  when  compared  to  the  seemingly  identical  concepts  in  Newtonian 
physics.  Nonetheless,  it  is  worth  following  Mannheim's  argument  on  the 
dynamic  aspect  of  the  communal  realm  of  life  and  experience,  since  it  illum- 
inates  very  clearly  his  treatment  of  the  dynamic  dimension  of  historical  know- 
ledge  -a  dimension  that  was  consistently  significant  in  his  writings. 
The  actual  tempo  of  change  in  conjunctive  knowledge  is  quite  varied  and 
dependent  upon  several  factors.  For  instance,  the  process  of  stereotyping 
'dams  up'  the  flow  of  conjunctive  experience.  Similarly,  the  perspectives 
.r 
from  which  the  communal  subject  views  the  institutions  and  norms  of  the 
society  are  likewise  'dammed  up'  by  the  process  of  stereotyping  and  the  flow 
of  collective  representations  is  likewise  retarded.  This  notion  of  the  stereo- 
typing  process  which  Mannheim  derives  from  Weber's  concept  of  'magical 63 
stereotyping',  is  significant  in  the  light  of  his  later  characterization  of  ideQl- 
ogles  as  a  check  upon  and  a  block  to  genuine  experience  of  a  historical  situ- 
ation  but,  somewhat  surprisingly,  this  connection  is  not  made  here.  Rather, 
the  discussion  of  stereotyping  leads  Mannheim  to  take  up  the  notion  of  collect- 
ive  representations  again  and  to  argue  that  society's  institutions  are  not  merely 
existent  entities  but  also  reflected  notions  shared  by  the  communal  subject. 
Economic  structures  and  forms  of  the  state,  for  example,  are  not,  for  Mann- 
heim,  natural  structures  but  must  be  understood  in  terms  of  the  totality  of 
the  relationships  which  constitute  them.  Likewise,  Mannheim  agrees  with 
Max  Adler  in  considering  'the  economic  sphere  not  as  a  material  natural 
i 
sphere  but  already  as  a  cultural  geistige  one' 
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That  is,  we  do  not  ex- 
perience  our  existence  in  a  purely  nominalistic  manner  but  within  a  parti- 
cular  cultural  context.  Mannheim  specifically  counters  Weber's  excessive 
nominalism  with  the  argument  that  it  presupposes  'that  only  the  individual 
subject  exists  and  that  contexts  and  structures  of  meaning  only  exist  insofar 
as  individual  subjects  conceive  of  them  or  are  in  some  manner  consciously 
orientated  towards  them'  . 
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In  contrast,  Mannheim  claims  that  the 
historian  and  sociologist  is  interested  in  supra-individual  structures  that 
extend  beyond  individual  consciousness,  in  structures  that  constitute  'inter- 
human  constellations  of  meaning'  and  should  not,  as  nominalism  would  have 
It,  treat  them  as  methodological  constructs  of  the  observing  subject.  Rather 
there  exist  'extremely  interesting  existential  relationships  between  the  in- 
tellectual  realities  of  an  age  and  the  reflexive,  conjunctive  experiences  of 
them'  .  The  former  exist,  as  it  were,  'behind  the  reflexive  consciousness 
of  the  single  individual'.  These  realities,  as  'global'  realities,  are  per- 
ceived  from  with  conjunctive  communities  so  that  knowledge  of  them  is 
perspectival  and  bounded  by  particular  standpoints.  Thus,  there  exists  an 64 
interaction  between  intellectual  realities  and  reflection  upon  them  from  with- 
in  a  community.  It  is  the  dynamics  of  both  realities  and  their  relationship 
which  interests  Mannheim. 
He  expresses  this  dynamic  relationship  in  the  following  manner: 
'Each  aspect  of  conjunctive  knowledge  of  the 
historical  sphere  is  not  only  bound  up  in  its 
emergence  to  the  social  sphere  of  experience 
and  to  the  intellectual  realities  that  absorb  it, 
but  also  each  new  aspect  of  knowledge  is  again 
returned  back  to  ongoing  life  and  transforms  the 
formation  and  thereby  the  intellectual  state  of 
these  intellectual  realities:  '  155 
Concepts  and  the  intellectual  realities  which  they  express  are  not  identical. 
It  is,  therefore,  Mannheim's  task  to  examine  'the  dynamic  of  intellectual 
realities'  and  'the  dynamic  of  the  conceptual  level'. 
Mannheim  seeks  to  distinguish  three  types  of  intellectual  reality:  what 
Durkheim  termed  institutions;  structures  of  meaning  that  comprehend  the 
natural  environment  and  the  inner  world  and  finally  the  individual  'work'. 
There  exist  also  collective  creations  such  as  language  and  morality  that  are 
neither  fully  characterised  as  institutions  or  'works'  .  Each  of  these  intell- 
ectual  realities  has  a  particular  mods  of  existence  that  cannot  be  identified 
with  or  reduced  to  the  reified  existence  of  individual  psychological  existence. 
The  social  realm  is  thus  full  of  collective  creations  of  the  life-community. 
Each  of  them  changes  but  not  in  isolation:  'the  transformation  of  one  sphere 
0  is  codetermined  by  change  in  the  others  I. 
156  In  itself  this  would  suggest 
a  mutual  interaction  of  intellectual  real  itites  which  gave  prominence  to  no 
single  one  of  them.  It  also  suggests  a  notion  of  reality  asFin  interrelated 
network  that  Is  often  found  in  Simmmel's  work.  However,  Mannheim  argues 65 
that  objective  tendencies  can  be  extracted  from  within  this  flux,  at  least 
within  the  totality  of  a  single  intellectual  totality.  Any  structure  may  con- 
tain  several  objective  tendencies.  Yet 
'which  of  these  tendencies  is  adopted  by  the  total 
intention  (Gesamtwollen)  is  only  explicable  from 
the  existence  of  the  living  community  and  not  solely 
from  the  structure  of  the  objective  form.  '  157 
In  this  way,  Mannheim  argues  against  those  types  of  interpretation  which 
interpret  a  work  solely  in  terms  of  its  own  structure.  Nonetheless,  the 
existence  of  a  wide  diversity  of  cultural  communities  can  only  lead  back  to 
the  possibility  of  asserting  the  dependency  of  perspectives  upon  different 
communities  which  the  individual  participates  in.  Within  his  total  existence, 
the  individual  participates  in  'various  stages  and  circles  of  communities' 
and  which  one  is  important  to  him  can  only  be  derived  from  a  historical 
analysis. 
It  is  this  diversity  of  perspective,  rooted  in  specific  experiential  communities, 
which  raises  special  problems  for  the  social  and  human  sciences.  The  imman- 
ent  or  intrinsic  level  within-these  sciences  is  small  compared  with  the  natural 
sciences;  their  total  problematic  grows  out  of  the  social  process  and  'esp- 
ecial  ly  out  of  social  struggles'  .  Similarly,,  intellectual  realities,  though 
historically  specific,  have  something  global  and  total  about  them  com- 
pared  with  perspectives,  with  'particular  reflexive  knowledge'  I.  Expressed 
differently,  we  can  see  that  in  the  social  sciences  there  is  a  specific  problem 
of  interpretation  at  issue  here  since  every  structure  possesses  'an  intended 
meaning  and  an  objective  meaning'.  The  former  belongs  to  the  conjunctive 
sphere,  the  latter  to  the  communicative.  What  Mannheim  is  intent  upon 
demonstrating  is  that  we  need  to  take  account  of  the  conjunctive  sphere  in  the 66 
social  sciences.  It  is  doubtful,  however,  whether  he  shows  clearly  how  the 
two  spheres  relate  to  one  another.  In  a  summary  of  this  section,  he  does, 
at  least,  state  the  problem  he  is  faced  with: 
'intellectual  structures  of  the  most  diverse  type 
fill  the  communal  sphere  of  experience;  they 
are  objectivities  opposed  to  the  human  subjects 
which  can  have  these  structures  in  a  dual  manner 
and  at  two  levels.  First  of  all,  in  pre-reflexive 
intellectual  intentionality  in  which  one  simply 
realizes  them  (one  also  terms  this  "living  in  the 
structures").  And  secondly,  in  that  one  is  orien- 
tated  theoretically  and  reflexively  upon  them. 
One  can  only  be  orientated  perspectivally  towards 
intellectual  spheres  ...  '  158 
Any  epoch  of  a  cultural  community  is  confronted  with  a  series  of  competing 
'  intentions  towards  the  world' 
[  Weltwollungen.  3that  also  express  diverse  in- 
tellectual  intentions.  Historical  knowledge  must  therefore  bring  some  order 
to  this  diversity  or,  as  Mannheim  puts  it,  'historical  knowledge  -  insofar  as 
it  constitutes  an  interpretation  -  is  the  ordering  of  intellectual  realities  of 
heterogeneous  origin  within  the  historical  realm  of  our  life  and  experience  I  . 
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This  distinction  between  pre-reflexive  knowledge  located  within  the  community 
of  experience  and  theoretical  reflexive  knowledge,  in  turn,  has  important 
implications  for  the  problem  of  interpretation.  Understanding,  for  Mannheim, 
Involves  two  elements:  understanding  through  contagion  -  in  the  sense  of 
Freudian  psychology  -  or  empathy,  which  is  an  inner  capacity  of  the  individual, 
and  understanding  in  terms  of  locating  something  within  a  life-context,  which 
Is  an  intellectual  capacity:  - 
f 
'hence  we  distinguish  understanding  of  existence 
(existential,  inner  contagion)  and  understanding 
of  meaningful  entities  (comprehension  of  mean- 
ing,  intellectual  understanding).  1  160 
In  our  ongoing  life-experience,  the  two  are  clearly  connected  but  in  the  case  of 67 
'the  understanding  of  intellectual  realities  which 
belong  to  a  particular  sphere  of  experience,  we 
apprehend  the  particular  exi-stentially-bounded 
perspectival  meanings  only  when  we  somehow 
investigate  the  sphere  and  structure  of  experience 
that  lies  behind  them.  '  161 
It  is  worth  pointing  out  here  that  this  distinction  remains  central  to  Mann- 
heim's  later  analysis  of  ideology  not  only  in  the  sense  that  intellectual  under- 
standing  must  somehow  rise  above  pre-reflexive  acceptance  of  ideologies  in 
order  for  us  to  engage  in  a  critique  of  ideology  but  also  in  that,  for  the  'relativ- 
ly  unattached  intelligentsia',  their  experience  of  diverse  conjunctive  commun- 
ities  assists  their  intellectual  understanding  of  the  knowledge  (ideologies), 
that  ar 
fe 
derived  from  them.  At  this  stage  of  his  analysis,  Mannheim  wishes 
to  designate  supra-conjunctive  understanding  FVerstehen]  by  another  term,  that 
of  comprehension 
[Begreifen].  This  theoretically'  reflexive  comprehension 
Mannheim  terms  'interpretation',  in  contrast  to  understanding  which  he  do- 
fines  as  'the  penetration  of  a  communally  bounded  sphere  of  experience,  of 
its  structures  of  mewing  and  of  the  existential  bases  of  these  structures. 
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The  perspectival  nature  of  both  simple  understanding  and  the  interpretation  of 
intellectual  structures  is  manifested 
'not  only  for  reflexive  comprehension  in  interpre- 
tation  but  already  for  the  existential  relationship 
of  the  human  subject  to  the  forms  of  alien  subjects 
and  alien  world  which,  in  a  historical  tradition,  can 
confront  him  as  a  'pre-world'  ['Vorwelt.  t  163 
In,  other  words,  Mannheim  recognizes  here  the  central  mediating  function  of 
tradition  in  hermeneutic  understanding.  There  exists  no  pure  interpretation  by 
the  human  subject  of  his  object;  rather,  this  relationship  is  mediated  by  the 
pre-existing  location  of  the  objects  within  a  specific  historical  tradition. 
However,  the  relationship  between  the  knowing  subject  and  his  object  is 68 
mediated  not  merely  by  a  historical  tradition  that  is  already  given  to  the 
human  subject  but  also  by  utopia,  a  utopia  which 
'contains  a  direction,  standpoint,  perspective  and 
problematic  from  which  the  existent  and  the  emer- 
gent  first  become  graspable  at  all.  The  investigation 
of  the  structure  of  utopia  is  therefore  one  of  the  most 
essential  tasks  in  the  sociology  of  thought.  1  164 
Thus,  in  his  first  systematic  reference  to  utopia,  its  function  for  Mannheim  is 
within  the  context  of  a  sociological  theory  of  interpretation.  But  even  at  this 
early  stage,  Mannheim  also  argues  for  its  political  significance  too.  He  views 
pure  utopianism  as  pre-scientific,  emerging  out  of  the  'tension  between  exist- 
AS 
ence  and  demand'  and  alsooperspectival.  Even  at  the  scientific  level,  con- 
cepts  remain  political  since 
'historical-sociological  knowledge  is  also  per- 
spectival  and  each  concept  in  such  a  dynamic 
reflexion  contains  a  dynamic  perspectivity: 
the  general  tensio  lives  within  it.  In  the  words 
"capitalism",  "proletariat"  and  "culture"  a 
compilation  is  not  contained  and  intended  but 
rather  a  directional  movement  viewed  from  a 
standpoint  embedded  in  the  historical  flux. 
Of  course,  it  is  in  their  concrete  specificity 
that  these  concepts  are  determined  by  a  direct- 
Ion  and  not  as  abstract  desti  l  lata.  1  165 
This  prompts  Mannheim  to  ask  'which  of  sociology's  concepts  are  clearly  not 
complicated  and  constituted  by  some  political  tensio?  '  It  leads  Mannheim 
to  question  once  more  Max  Weber's  nominalism  and  theory  of  value-freedom. 
The  understanding  and  interpretation  of  intellectual  realities  in  earlier  epochs. 
Implies  their  injection  into  our  own  realm  of  experience.  We  can  understand 
and  interpret  them  naively  or  dynamically.  We  can  also  interpret  them  from 
within  their  own  perspective  ('immanent  understanding  and  interpretation'). 
But  there  isthe  problem  of  the  location  of  this  perspective.  Mannheim 
4 
argues  that  there  exist  several  realms  of  experience  within  the  same  epoch. 
those 
For  instance, 
Awho  experience  social  mobility  move  from  one  ml milieu  to  another and  this  means  that  the  milieu  lose  their  absolute  character.  Again,  this 
is  essential  to  Mannheim's  later  attempt  to  escape  from  the  relativist  proble- 
matic  by  positing  the  existence  of  an  intelligentsia  whose  members  possess 
socially  diverse  origins.  It  also  presupposes  that  no  one  is  necessarily  rooted 
in  any  one  of  them;  it  presupposes  a  universe  of  possibilities  that  Musil 
outlined  in  Der  Mandohne  Eigenschaften. 
These  aspects  of  conjunctive  knowledge  give  rise  to  two  specific  problems  that 
Mannheim  already  alluded  to.  The  first  is  the  nature  of  evidence  in  con- 
junctive  knowledge.  The  second  is  the  consequences  of  the  stratification  of 
realms  of  experience  and  the  separation  of  community  and  consciousness. 
Evidence  is  derived  from  the  existential  community  and  is  qualitative.  It  is 
not  guaranteed  by  formal  methods  that  lie  outside  the  community.  Rather, 
the  apprehension  of  the  qualitative  'is  not  the  result  of  the  application  of 
these  methods  but  is  the  precondition  for  the  fact  that  they  can  be  applied  at 
alI'  . 
166  Instead,  Mannheim  seeks  in  'the  phenomencn'of  genuineness' 
[Echtheit] 
an  ontological  criterion  of  truth,  indeed  a  criterion  that  is  close  to 
Heidegger's  notion  of  authenticity{Eigentlichkeit]in  Sein  und  Zeit. 
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It 
is  summed  up  in  the  following  passage  : 
'Where  the  inherent  perspectivity  of  some  particular 
conjunctive  knowledge  is  given,  then  there,  4xists 
within  this  perspectivity  genuine-and  ungenuine 
existences  and  also  genuine  and  ungenuine  parti- 
cipation  in  experiences.  An  existence  is  genuine 
which  exists  on  the  basis  of  its  ontological  prin- 
ciple  Seinsprinzipl;  an  experience  is  genuine  whose 
perspectivity  is  determined  only  through  the  perspect- 
ivity  of  the  standpoint.  '  168 
4 
In  this  way,  genuineness  becomes  'merely  an  expression  of  the  search  for 
such  an  ontological  criterion  of  truth'  I.  Truth  thus  resides  within  'a  con- 
junctive  experiential  community  of  authorities 
{Kennernj'i 
within  acommunity 70 
that  is  usually  conservative  and  bounded  by  tradition.  It  is  these  onto- 
logical  roots  of  knowledge  (including  ideology)  that  later  give  rise  to  the 
sheer  massivity  of  competing  ideologies  that  are  each,  from  their  own  perspect- 
ive,  equally  valid. 
The  second  related  problem  which  Mannheim  confronts  is  the  consequences 
of  a  stratified  society  for  conjunctive,  knowledge.  The  unity  of  world  intent- 
ion  and  world  structure  is,  he  argues,  only  found  in  primitive  stages  of  develop- 
ment.  This  unified  world  breaks  down  when  relationships  of  subordination 
and  domination  emerge.  Once  consequence  is  that  the  same  cultural  reality 
is  experienced  and  interpreted  differently  -  from  above  and  from  below.  -  How- 
ever,  institutional  structures  such  as  language  give  a  stratified  society  a 
communicative  sphere  not  restricted  by  conjunctive  perspectivism.  At  the 
same  time,  the  exclusiveness  of  class  communities  leads  to  the  autonomous 
dynamic  of  their  cultures  so  that  we  can  speak,  for  example,  of  'bourgeois  art'. 
At  the  level  of  the  naive  experiencing  of  the  world  communicative,  exact  know- 
ledge  is  pushed  aside  and  we  participate  almost  entirely  in  the  conjunctive 
community  of  experience  and  knowledge.  The  individual  Is  consciousness  is 
'as  it  were,  to  be  seen  as-a  petrefaction  of  previous  epochs  of  the  history  of 
"  consciousness  '.  whose  layers  and  strata  have  to  be  reconstructed  by  a  socio- 
ology  of  knowledge.  However,  there  exists  in  stratified  societies  a  'relative- 
ly  independent'  intellectual  culture 
[Bildungskultur].  Here  the  continuation 
and  development  of  the  cultural  process,  'does  not  result  immediately  from 
the  life-community  I  and  tendencies  and  world  intentions  are  experienced,  as 
it  were,  at  one  remove  from  the  primary  conjunctive  communities.  None- 
40 
theless,  'the  intellectual  culture  is  not  free-floating  since  it  can  only  exist 
primarily  out  of  the  comprehension  of  such  cultural  communities'.  -169  It  is 71 
also  not  free-floating  since  it  participants  come  from  diverse  existential 
communites  which  therby  provide  it  with  its  competing  tendencies.  This 
leads  Mannheim  to  maintain  that  development  in  the  human  sciences  is, 
unlike  the  natural  sciences,  bounded  by  specific  cultural  circles.  Within 
the  intellectual  community  at  any  one  time.,  'several  standpoints  for  reflexive 
knowledge  of  the  cultural  sphere'  are  available.  Mannheim  concludes  that 
'the  investigation  and  development  of  these  standpoints  provesto  be  the  most 
essential  task  of  any  sociology  of  culture  and  thought'. 
170 
This  is  not  the 
least  because,  faced  with  the  diversity  of  standpoints,  it  is  essential  to  grasp 
the  fundamental  movement  and  relationship  of  these  standpoints,  to  group 
them  around  the  basic  dynamic  direction  within  the  cultural  process.  This 
basic  dynamic  is  focused  around  the  development  of  the  economic  and  social 
forms  of  capitalism  and  the  groups  that  lie  behind  them.  Thus,  the  con- 
clusion  to  this  section  of  Mannheim's  manuscript  already  anticipates  the 
problematic  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie  -  the  competing  ideological  standpoints 
rooted  in  specific  social  existence;  the  need  to  grasp  the  totality  of  these 
standpoints  or  at  least  what  is  valuable  in  them  and  the  crucial  role  of  an 
intellectual  strata  in  performing  this  synthesis.  At  this  stage,  he  views 
the  preceding  analysis  as  the  attempt  'to  work  out  a  systematic  basis  for  a 
sociology  of  thought'  . 
a 
In  the  final  section  of  this  manuscript,  Mannheim  commences  an  analysis 
of  the  sociological  genesis  of  a  sociology  of  culture;  a  task  which  he  had 
already  set  himself  in  his  earlier  unpublished  treatise.  However,  this  brief 
and  unfinished  section  is,  unlike  the  earlier  attempt  to  deal  with  this  problem, 
much  more  preoccupied  with  the  theory  of  ideology,  which  is  presented  in  a 
more  sympathetic  and  sophisticated  manner.  Mannheim  views  'the  ultimate 72 
goal  of  an  investigation  of  ideology'  as  being  'to  grasp  the  total  ideological 
super-structure  with  regard  to  its  sociological  determination'  .  Such  an 
analysis  must  examine,  for  example, 
'how  a  specific  type  of  methodology  in  its  systematic 
points  of  origin  is  the  expression  of  a  specific  in- 
tellectual  intention  IDenkwollen 
,  the  latter  a  part 
of  a  specific  world  intention  Weltwol  len]  and  how  this 
world  intention  directly  coincides  -  through  a  certain 
tensio  -  with  a  specific  strata  in  a  determinate  con- 
stellation  of  the  social  process.  If  one  wishes  to 
make  more  of  the  sociology  of  culture  and  the  analy- 
sis  of  ideology  than  a  collection  of  convenient 
observations  upon  interest-determined  thought,  then 
this  latter  method  must  be  applied.  For  this  pur- 
pose,  we  must  introduce  the  concept  of  "immediate 
i  nterestedness"  and  that  of  "mediated  engagement" 
mittelbaren  Engagiertseinj.  It  would  also  be  a 
brutalisation  of  the  economic  theory  of  history  to 
interpret  the  whole  superstructure  in  all  its  parts 
as  being  linked  by  immediate  interests  to  the 
social  base.  '  171 
Mannheim  here  reveals  his  conception  of  the  analysis  of  ideology  as  one  which 
moves  from  the  intellectual  structure,  through  an  intellectual  intention  which 
is  itself  linked  to  a  particular  orientation  towards  the  world.  This,  in  turn, 
coincides  with  a  specific  strata  in  society.  At  the  level  of  his  own  method- 
ology,  Mannheim  still  maintains  that  it  is  possible  to  remove  what  is  false 
from  the  'inherent  perspectivity'  of  world  views  in  order  to  finish  up  with  a 
valid  historical  construct.  Whereas  Lukäcs  argues  that  access  to  the  totality 
of  society  is  limited  to  the  proletariat,  Mannheim  maintains  that  certain 
aspects  of  history  are  only  accessible  from  certain  'centres  of  life'  and  that 
the  whole  historical  process  may  only  be  graspable  from  a  particular  stand- 
point  from  which  we  cai  unify  all  existing  methods  and  a  view  of  'the  totality 
of  the  historical  process'.  Unlike  Lukäcs,  however,  the  nature  of  this 
totality  is  very  differently  constituted  since  it  is  derived  from  a  synthesis  of 
perspectives.  What  Mannheim  does  retain  from  Lukacs,  though  again  within 73 
a  very  different  context,  is  the  notion  of  mediation.  A  sociological  theory 
of  culture  is  not  to  be  one  that  is  merely  concerned  with  'the  investigation 
of  the  immediate  interest  of  certain  strata  in  specific  contents  but  with  med- 
fated  engaged  existence'. 
172 
It  would  be  concerned  not  merely  with  'the 
partial  interest  of  groups  that  confront  other  interest  of  groups'  but  with  the 
fact  that  'worlds  struggle  against  worlds'.  Hence,  Mannheim  argues  that 
the  sociology  of  culture  and  the  study  of  ideology  are  not  concerned  merely 
with  analysing  group  interests  in  relation  to  a  group's  position  in  society  but 
with  human  engagement  and  commitment  to  specific  'world  intentions'. 
i 
Furthermore,  Mannheim  rejects  working  exclusively  with  the  category  of  the 
end's  -means  relationship  that  is  often  implied  in  the  notion  of  'interestedness' 
and  the  direct  study  of  itrerests  on  the  grounds  that  this  would  only  be  possible 
were  one  to  treat  the  cultural  sphere  as  a  natural  process.  He  argues  that 
'Were  human  history  merely  the  struggle  for  life,  a 
vital  process,  then  it  would  not  be  necessary  that 
struggling  strata  should  fight  one  another  with  world 
views,  it  would  suffice  ...  that,  apart  from  the 
means  of  brutal  struggle,  they  also  possessed  poli- 
tical  ideologies.  However,  it  is  as  a  result  of  the 
supra-natural  sphere  of  human  beings  that  it  also 
possesses  world-views  in  which  these  ideologies 
are  embedded  and  also  that  hence  ideologies  are 
only  effective  as  ideologies  because  they  possess 
such  a  deep  anchorage.  Conversely,  however,  this 
cultural  world-view  sphere  is  not  so  free-floating 
that  in  its  point  of  departure  it  is  not  connected  with 
the  natural  and  social  side  of  social  life:  not  in  the 
sense  of  immediate  determination  but  in  the  sense 
of  a  mediated  anchored  existence.  '  173 
Thus  for  Mannheim,  ideologies  are  subordinate  to  the  more  comprehensive 
world-views  in  which  they  are  embedded  and  from  which  they  derive  their 
effectiveness.  It  also  follows  from  this  conception  of  the  sociology  of  culture 
and  the  analysis  of  ideology  that  it 74 
'represents  a  combination,,,  connection  of  natural 
scientific  and  human  scientific  methods.  It 
connects  a  natural  -scientific  study  of  the  social 
process  with  an  interpretation  of  the  whole  cul- 
tural  superstructure  that  runs  in  a  specific 
direction.  1  174 
More  clearly  than  elsewhere  in  his  work,  Mannheim  here  provides  the  clue 
as  to  why  his  analysis  of  ideology  appears  at  times  both  naturalistic  and 
positivistic  as  well  as  within  the  hermeneutic  tradition  of  interpretative 
understanding.  It  also  points  to  the  common  conception  of  Marx's  material- 
istic  analysis  of  the  social  process  as  a  natural  scientific-one  since  it  is 
apparent  that  he  associates  an  interest-theory  of  ideology  with  orthodox  Marx- 
ism,  if  not  with  Marx's  own  work.  For  concrete  instances  of  how  Mannheim 
applies  these  two  types  of  analysis  and  links  them  together  one  must  turn 
to  his  subsequent  writings. 
The  three  attempts  by  Mannheim  to  apply  the  sociology  of  knowledge  to 
specific  areas  are  the  studies  of  conservative  thought,  competition  and  gener- 
ations.  The  first  two  are  probably  of  greater  significance  than  the  third.  What 
has  been  handed  -down  to  us  as  'Das  konservative  Denken' 
175 
and,  in  English, 
as  'Conservative  Thought' 
176 
are  two  versions  of  Mannheim's  Habilitation- 
schrift  which  he  wrote  in  1925  and  was  awarded  at  Heidelberg  University  on 
12th  June  1926  after  giving  his  required  public  lecture.  Unfortunately,  the 
original  thesis  is  not  available  so  that  reference  will  be  made  to  the  published 
German  essay  which  differs,  in  some  respects,  from  the  English  version. 
"  After  his  Habilitation,  Mannheim  was  employed  by  Heidelberg  University  as 
a  Privatdozent  in  the  Institut  Mr  Social-und  Staatswissenschaften  from  the 
winter  semester  of  1926-7  until  he  accepted  the  chair  of  economics  and 
sociology  (previously  held  by  Franz  Oppenheimer)  at  Frankfurt  University  in 75 
1930.  Some  of  the  details  surrounding  his  Habilitation  will  be  dealt  with 
later  since  they  illuminate  several  aspects  of  Mannheim's  position  at  this 
time. 
The  essay  on  conservative  thought  is  usually  taken  to  be  the  prime  example 
of  Mannheim's  attempt  to  apply  the  sociology  of  knowledge  which  he  had 
already  developed  to  a  specific  area.  Certainly  none  of  his  other  applicat- 
ions  contain  evidence  of  the  kind  of  detailed  research  which  went  into  this 
examination  of  German  conservatism.  But,  of  course,  it  is  not  merely  an 
application  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge.  Rather,  it  also  signifies  an 
extension  of  Mannheim's  earlier  sociology  of  culture.  In  particular,  it  is  an 
instance  of  his  extension  of  the  analysis  of  Weltanschauungen  into  the  political 
sphere.  As  we  have  seen,  this  had  already  been  touched  upon  in  his  second 
unpublished  essay  which  even  contained  a  brief  outline  of  the  themes  to  be 
developed  in  'Das  konservative.  Denken'.  From  1926  onwards,  it  is  possible 
to  see  Mannheim's  interest  in  political  world-views  developing  up.  until  1928 
with  the  writing  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie.  In  this  period  we  also  see  the  trans- 
formation  of  an  analysis  of  world-views'  into  an  analysis  of  ideologies.  But 
the  categories  derived  from  a  Weltanschauungslehre  and  aesthetics  are  domin- 
ant  in  'Das  konservative  Denken'.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  they  are 
also  retained  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie. 
/' 
i 
For  the  moment,  it  is  worthwhile  examining  'Das  konservative  Denken'  in 
greater  detail.  Its  theme.  is  the  development  of  a  specific  'conservative 
style  of  thought'  and  the  analysis  of  it  seeks 
'to  determine  the  specific  morphology  of  this 
style  of  thought,  to  reconstruct  its  historical 76 
and  social  roots,  to  pursue  the  change  in  form 
[Gestaltwandel]  of  this  style  of  thought  in  assoc- 
iation  with  the  social  fates  of  the  groups  that  bear 
it,  to  demonstrate  its  extension  and  its  sphere  of 
emanation  in  the  whole  of  German  intellectual  life 
up  to  the  present  day.  '  177 
We  have  here  some  of  the  central  features  of  Mannheim's  programme  for  a 
sociology  of  knowledge  and  its  weaknesses.  The  object  of  analysis  remains 
rooted  in  the  earlier  framework  of  the  analysis  of  world-views,  namely,  as  a 
'style  of  thought'  .  The  changes  in  its  Gestalt  are  to  be  examined  in  the 
light  of  the  'social  fates'  of  the  groups  who  produce  such  styles  of  thought. 
As  so  often  in  Mannheim's  later  work,  the  sociological  analysis  is  to  con- 
elude  with  some  reflections  upon  the  relevance  of  this  analysis  for  the  present 
period  -a  'diagnosis  of  the  times'  that  is  evident  not  merely  in  the  book  of 
that  title  but  also  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie. 
As  with  Mannheim's  earlier  work,  the  analysis  of  world-views  is  confronted 
with  the  problem  of  the  mediation  between  particular  cultural  styles  and 
specific  social  tendencies.  This  mediation  is  not  necessarily  clarified  by  a 
hermeneutic  interpretation  which  sees  all  works,  however  far  removed  they 
"  may  be  from  'the  battlegrounds  of  life',  as  'part'  of  a  'comprehensive  con- 
text  of  experience'  .  These  contexts  or  constellations  of  experience 
CErfahrungszusammenhange] 
also  include  'everyday  life-experience'  .  The 
kind  of  knowledge  that  is  to  be  investigated,  however,  does  not  possess  this 
comprehensive  quality.  The  conservative  style  of  thought  is  also  a  form  of 
political  knowledge'  which  is  'excessive',  'perspectival'  and  'one-sided'. 
But  if  we  confront  this  'one-sidedness,  and  expose  it  then  we  can  counter  its 
'propagandistic  excesses'. 
178 
ThusýMannheim  appears  to  introduce  a  dis- 
Unction  between  the  political  dimension  of  a  style  of  thought  or  of  a  world- 77 
view  and  that  world-view  as  a  whole.  If  the  'one-sidedness'  of  this  political 
dimension  is  revealed  as  only  a  'perspective'  and  its  absolutist  claims  are 
undermined,  then  the  style  of  thought  may  well  remain  valuable  for  human 
knowledge.  In  concrete  terms,  this  means  that  the  conservative  style  of 
thought  is  part  of  a  stream  of  thought  that  lies  at  the  roots  of  the  philosophy 
of  life  of  present  times.  Its  critique  of  an  excessive  rationalism,  Mannheim 
sees  as  not  merely  a  valuable  contribution  to  the  human  sciences  but  also, 
a 
as  we  have  seen,  a  basic  step  forward  and^constituent  element  of  his  own 
sociology  of  knowledge  (i.  e.  that  knowledge  is  produced  by  real,  historical 
human  subjects  rather  than  transcendental  ones). 
This  conservatism  is  'an  objective-intellectual  structural  constellation'. 
In  order  to  examine  its  specific  'mode  of  existence'  (Seinsart),  one  must 
'first  of  all  strictly  separate  timelessness  and  objectivity  from  one  another'  . 
This  structural  constellation  is  'a  special  connectedness  of  forms  of  the  soul 
and  intellect'  which  survives  its  individual  bearers.  In  opposition  to  both 
nominalism  (Weber)  and  realism,  which  Mannheim  views  as  being  unable  to 
cope  with  the  mode  of  existence  of  such  a  structural  constellation,  he  seeks 
to  advance  a  third  alternative,  that  of  a  'historical-dynamic  structural  con- 
stellation'  that  possess  'an  objectivity  that  uniquely  commences  in  time, 
whose  fate  is  contained  within  it  and  which  finishes  with  it'.  At  the 
179 
0 
root  of  this  structural  constellation  there  is  'a  fundamental  intention  (Stil- 
rinzi  )'  that  is  also  historically  dynamic  and  which  changes  'with  the 
concrete  fates  of  living  human  beings'.  This  'fundamental  intention'  is, 
in  turn,  the  reflection  of  the  life  experience  of  a  particular  group.  This  must 
itself  be  investigated  in  greater  detail. 78 
Mannheim  examines  the  development  of  German  conservatism  in  the  first 
half  of  the  nineteenth  century  both  in  terms  of  its  'unity  of  style'  ,  its 
'inner  principle  of  development'  and  in  terms  of  its  relation  to  changes  in 
German  society.  It  becomes  a  systematic  political  style  of  thought  only  in 
reaction  to  other  styles  of  thought  (e.  g.  bourgeois  liberalism).  At  the  root 
of  these  styles  lie  different  modes  of  experiencing  the  world;  for  instance, 
the  'conservative  experiencing  of  property.  What  is  at  issue  is  not  the  nature 
of  property  relationships  but  always  for  Mannheim  -  and  this  is  true  of  other 
categories  such  as  freedom  -  the  mode  of  experiencing  them.  Hence,  when 
comparing  progressive  and  conservative  thought,  Mannheim  insists  that 
'here  we  have  before  us,  ultimately,  two  original 
types  of  experience  of  things  and  the  environment 
from  which  only  subsequently  two  currents  of 
thought  result.  '  180 
Here,  Mannheim  clearly  reveals  his  belief  in  'experience'  as  something 
prior  to  'thought'  which  appears  'only  subsequently'.  If  we  follow  through 
this  distinction  to  its  conclusion,  then  we  are  faced  with  the  problem  of  how 
to  analyse  this  non-rational  experience  that  is,  for  Mannheim  the  ens  real- 
issimum.  Presumably  it  can  only  be  approached  indirectly  throught  its  mani- 
festations  in  thought  or  other  cultural  complexes.  For  the  moment,  it  is 
important  to  note  that  Mannheim  sees  the  unity  of  the  conservative  style  of 
thought  as  being  rooted  in  the  modes  of  experiencing  property  (p.  86  f),  free- 
dom  (p.  90  f)  and  time  (p.  98  f),  which  also  includes  the  experiencing  of 
history.  All  form  part  of  a  Grunderleben.  'Conservative  thought  is  thus 
"  (embedded  in  this  form  of  experience  of  the  environment  and  inner  world'  . 
181 
As  'modern  structural  forms  of  social  existence'  develop,  so  too  does  con- 
servative  thought  become  more  reflexive  and  distanced  from  its  original  basic 
I* 
experience  .' 79 
This  analysis  of  the  conservative  style  of  thought  as  a  comprehensive  Gestalt 
is  only  the  first  part  of  Mannheim's  sociological  study.  He  goes  on  to 
examine  the  'concrete-historical  emergence'  of  this  style  of  thought  from  the 
standpoint  of  'stratification  and  development'.  Thus..  'the  phenomenological- 
logical  analysis  of  style'  must  be  complemented  by  a  sociological  analysis 
of  the  'social  agents'  of  this  style  of  thought.  However,  we  find  that  at 
the  root  of  the  concrete-historical  emergence  of  the  conservative  style  of 
thought  lies  a  conflict  between  'feudal-traditionalistic  intentions 
[Wollungen] 
and  bureaucratic-absolutist  rationalism'  in  Prussia.  The  romantic  irrational- 
ist  reaction  to  the  enlightenment  is,  like  the  enlightenment  itself,  given  ex- 
. 
pression  primarily  byIsocially  free-floating  intellectuals'.  In  a  remarkable 
footnote  at  this  point  Mannheim  speculates  as  to  'at  which  social  standpoint 
a  philosophy  of  history,  hence  an  interest  in  the  totality  of  the  historical  process, 
is  likely  to  arise'. 
182 
Mannheim  suggests  as  an  answer  to  this  truly  Lukacs- 
ian  question  that  was  posed  in  Geschichte  und  Klassenbewusstsein  that,  des- 
pite  the  free-floating  intelligentsia's  tendency  to  develop  'empty  speculation', 
the  best  chance  for  the  achievement  of  compre- 
hensive  views 
[Gesamtanschauungen]of  history 
nonetheless  exists  when  intellectuals,  gifted 
with  an  instinct  for  what  is  concrete,  and  who 
are,  to  start  with,  free  floating,  ally  themselves 
with  the  aims  of  real  existing  social  forces.  '  183 
At  this  point,  Mannheim  already  substitutes  the  free-floating  intellectuals  for 
the  proletariat  in  answer  to  the  question  originally  posed  by  Lukäcs.  But 
there  is  an  important  difference.  Where  Mannheim  speaks  of  this  strata  in 
relation  to  specific  historical  situations,  he  argues  that  they  provide  of  com- 
prehensive  perspective  that  is  both  valuable  and,  at  the  same  time,  falsified. 
He  suggests  that 
'Their  own  social  position  does  not  bind  them  to 
any  cause,  but  they  have  an  extraordinarily  re- 80 
fined  sense  for  all  the  political  and  social  currents 
around  them 
...  let  them  take  up  and  identify 
themselves  with  someone  else's  interests  -  they 
will  know  them  better,  really  better,  than  those  for 
whom  these  interests  are  laid  down  by  the  nature 
of  things,  by  their  social  condition  ...  Their 
virtue  is  not  thoroughness  but  a  flair  for  events  in 
the  spiritual  and  intellectual  life  of  their  society. 
Their  constructions  are  therefore  always  false  or 
even  diliberately  falsified.  But  there  is  always 
something  that  is  astutely  observed.  !  184 
Later,  of  course,  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie,  Mannheim  suggests  that,  armed 
with  the  sociology  of  knowledge,  they  can  in  fact  provide  a"historical  synthesis 
of  perspectives.  Even  here,  Mannheim  already  argues  that  they  are  an  essen- 
tial  element  of  modern  society 
'If  ...  there  were  no  such  stratum  of  socially 
free  and  unattached  intellectuals,  it  might  easily 
happen  that  all  spiritual  content  would  disappear 
from  our  increasingly  capitalistic  society  and 
leave  nothing  but  naked  interests.  For  it  is  in- 
deed  the  latter  that  are  the  agents  of  both  ideas 
and  ideologies.  '  185 
Despite  this  correlation  between  'naked  interests'  and  ideologies,  and,  pre- 
sumably,  their  central  importance,  the  notion  of  social  interests  plays  a  re- 
markably  marginal  role  in  Mannheim's  sociology  of,  knowledge. 
Instead,  Mannheim  moves  on  in  his  analysis  of  the  'sociological  situation' 
"  of  conservative  thought  with  an  examination  of  the  social  thought  of  some  of 
the  central  figures  in  the  German  romantic  conservative  tradition.  We  find 
that  the'older  stratum  of  experience  and  thought'  came  to  life,  with  its  contact 
and  association  with  'the  romantic  orientation  to  the  world'  . 
186 
In  reaction 
i 
to  the  bureaucratic  rationalism  of  the  Prussian  state,  conservative  thought 
emphasized  Iife  against  the  concept  which  later  developed  into  a  more  general 
philosophy  of  life.  Indeed,  Mannheim  views  the  polarities  in  nineteenth  cen- 
tury  philosophy  between  'being'  and  'thought'  'concept'  and  'idea',  'spec- 81 
ulation'  and  'praxis'  as  an  expression  of'the  political  polarities  of  liberal 
and  conservative  world  orientations  '  . 
187 
However,  Mannheim  argues  that 
it  is  not  enough  to  explain  these  different  streams  of  thought  in  terms  of  their 
contrary  intellectual  positions.  Rather,  the  analysis  must  have  recourse  to 
'the  ultimate  presuppositions'  of  these  styles  of  thought,  'their  existential 
premises' 
188 
and  the  relationship  between  theory  and  practice  that  is  mani- 
fested  in  them.  in  this  romantic  conservatism  'thought  is 
...  a  function  of 
Iife  and  praxis'  and  'knowledge  is  action'.  This  is  the  source,.  Mannheim 
argues,  of  the  modern  concept  of  'life':  real  'existence'  was  no  longer  to 
be  found  in  the  empirical  or  everyday  sphere  but  in  'pure  experience'  I.  Mann- 
heim  sees  this  later  concept  of  life  embodied  in  the  phenomenological  school, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  Dil  they's  historicism,  on  the  other)and  analyses  its 
roots  in  the  manner  of  Lukacs.  The  philosophy  of  life  points  out  that  this 
rationalised  world,  'this  world  of  alleged  reality  is  merely  the  world  of  capital- 
ist  rationalisation  which,  as  such,  conceals  behind  it  a  world  of  "pure  ex- 
periences"'  . 
189 
Mannheim,  in  this  context,  also  points  to  the  affinities 
between  Marxism  and  the  philosophy  of  life; 
'What  Hegel  and  Marxism  have  in  common  with  the 
philosophy  of  life  is  that  for  them,  as  for  the  phil- 
osophy  of  life,  a  relativization  of  "everyday", 
"static",  "abstract"  thought  is  possible  and  indeed 
on  a  dynamic  basis.  But  whereas  in  the  internal- 
ised  "philosophy  of  life"  this  dynamic  basis  is 
something  pre-theoretical  -  the  pure  "duree",  the 
pure  "experience"  -  in  Hegel  's  thought  the  dynamic 
basis  from  which  he  relativizes  "ordinary",  "abstract" 
thinking  is  an  intellectual  one  (rationality  of  a  higher 
order),  and  for  proletarian  thought  it  is  the  class 
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struggle  and  the  economically  based  social  process.  ' 
Perhaps  this  fusion  of  Dilthey  and  what  Mannheim  takes  to  be  a  Marxist 
perspective  accounts  for  contemporary  confusion  concerning  the  Marxist 
basis  of  Mannheim's  own  thought.  What  it  does  indicate,  however,  is 82 
Mannheim's  own  'dynamic  synthesis'  of  Hegel,  Marx  and  Dilthey. 
Mannheim  concludes  with  the  same  emphasis  upon  experience  that  he  comm- 
enced  with  at  the  start  of  his  study.  The  analysis  of  the  differences  between 
conservative  and  progressive  style  of  thought  has  shown,  Mannheim  argues, 
that  'the  social  differentiation  of  experience  and  thought  extends  into  the 
ontological'  sphere.  The  task  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  in  this  respect 
is,  by  the  refinement  of  'the  methods  of  social  analysis,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  phenomenological  analysis  of  meaning,  on  the  other', 
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to  make 
the  emergence  of  historical  consciousness  itself  a  problem  that  can  be  success- 
fully  studied.  But  again  it  can  be  pointed  out  that  the  programme  that  Mann- 
heim  establishes  for  the  sociology  of  knowledge  seldom  confronts  the  relation- 
ship  between  the  two  forms  of  analysis.  In  part,  this  is  because  his  political 
intention  -  the  diagnosis  of  the  times,  the  interpretation  of  historical  phen- 
omena  within  a  universal  context  -  often  leads  to  false  syntheses  and  false 
justapositions  of  structures  of  meaning  whose  origins  themselves  remain  un- 
analysed.  In  another  remarkable  passage  in  this  study  of  conservative 
thought,  Mannheim,  perhaps  unwittingly  reveals  the  context  of  his  later  study, 
Ideologie  und  Utopie,  when  he  writes  that 
'Whereas  conservative  thought  is  thus  directed  towards 
the  past,  insofar  as  it  lives  in  the  present  and  bourgeois 
thought,  in  contrast,  since  it  is  the  agent  of  the  present, 
ives  from  what  is  new  now,  proletarian  thought  seeks 
to  grasp  the  elements  of  the  future  that  also  exist  in  the 
present  by  concentrating  upon  those  present  factors  in 
which  the  future  structural  forms  of  social  life  can 
already  be  seen.  1  192 
Ideology  (conservative  thought)  and  Utopia  (proletarian  thought)  are  neither 
appropriate  for  the  present.  The  crisis  of  bourgeois  thought  lies  in  the 
difficulty  of  diagnosing  the  present.  In  Ideologie  und  Utopie,  it  wilII  be 83 
assisted  by  the  sociology  of  knowledge  whose  practitioners  also  occupy  the 
middle,  independent  ground. 
In  passing,  it  is  worth  examining  some  of  the  contemporary  background  to 
this  work,  especially  since  this  was  Mannheim's  Habilitationschrift.  It 
was  submitted  in  Heidelberg  late  in  1925  and  was  examined  by  Emil  Lederer, 
Alfred  Weber  and  Carl  Brinkmann.  Of  the  three  Gutachten,  only  Lederer's 
was  substantial.  It  was  also  unequivocally  positive.  Lederer  states  that  it 
investigated 
'the  sociological  problem  ...  the  dependency  of  thought 
upon  the  period,  its  social  structure  and,  within,,  it, 
upon  the  position,  the  standpoint  of  the  thinker  ... 
In  so  doing,  the  problem  of  reality  and  "superstructure" 
is  raised,  but  reality  is  understood  here  not  merely 
in  the  sense  of  naked  economic  interests  but  also 
the  social  forms  of  appearance,  the  social  structure 
of  a  period.  '  193 
Lederer  goes  on  to  suggest  that  the  sociology  of  knowledge  raises  the  issue 
of  the  social  basis  of  the  Geisteswissenschaften  themselves.  He  concludes 
that  in  Mannheim's  study 
'A  new  sphere  of  scientific  work  is  traced  out  whose 
results  must  also  be  of  the  greatest  fruitfulness  for 
the  investigation  of  intellectual  -historical  connect- 
ions  just  as  one  may  also  expect  from  penetrating 
intuition  for  the  analysis  of  economic-social  pro- 
blems  and  for  knowledge  of  their  cultural  significance.  'ßg4 
Alfred  Weber's  much  briefer  Gutachten  holds  Mannheim's  study  to  be  'a  sig- 
/ 
nificant  achievement'  though  he  does  have  some  reservations  since  his 
'personal  viewpoint  would  have  sometimes  put  forward 
other  formulations  and  questions  tob.  The  superstruct- 
ure-base-theory  that  Mannheim-  although  no  historical 
materialist-  has  indeed  not  completely  grown  out  of 
seems  to  me  to  play  too  great  a  role  in  the  establish- 
ment  of  the  study.  1  195 
As  we  shall  see,  Weber  was  to  retain  this  conviction  that  Mannheim's 84 
I 
4 
sociology  of  knowledge  operated  within  a  quasi-Marxist  framework. 
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Birk- 
mann's  Gutachten,  though  very  brief,  was  also  positive.  As  an  indication  of 
Mannheim's  interests  at  this  time,  we  find  him  offering  three  possible  themes 
for  his  'Fakultätsvorlesung'  -  'on  Max  Weber's  sociology,  'the  sociological 
problem  of  generations'  and  'the  sociological  problem  of  the  intelligentsia'. 
As  his  Antrittsvorlesung  in  the  same  letter  of  4th  January  1926,  Mannheim 
offered  'The  Contemporary  Situation  of  Sociology  in  Germany',  which  he  in 
fact  gave  on  12the  June  1926.197  After  taking  out  German  citizenship,  which 
was  deemed  to  be  essential  for  him  to  be  awarded  this  thesis  -  and  which  was 
the  subject  of  some  opposition  in  Württemberg  though  not,  apparently,  in 
Bader'  -  Mannheim  was  appointed  as  Privatdozent  for  the  winter  semester  of 
1926;  7  in  Heidelberg,  where  he  remained  until  1930.198 
It  is  possible  to  see  in  the  study  on  conservative  thought,  the  development 
of  the  notion  of  competing  world-views  as  manifestations  of  the  objective 
struggle  of  systems  of  life.  Further,  Mannheim  already  argues  that  these 
world-views  suffer  from  their  particularity  unless  we  can  remove  their  claims 
to  absolute  validity.  Thus,  Mannheim  is  faced  with  the  dual  task  of  scient- 
Ifically  analysing  world-views  and  overcoming  their  absolutist  claims.  This 
dual  task  is  much  more  evident  in  his  paper  on  'The  Significance  of  Com- 
petition  within  the  Intellectual  Sphere'  given  at  the  Sixth  German  Sociological 
Congress  in  1928.199  This  paper  was  the  subject  of  a  significant  debate 
which  is  examined  in  the  next  chapter. 
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The  essay  on  competition  is  important  for  a  number  of  reasons,  both  in  its  own 
P,  right  and  in  relation  to  the  development  of  Mannheim's  sociology  of  knowledge. 
Much  more  so  than  the  study  of  conservatism,  the  essay  on  competition  high- 85 
lights  the  permanent  tension  in  Mannheim's  programme  for  a  sociology  of 
knowledge  between  a  sociological  analysis  of  the  determination  of  knowledge 
and  a  social  theory  of  knowledge  that  will  constitute  a  Zentralwissenschaft 
or  Grundwissenschaft  (both  are  Mannheim's  terms).  In  the  essay  on  com- 
petition,  this  dual  task  is  posed  in  terms  of  its  confrontation  with 
'two  comprehensive  groups  of  problems  (which  are 
closely  related  to  one  another)  ... 
First  of  all  it 
is  intended  to  make  more  concrete  the  problem  of 
competition  and  secondly  it  is  intended  as  a  con- 
t  ribution  to  a 
, 
sociological  theory  of  the  mind.  '  201 
This  concern  for  the  development  of  a  sociology  of  the  mind  -  the  actual 
dimensions  of  which  always  remained  unclear  -  was  a  constant  theme  in 
Mannheim's  work  until  his  emigration.  We  find,  for  instance,  that  in 
November  1930  Mannheim  was  offering  Mohr  Verlag  a  collection  of  his  essays 
-  under  the  title  Soziologie  des  Geistes;  which  included  the  essay  on  com- 
petition. 
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In  this  essay,  Mannheim  himself  notes  that,  along  with  his  essay  on  gener- 
ations,  it  is  to  be  understood  as  a  contribution  to  a  sociology  of  the  mind. 
However  undefined  this  project  maybe,  Mannheim  does  give  some  indication 
of  the  issues  it  will  take  up  in  his  programmatic  outline  of  the  themes  covered 
by  his  paper. 
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Thus,  it  will  be  concerned  with  the  necessity  of  examin- 
Ing  intellectual  life  from  the  sociological  standpoint.  '  Social  and  human 
scientific  knowledge  will  be  seen  as  an  instance  of  'existentially  bounded 
cognition  and  knowledge'  some  of  whose  characteristics  are  the  problem  of 
Verstehen,  'the  constitutive  projection  of  'the  world  view-background  (not 
only  in  the  form  of  evaluation)  into  the  results  of  thought'and  'the  will  bound 
up  with  the  social  world-view  and  social  sensibility  as  creative  principles, 
at  the  same  time,  as  the  vital  limits  of  each  kind  of  existentially  bounded 86 
knowledge'. 
204 
nowledge'  . 
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Within  the  context  of  the  process  of  competition  in  social 
life,  modern  thought  is  seen  to  exhibit  the  following  processes: 
'A.  Contrary  thought 
a)  The  social  division  of  the  centre  of  the  will 
(Willenszentrum)  that  lies  behind  thought 
b)  The  social  division  of  sensibility  (sphere  of 
intuition) 
c)  The  social  differentiation  of  the  statement  of 
the  problem  ... 
d)  The  social  division  of  methods  and  categories 
of  thought,  axiomatics 
e)  The  social  division  of  "historical  experience 
of  time" 
f)  The  social  division  of  ontological  experience 
of.  reality 
g)  The  social  division  of  the  hierarchy  of  values 
B.  Mutual  thought  (synthetic  tendencies) 
a)  The  orientation  of  competitors  with  one  another 
b)  Mutual  enhancement 
c)  The  opponent  as  the  ground  for  self-knowledge 
Emergent  reflexivity 
d)  Learning  from  one  another 
e)  The  phenomenon  of  "transcendence".  11 
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Further,  as  well  as  considering  other  consequences  of  competition  (e.  g.  at 
the  ideological  level),  Mannheim  hopes  his  paper  will  prompt  discussion  of 
an  evaluation  of  the  significance  of  existentially  bounded  thought  for  the 
.  human  sciences. 
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Though  Mannheim  by  no  means  deals  with  these  and  the  other  topics  he  out- 
lines  in  his  paper  on  competition,  the  programmatic  outline  does  provide 87 
some  interesting  insights  into  his  sociology  of  knowledge.  However  un- 
clearly  formulated,  this  programme  indicates  a  sequence  of  determination 
from  the  will  via  the  world-view  to  social  thought.  Both  the  will  that  lies 
behind  the  world-view  and  'social  sensibility'  constitute  the  limits  of  exist- 
entially  bounded  knowledge.  They  are  the  sources  of  creativity  and  would, 
at  first  sight,  appear  not  to  be  existentially  bounded.  However,  it  is  clear 
that  Mannheim  also  speaks  of  their  social  differentiation.  Indeed  this 
differentiation  is  an  essential  feature  of  his  conception  of  society  as  consist- 
ing  of  opposing,  differentiated  system  of  life  and  the  conflict  of  competing 
world-views. 
Such  considerations  lead  us  into  the  heart  of  the  paper  on  competition. 
Competition  is  a  central  feature  of  'social  life  as  a  whole'  that  'enters  as 
a  constituent  element  into  the  form  of  and  content  of  cultural  objectivation 
and  into  the  concrete  form  of  cultural  movement'  . 
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Mannheim  considers 
competition  to  play  'a  co-constitutive  role'  in  social  life.  Indeed,  in  accept- 
ing  a  dialectical  view  of  'the  form  of  development  and  change  in  intellectual 
life',  Mannheim  argues  that  competition,  along  with  gene  rations,  constitute 
two  'structural  determinations  of  social  life'.  As  we  shall  see,  this  em- 
phasis  upon  competition  as  a  determinant  of  social  thought  introduces,  in 
an  ahistorical.  manner,  a  market  model  of  society  and  social  change  that 
can  be  applied  to  social  groups,  world-views  and,  later,  ideologies.  Com- 
petition  is  'a  general  social  relationship'  that  also  permeates  economic 
life:  hence  it  must  be  universal  and  not  historically  specific.  Since  Mann- 
heim  emphatically  excludes  the  questions  of  truth  and  validity  in  this  analy- 
sis,  these  worldwiews  can  be  seen  to  have  equal  value. 35 
This  lack  of  evaluation  of  world-views  is  paralleled  in  Mannheim's  delimit- 
ation  of  the  sphere  of  'existential  Iy  bounded  thought'  .  Not  only  is  natural 
scientific  knowledge  excluded  but  the  social  knowledge  that  is  existentially 
bounded  is  lumped  together.  as  an  undifferentiated  whole.  It  comprises 
'historical  thought  (the  mode  and  manner  in  which 
one  conceives  of  history  and  represents  it  for  others), 
political  thought,  human  and  social  scientific 
thought  and  also  everyday  thought.  '  208 
Mannheim  thus  implicitly  maintains  that  these  forms  of  knowledge  are  all 
existentially  bounded  in  the  same  manner.  This,  of  course  includes  the 
human  and  social  scientific  thought  that  is  itself  concerned  with  everyday 
thought  or  political  thought.  In  all  instances,  the  thinking  subject  is  crucial 
to  the  results  of  thought.  All  these  forms  of  knowledge  are  perspectival, 
which  means  that 
'only  specific  historical-social  structures  of  con- 
sciousness  can  open  up  specific  qualitative  feat- 
ures  in  the  historically  living  object.  '  209 
This  does  not  lead  to-relativism  but  to  relationism  since,  Mannheim  argues 
'specific  (qualitative)  truths  are  not  apprehendable  or  formulable  other  than 
as  existentially  relative'.  What  is  incontestable  from  Mannheim's  analysis 
is  the  notion  that  these  structures  of  consciousness  and  world  views,  though 
rooted  in  group  experience,  do  come  together  in  the  process  of  competition. 
More  specifically,  parties  compete  for  what  Heidegger  terms  the  'public  in- 
terpretation  of  reality',  for  'possession  of  the  correct  (social)  view'.  It 
also  occurs  in  the  humanities  and  social  sciences  In  the  attempt  to  secure 
the  'correc't'  interpretation  in  a  particular  field.  Neusüss  suggests  that 
4 
Mannheim's  competition  of  world-views  can  be  seen  as  a  counterpart  to 
Popper's  notion  of  competing  theories  in  the  progress  of  science,  except  that, 
for  Mannheim,  objective  knowledge  is  not  possible. 
210  Certainly*there  are 89 
affinities  here  with  at  least  some  of  Kuhn's  formulations  of  a  theory  of 
scientific  development. 
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However,  Mannheim's  main  concern  here  is  with  the  competition  for  the 
'public  interpretation  of  reality'  .  This  arises  because 
'every  historical,,  world-view,  and  sociological 
piece  of  knowledge  ...  is  embedded  in  and 
carried  by  the  desire  for  power  and  recognition 
by  specific  concrete  groups  who  seek  to  make  212 
their  interpretation  of  the  world  the  public  one.  "-' 
Again,  we  are  never  presented  with  the  possible  parameters  of  this  struggle 
for  power  except  in  the  notion  of  competition.  This  is  evident  from  Mann- 
-helm's  typology  of  the  various  forms  in  which  the  public  interpretation  of 
reality  emerges  -  through  consensus,  monopoly,  atomised  competition  and 
concentration  (in  economic  categories,  oligopoly  or  duopoly).  Atomised 
competition,  for  example,  comes  about  through  the  challenge  to  the  mono- 
politic  position  of  the  church's  public  Interpretation  of  reality.  It  is  also 
part  of  the  process  of  the  democratisation  of  the  mind.  Ironically,  having 
earlier  (in  his  second  unpublished  essay)  questioned  Simmel's  analysis  of 
money  on  the  grounds  of  its  lack  of  historical  specificity  and  failure.  to  locate 
its  particular  capitalistic  features,  Mannheim  here  provides  an  analysis  of 
competition  that  suffers  from  exactly  the  same  weakness.  -  Mannheim's 
account  of  the  various  forms  of  competition  does  lead  him  to  introduce  a 
number  of  ideal  types  of  forms  of-political  knowledge  but  they  remain  largely 
abstractions.  His  real  interests  perhaps  lay  elsewhere. 
0 
After  analysing  the  concentration  of,  competition,  Mannheim  poses  the  quest- 
ion  as  to  whether  competition  produces  a  synthesis  as  well  as  polarisation. 
Mannheim's  reply  is  that  synthesis  and  polarisation  spring  from  'the 90 
same  social  process'  ,-  'the  simple  law  of  "competition  on  the  basis  of 
achievement"' 
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in  the  sense  that  one  party  borrows  from  its  opponent  and 
vice-versa.  Not  only  are  there  many  instances  of  syntheses  in  social  thought 
but,  most  significantly,  the  sociology  of  knowledge  itself  can  synthesize  view- 
points  since  it 
'provides  just  such  a  viewpoint  pushed  further  back 
from  which  purely  theoretical  -philosophical  differ- 
ences,  that  can  no  longer  be  reconciled  immanent- 
ly,  can  be  seen  through  in  their  partiality  and  there- 
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by  can  be  apprehended  from  a  synthetic  standpoint.  ' 
Here  synthesis  is  facilitated  by  the  process  of  distancing  from  social  com- 
petition  and  conflict  and  is  a  constituent  element  of  Mannheim's  later 
i 
theory'Iof  an  intelligentsia  armed  with  the  insights  of  the  sociology  of  know- 
ledge: 
However,  Mannheim  points  to  a  central  problem  of  the  process  of  achieving  - 
a  synthesis.  Syntheses  involve  selection  and  necessarily  raises  the  question 
of  the  standards  for  such  selection.  For  Mannheim,  the  principle  of  select- 
ion  is 
'that  which  is  the  most  applicable,  thus  the  most 
useful  for  the  living  world  orientation  of  all  parties 
in  an  epoch.  '  215 
"  But  Mannheim  is  aware  that  this  introduces  a  merely  pragmatic  criterion  of 
truth.  He  argues  that,  at  this  point,  the  question  of  the  criterion  for  truth 
cannot  be  answered  by  the  sociology  of  knowledge,  since  it  is  concerned 
with  quaestio  facti,  but  must  be  answered  by  epistemology,  which  is  concern- 
ed  with  guaestio  juris.  However,  the  sociology  of  knowledge  would  suggest 
that  epistemologies  are  also  existentially  bounded  since  each  epistemology 
[exists  only  as  the  justification  of  a  mode  of  thought  that  already  exists  or 
is'  just  emerging'  and  'in  the  historical-social  context,  epistemologies  are 91 
only  advanced  posts  in  the  struggle  between  styles  of  thought'. 
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At  this 
point,  of  course,  such  reflections  on  the  part  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge 
would  suggest  that  it  has  replaced  the  'structural  analysis  of  epistemologies' 
as  a  more  comprehensive  discipline. 
By  the  end  of  the  paper  on  competition,  Mannheim  had  sketched  out,  not 
merely  his  contribution  to  the  'sociology  of  the  mind'  but  also  two  central 
problematics  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie.  The  first  is  the  problem  of  competing 
world-views  and  ideologies  in  a  period  of  increasing  concentration  of  ideol- 
ogles  and  political  positions.  In  fact,  shortly  after  the  publication  of 
Ideologie  und  Utopie,  the  fragmentary  political  structure  of  Weimar  Germany 
did  give  way  to  an  increasing  polarised  political  structure.  The  second 
problem,  associated  with  a  'sociology  of  the  mind',  is  that  of  truth  and 
validity  claims  of  ideologies  within  a  market  model  of  ideologies  and  world- 
views.  This  was  the  question  that  Mannheim  posed  at  the  end  of  his  paper 
on  competition.  Both  problems  were  brought  together  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie. 
IV 
Mannheim's  Ideologie  und  Utopia  which  appeared  in  1929  is  in  many  ways  a 
different  book  from  the  one  we  know  as  Ideology  and  Utopia 
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It  com- 
prises  only  three  chapters:  'Ideologie  und  Utopie',  'Ist  Politik  als  Wissen- 
I  t. 
schaft  möglich?  '  and  Das  utopische  Bewusstsein'  and  contains  a  brief  in- 
troduction  to  the  first  chapter  that  is  ommitted  from  the  English  edition. 
There  is  a  consistent  attempt  in;  the  English  translation  to  distance  Mannheim 
from  the  Marxist  terminology  of  the  original.  To  give  but  one  example, 92 
whereas  a  subheading  in  the  first  chapter  of  the  original  reads  'The  problem 
of  "false  consciousness"',  the  English  version  reads  'Objectivity  and  bias'. 
In  an  unpublished  paper  on  Mannheim's  adjustment  to  England,  Kettler 
has  pointed  to  a  Whole  series  of  changes  including  'over  four  hundred  shifts 
in  meaning  which  do  not  seem  to  be  ordinary  products  of  translation'  . 
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Kettler  goes  on  to  summarise  some  of  the  most  important  changes  in  meaning 
and  the  philosophical  context  of  these  changes.  He  writes: 
1  The  German  terms  for  the  spirit,  its  properties,  and 
operations  are  brought  more  nearly  in  line  with  the 
psychological  language  current  in  English  philosophy 
of  mind  and  for  American  pragmatist  psychology: 
-  spirit  becomes  intellect  or  mind 
-  consciousness  becomes  mental  activity  or  even 
evaluation 
-  determinationsof  will  become  interests,  purposes, 
norms,  ends 
-  false  consciousness  becomes  an  invalid  ethical 
attitude 
-  primaeval  structuresof  mind  become  irrational 
mechanisms 
-  the  human  essence  is  not  undergoing  a  process 
itself  essential  whereby  it  comes  into  existence 
within  an  arena;  there  is,  rather,  a  matrix  within 
which  man's  essential  nature  is  expressed. 
2  The  philosophic  operations  being  performed  in  the 
study  are  redefined 
-  causal  explanations,  referring  to  influences  and 
determinations,  increase  at  the  expense  of  inter- 
pretative  claims  which  find  the  meaning  of  some 
cultural  product  by  relating  it  to  some  social  context 
-  philosophy  of  consciousness  is  rendered  as  "more 
comprehensive  philosophy" 
-  the  scientist-writer  distances  himself  further  from 
the  phenomena  he  is  discussing;  he  is  less  disposed 
to  speak  of  his  work  as  self-clarification 
-  the  notion  that  thinking  the  problem  through  will  lead 
to  its  transcendence  is  displaced  by  a  greater  stress 
on  sociology  of  knowledge  as  a  tool  against  bias  and 
an  aid  to  objectivity.  1  220 
'  Many  of  these  changes  we  made  by  Mannheim  in  order  to  communicate  better 
with  his  English  audience.  In  a  letter  to  Wirth,  Mannheim  gives  two  reasons 93 
for  publishing  a  new  book  out  of  the  old.  These  are  that 
'The  greater  security  which  rules  in  this  nation  has 
not  opened  the  minds  of  even  the  most  clear-headed 
among  the  local  intellectuals  to  the  problem  of  the 
sociological  antecedents  of  consciousness.  Most 
would  consider  the  old  book  as  nothing  more  than  a 
document  from  a  world  closed  to  them  ...  The 
second  difficulty  one  encounters  in  this  country  is 
that  there  is  no  tradition  of  sociology  ...  no  con- 
ception  of  an  empricism  which  can  be  something 
more  than  counting,  measuring  or  describing.  '  221 
Since  our  concern  is  not  with  Mannheim's  reception  in  the  English-speaking 
. 
world  but  with  the  development  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  in  Germany,  it 
is  all  the  more  important  to  return  to  the  original  text  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie 
and  attempt  to  reconstruct  its  context. 
One  essential  part  of  that  context  is  contained  in  the  introductory  remarks  to 
the  first  chapter  which  were  not  included  in  the  English  translation.  Though 
Mannheim  argues  that  the  sociology  of  knowledge  is  too  new  'to  make  possible 
a  systematic  and  architectonic'  treatise,  nonetheless  the  themes  examined  in 
Ideologie  und  Utopie  signify  a  'new  orientation  to  the  world'.  As  a  new 
approach,  it  is  not  confined.  to  'a  rigid  organisational  schema'.  Instead, 
'Thought,  viewed  from  the  total  context,  is  never  an 
end  in  itself  but  rather  a  permanently  self-recon- 
stituting  living  organon  that  forms  itself  anew  with 
the  changes  in  historical  events:  an  emergent 
structure  in  whose  elements  the  new  anthropogenesis 
also  takes  place.  '  222 
Hence,  Mannheim  intends  that  his  study  will  not  be  lifted  out  of  'this  living 
stream'  In  which  things  are  rendered  problematic.  Rather,  it  will  remain 
4 
sensitive  to  the  'immediate  existential  situation  and  the  "predicament  of  life"' 
that  require  to  be  approached  through  interpretation  and  empathetic  under- 
standing 
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At  the  substantive  level,  Mannheim  argues  that  the  problem  of  ideology  will 
be  systematically  examined  within  the  context  of  'the  decisive  currents  of 
contemporary  thought',  particularly  since  within  specific  problem  areas, 
such  as  the  relation  of,  theory  to  practice,  the  determination  of  concepts 
themselves  varies  'according  to  the  social  standpoint  of  the  observer'  . 
Furthermore,  whereas  'the  present  utopian  and  ideological  rootedness  of 
thought  has  been  seen  up  tiII  now  I  arge  lyin  party  terms  (i 
.  e.  only  in  the 
opponents  thought-')0  Mannheim  will  examine  this  rootedness  for  all  thought. 
Only  when  this  'unavoidable  radicalisation'  of  the  problem  of  ideology  and 
utopia  has  been  worked  through  will  it  be  possible°to  ask  'how  at  this  level 
of  thought  it  can  still  be  recognised  as  such,  how  at  this  level  of  being  in- 
tellectual  existence  is  still  possible'.  Thus,  from  the  very  outset,  Mann- 
heim  is  posing  the  question  of  the  possible  alienation  and  powerlessness  of 
the  mind.  Mannheim  will  seek  to  direct  his  analysis  at  the  'totality'  of 
the  present  'crisis  situation  of  thought'  but  in  the  knowledge  that  'no  pre- 
mature  solutions'  are  possible.  The  analysis  will  deepen  the  crisis  by  re- 
vealing  the  contradictions  that  exist  within  the  various  possibilities  open 
to  us. 
But  this  crisis  is  not  merely  an  abstract  intellectual  one.  Ideology  and 
Utopia  do  not  represent  two  isolated  phenomena.  Rather, 
'The  words  ideology  and  utopia  do'not  simply  signify 
the  historical  emergence  of  two  new  facts  but,  rather, 
the  serious  emergence  of  a  fundamentally  new  theme. 
The  whole  world  has  become  a  theme  in  a  new  sense 
through  them,  because  in  their  medium  the  meaning  re- 
levances  which  the  world  first  makes  into  the  world, 
confronts  us  in  a  new  manner.  1  223 
This  new  mode  of  encounter  with  the  world  and  with  ourselves  arises  out  of 
the  fact  that  'whereas  the  earlier,  naive  person  lived  fixed  upon  "contents 95 
of  ideas",  we  experience  these  ideas  in  the  light  of  this  tendency  increasing- 
ly  as  ideologies  and  utopias'.  We  now  live  out  these  ideas  as  ideology 
and  utopia  not  as  ideas  in  themselves.  Indeed  'what  is  common  and  ultimate- 
ly  decisive  in  ideological  and  utopian  thought  is  that  in  them  one  experiences 
the  possibility  of  false  consciousness.  1 
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This  is  the  starting  point  of 
the  original  analysis  of  ideology  and  utopia.  Again,  it  is  evident  that>for 
Mannheim,  the  crucial  issue  is  alienation  from  our  own  thought  which  has 
been  transformed  into  ideology  or  utopia.  Further,  this  aspect  of  Mannheim's 
statement  of  the  problem,  and  especially  the  emphasis  upon  the  possibility 
of  false  consciousness,  places  his  analysis  potentially  much  closer  to  that 
of  Luk(cs  than  is  evident  in  the  English  translation. 
In  the  first  chapter  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie,  Mannheim  aims  to  develop  further 
Marx's  study  of  ideology  and  render  it  scientific  (value-free)  and  hence  to 
develop  a  new  theory  of  ideology.  Mannheim's  notion  of  ideology  is  both 
a  heuristic  concept  and  seen  as  a  process  that  permeates  all  human  thought 
in  all  historical  periods.  In  proceding  to  his  value-free  concept  of  ideology 
and  to  the  sociology  of  knowledge,  Mannheim  starts  out  by  separating  the 
particular  and  total  concepts  of  ideology.  The  particular  concept  refers  to 
the  rejection  of'"specific"  ideas  and  "representations"'  of  one's  opponent 
which  are  seen  as  'more  or  less  conscious  disguises  (Verhüllungen)  of  a 
situation  whose  true  recognition  does  not  lie  in  the  interests  of  the  opponent'. 
In  contrast,  the'radical,  total  concept  of  ideology'  refers  to  'the  total  struct- 
Ir 
ure  of  consciousness'  of  an  age  or  a  concrete  social  group.  What  both  have 
in  common  is  that  the  intended  content  of  the  ideas  is  not  apprehended  direct- 
ly  but  indirectly  through  an  understanding  of  a  particular  'collective  or  in- 
dividual  subject'  and  the  'existential  situation  of  the  subject'  .  That  is, 96 
the  ideas  are  'interpreted  as  functions  of  this  existential  situation'.  Hence, 
'the  concrete  constitution,  the  existential  situation  of  the  subject  is  of  co- 
constitutive  significance  for  these  opinions,  assertions  and  knowledge'. 
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But  there  are  significant  differences  between  the  two  concepts.  The  particu- 
lar  concept  referred  to  'only  a  part  of  the  assertions  of  the  opponent'  and 
even  then  only  to  their  content,  whereas  the  total  concept  'places  in  question 
the  whole  world-view  of  the  opponent  (including  the  categorial  apparatus)  and 
also  seeks  to  understand  these  categories  from  out  of  the  collective  subject'  I. 
Secondly,  the  particular  concept  engages  in  'functional  i  sation  only  at  the 
psychological  level'  .  In  contrast,  the  total  concept'  Ifunctionalises  the 
noological  level'  -  the  contents,  form  and  conceptual  apparatus  of  thought. 
Thirdly,  the  particular  concept  operates  with 
'a  psychology  of  interests;  the  total  concept,  i 
contrast,  with  a  much  more  formalised  where  "V 
W, 
possible  a  concept  of  function  that  is  intended 
towards  objective  structural  connections.  '  226 
Furthermore,  this  implies  that  the  particular  concept  is  associated  with  a 
whe«aS 
causal  analysis,  the  total  concept  with  a  notion  of  correspondence.  Finally, 
the  particular  notion  refers  to`a  psychological,  reel'  functionalisation,  the 
total  concept  functional  ises  thought  in  terms  of  'an  "imputed  subject"'  . 
Mannheim  cites  Marx's  conception  as  an  instance  of  the  total  concept  of 
ideology.  But  in  subsequently  asserting  that  ideology  is  universal,  Mann- 
heim  removes  it  from  Marx's  more  specific  formulations.  Ideology  becomes 
a  concept  that  refers  to  a  general  connection  between  thought  and  existence; 
" 
it  becomes  existentially  bounded  thought.  But  as  we  shall  see,  this  conn- 
ection  can  only  have  meaning  when  the  concept  of  existence  is  precisely  de- 
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fined.  Furthermore,  Mannheim's  analysis  once  more  raises  the  question  of 
its  relationship  to  Marx's  critique  of  ideology.  Before  we  can  examine  these 
questions,  we  must  proceed  further  with  Mannheim's  own  account. 
The  total  conception  of  ideology  involves  a  much  more  'radical  doubt'  and 
'destruction'  of  thought,  an  attempt  to  destroy  'the  intellectual  basis'  of 
one's  opponents  thought.  This  is  only  possible  in  a  world  subject  to  funda- 
mental  transformation,  a  world  of  'decisive  social  polarities'.  Such  a 
world  emerged  out  of  the  bourgeoisie's  '.  new  approach  to  the  world'  (Welt- 
wollen)  which  developed  a  new  economic  system  and  'a  new  style  of  thought'. 
The  most  important  stage  in  the  development  of  the  total  concept,  indeed 
'the  last  and  most  important  step'  was  its  association  with  social  classes  so 
that  styles  of  thought  could  be  seen  to  vary  with  class  divisions.  But  this 
very  attempt  to  destroy  the  structure  of  consciousness  of  a  whole  group  in 
its  totality  brings  with  it  the  problem  of  the  possibility  of  false  consciousness  - 
which  Mannheim  takes  to  be  an  age-old  problem.  As  an  indication  of  the 
changes  in  the  English  edition  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie,  it  is  worth  pointing 
out  at  the  point  that  in  the  English  text  'The  Problem  of  "False  Consciousness"' 
becomes  'Objectivity  and  Bias'  and  a  highly  significant  definition  of  false 
"  consiousness  is  added  which  is  not  in  the  original.  It  is  defined  as  'the 
problem  of  the  totally  distorted  mind  which  falsifies  everything  which  comes 
within  its  range', 
227a 
truly  individualistic,  psychologistic  definition! 
i 
After  tracing  the  recent  development  of  the  concept  of  ideology  from  its 
-  'irrealit  '  thesis  in  relation  to  politician's  praxis  (Les  ideologues)  to  modern 
Marxism,  Mannheim  suggests  that  the  concept  has  retained  its  relation  to 
political  praxis  to  such  an'extent  that  ""pragmatism"  in  specific  spheres  of _ 
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life  belongs,  as  it  were,  to  the  natural  world-view  of  modern  man.  '228  To- 
day,  the  concept  has  become  the  weapon  of  'strata  who  find  themselves  in 
opposition,  above  all  the  proletariat'.  But  it  'cannot  permanently  be  the 
Intellectual  privilege  of  a  single  class'.  Rather,  it  can  be  and  is  applied 
by  all  groups  in  society.  However,  'through  this  general  expansion  of  the 
ideological  conception  a  fundamentally  new  state  of  consciousness  is  con- 
stituted'and  'the  problem  of  false  consciousness,  the  problem  of  reality  etc., 
receive  a  new  meaning'  which  'transforms  our  whole  axiomatic,  our  ontology 
" 
and  epistemology'. 
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As  soon  as  we  move  beyond  a  specific  sociological 
analysis  of  i  deol  ogy  ý  and  recognise  that  our  own  standpoint  is  i  deol  gi  cal  ,  we 
-move  to  Ua  general  conception  of  the  total  concept  of  ideology'  .  Indeed, 
'This  general  conception  of  the  total  concept  of  ideol- 
ogy  whereby  human  thought  of  alI  parties  and  in  all 
epochs  is  ideological,  is  difficult  to  avoid.  '  230 
But  it  is  at  this  very  point  of  generalisation  of  the  total  conception  of  ideology 
that  the  sociology  of  knowledge  emerges  and  it  is  here  that  the  existential 
boundedness  of  thought  (its  Seinsgebundenheit)  becomes  the  theme  of  'in- 
tel  lectual  -historical  research'  . 
In  turn,  this  'modern  historical-sociological  insight  into  the  factual  stand- 
point-boundedness  of.  all  historical  thought'  raises  another  problem:  that  of 
relativism.  Mannheim  argues  that  relativism  emerges  out  of  the  conflict 
between  this  insight  and  adherence  to  a  traditional 
,, 
'static  paradigm  of  thought' 
that  rejects  any  knowledge  that  is  bounded  by  its  standpoint  as  merely  re- 
lative.  What  It  overlooks  is  the  sociology  of  knowledge  insight  that  'epis- 
temology  is  just  as  much  embedded  in  the  historical  stream  (Werdestrom) 
as  is  our  whole  though  . 
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There  exist  'areas  of  thought  in  which  stand- 
point-free,  unrelated  knowledge  is  inconceivable.  In  particular,  historical 99 
knowledge  is  'essentially  relational  I  and  only  formulable  in  terms  of  its 
relation  to  a  standpoint.  If  this  is  the  case  then,  Mannheim  argues,  we 
must  ask  'which  standpoint  has  the  greatest  chances  of  an  optimum  of  truth'  . 
In  relation  to  the  general  and  total  conceptions  of  ideology,  Mannheim  conceives 
of  two  possibilities  :a  'value-free'  approach  and  an  'evaluative  (episte- 
mological-metaphysical)  approach.  The  value-free,  total  and  general  con- 
cept  of  ideology  is  to  be  found  in  historical  research  where  the  question  of 
the  'correctness'  of  the  ideas  studied  is  not  raised  but  merely  the  question 
of  'how  particular  socially  structured  existential  situations  press  for  parti- 
cular  forms  of  interpretation  of  existence'  . 
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But  the  very  awareness  of 
the  permeation  of  ideology  in  all  thought  is  itself  only  possible  in  a  period  of 
'rapid  and  radical  social  and  intellectual  transformation'.  In  such  a  period  - 
and  it  is  clear  from  the  context  that  Mannheim  is  thinking  of  contemporary 
Germany  -  'there  exist  too  many  positions  of  equal  value  and  intellecttally 
. 
of  equal  force  that  mutually  relativise  one  another' 
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for  one  to  take  up  a 
single  position.  It  is  a  'twilight  in  which  all  things  and  positions  reveal 
their  relativity'  .  In  this  sense,  it  is  a  *privilege  of  the  present  times  to  be 
In  a  position  to  be  able  to  see  'all  things  suddenly  become  transparent'. 
This  means,  however,  stepping  out  of  'the  fortuitous  existence  of  the  every- 
day  world  (das  zufäi  I  ige  Sosein  des  Al  stags)  where  today  romanticised  notions 
("myths")  belong'. 
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In  turn,  as  Mannheim  recognises,  this  implies 
operating  within  'an  evaluative,  epistemological  and,  ultimately,  in  an 
f 
ontological-metaphysical  evaluation'  and  'assenting  to  a  particular  world- 
view'.  It  is,  in  fact,  'an  Inavoidable  ex-post  -ontology  I,  it  'is  our  horizon 
which  no  ideological  destruction  can  destroy'  .  It  points  to  a  possible  solution 
to  the  problem  of  ideology  in  that 100 
'the  unmasking  of  ideology  and  utopia  can  only 
expose  thought  (Gehalte)  with  which  we  are  not 
identical  and  it  raises  the  question  as  to  whether 
or  not,  in  particular  circumstances,  the  construct- 
ive  lies  already  in  the  destruction  itself,  whether 
the  new  will  and  the  new  human  being  are  already  235 
present  in  the  direction  of  exposure  to  questioning.  ' 
Although  extremely  vague,  and  though  Mannheim  -  as  he  himself  ädmits  - 
never  returns  to  this  issue,  it  does  illuminate  his  belief  in  an  ontology  that 
lies  deeper  than  ideological  and  utopian  distortions. 
Yet  Mannheim's  solution  to  the  problem  of  ideology  does  not  lie  in  this 
direction.  The  development  of  the  value-free  concept  of  ideology.  at  the 
level  of  historical  and  sociological  research  opened  up  'two  important  alter- 
native  world-view-metaphysical  decisions'.  Either  one  assumes  that  history 
itself  is  arbitrary  and  that  changes  are  fortuitous  or  one  assumes  that  changes 
in  relationships,  in  their  simultaneity  and  their  sequence,  arise  out  of  necess- 
1  ty.  Mannheim  argues  that  historical  research  must  choose  the  second  option 
.  and  examine  historical  factors  in  terms  of  an  'emergent  totality'.  The  study 
of  ideology  undertaken  along  these  lines  represents  a  'sociological  diagnosis 
of  the  times'  in  which  'the  concept  of  ideology  itself  can  be  applied  in  the 
diagnosis  of  the  contemporary  intellectual  situation'. 
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Once  more,  Mann- 
heim  at  this  point  crystallizes  the  dual  intentions  of  the  sociology  of  know- 
ledge  -  as  a  value-free  study  of  the  social  bases  of  thought  and  as  a  diag- 
nosis  of  the  times. 
f 
In  moving  over  to  an  evaluative  concept  of  ideology,  impelled  by  'the  histor- 
ical  dialectic',  the  problem  of  false  consciousness  recurs  once  more  since 
the  evaluative  concept  of  ideology  seeks 
'to  distinguish  from  amongst  norms,  modes  of 101 
thought  and  schemes  of  orientation  at  one  and 
the  same  time,  the  true  and  untrue,  the  genuine 
and  i  ngenu  i  ne  .1 
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False  consciousness  therefore  prevents  us  from  grasping  the  newly  formed 
existence  that  makes  up  our  present  time.  Its  recognition  is  only  made 
possible  by  a  dynamic  concept  of  ideology. 
'Accordingly,  in  the  ethical  sphere  a  consiousness 
is  false  when  it  is  oriented  towards  norms  that, 
even  with  the  best  will,  are  incapable  of  dealing 
with  a  given  stage  of  existence,  when  therefore 
the  individual's  failure  cannot  be  interpreted  as 
an  individual  violation  but  rather  the  erroneous 
action  arises  from  the  compulsion  of  a  falsely 
grounded  moral  axiomatic.  In  moral  self-inter- 
pretation,  a  consciousness  is  false  if;  through 
the  customary  sources  of  meaning  (life-forms, 
forms  of  experience,  interpretation  of  the  world  and 
humanity),  it  obscures  and  hinders  new  moral 
reactions  and  new  human  activity.  A  theoretical 
consciousness  is  false  if,  in  "wordly"  orientation 
to  life  it  thinks  in  categories  which,  if  taken 
seriously,  would  lead  to  one  being  unable  to  cope 
with  a  given  stage  of  existence.  Hence,  it  is 
primarily  redundant  and  outmoded  norms  and  forms 
of  thought,  as  well 
. 
as  modes  of  interpreting  the 
world,  that  can  degenerate  into  this  'ideological' 
function'.  238 
Mannheim  adds  in  a  footnote  that  false  consciousness  as  consciousness  that 
is  'inadequate  to  existence'  (seins-inadtiquat)  can  also  exist  in  relation  to 
consciousness  that  is  ahead  of  its  'existence',  i.  e.  utopian  thought.  For 
the  moment,  Mannheim  argues  that  this  new  concept  of  ideology  is  both 
evaluative  and  dynamic,  evaluative  because  it  makes  judgments  concerning 
'the  reality  of  contents  of  thought  and  structures  of  consciousness  and  dynamic' 
because  'these  judgments  are  measured  against  a  reality  that  is  always  in 
constant  flux'  .  This  new  concept  recognises  that  'diversely  situated  false 
structures  of  consciousness  can  exist  in  the  same  historical-social  realm', 
-it  ;;, 
structures  that  refer  to  a  form  of  existence  that  is  either  past  or  not  yet  in 
existence.  These  false  structure3of  consciousness,  in  turn,  can  only  be 102 
measured  against  'a  "reality"  that  only  reveals  itself  in  praxis'- 
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in  arguing  that  ideological  and  utopian  thought  is  striving  for  and  is  to  be 
measured  against  reality,  we  are  confronted  with  the  nature  of  this  reality. 
This  is  important  for  two  reasons.  The  first  is  that  Mannheim's  criterion 
of  truth  appear  to  be  appropriateness  for  the  present  reality,  as  when  he 
states  that  'thought  should  contain  neither  less  nor  more  than  the  reality  in 
whose  medium  it  operates'.  Secondly,  and  more  importantly,  Mannheim 
argues  that  our  notion  of  reality  has  also-been  called  into  question.  With 
regard  to  the  problem  of  reality,  Mannheim  argues  that  'precisely  upon  the 
multiple  forms  of  this  concept  depends  the  multiple  forms  of  our  whole 
thought'.  The  implication  of  this  for  a  diagnosis  of  the  times  is  that 
'only  when  the  investigating  individual  has  assimulated 
all  the  decisive,  important  series  of  motivations  that 
have  developed  historically  and  socially  and  character- 
ise  in  their  actual  tension  the  contemporary  situation 
only  then  can  it  be  possible  to  conceive  of  finding  a 
solution  appropriate  to  the  present  life-situation.  '  240 
But  Mannheim  goes  on  to  argue  that  the  problem  here  lies  in  the  appropriation 
of  the  relevant  material  since  'facts'  themselves  are  constituted  in  'an 
-intellectual  and  life-context'  and  concepts  have  their  'perspectivity'. 
Therefore,  one  cannot  appeal  to  a  single  standpoint  since  'the  intellectual 
crisis  is  not  the  crisis  of  a  single  standpoint  but  the  crisis  of  a  world  which 
has  reached  a  certain  stage  in  its  intellectual  development'  I. 
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f  Mannheim's  solution  is  to  search  for  the  totality  that  is  arrived  at  by  taking 
up  particular  viewpoints  which  are  also  intent  upon  grasping  the  whole  of 
reality  and  achieving  'the  maximum  possible  enlargement  of  our  horizon  of 
vision'  .  The  situational  analysis  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  is  thus  to 103 
b©  directed  towards  knowledgo  of  the  totality. 
In  this  first  chapter,  Mannheim  already  outlines  the  central  issues  of  his 
sociology  of  knowledge  and  his  new  concept  of  ideology.  Many  contemporary 
commentators  were  particularly  concerned  with  the  relationship  between  Mann- 
heim's  concept  of  ideology  and  false  consciousness  and  that  of  Marx. 
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For 
the  moment,  It  is  worth  pointing  to  a  number  of  significant  differences.  Inso- 
far  as  Mannheim  generalizes  the  notion  of  ideology  as  permeating  all  human 
thought  In  all  periods,  he  removes  it  from  Marx's  more  specific  formulations. 
There  is  a  tendency  to  assume  that  the  particular  and  total  concepts  of  ideal- 
ogy  are  those  of  Marx.  However,  neither  the  psychologistic  aspects  of  the 
particular  concept  nor  the  total  negation  of  thought  in  the  total  concept  are  to 
be  found  in  Marx.  But  perhaps  most  significantly  of  all,  false  consciousness 
for  Marx  is  one  which  is  a  true  representation  of  a  false  reality.  That  is, 
ný  -  the  accent  h  ar.  upon  the  object  and  not  the  subject.  The  reverse  is  true  for 
Mannheim.  This  inversion  is  formulated  by  Neusüss  as  follows: 
'Whereas  Mannheim  reproaches  thought  for  not  being 
at  all  autonomous  but  rather  existentially  bounded 
and  hence  ideological,  Marx  reproaches  "existentially 
bounded"  thought  for  being  ideological  insofar  as  it 
takes  itself  to  be  autonomous.  ..  The  connection 
between  being  and  consciousness  which,  where  it 
is  not  reflected  upon,  becomes  the  characteristic 
of  ideologies  for  Marx,  appears  by  Mannheim  to  be 
itself  the  index  of  what  is  ideological.  '  243 
Further,  one  might  add  here  that  whereas  the  problem  of  ideology  for  Marx 
(and  Lukacs)  is  a  consequence  of  alienation  and  reification,  for  Mannheim  it 
4 
is  the  result  of  an  abstract  existential  boundedness.  Even  if  we  accept  the 
significance  of  social  dependency  in  Mannheim's  argument,  there  remains 
the  problem  of  what  exactly  this  social  dependency  is  based  upon.  Mann- 
(- 
helm  so  often  only  provides  apparent  definitions  of  reality  and  existence. 104 
Often  tho  definition  of  reality  (Sein)  is  an  amalgamation  of  being  and  mean- 
ing,  i  e.  It  is  the  meaningful  experiencing  of  what  is  there  or  at  hand.  Thus, 
whereas  one  can  often  find  apparently  concrete  references  to  social  processes 
and  entities,  there  remains  at  the  meta-theoretical  level,  as  Neususs  argues, 
a  more  fundamental  phenomenological  -  Lebensphilosophie  identity  of  being 
and  meaning,  of  life  systems  and  social  theories. 
264 
For  instance,  to  take 
an  example  central  to  Marx  and  Lukäcs,  social  classes  do  not  derive  from  a 
material  process  of  reproduction  but  from  their  association  with  world-views. 
Reference  to  such  relationships  as  to  the  production  process  and  systems  of 
domination  that  can  be  found  in  Mannheim's  work  are  most  often  seen  as 
part  of  a  centre  of  experience.  Indeed,  at  the  centre  of  Mannheim's  analysis  - 
and  this  can  be  seen  clearly  in  his  notion  of  what  constitutes  false  conscious- 
ness  -  Is  the  human  individual  who  mediates  the  spheres  of  existence  and 
meaning.  For  all  Mannheim's  emphasis  upon  praxis,  the  theory  of  action 
that  is  implied  in  his  notion  of  ideology  and  utopia  (i.  e.  both  prevent  adjust- 
ment  to  the  present)  is  both  extremely  passive  (e.  g.  adjustment,  coping  etc) 
and  is  ultimately  ncta  theory  of  action  at  all.  At  its  roots  lies  a  notion  of 
human  beings  not  primarily  as  actors  but  as  experiencing  human  subjects  of 
history.  Being  and  consciousness  are  not  mediated  through  a  concrete 
process  but  are  unified  in  experience.  In  turn,  the  individual  and  his  ex- 
k 
perience  are  embedded  in  a  dynamic  stream  of  life  that  is  constituted  by  the 
sequence  of  similar  and  opposing  standpoints,  life-systems,  world  views 
and  structures  of  experience.  The  individual  is,  therefore,  not  a  point  of 
4 
observation  of  this  process  but  a  part  of  this  process  itself.  This  reflex- 
ivity  is,  of  course,  quite  valid  except  that  the  individual  does  not  constitute 
this  process,  he  merely  experiences  it.  Theories,  for  example,  are  merely 
F 
a  stream  within  a  stream;  Marxism,  for  example,  is  no  longer  a  social  theory 105 
jý. 
but  a  metaphysics  -  in  fact,  one  amongst  others. 
However,  Mannheim  provides  a  central  chapter  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie  pre- 
cis&ly  upon  the  relationship  between  theory  and  practice.  In  fact,  when 
discussing  the  English  translation  with  his  publishers,  Mannheim  originally 
suggests  this  essay  should  belong  first. 
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Though  this  was  not  followed 
up  -  even  by  Mannheim  himself  -  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  this  is  the 
largest  chapter  of  the  book.  In  the  light  of  the  preceding  discussion,  one 
might  argue  that  if  Mannheim's  theory  of  social  action  is  to  be  found  any- 
where,  then  it  should  be  in  a  chapter  entitled  'is  Politics  possible  as  a 
Science?  (The  Problem  of  Theory  and  Practice)'  . 
Mannheim  argues  that  the  question  as  to  whether  politics  is  possible  as  a 
science  must  raise  the  problem  of  the  nature  of  political  action.  This  is 
directed  towards  state  and  society  'insofar  as  these  are  still  conceived  in 
the  process  of  becoming'.  Hence,  we  need  to  ask  'Is  there  a  science  of 
what  is  in'(Iux,  what  Is  becoming,  a  science  of  the  creative  act?  '. 
246 
In 
turn,  this  depends  upon  the  existence  of  areas  of  society  not  already  brought 
under  the  process  of  rationalisation  and  administration.  For  Mannheim, 
'the  most  important  areas  of  our  social  sphere  are  even  now  still  anchored 
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in  the  irrational'  .  These  include  the  economy  and  the  class  structure. 
But  the  problem  of  acquiring  knowledge  of  this  sphere  is  that  it  is  in  a  state 
of  permanent  flux.  More  importantly,  the  observer  himself  is  a  participant 
In  'the  conflicting  forces'  and  that  means  not  merely  that  he  takes  up  a 
position  within  this  conflict  but  also  that'the  form  of  stating  the  problem,  the 
most  general  form  of  his  mode  of  thought  and  even  his  categorial  apparatus' 
are  bound  up  with  the  'vital  political  undercurrents'.  This  then,  in  an 106 
acuto  form,  is  part  of  the  problem  of  the  relationship  of  theory  to  practice. 
Thus  for,  Mannheim  has  reproduced  the  political  sphere  some  of  the  problems 
which  he  already  outlined  in  the  first  chapter  -  the  political  sphere  as  per- 
menently  in  flux;  knowledge  of  this  sphere  is  existentiall  rooted;  these 
roots  are  themselves  in  flux.  Similarly,  when  he  turns  to  an  analysis  of 
the  relationship  between  theory  and  practice  in  the  most  important  'ideal- 
typical  representatives'  of  social  and  political  currents  in  the  nineteenth 
and  twentieth  centuries,  Mannheim's  response,  as  with  ideological  perspect- 
Ivism  earner,  is  to  search  for  a  synthesis. 
Mannheim  examines  the  bureaucratic  conservatism,  conservative  historicism, 
liberal  -democratic  bourgeois  thought,  the  socialist-communist  conception 
and  the  fascist  versions  of  the  relationship  between  theory  and  practice.  The 
ideal-typical  presentation  of  these  five  perspectives  would  seem  to  accord  to 
each  of  them  an  equal  status.  '  As  with  the  discussion  of  ideologies  earlier, 
Mannheim's  response  is  to  argue  that  their  content  is  dependent  upon  the 
social  standpoint  from  which-they  emerged: 
'not  only  the  ultimate  orientations,  evaluations, 
contents  but  also  the  manner  of  stating  the  pro- 
blem,  the  type  and  mode  of  observation  and  even 
the  categories  in  which  one  subsumes,  collects 
and  orders  experience  vary  according  to  the  stand- 
point.  '  248 
One  way  out  of  this  apparent  impasse,  is  the  formation  of  party  schools  that 
will  examine  their  own  world-views  but  this  would  encourage  the  suppression 
" 
of  'the  problem  of  the  whole',  the  conception  of  politics  and  society  as  a 
totality. 
A  more  promising  possibility  for  Mannheim  lies  in  the  very  fact  of  recog- 107 
nixing  'the  partisan  boundedness  of  knowledge  of  politics  and  world  views'. 
In  a  manner  similar  to  Simmei,  Mannheim  argues  that  all  knowledge  is 
frogrmentary  but  Mannheim  sees  in  the  complementary  nature  of  these  partial 
perspectives  of  the  totality  the  possibility  of  attaining  knowledge  of  the 
totality.  Their  partiality  Iles  in  the  fact  that 
'the  different  vantage  points  (standpoints)  as  they 
emerge  in  the  stream  of  social  life  enable  each 
one  from  its  particular  point  in  the  stream  to 
recognise  the  stream  itself.  .. 
All  political  viewpoints  are  merely  partial  because 
tho  historical  totality  is  always  too  comprehensive 
to  be  grasped  by  any  one  of  the  individual  points 
of  view  that  emerge  out  of  it.  But  precisely  because 
all  these  points  of  view  emerge  out  of  the  same 
historical  and  social  stream,  because  therefore  their 
partiality  is  constituted  in  the  elements  of  an  emerg- 
ent  totality,  it  is  possible  to  see  them  in  juxtaposition 
and  their  synthesis 
[Zusammenschau,  becomes  a  task 
11  that  must  be  continually  reformulated  and  resolved., 
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This  synthesis  of  thought  styles  must  be  dynamic  and  must  cover  not  merely 
the  contents  of  thought  but  also  their  basis. 
The  agent  of  this  synthesis  is,  for  Mannheim,  the  intelligentsia.  Mannheim 
also  recognises,  however,  that  historically  the  desire  for  a  synthesis  of  pers- 
pectives  has  usually  come  from  'those  middle  classes  who  feel  themselves 
threatened  from  above  and  below  and  who,  from  the  outset  and  out  of  social 
instinct  seek  a  mediation  between  extremes'.  This  synthesis  can  be  static  - 
'the  arithmetic  average'  of  viewpoints  -  or  dynamic.  In  the  latter  case,  it 
must  be  based  upon  a  political  position 
'that  affords  a  progressive  development  of  history 
in  such  a  manner  that  it  will  retain  as  much  as 
possible  of  the  accumulated  cultural  acquisitions 
and  social  energies.  '  250 
Such  a  position  is  not  likely  to  be  the  middle  strata  but  that  of  'a  relatively 108 
classless  stratum  that  is  not  too  firmly  anchored  in  the  social  order'  - 
'the  socially  free-floating  intelligentsia?.  This  intelligentsia  cannot  be 
simply  located  in  social  class  categories  even  though  'our  intelligentsia  is, 
to  a  considerable  extent,  a  rentier  intelligentsia  that  lives  from  industrial 
loan  capital'  and  contains  state  officials  and  members  of  the  liberal  pro- 
fessions.  But  in  all  these  instances,  it  is  the  case  that  they  are  'less 
.  clearly  identified  with  one  class  than  those  strata  who  directly  participate 
in  the  economic  process'.  This  is  the  first  criterion  of  their  suitablility  for 
performing  a  synthesis  of  political  viewpoints.  Here,  of  course,  therri  s  an 
implicit  assumption  that  the  degree  of  political  commitment  also'varies  in 
proportion  with  the  degree  of  direct  participation  in  the  economic  process. 
The  second  criterion  is  'a  unifying  sociological  bond  between  intellectual 
groups,  namely  education'.  This  is  because 
'participation  in  a  common  education  heritage  tends 
increasingly  to  suppress  differences  of  birth,  status, 
occupation  and  ownership  and  unites  the  individual 
educated  people  on  the  basis  of  this  education.  '  251 
Thirdly,  this  'modern  education'  is  'a  living  struggle,  a  microcosm  of  the 
conflicting  purposes  and  tendencies  in  the  social  sphere'.  The  individual  is 
thus  subjected  to  the  opposing  tendencies  of  social  life 
., 
unlike  someone  directly 
participating  in  the  production  process  who  'tends  to  take  up  the  world-view  of 
e 
the  specific  life-circle  and  act  exclusively  on  the  basis  of  the  dtermination 
of  his  specific  situation'.  Intellectuals  are  therefore  determined  in  the  out- 
look  by  both  their  social  background  and  their  education. 
0 
As  a  free-floating  intelligentsia,  they  have  two  courses  of  action  open  to  them. 
'  The  first  is  attachment  to  one  of  the  antagonistic  social  classes.  Even  here 
there  is,  Mannheim  argues,  an  implicit  tendency  towards  a  dynamic  synthesis 109 
since  this  adherence  has  usually  been  to  the  class  or  party  in  need  of  intellect= 
ual  development.  The  second  option  lies,  not  in  the  development  of  class 
consciousness  but  in  'the  concrete  conscious  recognition  of  their  own  social 
position  and  the  mission  that  emerges  out  of  it'.  Though  not  playing  an  in- 
dependent  politically  active  role,  they  can  nonetheless  seek  out  the  position 
'out  of  which  a  total  orientation  to  events  is  possible',  they  can  choose  'to 
be  nightwatchmen  in  an  otherwise  at  I  too  dark  night'  .  Here  we  come  across 
the  fourth  criterion  for  intellectuals'  role  as  synthesizers,  namely,  their 
ability  to  choose  a  position,  'to  create  a  forum  outside  the  party  schools  that 
secures  the  perspective  of  and  interest  in  the  particular  totality.  ' 
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The  political  knowledge  of  the  totality  gained  by  the  intelligentsia  and  -  by 
implication  -  political  science  is  a  form  of  situationally  determined  know- 
ledge  that  is  not  secured  merely  by  'observation'  but  by  'active  partici- 
pation'.  It  is,  Mannheim  argues,  a  new  form  of  knowledge  'for  which  decision 
and  viewpoint  are  -inseparably  bound  together'  and  in  which  'one  must  never 
separate  impulse  of  the  will,  evaluation  and  world-view  from  the  result  of 
thought'. 
253 
Mannheim  is  assuming  here  that  only  political  knowledge  is 
the  result  of  engagement  as  well  as  reflection  -  to  use  Apel's  terminology  - 
and  not  the  whole  of  human  knowledge.  Ironically,  the  form  of  engagement 
which  he  has  in  mind  is  itself  the  product  of  the  intelligentsia's  detachment. 
It  is  the  search  for  a  synthesis  of  'the  one-sidedness'  of  knowledge  derived 
0 
from  particular  social  positions. 
This  political  and  historical  knowledge  is  'partial,  perspectival,  connected 
with  collectively  bounded  group  intentions'  and  develops  only  in  connection 
with  them.  Hence,  it  'interprets  reality  in  a  specific  manner'  and  is  a  form 110 
of  knowledge  with  an  'orientation  towards  action'.  These  insights,  Mann- 
heim  argues,  into  the  nature  of  political  knowledge  are  only  possible  through 
the  sociology  of  knowledge.  By  implication,  the  sociology  of  knowledge  will 
also  be  a  Grundwissenschaft  in  relation  to  the  study  of  politics  if  not  to  its 
practice.  However,  the  sociology  of  knowledge  has  three,  options  open  to  it 
with  regard  to  political  knowledge.  '  One  can  argue  that  its  existential  bound- 
edness  makes  any  true  knowledge  and  understanding  of  politics  impossible. 
This  is  presumably  a  strictly  scientistic  viewpoint.  Secondly,  Mannheim 
suggests  that  the  sociology  of  knowledge's  task  could  be 
'disentangling  the  evaluative,  standpoint  and  impulsive 
element  from  every  concrete,  existing  "knowledge", 
eliminating  it  as  a  source  of  error  and  doing  so  in 
order  to  arrive  at  a  "value-free",  "supra-social", 
"supra-historical"  realm  of  "objectively"  valid 
knowledge.  '  254 
This  is  presumably  a  positivistic  strat-egy  not  unlike  that  recommended  by 
Geiger. 
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Mannheim  sees  it  as  the  strategy  employed  by  Max  Weber  and 
adherents  to  'formal  sociology'  and  it  is  one  which  he  regards  as  legitimate 
for  certain  spheres  of  knowledge. 
Mannheim  himself,  however,  adopts  a  third  strategy  which  argues  that  in 
the  case  of  political  knowledge  the  evaluative  element  cannot  be  easily  separ- 
ated  from  the  non-evaluative.  Nonetheless,  there  does  exist  a  consensus 
ex  post  with  regard  to  an  increasingly  larger  area  of  political  knowledge. 
Though  Mannheim  does  not  suggest  this  here,  this  would  appear  to  be  pre- 
cisely  the  kind  of  knowledge  derived  from  his  own  analyses  of  ideology  and 
utopia.  Mannheim's  strategy  involves  a  'decision'  in  favour  of  a  dynamic 
synthesis.  But  his  own  strategy  also  contains  a  strong  positivist  element 
since  he  argues  that  the  advances  in  the  sociological  analysis  of  ideologies 
will  enable  us 111 
'to  calculate  more  precisely  the  collectively  bounded 
wills  and  their  corresponding  thought  and  to  predict 
approximately  the  ideological  reactions  of  social 
strata.  1  256 
At  no  point  does  Mannheim  examine  the  ends  to  which  these  predictions  and 
calculations  will  be  placed,  except  that  they  will  rest  upon  an  ethics  of  re- 
sponsibility  (Verantwortungsethik).  Again  echoing  Weber,  Mannheim  argues 
that  this  kind  of  knowledge  is  part  of  the  increasing  rationalisation  of  the 
world  in  which  politics  is  replaced  by  administration  insofar  as  the  irrational 
realm  -  for  Mannheim  the  root  of  political  activity  -  becomes  correspondingly 
narrower. 
Mannheim's  search  for  a  synthesis  of  one-sided,  political  perspectives  can 
be  seen  as  an  extension  of  his  earlier  argument  for  the  synthesis  of  ideologies 
in  the  broadest  sense.  The  cultural  synthesis  has  become  a  political  synthe- 
sis  and  presumably  a  synthesis  that  mediates  class  and  political  conflicts. 
This  dynamic  political  synthesis  can  thus  be  seen  as  an  extension  of  the 
search  for  a  synthesis  that  Mannheim  had  postulated  ever  since  his  essay  on 
historicism.  As  Lenk  argues,  'thinking  through  historicism  to  its  ultimate 
limits  also  implies  at  the  same  time,  thinking  through  ideologies  to  their 
limits'. 
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Hence,  one  should  not  regard  Mannheim's  theory  of  intellect- 
uals  merely  as  a  response  to  a  sociological  problem  since  'Mannheim's 
theory  of  the  "free-floating  intelligentsia"  does  not  spring  from  a  sociological 
problematic  but  a  cultural  and  philosophy  of  history  postulate. 
258 
Mann- 
heim  assumes  that  this  intelligentsia  is  distanced  from  the  historical  process 
and  that  this  very  distance  and  its  social  lack  of  attachment  gives  it  the 
best  chance  of  revealing  the  synthesis  of  historical,  political  standpoints. 
Mannheim  sees  the  harmonisation  of  conflicting  class  positions  and  polarised 112 
political  ideologies  as  a  possiblity  even  in  the  later  period  of  the  Weimar 
Republic.  Perhaps  nowhere  more  clearly  than  in  the  theory  of  the  relatively 
detached  intelligentsia  can  one  see  the  practical,  political  intention  behind 
Mannheim's  sociology  of  knowledge  as  the  mediation  of  political  conflict. 
Within  a  different  context,  Lukäcs,  only  three  years  previously,  had  pointed 
to  this  notion  of  a  detached  intelligentsia  when  he  argued  that 
'This  belief  in  being  suspended  above  all  class  an- 
tagonism,  all  egoistic  human  interests  is  the 
typical  standpoint  of  intellectuals  who  do  not 
directly-participate  in  the  process  of  production, 
whose  existential  basis,  both  material  and 
intellectual,  seems  to  be  the  "whole"  society, 
without  class  differences.  '  259 
It  is  possible  to  state  Mannheim's  position  more  forcefully.  In  a  world 
in  which  al  I  ideologies  and  political  positions  have  been  reduced  to  equal 
status  -  rather  like  the  equivalent  exchange  value  of  commodities  -  and  all 
seem  to  be  competing  with  one  another  on  an  equal  basis  -  as  in  the  notion  of 
a  free  market  model  of  society  -  the  liberal  response  is  to  search  for  some 
commanding  position  above  these  ideologies  and  conflicting  parties  from 
which  it  will  be  possible  to  regulate  them  or,  at  least,  extract  from  each 
what  is  valuable  in  them.  With  some  exaggeration,  one  could  say  that 
Mannheim's  free-floating  intelligentsia  in  late  Weimar  Germany  play  a  not 
dissimilar  role  to  Hobbes'  Leviathan  in  a  mid-seventeenth  century  England 
that  has  been  disrupted  by  civil  war. 
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Mannheim's  free-floating  intelligentsia  form  a  necessary  part  of  his  attempted 
contemporary  diagnosis  of  society  and  his  attempt  to  construct  a  sociology  of 
the  modern  world  in  a  period  of  crisis.  But  the  search  for  a  cultural  synthesis 
was  itself  a  common  theme  amongst  many  sections  of  the  intelligentsia  in 
Weimar  Germany.  In  part,  it  had  its  origins  in  the  development  of  the  anal- 113 
ysis  of  world-views  before  the  First  World  War  by  philosophers  such  as 
Dilthey.  In  the  post-war  period,  as  Ringer  suggests,  the  disintegration  of 
German  society  and  especially  the  crumbling  status  of  the  Gelehrtenstand, 
prompted  more  urgent  searches  for  cultural  syntheses. 
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Perhaps  part  of 
the  appeal  of  Mannheim's  Ideologie  und  Utopie  lay  in  the  forceful  manner  in 
which  the  author  drew  the  political  parallel  to  the  need  for  a  cultural  synthesis 
and  a  period  of  increasing  social  and  political  crisis.  This  is  the  context, 
for  example,  within  which  Neusüss  comments  on  Mannheim's  political  in- 
tentions  when  he  suggests  that 
'In  Mannheim,  a  typical  member  of  that  German  Iate- 
liberal  learned  world  is  evident  which  saw  itself 
hemmed  in  between  the  fronts  of  a  situation  of  rapid 
social  upheaval  that  it  conceived  of  as  a  "cultural 
crisis"  and  in  danger  of  being  destroyed. 
Mannheim's  path  of  confronting  this  danger  through 
a  "cultural  synthesis"  and  thereby  at  the  same  time 
of  raising  himself  above  the  social  and  political 
struggle  of  his  time,  in  fact  therefore  implied  an 
attempted  escape.,  It  finished  up  in  the  fictitious 
position  of  a  "free-floating  intelligentsia"  that, 
more  a  wishful  image  than  reality,  was  to  synthesize 
everything  with  everything  else,  whereas  in  fact  it  was 
the  expression  of  social,  political  and  intellectual 
hopelessness.  '  262 
This  political  motive  in  his  sociology  of  knowledge  was  not  to  return  in  his 
writings  to  such  a  prominent  extent  until  much  later,  and  under  very  differ- 
ent  circumstances,  in  some  of  his  English  works.  Furthermore,  as  will  be 
evident,  this  intelligentsia  also  plays  its  role  not  merely  in  synthesizing 
ideologies  but  also  in  producing  utopias.  'Utopian  Consciousness'  is  the 
0 
third  and  final  chapter  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie. 
In  the  only  detailed  study  of  Mannheim's  notion  of  utopia,  Neusüss  argues 
that,  as  employed  by  Mannheim,  its  contradictory  definitions  can  only  be 114 
understood  in  the  light  of  Mannheim's  meta-theoretical  intentions. 
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Mannheim  certainly  does  not  provide  us  with  a  fixed  definition  of  utopia.  It 
appears  as  a  form  of  consciousness  similar  to  ideological  consciousness,  as 
the  revolutionary  principle  of  history  and  as  fictional  thought.  Its  meaning 
differs  with  the  context.  Mannheim  starts  out  by  defining  utopian  conscious- 
ness  as  one  that  'does  not  find  itself  covered  by  the  "reality"  (Sein)  that 
surrounds  it'.  This  incongruity  arises  from  the  fact  that 
'such  a  consciousness  is  oriented  in  experience,  thought 
and  action  towards  factors  that  this  "reality"  does  not 
contain  as  realised.  '  264 
Thus  far,  this  definition  is  identical  with  one  of  the  definitions  of  ideology. 
However,  Mannheim  goes  on  to  argue  that 
'Only  those  orientations  that  "transcend  reality"  will 
be  referred  to  by  us  as  utopian  which,  transformed 
into  action,  tend  to  shatter,  partly  or  wholly,  the 
prevailing  order  of  existence.  '  265 
This  implies  that,  to  be  utopian,  consciousness  must  not  merely  conceive  of 
states  of  affairs  beyond  the  statugquo  but  must  actually  be  realised.  All 
historical  periods  have  had  states  of  consciousness  that  transcended  their 
reality  but  they  did  not  operate  as  utopias  but  as  ideologies,  as 
'appropriate  ideologies  to  this  stage  of  existence,  as 
long  as  they  were  "organically"  (i.  e.  without  re- 
volutionary  effectiveness)  integrated  into  the  world. 
view  of  the  period.  '  266 
Mannheim  himself  suggests  that  what  is  crucial  to  such  definitions  of  utopia 
Is  the  notion  of  existence  or  reality  which  utopias  transcend.  For  Mannheim, 
this  is  a  reality  or  existence  that  is  'concretely  valid',  'a  functioning  and, 
in  this  sense  a  real  determinable  social  order',  one  which  contains  not  merely 
economic  and  political  structures  but  'all  forms  of  human  interaction'.  Such 
an  effectively  operating  order  of  life  is  also  'enmeshed  by  notions  that  are 
therefore  to  be  designated  as  "transcendent  of  existence,  "as"  unreal"'  because 115 
they  cannot  be  lived  out  in  that  society.  In  an  illuminating  passage,  Mann- 
heim  states  the  motive  for  a  sociology  of  knowledge.  He  suggests  that 
'all  those  ideas  which  do  not  fit  into  the  current  order 
of  life  are  "existentially  transcendent"  or  unreal. 
Ideas  which  correspond  to  the  concretely  existing 
and  de  facto  functioning  present  order  of  existence, 
we  term  "adequate",  existentially  congruent  ideas. 
They  are  relatively  rare  and  only  a  consciousness 
fully  clarified  by  sociology  (soziologisch  völlig 
geklärtes  Bewusstsein)  operates  through  existent- 
ially  congruent  ideas  and  motives.  '  267 
More  clearly  than  elsewhere  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie,  Mannheim  here  points 
to  the  sociology  of  knowledge's  role  as  ensuring  that  consciousness  is  con- 
gruent  with  present  existence.  This  is  why  a  diagnosis  of  the  present  time 
is  so  significant.  In  ideology  and  utopia,  the  present  is  precisely  what  is 
absent.  ' 
Mannheim  argues  that  ideologies  are  'those  existentially  transcendent 
notions  that  never  succeed  de  facto  in  the  realisation  of  their  projected  con- 
tents'  .  Indeed,  Mannheim  maintains  that  there  exists  'a  whole  scale  of 
possible  types  of  ideological  consciousness'  from  the  dominant  axiomatics  of 
thought,  to  'cant-consciousness'  which  conceals  vital  interests  and  ideolo- 
gies  of  lies. 
But  whereas  utopias  are  also  existentially  transcendent  they  are  not  ideologies 
insofar  and  to  the  extent  that  they  succeed  through 
counter-activity  in  transforming  the  existing 
historical  existential  reality  in  the  direction  of  their 
own  notion.  '  268 
Mannheim  concedes  that  the  designation  of  what  is  ideological  and  what 
utopian  presents  difficulties  but  essentially  rests  upon  'at  which  stage  of 
existentialy  reality  one  applies  the  standard'.  In  turn  this  implies  that  the 116 
standard  is  determined  by  the  human  subject's  position  and  perspective. 
For  instance,  'the  representatives  of  a  specific  existential  reality  will  term 
utopian  all  those  notions  that  from  their  point  of  view  can,  in  principle,  never 
be  realised'  . 
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They  will  conceive  of  them  as  'absolutely  utopian'.  In 
contrast,  Mannheim  argues  that  he  will  speak  of  'merely  relative  utopia, 
i.  e.  one  that  seems  to  be  unrealisable  only  from  the  point  of  view  of  an 
existent  stage'  of  existence.  Even  here,  however,  the  notion  of  utopia, 
like  all  other  historical  concepts,  depends  upon  the  perspective  of  the  person 
using  the  term.  But  once  more  Mannheim  is  in  search  of  the  'correct' 
concept  of  utopia  -  the  one  '  most  adequate  to  our  stage  of  thought'  .  Thi  s 
can  only  be  in  relation  to  the  present.  existing  social  order.  Therefore,  as 
Mannheim  himself  argues,  'the  utopias  of  today  can  become  the  realties  of 
tomorrow'  and,  presumably,  the  ideologies  of  tomorrow.  The  other  implicat- 
ion  of  this  'historical'  notion  of  ideologies  and  utopias  (i.  e.  the  fact  that 
they  are  judged  in  terms  of  an  absent  present)  is  that,  for  Mannheim,  dom- 
inant,  groups  will  determine  what  is  utopian  and  ascendant  groups  what  is 
ideological.  Despite  these  difficulties,  however,  when  we  look  into  the 
past  we  can  see  an  unambiguous  criterion  for  both  forms  of  consciousness: 
'The  criterion  for  ideology  and  utopia  is  realisation'  . 
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It  need  hardly  be 
pointed  out  here  that  this  is  an  ex  post  criterion,  which  makes  It  impossible 
to  recognise  what  is  utopian  in  the  present.  Thus,  when  Mannheim  proceeds 
to  argue  that  what  are  utopian  are  'all  those  existentially  transcendent  notions 
(hence  not  merely  wish-projections)  that  in  anyway  have  a  transforming  effect 
0 
upon  historical-social  existence', 
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we  cannot  know  whether  they  will  have 
a  'transforming  effect'  until  that  effect  has  been  realised. 
9 
In  the  examination  of  utopias,  what  interests  Mannheim  specifically  is  'the 117 
concrete  analysis  of  the  historical-social  position  from  which  they  arose: 
from  the  structural  situation  of  that  stratum  which  at  any  time  espouses 
them'. 
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Historically,  utopias  change  their  form  in  response  to  changing 
social  circumstances  and  the  'constantly  shifting  total  constellation'.  So 
far,  the  analysis  would  be  concerned  with  the  'socially  bounded  form  of 
utopia'  at  a  particular  time.  It  is  also  possible,  however,  to  investigate 
'the  problem  of  a  transformation  of  "utopian  consciousness"'  , 
but 
'only  when  the  utopian  element  ...  tends  to  be 
completely  infused  into  every  aspect  of  the  dom- 
inant  consciousness  of  the  time,  when  the  form 
of  experience,  the  form  of  action  and  mode  of 
observation  (perspective)  are  organised  in  accord 
with  this  utopian  element,  can  one  cum  fundamento 
in  re  speak  not  only  of  diverse  forms  of  utopia  but, 
at  the  same  time,  also  of  diverse  forms  and  levels 
of  utopian  consciousness.  '  273 
Although  Mannheim  does  not  make  this  explicit,  his  notion  of  'utopian  con- 
sciousness'  presumably  corresponds  with  the  total  conception  of  ideology, 
at  least  with  regard  to  its  comprehensiveness.  Mannheim,  in  fact,  pro- 
ceeds  to  develop  four  historical  ideal  types  of  utopian  consciousness:  the 
orgiastic  chiliasm  of  the  Anabaptists,  the  liberal  humanitarian  Idea,  the 
conservative  idea  and  the  socialist  -  communist  utopia.  From  what  Mann- 
heim  has  already  said,  it  is  clear  that  genuine  utopian  consciousness 
springs  only  from  whole  social  groups.  Further,  some  utopias  like  Thomas 
More's  =  mentioned  by  Mannheim  -  are  not  utopias  at  all  on  his  criterion 
since  they  are  not  successful  and  not  realised.  From  the  examples  Mann- 
heim  provides,  it  is  obvious  that  he  proceeds  only  with  an  immanent  anal- 
ysis  of  the  concept  of  utopia.  Each  utopia  can  potentially  be  played  off 
against  the  others.  As  with  the  instances  of  political  ideologies,  it  is 
difficult  to  see  any  criterion  for  evaluating  them.  They  are  not  related  to 
substantive  historical  changes  but  are  instead  interpreted  merely  in  terms  of 
their  immanent  chances  in  form 118 
As  in  each  of  the  two  previous  chapters,  Mannheim  concludes  with  an  ana- 
lysis  of  the  contemporary  situation  with  regard  to  utopian  consciousness. 
The  utopian  forms  Mannheim  has  just  analysed  are  seen  to  compete  with 
one  another  in  different  forms  in  the  modern  period.  Indeed,  through  their 
mutual  struggles  they  tend  to  destroy  their  intensity  by  revealing  their  histori- 
cal  and  social  determination,  i.  e.  their  partiality.  Utopias  in  the  modern 
world  become  'guiding  perspectives'  ,  'heuristic  principles'  and  'possible 
points  of  view'  .  The  disappearance  of  utopias  is  accompanied  by  the  dis- 
appearance  of  a  total  perspective  which  is  now  confined  to  the  left  (Lukäcs) 
and  right  (Spann)  wings  -  the  only  groups  who  still  believe  in  a  totality 
of  historical  development.  Others,  like  Troeltsch,  retain  it  as  a  working 
hypothesis  or  like  Alfred  Weber  retain  it  as  a  Gestalt.  In  the  middle  are 
those  like  Max  Weber  who  search  for  'eternally  valid  structures  of  types'. 
In  the  modern  period,  with  the  disappearance  of  utopias,  'qualitatively 
differentiated  time  becomes  a  homogeneous  space'  .  We  experience  the 
'homogenisation  of  events  in  which  every  fact  loses  its  particular  temporal 
Index  and  its  local  colour'  and  'all  those  elements  of  thought  and  perspect- 
ive  rooted  in  utopias  are  now  relativised  sceptically  as  ideologies.  ' 
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This  disappearance  of  reality  transcendence  -  both  ideological  and  utopian  - 
has  taken  other  forms.,  -Ina  somewhat  obscure  ý  passage,  Mannheim  seems 
to  suggest  that  Marxism  both  reduced  the  intellectual  sphere  to  the  social- 
economic  situation  whilst  at  the  same  time-was  'materialist  only  in  name' 
since  this  economic  sphere  was  'a  structural  context  of  mental  attitudes'  . 
But  this  process  of  undermining  the  into-Ilectual  sphere  was  extended  to  its 
relativization,  to  an  'eternal  human  substratum  of  drives'  by  writers  like 
Freud  and  Pareto.  This  'process  of  the  complete  destruction  of  all  spiritual 119 
elements'  has  also  permeated  the  arts,  sexual  relations,  sport  -  where 
Sachlichkeit  predominates  -  as  well  as  the  political  sphere  where  politics 
has  been  reduced  to  economics.  Indeed,  'all  ideas  have  been  discredited, 
al  I  utopias  destroyed'  . 
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Faced  with  this  pervasive  reified  and  ahistorical  Sachlichkeit,  Mannheim  asks 
whether  all  that  we  can  hope  for  is  the  maintenance  of  'integrity'  (Echtheit) 
or  genuineness  in  the  ethical  sphere.  This  was  certainly  an  important  cate- 
gory  in  his  unpublished  writings  but  now'  Mannheim  is  inclined  to  suggest  that 
it,  too,  has  fallen  prey  to  modern  Sachlichkeit.  Mannheim  goes  on  to 
suggest  that  there  are,  in  fact,  only  two  possible  ways  out  of  'the  con- 
temporary  lack  of  tension'  between  the  existent  and  the  transcendent.  The 
first  is  socialism  and  communism  which  retain  'at  least  one  form  of  utopia'  . 
If  there  is  a  peaceful  evolution  towards  'a  later,  more  complete  form  of  in- 
dustrialism'  then  Mannheim  suggests  that  the  subordinate  strata  will  also 
undergo  the  same  kind  of  transformation  that  he  has  just  outlined.  If  it  can 
be  achieved  only  through  revolution,  then  the  utopian  and  ideological  elements 
will  flare  up  anew.  The  'fate  of  reality  -  transcendence'  therefore  rests, 
in  part,  upon  this  form  of  social  opposition.  The  second  possibi  I  ity  for  the 
maintenance  of  utopias  and  the  intellectual  sphere  lies  with  'a  distinctive 
social  -intellectual  middle  stratum'  .  This  'thin  stratum'  (Dünnschicht)  is 
narrower  than  the  intelligentsia  as  a  whole.  Mannheim  implies  that  it  is 
the  critical  elements  within  the  intelligentsia  -  its  'free-floating  intellect- 
. 
uality'  -  that  remains  out  of  accord  with  the  existing  situation.  As  a 
stratum  it  is  faced  with  four  alternatives.  The  first  is  affiliation  with 
'the  radical  wing  of  the  socialist-communist  proletariat'  I.  Mannheim  suggests, 
however,  that  they  live  in  'an  aproblematical  situation.  '  For  them  there  still 120 
exists  no  conflict  between  intellectual  and  social  allegiance.  The  second 
option  (Max  Weber,  Pareto),  having  discarded  utopias,  'becomes  sceptical 
and,  in  the  name  of  integrity,  proceeds  ...  to  destroy  ideology  in  science.  ' 
The  third  alternative  is  a  retreat  into  the  past.  The  fourth  and  final  alter- 
native  shuts  itself  off  from  the  historical  process  and  returns  to  the  'ecstatic'  I. 
Mannheim  offers  no  prophecy  of  which  of  these  alternatives  will  come  to 
dominate  the  future  since  'because  we  are  human  beings  and  not  things' 
much  depends  on  our  will: 
'what  one  here  opts  for  lies  ultimately  with  each 
individual.  What  has  been  presented  so  far  can 
only  contribute  towards  helping  him  to  see  the 
significance  of  his  option.  '  276 
In  the  last  resort,  therefore,  all  Mannheim's  emphasis  upon  'existential 
boundedness'  falls  away  and  one  is  left  with  the  decisions  of  the  individual 
will.  As  a  final  comment,  Mannheim  suggests  that  is  possible  to  conceive, 
in  principle,  of  a  world  that  is  'absolutely  lacking  in  ideology  and  utopia'. 
But  'the  most  fundamental  distinction  between  the  two  forms  of  transcend- 
ence  of  reality'  would  become  apparent  since 
'Whereas  the  disappearance  of  the  ideological  re- 
presents  a  crisis  only  for  specific  strata  and  the 
objectivity  (Sachlichkeit)  that  emerges  from  the 
unmasking  of  ideologies  always  implies  self- 
clarification  for  the  totality,  the  complete  dis- 
appearance  of  the  utopian  would  transform  the 
structure  of  the  whole  of  human  nature.  The 
disappearance  of  utopia  brings  about  a  static 
Sachlichkeit  in  which  man  himself  becomes 
a  thing  (Sache).  1  277 
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In  such  a  state  of  affairs,  man,  'with  the  relinquishing  of  diverse  forms  of 
utopia,  loses  the  will  to  make  history  and  thereby  a  vision  of  it'.  Here, 
Mannheim  makes  explicit  his  belief  that  utopias  supply  the  dynamic  to  history 
just  as  we  saw  earlier  that  competition  and  generational  changes  were  the  co- 121 
determinants  of  changes  in  forms  of  knowledge. 
Yet  it  is  also  apparent  that  utopias  are  of  a  different  order  to  competition 
and  generations  in  Mannheim's  metaphysics  of  history.  Utopia  is  the 
dynamic  of  existence  and  of  history,  a  dynamic  that  can  be  both  evolution- 
ary  and  revolutionary.  Mannheim  views  utopias  as  impulses  of  conscious- 
ness  or  the  will.  Once  more,  the  problem  of  social  strata  arises  in  his 
sociology  of  knowledge  in  their  status  as  the  agents  or  bearers  of  forms  of 
consciousness.  They  do  not  emerge  out  of  the  process  of  social  reproduct- 
ion.  On  the  other  hand,  Mannheim's  analysis  appears  to  be  orientated  to- 
wards  a  dichotomous  model  of  society  in  his  discussion  of  utopia  insofar  as 
utopias  emerge  from  below  and  ideologies  are  seen  to  operate  in  the  reverse 
direction.  This  is  in  contrast  with  his  more  pluralistic  model  of  society 
both  in  the  essay  on  competition  and  in  earlier  chapters  of  Ideologie  und 
!  2i  e-  Similarly,  the  sociological  concept  of  ideology  employed  in  the 
earlier  chapters  is  characterised  by  a  closed  partial  standpoint  that  can  be 
overcome  through  cultural  synthesis.  The  concept  of  utopia,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  ultimately  to  be  located  not  in  a  sociological  context  -  though  Mann- 
heim  does  attempt  this  somewhat  unsuccessfully  In  his  analysis  of  hist- 
orical  examples  of  utopias  -  but  within  the  context  of  an  ontology  of  human 
history.  Utopia  is  here  to  be  seen  at  the  end  of  the  chapter  as  a  kind  of 
voluntaristic  moment  of  human  consciousness  that  is  enlightened  and  dynamic. 
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But  if  we  accept  this  as  being  the  case,  then  it  is  difficult  to  see  what, 
precisely,  is  the  role  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  with  regard  to  utopian 
consciousness.  Of  course,  one  role  is  the  examination  of  the  social  found- 
ations  of  historical  utopias.  But  with  regard  to  Mannheim's  ontological 122 
notion  of  utopia'and  in  relation  to  his  philosophy  of  history,  the  sociology  of 
knowledge  would  appear  to  be  robbed  of  its  crucial  role,  for  example,  as 
synthesizer  of  perspectives.  It  can  only  point  to  the  significance  of  utopia  as 
the  dynamic  of  history.  The  diagnosis  of  the  present  crisis  then  appears 
without  any  resolution  -  except  the  hope  that  utopian  consciousness  will  be 
preserved  in  the  future. 
These  kinds  of.  arnb  i  gu  i  ti  es  in  the  notion  of  utopia,  however,  form  part  of  the 
wider  context  of  the  divergent  conceptions  of  both  ideology  and  utopia. 
Neusüss  has  usefully  outlined  these  various  diverse  conceptions  in  his  study 
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of  utopian  consciousness.  He  argues  that  it  is  possible  to  distinguish  in 
Ideologie  und  Utopie  the  following  conepts  of  ideology  and  utopia: 
1  General,  total  and  value-free  concept  of  ideology. 
This  concept  concerns  the  existence  of  the  'exist- 
ential  boundedness'of  all  thought  and  knowledge. 
it  is  an  uncritical  concept  that  says  nothing  con- 
cerning  the  truth  or  falsity  of  thought. 
2  General,  total  and  evaluative  concept  of  ideology. 
Describes  'false  consciousness  in  the  sense  of  an 
"ingenuineness"  (Unechtheit)  that  is  grounded  in 
a  philosophy  of  history'. 
This  concept,  too,  does  not  distinguish  between 
ideology  and  utopia. 
3  Concept  of  reality  incongruence  or  existentially 
inadequate  consciousness.  This  can  also  refer 
to  both  ideology  and  utopia. 
3a  Pragmatic  concept  of  ideology.  Refers  to  conscious- 
ness  which  'hides  social  and  political  reality  in 
favour  of  dominant  interests'  I. 
3b  Particular  concept  of  ideology.  Refers  to  specific 
contents  of  thought. 
3c￿Total  and  special  concept  of  ideology.  Refers  to 
'the  total  consciousness  of  a  dominant  strata' 
(cant-Bewusstsein) 123 
4  Utopian  consciousness.  A  consciousness  that 
'transcends'  existence  and  leaps  out  of  reality. 
4a  Revolutionary  utopia.  The  consciousness  of 
subordinate  strata  and  hence  the  complement 
to  ideology  as  defined  in  3b  and  3c. 
4b  Potential  utopia.  Refers  to  ideologies  that  can 
become  utopian. 
4c  Dynamic  concept  of  utopia.  The  dynamic  element 
of  all  human  thought. 
4d  Utopia  that  is  adequate  and  immanent  to  exist- 
ence.  The  'dynamic  synthesis  of  existentially 
inadequate  utopias',  in  fact,  the  sociology  of 
knowledge  itself.  277 
As  Neusüss  argues,  such  a  diversity  in  the  usage  of  the  two  concepts  casts 
considerable  doubt  upon  their  fruitfulness  for  empirical  sociological  analysis, 
which  is  at  least  one  of  the  intentions  behind  Mannheim's  sociology  of  know- 
ledge.  The  sociological  dimension  of  the  concepts  is  fused  with  their  onto- 
logical,  philosophy  of  history  dimension.  Furthermore,  we  have  seen  the 
extent  to  which  they  change  their  significance  and  meaning  in  the  course 
of  Ideologie  und  Utopie.  Their  'congruence,  adequacy  and  transcendence' 
in  relation  to  social  and  historical  reality  or  existence  also  raises  the 
question  as  to  the  nature  of  the  reality  against  which  consciousness  is 
judged.  Furthermore,  Neusüss  is  correct  to  point  out  that  at  least  one  of 
the  concepts  of  utopia  (4d)  in  fact  denotes  the  sociology  of  knowledge  itself. 
Its  function  as  the  synthesizer  of  inadequate  utopias  would  suggest  that, 
within  the  sociological  dimension,  it  is  'a  'scientific'  utopia  and  within  the 
philosophy  of  history  and  also  ontologically  it  is  the  form  of  consciousness 
most  adequate  to  contemporary  reality.  But,  once  more,  as  Neususs 
suggests,  we  are  confronted  with 
'the  core  of  the  ontological  problems  of  the  sociol- 
ogy  of  knowledge 
...:  can  "reality"  (Sein)  as 
such  in  terms  of  itself  be  "adequate"  ?.  or  carried 124 
still  further:  Does  not  the  adequacy  of  "reality" 
(Sein)  to  itself  not  lie  in  precisely  its  being 
inadequate  to  itself,  insofar  as  it  constantly 
transcends  itself?,  280 
The  sociology  of  knowledge  and  its  consciousness  is  itself  a  part  of  that 
reality  or  existence  against  which  consciousness  is  judged  to  be  adequate. 
Adequacy,  for  Mannheim,  must  also  include  the  possiblity  of  transcendence. 
Whereas  many  later  commentators  have  identified  the  central  problem  of 
the  sociology  of  knowledge  at  the  epistemological  level  -  as  the  relativist 
problematic  -  it  would  seem  more  reasonable  to  argue  that  it  lies  further  back, 
in  Mannheim's  case,  in  the  basic  ontological  presuppositions  upon  which  it 
is  based.  Mannheim  is  not  merely  advancing  a  sociology  of  knowledge  that 
possesses  a  sociological  dimension  but  behind  it,  and  often  fused  with  it, 
are  a  series  of  meta-theoretical  presuppositions  grounded  in  a  questionable 
philosophy  of  history  and  ontology. 
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Within  a  year  of  the  publication  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie,  Mannheim  succeeded 
to  Oppenheimer's  chair  of  sociology  and  economics  at  Frankfurt  University 
in  1930.  Though  Mannheim  was  still  working  on  the  sociology  of  knowledge 
until  1933,  and  had  in  hand  a  number  of  projects,  little  was  published  direct- 
ly  in  this  area. 
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Two  brief  pieces  that  were  published  in  this  period  are 
worthy  of  some  discussion.  The  first  is  the  contribution  to  Vierkandt's 
Handwörterbuch  der  Soziologie  published  in  1931.282  The  second  is  Mann- 
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heim's  lecture  on  the  contemporary  tasks  of  sociology  published  in  1932. 
Both  illustrate  the  extent  to  which  Mannheim  by  now  regarded  the  sociology 125 
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of  knowledge  as  an  established  tradition  within  sociology  and  with  its  own 
distinctive  history  of  development.  It  had  achieved  encyclopaedic  if  not 
textbook  status  within  sociology.  In  so  doing,  it  lost1in  many  ways,  its 
problematic  status  and  its  relationship  to  a  diagnosis  of  the  times.  In  other 
words,  it  lost  that  sense  of  urgency  which  is  apparent  both  in  Ideologie  und 
Utopie  and,  as  we  shall  see,  the  reception  of  that  work. 
In  his  article  on  'Wissenssoziologie',  Mannheim  views  the  sociology  of 
knowledge  as  pursuing  two  aims:  as  a  theory,  it  develops  'a  doctrine  of  the 
so-called  "existential  boundedness"  of  knowledge'  and  as  'historical- 
sociological  research'  it  traces  the  different  forms  which  this  'existential 
boundedness'  has  taken  in  the  pad  and  the  present.  As  a  discipline  that 
emerged  with  the  'contemporary  crisis  situation  of  thought',  it  has  sought 
to  take  as  one  of  its  central  themes  'the  social  boundedness  of  theories  and 
modes  of  thought',  which  requires  'an  unreserved,  radical  thinking  through 
to  its  limits  of  this  problem'  in  order  to  arrive  at  'a  theory  appropriate 
to  the  present  situation'. 
As  a  discipline,  the  sociology  of  knowledge  is  closely  related  to  the  theory 
of  ideology  whose  task  has  been  'to  unmask  the  more  or  less  conscious  lies 
and  disguises  of  human  interest  groups  and  especially  of  political  parties'. 
The  sociology  of  knowledge  is  not  so  much  concerned  with  deliberate'  lies 
but  with  the  way  in  which  phenomena  reveal  themselves  'in  a  necessary 
manner'  according  to  the  social  standpoint  of  the  observer. 
'Thus,  it  is  not  the  intention  to  disguise  that  de- 
termines  in  all  these  instances  the  "one-sided- 
ness"  and  "falseness"  of  statements,  but  the 
inavoidably  diverse  forms  of  structures  of  con- 
sciousness  of  diversely  situated  types  of  human 
subject  in  the  historical-social  sphere.  1  284 126 
The  sociology  of  knowledge  wishes,  accordingly,  to  distinguish  between  a 
particular  and  a  total  concept  of  ideology.  The  particular  concept  of  ideol- 
ogy  exists  at  the  psychological  level  and  is  concerned  with  concealment, 
falsification  or  deception.  The  total  conception,  in  contrast,  does  not 
raise  the  'accusation  of  deception'  (Lügenverdacht)  and  hence  in  the  social- 
ogy  of  knowledge  the  word  '  ideology'  is  'no  Ionger  pejorative'  I.  Indeed, 
the  sociolögy  of  knowledge  will  increasingly  seek  to  avoid  the  concept  al- 
together  and  speak  instead  of  'an  "existentially  bounded  -  or  standpoint- 
bounded  -  perspectival  structure  (Aspektstruktur)"  of  a  thinker'. 
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We  see 
here  how  quickly  Mannheim  has  distanced  himself  from  the  discussion  of 
ideology  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie  or,  at  least,  how  soon  he  has  moved  over 
to  a  'value-free'  concept  of  ideology. 
The  sociology  of  knowledge  is  now  to  be  primarily  concerned  with  the  'exist- 
ential  boundedness'  of  thought  which  denies  the  notion  of  an  immanent  develop- 
ment  of  knowledge  and  which  sees  the  existential  factors  that  are  responsible 
for  the  perspectival  nature  of  knowledge  as  much  more  than  of  'mere 
genetic  relevance'.  It  will  examine  the  collective  'living,  energies  and 
outlooks  derived  from  the  will  that  stand  behind  the  theoretical'  sphere.  This 
will  include  the  investigation  of  social  scientific  knowledge  and  the  "'- 
meat  i  on  of  the  standpoint"  of  the  observer  into  the  results  of  knowledge'  and 
their  'existential  relativity'  .  In  turn,  this  involves  an  analysis  of  the  kind 
of  concepts  used  by  social  groups,  the  structure  of  their  categori  al  apparatus, 
ol 
the'so-called"thought  model'I  I  used  to  apprehend  an  object,  the  level  of  ab- 
straction  and  concretisation  of  thought.  Al  I  these  are  'bound  up  with  social 
existence  in  the  same  manner'  . 127 
This  new  mode  of  analysis  would  appear  to  arise  in  what  Scheler  termed  an 
'age  of  equalization'  in  which  different  groups  and  their  world-views  con- 
front  and  conflict  with  one  another  and  in  which  they  often  'talk  past  one 
another'.  The  sociology  of  knowledge  should  be  able  to  restore  communi- 
cation  through  persuading  people  to  'distance'  themselves  from  their  specific 
situation,  to  'relationise'  their  mode  of  thought  and  to  recognise  its 
'particularistic'  nature  (i.  e.  to  remove  its  claim  to  absolute  validity). 
All  these  processes  also  lie  at  the  very  basis  of  sociology  of  knowledge 
analysis  itself.  But  in  performing  this  task  of  opening  up  communication, 
the  sociology  of  knowledge  is  more  than  'a  sociological  description  of  facts'  . 
It  is  also  a  'critique'  but  only  insofar  as  it  reconstructs  the  limits  of  the 
scope  of  statements.  It  is,  indeed,  a  far  cry  from  a  critique  of  ideology. 
% 
What  is  also  new  in  this  account  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  when  com- 
pared  with  Ideologie  und  Utopie  is  Mannheim's  more  explicit  concern  for  its 
relationship  to  epistemology.  In  particular,  Mannheim  takes  up  the  phen- 
omenon  of  the  'particularisation'  of  thought  where  we  are  dealing  with  an 
instance  in  which 
'a  pure  determination  of  a  fact  (the  fact  of  the 
partiality 
IPartikularitat] 
of  a  persepctive 
that  is  confirmable  in  human  assertions)  may 
be  relevant  to  its  meaning  (Sinnrelevant),  a 
genesis  that  may  be  relevant  to  the  genesis 
of  its  meaning  and  therefore  at  least  makes 
the  further  construction  of  the  sphere  of  valid- 
ity  as  autonomous  from  its  genesis  very 
difficult.  1  286 
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Unfortunately,  Mannheim  argues,  the  present  dominant  epistemology  does 
not  allow  this  to  bo  taken  into  account  since  it  would  challenge  its  primacy 
over  individual  disciplines.  But  epistemology  itself,  though  it  isIthe  funda- 
mental  science  (Grundwissenschaft)  of  individual  sciences  (Einzelwissen- 128 
schaften)'  is  itself  'based  upon  the  state  of  existing  cognitive  situations'  . 
upon  a  'historically  and  socially  pregiven  substratum'  .  There  is  a  further 
instance  of  the  inversion  of  the  supremacy  of  epistemology  over  individual 
disciplines  in  the  development  of  knowledge  itself  since 
'New  forms  of.  knowledge  emerge,  ultimately, 
out  of  collective  life-contexts  and  do  not  first 
emerge  after  a  science  of  principles  has  demons- 
trated  their  possibility;  hence  they  do  not  need 
to  be  first  legitimated  by  an  epistemology.  '  287 
Mannheim  here  anticipates  some  elements  of  Kuhn's  argument  concerning 
the  development  of  scientific  knowledge.  in  that  he  argues  that  revolutions 
in  epistemology  succeed  revolutions  in  science  and  not  vice-versa  and  in 
that  lie  sees  epistemology  as  a  mode  of  legitimation  of  the  existing  state  of 
science.  However,  this  is  not  the  main  thrust  of  Mannheim's  argument  which 
is,  instead,  directed  primarily  against  the  domination  of  the  natural  scientific 
paragidm  as  the  standard  for  what  constitutes  knowledge. 
Indeed,  here,  Mannheim  would  appear  to  argue  against  Kuhn  in  that 
Mannheim  views  natural  science  as  largely  detached  from  'the  historical- 
social  perspectival  structure  of  the  knowing  subject'  I.  On  the  other  hand,  he 
does  argue  for  historical  knowledge  at  least  that  its  notion  of  truth  is  depend- 
ent  upon  what  'is  realised'  in  a  particular  period.  But  the  absence  of  any 
further  discussion  of  the  notion  of  historical  period  at  this  point  leaves 
Mannheim  with  a  thorough-going  historicist  stance  in  relation  to  truth.  The 
central  problem  in  the  historical  and  social  sciences  is,  for  Mannheim,  that 
of  their  objectivity.  In  the  case  of  'existentially  bounded  thought',  object- 
Ivity  is  only  attainably  'by  indirect  means'  in  those  instances  where  ob- 
servers  do  not  share  the  same  perspective.  It  is  attained  through  seeking 
out  'a  formula  for  the  conversion  and  translation  of  these  diverse  perspectival 129  ± 
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viewpoints  with-each  other'. 
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The  criterion  here  is  the  comprehensive- 
ness  of  the  various  standpoints.  A  second  possibility  lies  in  the  very  re- 
cognition  of  the  existential  boundedness  of  thought  and  the  neutralisation 
of  its  partiality  so  that  one  can  move  to  a  higher  level  of  abstraction.  Mann- 
heim  suggests  that  this  approach  is  pursued  by  formal  sociology  which  produces 
general  categories  through  the  'neutralisation'  and  'formalisation'  of  parti- 
cular  facts.  Mannheim  concludes,  however,  that  the  weakness  of  this 
approach  is  that  this  formalism  is  likely  to  overlook  the  qualitative  contents 
and  meanings  of  particular  phenomena.  In  the  end,  Mannheim  does  not 
come  down  in  favour  of  either  approach  to  what  he  considers  to  be  objectivity 
in  the  social  sciences. 
At  the  level  of  concrete  analyses  in  the  sociology  of  knowledge,  Mannheim 
argues  that  the  central  methodological  approach  is  not  dissimilar  from  the 
methods  of  art  history  as  the  history  of  style'.  In  particular,  the  'im- 
putation  of  meaning'  (sinngemässe  Zurechnung)  and  the  'imputation  of 
facticity'  (Faktizitätszurechnung),  are  central  to  its  approach.  One  first 
form  of  imputation  seeks  to  construct  unities  of  styles  of  thought  and  perspect- 
ival  structures  by  tracing  the  various  elements  back  to  a  'focal  world-view 
and  sense  of  life  (Lebensgefühl)  I.  These  ideal  types  are  then  examined  in 
relation  to  their  actual  appearance  in  society,  i.  e.  to  the  composition  of  the 
groups  and  strata  which  expressed  them.  Mannheim's  notion  of  imputation 
does  not,  therefore,  proceed  to  a  notion  of  'objective  possibility'  as  develop- 
ed  by  Lukäcs  but  transforms  it  into  a  heuristic  device  that  will  produce 
valuable  hypotheses  for  empirical  research.  It  is  also  worth  noting  here 
that  Mannheim  retains  his  central  orientation  towards  world-views  and  styles 
of  thought  which,  as  we  have  seen,  was  developed  in  his  earliest  writings. 130 
In  this￿essay  on  the  sociology  of  knowledge,  we  can  detect  Mannheim's 
increasing  distance  from  the  problem  of  ideology  and  a  firmer  orientation 
towards  an  empirically  orientated  sociology  of  knowledge.  At  the  same 
time,  however,  he  retains  an  interest  in  the  epistemological  problems  raised 
by  his  sociology  of  knowledge  though,  as  with  his  account  in  Ideologie  und 
Utopie,  he  remains  as  far  as  ever  from  any  solution  to  them.  Possible 
solutions  are  still  presented  as  tentative  suggestions.  In  his  later  works, 
neither  the  problem  of  ideology  nor  the  epistemological  problems  were  sub- 
stantially  developed  any  further.  Similarly,  his  programme  for  an  empirical 
sociology  of  knowledge  remained  a  programme  for  him,  although  he  super- 
vised  a  number  of  works  in  Frankfurt  on  empirical  themes.  He  did,  how- 
ever,  turn  to  an  examination  of  the  role  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  within 
the  context  of  sociology  as  a  whole  in  the  last  work  published  before  his 
emigration. 
Die  Gegenwartsaufgaben  der-Soziologie,  (The  Contemporary  Tasks  of  Sociol- 
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ogy)  is,  as  its  title  suggests,  concerned  with  sociology  in  general  and 
not  specifically  with  the  sociology  of  knowledge.  However,  Mannheim  does 
examine  the  role  of  the  latter  within  the  wider  context  of  the  discipline.  For 
sociology  itself,  Mannheim  sees  two  roles: 
'Sociology  can  confront  us  in  a  dual  form  and  function: 
as  a  particular  discipline  and  as  a  foundational  science 
(Grundwissenschaft)'  290 
As  a  particular  discipline  (Spezialwissenschaft),  sociology  has  its  own 
thermatic  and  methodology:  'the  intellectual  strategy  that  was  applied  in 
the  conflict  concerning  sociology  from  Simmel  to  von  Wiese  was  to  legiti- 
mate  our  discipline  as  an  individual  discipline'.  Since  then,  however,  we 
have  moved  towards  the  total  problematic  of  theglobus  intellectuälis  and 131 
our  viewpoint  has  been  extended  towards  sociology  as  a  universalistic 
science,  Mannheim  argues  that  there  are  three  basic  constellations  of 
sociology  -  as  a  special  science  (general  sociology),  as  the  sociology  of 
individual  disciplines  (e.  g.  politics)  and  as  the  study  of  the  social  charact- 
er  of  culture  and  its  development. 
Amongst  the  sociologies  of  individual  disciplines,  Mannheim  singles  out 
the  sociology  of  knowledge.  As  a  special  discipline,  it  has  two  areas  of 
research:  the  theory  of  ideology  and  the  sociology  of  knowledge.  As  a 
theory  of  ideology  it  is  concerned  with  all  tconscious  and  unconscious  lies 
and  illusory  interpretations'  since 
'the  everyday  interpretation  of  the  world  is  full  of 
concepts,  intellectual  schema  and  myths  that  are 
either  still  so  primitive  that  they  can  really  only 
be  understood  as  the  rudiments  of  magical-mythical 
consciousness  or  as  conscious,  ready  to  hand 
deceptive  tales  that  can  be  interpreted  as  the 
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suppression  of  an  appropriate  social  orientation.  ' 
In  order  to  counter  such  illusions,  sociology  must  have  'a  critical  and  rat- 
ional  consciousness'  and  'knowledge  of  social  forces'.  The  study  of  ideol- 
ogy  should  achieve  not  the  destruction  but  the  'exposure  of  reality,  of  real 
phenomena  that  surround  us'  .  It  is  therefore  an  illusion  to  maintain  that 
ideologies  only  exist  within  the  political  sphere.  Rather  they  permeate 
the  whole  of  our  everyday  real  i  ty  I.  Hence 
0 
'In  this  sense,  the  purification  of  the  basic  concepts 
and  erroneous  interpretation  of  the  everyday  world, 
7 
a  revelation  of  the  forces  and  interests  that  socially 
determine  history,  is  an  absolutely  essential  peda- 
gogic  mission  of  sociology  and  particularly  of  that 
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branch  which  we  have  termed  the  theory  of  ideology. 
At  a  deeper  level,  this  'self-revision  of  thought'  takes  place  through  the 
sociology  of  knowledge  in  the  more  restricted  eonse  of  the  term.  It  seeks, 132 
'over  and  above  the  conscious  and  semi-conscious 
deceptions  of  the  everyday  world  and  party  interests, 
to  examine  that  constitutive  false  approach  of  thought 
that  is  evident  in  the  sciences  themselves.  ..  Its 
task  therefore  lies  in  the  elimination  of  all  those 
masks  that  emerge  out  of  particular  outlooks,  out  of 
particular  outlooks  which  originate  in  the  natural 
limitation  and  confinement  of  individual  sciences, 
of  spheres  of  life  and  historical  situations.  '  293 
Our  intellectual  apparatus  only  reveals  some  sides  and  contents  of  the  world. 
In  so  doing,  it  represents  a  form,  of  masking  of  the  total  situation  since  it 
overlooks  other  perspectives.  It  is  therefore  sociology's  'task  to  reveal  false 
perspectives  not  merely  in  everyday  thought  but  also  in  other  disciplines 
insofar  as  it  is  able  to  reveal  'from  which  social  standpoint'  different 
theories  emerge. 
The  third  sociological  domain  is  that  of  the  'study  of  the  total  context  of 
social-intellectual  phenomena'  -  the  sociology  of  culture.  As  such,  it  is 
not  concerned  with  a  definite  sphere  of  the  social  process  but  with  'the 
totality  of  cultural  spheres  in  relation  to  social  life'.  Here  culture  is 
interpreted  as  'an  expression  of  life'  or  'a  causal  or  mutual  interactional 
relationship'  is  seen  to  exist  between  society  and  cultural  spheres  or  a 
'dialectical  development'  of  the  two  is  seen  as  a  dynamic  whole.  In  this 
context  of  the  sociology  of  culture,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  Mannheim 
no  longer  -  as  in  his  earlier  writings  or  as  in  SchelerIs  major  work  -  views- 
the  sociology  of  knowledge  as  part  of  this  sphere  of  sociology. 
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When  Mannheim  turns  to  the  principles  governing  the  choice  of  subject- 
matter  for  sociology,  he  also  sees  the  sociology  of  knowledge  playing  a 
significant  role,  especially  in  relation  to  the  examination  of  values. 
Sociology  itself  should  not  espouse  a  political  position  since  it  would  be 1 
the  death  of  sociology  if  it  became  merely  an  instrument  of  agitation  for 
one  or  several  parties'  I.  On  the  other  hand,  sociology  should  not  shy  away 
from  examining  'the  political  and  social  themes  of  life'.  Such  themes 
should  be  examined  but  within  a  value-free  context 
'The  very  fruitful  confrontation  over  the  value-freedom 
of  the  social  sciences  has  ...  shown  the  way  in  which 
politics  can  be  taught  without  the  suggestion  of  judg- 
ment  and  evaluation.  And  if  too,  in  this  context, 
the  sociology  of  knowledge  pointed  to  some  diffi- 
culties  that  remain  even  in  the  complete  abstention 
from  values,  and  in  the  complete  "freedom  from 
evaluation",  that  a  certain  amount  of  standpoint- 
boundedness  remains  in  this  notion,  then  it  did  so 
precisely  in  the  interests  of  a  still  more  thorough- 
going  self-control  and  objectivity  but  not  in  order 
to  open  every  possible  gateway  and  door.  "294 
The  sociology  of  knowledge  is  here  seen  as  functioning  'in  the  service  of 
self-criticism  and  the  distancing  of  existential  boundedness"  .  On  the  other 
hand,  Mannheim  also  insists  that  sociology  emerged  as  an  'oppositional 
science'(Oppositionswissenschaft)  and  'is  born  in  conflict  with  the  diverse, 
collectively  pregiven  attitudes  to  society''.  As  an  attempt-  to  group  the 
various  currents  in  society, 
'sociobgy  is  the  appropriate  orientation  to  life  by 
people  in  an  industrial  society  ...  whether  this 
society  is'  organi  sed  on  'a  capitalist  or  socialist 
basis.  1  295 
Sociology  provides  an  understanding  of  the  total  constellations  out  of  which 
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individual  life  situations  can  become  intelligible.  In  this  respect,  therefore, 
what  Mannheim  earlier  argued  was  a  central  feature  of  the  sociology  of  know- 
ledge  has  now  become  a  task  of  sociology  itself:  namely,  'a  deeper  self- 
understanding  and.  ..  an  enlarged  understanding  of  the  world'  . 
Within  the  wider  context  of  the  task  of  generating  greater  self-understanding, 
it  should  not  be  assumed  that  sociology  is  seeking  to  replace  philosophy 134-, 
since  'it  is  an  erroneous  interpretation  of  sociology  when  one  claims  that  it 
wishes  to  take  the  place  of  philosophy  itself'.  On  the  other  hand,  this 
should  not,  in  turn,  imply  that  sociology  has  nothing  to  do  with  philosophy: 
'One  can  leave  the  fundamental  primacy  of  philosophy 
untouched  and  nonetheless  concede  that  quite  essential 
self-corrections  of  concrete,  existing  philosophies  can 
emerge  through  reflection  based  on  the  sociology  of 
knowledge.  For  the  fact  that  particular  philosophies 
had  primarly, 
_fulfil  the  functions  of  ideological  masking 
is  now  quite  clear.  This  does  not  imply,  however, 
that  this  must,  in  principle,  always  be  the  case.  If 
one  correctly  understands  the  significance  of  sociology 
for  philosophy,  then  recent  developments  initiate  a 
co-operation  between  ontology  and  sociology.  Here 
one  must  concede  the  fundamental  primacy  of  onto- 
logy  over  sociology  whilst,  at  the  same  time,  one 
must  see  how  each  concrete  historical  ontology  is 
endangered  by  its  identification  with  hypostatizat- 
ions.  Ontology  must  therefore  be  investigated  in 
order  to  discover  whether  or  not  a  particular  and  parti- 
san  perspective  lies,  most  often  unconsciously,  be- 
neath  it.  In  this  context,  the  sociology  of  knowledge 
can  offer  a  through-going  critique  and  correction.  '  296 
Here,  Mannheim's  interest  in  the  relationship  between  the  sociology  of  know- 
ledge  and  philosophy  appears  to  have  shfted  from  a  challenge  to  traditional 
epistemologies  -  evident  even  in  his  earlier  writings  -  to  the  sociology  of 
knowledge's  role  as  a  'corrective'  to  absolutist  claims  in  particular  onto- 
logies.  At  no  point,  however,  is  it  possible  for  Mannheim  to  apply  this  re- 
flection  to  the  ontological  foundations  of  his  own  philosophy.  As  we  have 
seen,  this  ontology  and,  as  Neusüss  argues,  the  meta-theoretical  foundations 
of  his  sociology  of  knowledge,  remain  largely  unreflected  upon  and  hidden 
from  the  reader.  These  foundations  are,  of  course,  present  in  his  sociology 
of  knowledge.  For  all  Mannheim's  concern  for  ideology  here,  it  is  noticable 
how  little  reflection  is  devoted  to  his  own  ontological  assumptions. 135  ' 
VI 
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This  would  be  the  natural  point  at  which  to  examine  the  reception  of  Mann- 
helm's  work  in  Germany  and  especially  the  response  to  Ideologie  und  Utopie. 
This  is  reserved  for  the  next  chapter  in  the  form  of  an  examination  of  the 
debate  surrounding  his  paper  on  competition  and  the  many  reviews  of 
Ideologie  und  Utopie 
97 
In  terms  of  Mannheim's  work  as  a  whole  in  Germany, 
we  can  say  that  he  was  the  principal  contributor  to  the  sociology  of  knowledge 
in  Germany.  Unlike  Scheler,  who  seems  to  have  lost  interest  in  the  socio- 
logy  of  knowledge  after  1926  and  turned  his  attention  to  the  development  of 
a  philosophical  anthropology  until  his  death  in  1928,  Mannheim  maintained  i 
his  interest  in  the  development  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  up  to  his 
emigration  in  1933.  It  is  impossible  -  and  probably  fruitless  -  to  speculate 
as  to  what  the  later  reception  of  his  work  in  Germany  would  have  been  after 
1933  had  the  Weimar  Republic  survived.  What  is  certain  is  that  little  was 
published  in  the  Third  Reich  on  the  sociology  of  knowledge.  Alexander  von 
Schelting's  study  of  Max  Weber's  methodology,  published  before  he  too 
emigrated,  contains  a  critique  of  Mannheim's  work 
298 
as  does  the  study  of 
the  sociology  of  knowledge  by  Ernst  Grunwald. 
29A 
But  both  fall  outside  the 
immediate  period  with  which  we  are  concerned.  On  the  positive  side, 
Mannheim  developed  the  interest  of  others  in  the  sociology  of  knowledge 
03 
but  not  the  already  assembled  members  of  the  'Frankfurt  School',  who  re- 
rained  openly  hostile  to  the  whole  project. 
301 
This  would  also  seem  the  place  to  examine  Mannheim's  relationship  to 
Lukäcs,  especially  as  commentators  such  as  Kettler  and  Huaco  have  pointed 
to  the  connections  between  the  two  writers.  But  since  in  the  final  chapter 136  '=] 
of  this  study  the  subsequent  interpretation  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  in 
Weimar  Germany  is  examined  in  some  detail  it  is  perhaps  more  appropriate 
that  this  discussion  can  be  placed  in  that  wider  context. 
Similarly,  the  range  of  issues  contained  in  Mannheim's  sociology  of  know- 
ledge  are  so  wide-ranging  and  often  diverse  that  attention  must  be  devoted 
to  them  in  the  last  chapter.  Some  indication  of  the  kind  of  issues  which 
Mannheim's  sociology  of  knowledge  raised  is  contained  in-two  of  the  'debates' 
surrounding  the  sociology  of  knowledge  and  it  is  to  these  that  we  must  now 
turn. 
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83.  Ibid.,  p.  178,  n.  67. 
84.  Ibid.,  p.  69. 
85.  Ibid.,  p.  72. 
86.  Ibid.,  p.  77. 
87.  Ibid.,  p-79- 
88.  Ibid.,  p.  80. 
89.  W.  Jerusalem, 
90.  K.  Mannheim, 
91.  Cf.  K.,  ý-.  0.  Apel, 
92.  G.  Lukacs, 
93.  K.  Mannheim, 
'Soziologie  des  Erkennens',  Kölner  Vierteljahre- 
shefte  fur  Soziologie,  vol.  1,1921. 
Über  die  Ei  enart  Kultursoziologischer  Erkenntnis, 
op.  cit.,  p.  62. 
Transformation  der  Philosophie,  vol.  2,  Frankfurt 
1974. 
'Zur  Theorie  der  Literaturgeschichte',  Text  und 
Kritik,  loc.  cit.,  pp.  24-51.  The  original  is 
G.  Lukäcs,  'Megjegyzýsek  az  irodalomtortenet 
elm6lchez',  in  Alexander-emlekkdnyv,  Budapest 
1910,  pp.  380-421. 
Uber  die  Eigenart  Kultursoziologischer  Erkenntnis, 
op.  cit.,  p.  91. 
94.  Ibid.,  p.  94. 
95.  Ibid.,  p.  95. 
96.  Ibid.,  p.  96. 
97.  Ibid.,  p.  98. 
-98.  Ibid.,  p.  101. 
99.  Ibid.,  p.  104. 
100.  Ibid.,  p.  103. 
101.  Ibid.,  p.  106. 
102.  Ibid.,  pp.  156-7.  N.  B.  The  numbering  of  the  pages  should  not  be  taken 
to  indicate  that  a  whole  section  of  the  manuscript  has  gone  astray. 
Rather,  it  merely  means  that  the  pagination  is  erratic. 
103.  Ibid.,  p.  165. 143 
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104.  A.  Neusüss, 
105.  Ibid. 
106.  Cf.  A.  Neusüss, 
107.  D.  Kettler, 
108.  E.  Troeltsch, 
109.  K.  Mannheim, 
Utopisches  Bewusstsein  und  freischwebende 
Intelligenz,  Meisenheim  1968,  p.  71. 
Utopisches  Bewusstsein  und  freischwebende 
Intelligenz,  op.  cit.,  and  K.  Lenk,  Marx  in 
der  Wissenssozi-  of  ogie,  Neuwied/Berlin  1972, 
esp.  pp.  53ff. 
'Sociology  of  Knowledge  and  Moral  Philosophy', 
loc.  cit..,  p.  420. 
Der  Historismus  und  seine  Probleme,  Tübingen 
1922.  Cf,  also  E.  Troeltsch,  Der  Historismus 
und  seine  Überwindung,  Berlin  1924. 
'Historismus',  Archiv  für  Sozialwissenschaft, 
loc.  cit. 
110.  Cf.  the  correspondence  referred  to  in  n.  22  earlier. 
111.  K.  Mannheim,  'Problems  of  Sociology  in  Germany',  in 
K.  H.  Wolff  (ed.  ),  From  Karl  Mannheim, 
op.  cit.,  p.  266,  n-3- 
112.  K.  Mannheim,  'Historicism'  in  K.  Mannheim,  Essays  on  the 
Sociology  of  Knowledge, 
ö.  cit.,  6.84.  Translation  amended. 
113.  Ibid.,  p.  85.  Translation  amended. 
114.  H.  -  J.  Lieber,  'Einleitung',  to  H.,  -￿1.  Lieber  (ed.  ), 
Ideologienlehre  und  Wissenssoziologie, 
Darmstadt  19749  p.  35. 
115.  K.  Mannheim,  'Historicism', 
loc.  cit.,  p.  86.  Translation  amended. 
116.  Ibid., 
'117.  Ibid.,  p.  96. 
118.  Ibid.,  p.  127. 
119.  Ibid.,  p.  101. 
120.  Ibid.,  p.  102.  Translation  amended. 
121.  Ibid.,  p.  104. 
122.  Cf.  H.  G.  Gadamer,  Truth  and  Method  (trans.  G.  Burden  and  J.  Cumming). 
London/New  York  1975.  For  a  recent  discussion 
of  Mannheim's  hermeneutics  see  Z.  Baumaun, 
Hermeneutics  and  Social  Science,  London  1978, 
esp.  pp.  9-110. 
123.  K.  Mannheim,  'Historicism', 
loc.  cit.,  p.  127. 
124.  Ibid.,  p.  125. 144 
125.  K.  Mannheim,  Eine  soziologische  Theorie  der  Kultur  und  ihrer 
Erkennbarkeit,  ms.  pp.  lb9.  the  manuscript  is  in 
three  sections,  each  of  which  is  numbered 
separately.  Therefore,  reference  will  be  to 
page  numbers  in  section  I,  II  or  III. 
126.  K.  Mannheim,  '  Eine  soziologische  Theorie  der  Kultur  und  ihrer 
Erkennbarkeit,  I,  p.  41. 
127.  Ibid.,  p.  18. 
128.  Ibid. 
129.  Ibid.,  pp-5-6. 
130.  Ibid.,  p.  8. 
131.  Ibid.,  p.  9. 
132.  Ibid. 
133.  Ibid.,  p.  12. 
134.  /Ibid.,  p.  13. 
135.  Ibid.,  p.  20. 
136.  Ibid.,  p.  21. 
137.  Ibid.,  p.  22. 
138.  Ibid.,  p-37- 
139.  Ibid.,  p.  47- 
140.  K.  Mannheim,  Eine  soziologische  Theorie  der  Kultur  und  ihrer 
Erkennbarkeit, 
op.  cit.,  II,  P.  I. 
141*.  Ibid.,  p.  5. 
14z.  Ibid.,  p.  6. 
143.  Ibid.,  p.  7. 
144.  Ibid.,  p.  8. 
145.  Ibid.,  p.  31. 
146.  Ibid.,  p.  38.  This  is  almost  the  reverse  of  Wittgenstein 
statement  that  'the  limits  of  my  language  are 
the  limits  of  my  world'. 
0  147.  Cf.  K.  Mannheim,  'Das  Problem  der  Generationen', 
loc.  cit. 
148.  K.  Mannheim,  Eine  soziologische  Theorie  der  Kultur  und  ihrer 
Erkennbarkeit, 
op.  Cit.,  II,  p.  52. 



















Ibid.,  p.  56. 
Cf.  A.  Schutz, 
K.  Mannheim, 
Reflections  on  the  Problem  of  Relevance,  Yale  1970. 
Eine  soziologische  Theorie  der  Kultur  und  ihrer 
Erkennbarkeit, 
op.  cit.,  II,  p.  60. 
Ibid.,  p.  65. 
Ibid. 
Ibid.,  p.  70. 
Ibid.,  P-78., 
Ibid.,  P.  80. 
Ibid.,  pp.  91-2. 
Ibid.,  p.  93. 
Ibid.,  p.  94. 
Ibid. 
Ibid.,  p.  95" 
Ibid.,  p.  97" 
Ibid.,  P.  99. 
Ibid.,  P.  100. 
Ibid.,  P.  108. 
Cf.  M.  Heidegger, 
168.  K.  Mannheim, 
169.  Ibid.,  p.  130. 
170.  Ibid.,  p.  134. 
171.  K.  Mannheim, 
172.  Ibid.,  p.  5. 
173.  Ibid.,  p.  7. 
174.  Ibid. 
175.  K.  Mannheim, 
Sein  und  Zeit,  Tübingen  1926.  For  a  critique 
of  this  notion  of  authenticity.  see  T.  W.  Adorno, 
Jargon  der  Eigentlichkeit,  Frankfurt  1959. 
Eine  soziologische  Theorie  der  Kultur  und  Ihrer 
Erkennbarkeit, 
op.  cit.,  II,  p.  108. 
Eine  soziologische  Theorie  der  Kultur  und  ihrer 
Erkennbarkeit, 
op  cit.,  III,  p.  2. 
-  'Das  Konservative  Denken',  Archiv  für  Sozial- 
wissenschaft,  vol.  57,1927, 
pp.  6w142;  470-495. 146 
176.  K.  Mannheim,  'Conservative  Thought',  *  in  Essays  on  Socioloqy 
and  Social  Psychology,  (trans.  P.  Kecskemettii),, 
London  1953, 
pp.  74-164. 
177.  K.  Mannheim,  'Das  Konservative  Denken', 
loc.  cit.,  p.  68. 
178.  Ibid.,  p.  71. 
179.  Ibid.,  p.  75. 
180.  Ibid.,  p.  95. 
181.  Ibid.,  p.  104. 
182.  Ibid.,  p.  115,  n.  76. 
183.  Ibid.,  pp.  115-6. 
184.  K.  Mannheim,  'Conservative  Thought', 
loc.  cit.,  p.  127- 
185.  Ibid.,  p.  128.  Translation  slightly  changed.  My  emphasis. 
186.  K.  Mannheim,  'Das.  Konservative  Kenken', 
loc.  cit.,  p.  140. 
187.  Ibid.,  p.  471. 
188.  Ibid.,  p.  484. 
189.  Ibid.,  p.  491.. 
190.  Ibid.,  pp.  493-4. 
191.  Ibid.,  p.  495- 
192.  Ibid.,  p.  102. 
193.  L.  Lederer,  'Gutachten'  (pp.  12).  Archiv  der  Universität 
Heidelberg  Akten,  III  5a,  nr.  195,1925/6 
Ha  ilitation  Mannieim,  no.  103  1925/6),  p.  1. 
194.  Ibid.,  p.  12. 
195.  A.  Weber,  'Gutachten',  Habilitation  Mannheim,  no.  103, 
loc.  cit. 
196.  See  ch.  5  below. 
197.  This  is  yet  another  of  Mannheim's  unpublished  works  that  it  has  not  been 
possible  to  trace.  It  may  well  be  that  part  of  it  was  incorporated  into 
the  early  part  of  h  is  article,  'Zur  Problematik  der  Soziologie  in 




198.  As  an  indication  of  Mannheim's  teaching  interests  in  this  period,  it  may 
be  useful  to  indicate  the  courses  he  offered  while  at  Heidelberg: 
Winter  Semester  1926/27  -  Introduction  to  problems  in  sociology  and  the 
history  of  ideas. 
-  History  and  sociology  of  political  thought  in 
Germany  (1)  Conservatism. 
Summer'Semester  1927  -  The  political  and  social  significance  of 
philosophy  in  the  nineteenth  century. 
-  Seminar  on  the  economic  and  intellectual 
foundations  of  imperialism. 
(with  Emil  Lederer) 
Winter  Semester  1927/28  -  Max  Weber's  sociology. 
Summer  Semester  1928  -  Introduction  to  sociology. 
-  Seminar  on  sociology. 
Winter  Semester  1928/29  -  General  sociology. 
-  Sociology  of  the  press  and  public  opinion. 
-  Seminars  on  the  sociology  of  knowledge. 
Summer  Semester  1929  -  Sociology  of  the  press  and  public  opinion. 
-  Seminars  on  problems  of  sociology  and 
modern  phenomenology. 
Winter  Semester  1929/30  -  Sociology  of  public  opinion  and  the  press. 
-  Seminars  on  the  history  of  modern  ideas. 
Introduction  to  the  sociological  inter- 
pretation  of  sources. 
(What  is  of  interest  here  is,  like  Weber,  the  interest  in  the  press 
and,  like  Weber,  little  evidence  of  having  followed  up  this 
interest  subsequently.  ) 
199.  K.  Mannheim,  'Die  Bedeutung  der  Konkurrenz  in.  Gebiete  des 
Geistigen',  in  Verhandlungen  des  sechsten 
Deutschen  Soziologentages  1928,  Ttibingen  1929, 
pp.  35-83. 
200.  See  ch.  5  below. 
201.  K.  Mannheim,  'Die  Bedeutung  der  Konkurrenz  in  Gebiete  des 
Geistigen', 
op.  cit.,  p.  38. 
202.  K.  Mannheim  in  a  letter  dated  6.10.1930.  The  collection  was  never 
published. 
1 
203.  These  are  presented  at  the  beginning  of  the  paper  and  were  not  translated 
into  English. 
204.  K.  Mannheim,  'Die  Bedeutung  der  Konkurrenz  in  Gebiete  des 
Geistigen', 
op.  cit.,  p.  36. 
205.  Ibid.,  p.  37. 148 
206.  For  a  discussion  of  this  outline  see  ch.  5  below. 
207.  K.  Mannheim,  'Die  Bedeutung  der  Konkurrenz  in  Gebiete  des 
Geistigen', 
op.  cit.,  p.  39. 
208.  Ibid.,  p.  41. 
209.  Ibid.,  p.  42. 
210.  A.  Neusüss,  Utopisches  Bewusstsein  und  freischwebende 
Intelligenz,  Meisenheim,  1968, 
p.  25. 
211.  As  in  I.  Lakatos  and  A.  Musgrave,  Criticism  and  the  Growth  of  Knowledge, 
Cambridge  1970. 
212.  K.  Mannheim,  'Die  Bedeutung  der  Konkurrenz  in  Gebiete  des 
Geistigen', 
o  cit  45  p.  .,  p.  - 
213.  Ibid.,  p.  74. 
214.  Ibid.,  pp-77-8. 
215.  Ibid.,  p.  80. 
216.  Ibid.,  p.  81. 
217.  K.  Mannheim,  Ideologie  und  Utopie,  Bonn  1929.  Recent  German 
editions  of  this  work  have  incorporated  the 
additional  material  from  the  English  edition  into 
the  text.  Since  the  new  edition  is  more 
accessible,  all  references  will  be  to  K.  Mannheim, 
Ideologie  und  Utopie,  Frankfurt  1969,5th  ed. 
The  English  edition  was  first  published  in  1936 
as  K.  Mannheim,  Ideology  and  Utopia,  London  1936. 
It  contained  a  preface  by  Louis  Wirth,  an 
additional  introductory  chapter  by  Mannheim  and 
his  encyclopaedia  article  on  the  sociology  of 
knowledge. 
218.  '  Cf.  K.  Mannheim,  Ideologie  und  Utopie,  Frankfurt  1969,  p.  65,  and 
K.  Mannheim,  Ideology  and  Utopia,  London,  1936. 
p.  69. 
219.  Cf.  D.  Kettler,  'Rhetoric  and  Social  Science:  Karl  Mannheim 
Adjusts  to  the  English-Speaking  World', 
unpublished  ms  ., 
p.  2. 
220.  Ibid. 
221.  Ibid.,  p.  8. 
222.  K.  Mannheim,  Ideologie  und  Utopie, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  4  9-50. 
223.  Ibid.,  p.  52. 
-,  A 
224.  Ibid.,  p.  53. 148ýa) 
225.  Ibid.,  p.  54.  In  the  English  translation  'co-constitutive'  is  reduced 
to  'influence';  cf.  K.  Mannheim,  Ideology  and  Utopia,  op.  cit.,  p.  50. 
226.  Ibid.,  p.  55. 
227.  K.  Mannheim,  Ideology  and  Utopia,  op.  cit.,  p.  62.  Compare 
K.  Mannheim,  Ideologie  und  Utopie,  op.  cit., 
pp.  64-5. 
228.  "  K.  Mannheim,  Ideologie  und  Utopie, 
op.  cit.,  p.  67- 
229.  Ibid.,  p.  69. 
230.  Ibid.,  p.  70. 
231.  Ibid.,  p.  72. 
232.  Ibid. 
233.  Ibid.,  P.  76. 
234.  Ibid.,  p.  78. 
235.  Ibid.,  p-79- 
236.  Ibid.,  p.  82. 
237.  Ibid.,  p.  83- 
238.  Ibid.,  pp.  83-4. 
239.  Ibid.,  p.  86. 
240.  Ibid.,  pp.  86-7. 
241.  Ibid.,  p.  92. 
242.  Cf.  ch.  5  below. 
243.  A.  Neustiss,  Utopisches  Bewusstsein  und  freischwebende 
Intelligenz, 
OP. -Cit.,  p.  40. 
244.  Ibid.,  p.  50f. 
245.  Cf.  D.  Kettler,  'Rhetoric  and  Social  Science', 
loc.  cit.,  p.  5. 
246.  K.  Mannheim,  Ideologie  und  Utopie, 
"  op.  cit.,  p.  97. 
247.  Ibid.,  p.  100  My  emphasis. 
248.  Ibid.,  p.  128. 
249.  Ibid.,  pp.  131-2. 
250.  Ibid.,  p.  134. 
251.  Ibid.,  p.  136. 
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252.  Ibid.,  p.  '141. 
253.  Ibid.,  p.  149. 
254.  Ibid.,  p.  163- 
'255.  Cf.  for  example,  T.  Geiger,  Ideologie  und  Wahrheit,  Stuttgart/Vi.  enna 
1953.  For  a  critique  of  Geiger's  position  on  the  sociology  of 
knowledge  see  K.  Lenk,  Marx  in  der  Wissenssoziologie,  op.  cit., 




















K.  Mannheim,  Ideologie  und  Utopie, 
op.  cit.,  p.  165-  My  emphasis. 
K.  Lenk,  Marx  in  der  Wissenssöziologie, 
OP.  cit.,  P-7;  - 
Ibid.,  p.  78. 
G.  Lukgcs,  'Moses  Hess  und  die  Problem  der  idealistischen 
Dialektik',  Archiv  fur  die  Geschichte  des 
Sozialismus  und  der  Arbeiterbewegung,  vol.  12,1926 
p.  123. 
The  aff.  inities  are  even  closer  if  one  accepts  Macpherson's  argument 
concerning  the  latent  market  mode  of  society  in  I-bbbes'  work. 
Cf.  C.  B.  Macpherson,  The  Political  Theory  of  Possessive  Individualism, 
Oxford  1963. 
Cf.  F.  K.  Ringer,  The  Decline  of  the  German  Mandarins.  The  German 
Academic  Community,  1  90-1933,  Cambridge:  Mass.  1969. 
A.  Neusüss,  Utopisches  Bewusstsein  und  freischwebende 
Intelligenz, 
op.  cit.,  p.  236. 
Ibid.,  pp.  112-182. 
K.  Mannheim, 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid.,  P.  M. 
Ibid.,  P-172. 
Ibid. 
Ibid.,  P-178. 
Ibid.,  p.  179. 
Ibid.,  p.  181. 
Ibid.,  p.  182. 
Ibid.,  p.  218. 
Ideologie  und  Utopie, 
op.  cit.,  P.  169. 
My  emphasis. 
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275.  Ibid.,  p.  220. 
276.  Ibid.,  p.  224. 
277.  Ibid.,  p.  225. 
278.  A.  NeusUss-,  Utopisches  Bewusstsein  und  freischwebende 
Intelligenz, 
op.  cit.,  PP"134-139. 
279.  Ibid.,  pp.  134-6. 
280.  Ibid.,  p.  136. 
281.  On  Mannheim's  project  in  this  period  see  the  reference  to  his  corres- 
pondence  with  Mohr  Verlag  in  n.  22  above.  The  only  other  article  in  any 
way  connected  with  the  sociology  that  was  published  in  this  period  aside 
from  the  two  referred  to  below,  was  K.  Mannheim,  'Über  das  Wesen  und  die 
Bedeutung  des  wirtschaftlichen  Erfolgsstrebens.  Ein  Beitrag  zur 
Wirtschaftsso  ziologie',  Archiv  für  Sozialwissenschaft,  vol.  63,1930. 
English  trans  lation  by  P.  Kecske  meti  in  K.  Mannheim,  Essays  on  the 
Sociology  of  Knowledge,  London  1952,  pp.  230.275. 
282.  K.  Mannheim,  'Wissenssoziologie'  in  A.  Vierkandt  (ed.  ), 
"  I 
Handwörterbuch  der  Soziologie,  Stuttgart  1931; 
reprinted  in  K.  Mannheim  Ideologie  und  Utopie, 
5th  ed.,  Frankfurt  1969,  pp.  227-267.  References 
are  to  this  reprint.  The  English  translation 
(L.  Wirth  and  E.  Shils)  is  in  K.  Mannheim, 
Ideology  and  Utopia, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  237-280. 
283.  K.  Mannheim,  Die  Gegenwartsaufgaben  der  Soziolojie. 
Ihre  Lehrgestalt,  Tübingen  1932. 
284.  K.  Mannheim,  'Wissenssoziologie'  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie, 
op.  cit.,  p.  228. 
285.  Ibid.,  p.  229. 
286.  Ibid.,  p.  246. 
287.  Ibid.,  p.  248. 
288.  Ibid.,  p.  258. 
289.  K.  Mannheim, 
290.  loc.  cit.,  p.  4. 
291.  Ibid.,  pp.  18-19. 
292.  Ibid.,  p.  19. 
293.  Ibid.,  p.  20. 
294.  Ibid.,  pp"39-40. 
295.  Ibid.,  p.  41. 
Die  Gegenwartsaufgaben  der  Soziologie, 
op.  cit. 
296.  Ibid.,  pp-54-5. 151 
297.  See  ch.  5  below. 
298.  A.  V.  Schelting,  Max  Webers  Wissenschaftslehre,  Tübingen  1934. 
299.  E.  Grünwald,  Das  Problem  der  Soziologie  des  Wissens,  Vienna 
1934, 
300.  See,  for  instance,  the  list  of  dissertations  in  the  bibliography 
attached  to  K.  Mannheim,  Ideology  and  Utopia,  op.  cit.,  pp.  303-4. 
301.  Cf.  M.  Jay,  'The  Frankfurt  School's  critique  of  Karl  Mannheim 
and  the  Sociology  of  Knowledge',  Telos,  no.  20, 
1974,  pp-72-89  and  the  important  reply  by 
J.  Schmidt;  Cf.  J.  Schmidt,  'Reply  to  Martin  Jay', 
Telos.  21,1974,  pp.  168-180. 
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CHAPTER  FIVE 
The  debate  surrounding  the  sociology 
of  knowledge:  1918-33 
.f CHAPTER  FIVE 
An  examination  of  the  debates  surrounding  the  sociology  of  knowledge  in 
Weimar  Germany  represents  not  merely  an  extension  of  the  discussion  of 
this  sociological  tradition  but  also,  in  one  sense,  a  summary  of  it.  The 
debates  illustrate  the  extent  to  which  the  sociology  of  knowledge  existed 
152 
not,  as  today,  largely  as  a  marginal  discipline  hovering  between  sociology, 
social  philosophy  and  the  philosophy  of  science  but  as  a  discipline  which 
questioned  and  sometimes  challenged  the  foundations  of  sociology  itself. 
This  was,  of  course,  viewed  then  and  subsequently  both  as  its  strength 
and,  by  most  commentators,  as  its  weakness.  But  over  and  above  this, 
an  examination  of  these  debates  enables  us  to  at  least  prepare  the  ground 
for  a  discussion  of  the  role  and  significance  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge 
within  the  German  tradition. 
Within  this  period  there  were  at  least  three  'debates'  which  were  directly 
concerned  with  the  sociology  of  knowledge.  In  1924,  at  the  Fourth  Ger- 
man  Sociological  Congress,  the  issue  of  the  relationship  between  science 
and  social  structure  was  discussed  by  Max  Scheler  and  Max  Adler  and 
,, 
commented  upon  by  many  others. 
1 
This  was  the  first  explicit  sociolo- 
gical  debate  surrounding  this  new  discipline,  if  one  excludes  the  brief 
exchanges  between  Schaler  and  Jerusalem  in  1921  and  1922  referred  to 
earlier. 
2 
Of  course,  some  of  the  issues  that  were  later  to  be  central  to 
the  controversy  surrounding  the  sociology  of  knowledge  -  especially  after 
1 
the  publication  of  Mannheim's  Ideologie  und  Utopie  in  1929  -  were  already 153"' 
aired  in  what  Siegfried  Kracauer  termed  'the  so-called  Wissenschaftsstreit' 
which  followed  from  Weber's  'Wissenschaft  als  Beruf'  lecture  of  1919 
and  which  concerned  writers  such  as  Singer  and  Scheler. 
3 
However  this 
was,  strictly  speaking,  prior  to  the  emergence  of  the  sociology  of  know- 
ledge  as  a  distinctive  discipline  in  Germany  although  Scheler  was  himself 
one  of  the  participants.  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  this  debate  was  in- 
significant;  indeed,  it  will  be  examined  for  the  light  it  throws  upon-the 
role  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  in  the  next  chapter. 
4 
What  concerns 
us  here  is  the  strictly  sociological  debates  surrounding  the  sociology  of 
knowledge.  If  the  Scheler-Adler  discussion  of  the  relationship  between 
science  and  social  structure  was  the  first  of  these  public  debates,  it  cannot 
be  said  that  it  subsequently  generated  further  discussion  apart,  perhaps, 
from  a  paper  by  Dunkmann  on  the  sociological  foundation  of  science  which 
was  published  in  1927  and  which  explicitly  dealt  with  Scheler's  views 
5 
on  science. 
The  second  major  debate  surrounding  the  sociology  of  knowledge  occurred 
at  the  Sixth  German  Sociological  Congress  in  Zurich  in  1928.6  One 
section  of  this  conference  was  concerned  with  the  sociological  treatment 
of  the  phenomenon  of  competition  and  comprised  papers  by  von  Wiese  and 
Karl  Mannheim.  As  is  evident  from  the  ensuing  discussion,  it  is 
Mannheim's  paper  on  the  significance  of  competition  in  the  intellectual 
sphere,  rather  than  von  Wiese's  paper  concerned  with  more  general  aspects 
of  competition,  which  sparked  off  a  heated  debate  on  the  sociology  of  know- 
ledge. 
7 
This  congress  stimulated  a  discussion  by  Alfred  Meusel  of  both 
papers,  not  published  until  1930.8  It  'also  formed  the  starting  point' 
for  a  discussion  by  Alexander  von  Schelting  of  the  conflict  surrounding  the 154  "  1i 
sociology  of  knowledge  ('Zum  Streit  um  die  Wissenssoziologie') 
published  in  1929.9  Von  Schelting  indeed  saw  Mannheim's  paper  in 
particular  as  making  this  interest  in  the  problems  thrown  up  by  the 
sociology  of  knowledge  'more  lively'  .  It  is  important  to  review  this 
article  in  view  of  von  Schelting's  subsequent  critique  of  Mannheim's 
sociology  of  knowledge  in  his  Max  Weber's  Wissenschaftslehre  published 
in  1934. 
The  third  'debate'  -  although  not,  strictly  speaking,  a  'debate'  -  con- 
sists  of  the  extensive  reviews  of  Mannheim's  major  work  Ideologie  und 
Utopie  from  1929  onwards. 
1° 
The  large  number  and  broad  range  of  the 
reviews  and  critiques  testifies  not  merely  to  the  interest  in  the  sociology 
of  knowledge  but  also  to  the  significance  which  Mannheim's  work  had  for 
the  sociological  tradition  and,  more  generally,  for  the  social  sciencesand 
philosophy  in  Germany.  It  constitutes  the  peak  of  Interest  in  the  sociol- 
ogy  of  knowledge  in  this  period  and  coincides  with  the  dramatic  heighten- 
ing  of  the  economic  and  political  crisis  of  German  society  after  1929.  In 
the  light  of  this,  von  Schelting  was  not  exaggerating  when  he  suggested 
that  the  sociology  of  knowledge  'today  undoubtedly  stands  in  the  foreground 
of  sociological  cognitive  interests'  . 
11 
4 
In  view  of  our  subsequent  evaluation  of  the  significance  of  the  sociology 
of  knowledge'for  German  sociology,  attention  will  also  be  paid  to  the 
reception  and  critique  of  Mannheim's  version  of  the  sociology  of  know- 
ledge  provided  by  the  Frankfurt  School  within  this  period.  This  is  for  a 
"w 
number  of  reasons.  '  Firstly,  commentators'  such  as  Lenk,  have  sharply 
demarcated  the  Frankfurt  School  is  critique  of  ideology  from  the  sociology of  knowledge  tradition  in  Germany,  especially  that  established  by  Mann- 
heim. 
12 
Secondly,  and  of  more  contemporary  interest,  writers  hostile 
both  to  the  sociology  of  knowledge  and  to  the  Frankfurt  School  tradition, 
like  Popper  and  Albert,  have  suggested  links  between  critical  theory  and 
the  sociology  of  knowledge. 
13 
Albert,  for  example,  has  pointed  to  the 
affinity  between  the  discussion  of  cognitive  interests  by  Habermas  and 
Apel  and  Scheler's  version  of  three  cognitive  interests. 
14 
It  is  there- 
fore  useful  to  examine  the  early  reception  of  the  Frankfurt  School  to  the 
sociology  of  knowledge,  not  least  because  from  1930  until  1933,  Mannheim 
himself  succeeded  to  Oppenheimer's  chair  of  economics  and  sociology  at 
Frankfurt  University. 
Unfortunately,  it  is  not  possible  to  review  all  the  other  contributions  to  - 
the  sociology  of  knowledge  in  this  period,  though  some  brief  mention  wi  II 
be  made  of  them. 
15 
A  comprehensive  account  of  the  sociology  of  know- 
ledge  in  this  period  should  perhaps  also  include  contributions  to  the 
critique  of  ideology.  Indeed,  at  least  since  the  publication  of'Lukacs' 
Geschichte  und  Klassenbewusstsein  in  1923,  and  certainly  after  the  pub- 
lication  of  Mannheim's  Ideologie  und  Utopie  in  1929,  the  whole  of  the 
literature  associated  with  the  critique  of  ideology  could  legitimately  be 
included  in  such  a  survey.  However,  much  of  this  literature  must,  of 
necessity,  be  excluded.  This  is  particularly  unfortunate  in  the  case  of 
writers  like  Korsch,  for  whom  a  case  has  been  made  as  being  an  import- 
f 
ant  influence  upon  the  early  Frankfurt  School. 
16 
Yet  his  discussion  of 
ideology  did  not  otherwise  directly  influence  the  sociology  of  knowledge 
tradition.  This  is  in  contrast  perhaps  to  some  of  the  work  of  the  Austro- 
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Marxist  Max  Adler  whose  work  was  not  only  influential  as  a  neo-Kantian 156  6` 
Marxist  version  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  but  who  personally  part- 
icipated  in  one  of  the  debates  surrounding  the  sociology  of  knowledge  in 
1924.17  Even  so,  Adler's  version  of  a  sociology  of  knowledge  was 
hardly  taken  up  at  all  in  Germany. 
Despite  these  limitations,  the  following  survey  of  the  debates  should  at 
least  illustrate  the  extent  to  which  the  sociology  of  knowledge  and  the 
problems  associated  with  it  were  of  central  importance  to  the  course  of 
German  sociology  in  the  Weimar  period.  More.  specifically,  the  survey 
should  confirm  the  extent  to  which  the  development  of  the  sociology  of 
knowledge  was  not  merely  of  interest  to  Scheler  and  Mannheim  but  was 
. of'interest  to  many  of  the  contributors  to  the  debates.  -  That  is,  the  work 
of,  say,  Scheler  and  Mannheim  must  have  achieved  some  resonance  with- 
in  the  German  sociological  tradition  in  order  for  it  to  become  a  major  con- 
cern  of  sociologists.  at  least  towards  the  end  of  the  Weimar  period.  What 
this  suggests  is  that  the  sociology  of  knowledge  was  able  to  develop  out 
of  concerns  which  other  sociologists  shared  or  at  least  were  aware  of  -  to 
some  extent,  a  common  tradition  which  made  it  likely  that  sociology  would 
take  up  the  problems  associated  with  the  sociology  of  knowledge  within 
this  period.  This  tradition  and  some  of  the  mediating  social  factors  have 
already  been  outlined  in  the  first  chapter  of  this  study. 
i 
II, 
The  debate  at  the  Fourth  German  Sociology  Congress  in  1924  surrounding 
Marx  Scheler's  paper  on  'Science  and  Social  Structure'  is  significant because  it  is  the  one  occasion  upon  which  a  sociological  standpoint 
(Scheler!  s)  is  confronted  explicitly  with  a  Marxist  one  (Adler's).  In 
the  light  of  later  interpretations  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge,  this  is 
a  somewhat  surprising  finding  since  many  writers  today  contrast  the 
sociology  of  knowledge  with  the  critique  of  ideology  -  quite  possibly  with 
good  reason. 
18 
Hence  one  might  have  expected  greater  public  debate 
within  the  sociological  tradition  between  a  'sociological'  and  a  'Marx- 
ist'  standpoint  especially  in  such  an  areas  as  the  sociology  of  knowledge 
where  the  'debate'  with  Marx  seems  so  explicit.  '  Less  surprising  is  the 
fact  that,  as  a  debate,  the  1924  confrontation  was  hardly  productive  in 
terms  of  the  development  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge.  Scheler's  dis- 
cussion  of  science  was  taken  up  in  his  own  later  writings,  expecially  in 
Die  Wissensformen  und  die  Gesellschaft  but  only  Dunkmann's  article 
'Die  soziologische  Begründung  der  Wissenschaft'  (1927)  can  in  any  way 
be  traced  back  to  this  discussion  of  which  he  was  a  participant.  Much 
of  Adler's  reply  to  Scheler  hardly  addressed  the  Issue  of  the  relationship 
between  science  and  social  structure  though  it  does  provide  a  clue  to  his 
own  version  of  a  sociology.  of  knowledge.  However,  Adler's  approach 
was  hardly  taken  in  at  all  within  the  German  tradition.  The  subsequent 
major  controversies  surrounding  the  sociology  of  knowledge  centred  around 
Mannheim's  approach,  which  many  contemporaries  took  to  be  either  some 
version  of  a  Marxist  approach  or  at  least  a  confrontation  with  it. 
I 
Scheler's  discussion  of  'Science  and  Social  Structure'  has  already  been 
dealt  with  in  an  earlier  chapter. 
19 
There  it  was  shown  that  Scheler  ex- 
tended  his  theory  of  biological  drives  to  the  sphere  of  scientific  knowledge 
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and  treated  science  within  the  context  of  his  metaphysics.  As  we  shall see,  Adler  and  many  other  discussants  doubted  whether  Schekr's  position 
was  a  sociological  one.  What  is  of  interest  in  Adler's  long  reply  to 
Scheler  is,  however,  not  merely  his  own  criticisms  of  Scheler  but  the 
outline  of  his  own  position  on  the  sociology  of  knowledge. 
20 
Adler's 
emphasis  upon  his  own  position  rather  than  a  systematic  critique  of 
Scheler's  was  due 
,  in  part,  to  the  fact  that  Scheler's  paper  was  not  made 
available  to  hirr{before  the  congress. 
As  we  have  seen  earlier,  Adler's  central  argument  against  Scheler's  paper 
was  whether  it  formed  a  contribution  to  sociology  at  all.  Adler  suggested 
that  Scheler  commenced  with  an  'intellectual  -historical'  approach  that 
confuses  the  intellectual-historical  and  social  determination  of  thought. 
A  sociological  interpretation  of  forms  of  thought  should  commence  when 
the  'whole  intellectual  historical  process  is  investigated  in  terms  of.  its 
social  dependency  and  beyond,  its  inner  psychological  and  ideological 
determination.  '21  The  sociological  approach  presupposes  the  intellectual- 
historical  dimension  but  is  not-co-terminus  with  it.  In  this  context, 
Adler  objects  to  Scheler's  broad  contrast  between  the  European  and  Asiatic 
mentality  as  'a  mere  phenomenology  of  intellectual  history'.  Indeed,  'the 
sociological  problem  in  fact  first  commences  where  this  phenomenology 
is  terminated.  '  However,  when  Scheler's  analysis  moves  onto  his  theory 
of  drives  (Trieblehre),  Adler  suggests  that  he  can  see 
'neither  a  phenomenological  nor  a  sociological 
advantage  and  indeed  believes  that,  wherever 
intellectual  problems  are  traced  back  to  a  drive, 
a  methodological  error  is  present  since,  in  so 
doing,  an  actual  ideological  problem  is  reduced 
to  a  biological  one.  The  drive  is  always,  to 
some  extent  biological  and  we  can  never  come  from 
biology  to  sociology.  In  any  case,  these 
drives  display,  for  Scheler,  a  very  remarkable 
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diversity  such  that  one  is  inclined  to 
believe  that  they  are  not  genuine  drives 
at  all  but  rather  are  arbitrary  character- 
isations  of  diverse  currents  of  intellect- 
ual  life.  ' 
Adler  seems  to  suggest,  in  fact,  that  this  theory  of  drives  is  a  sub- 
stitute  for  Marx's  analysis  of  the  material  base  but,  he  argues,  Scheler's 
confrontation  with  Marxism  is  misplaced.  Adler  both  criticizes  Schelor's 
position  and  proceeds  to'outline  his  own  Marxist  standpoint  in  much  of 
the  remainder  of  his  reply. 
Adler  accuses  Scheler  of  a  false  notion  of  Marxism  in  that  'like  so  many 
other  opponents  of  Marxism,  he  believes  that  the  materialist  interpretat- 
ion  öf  history  brings  the  whole'of  intellectual  life,  ideology  into  a  one- 
side  causal  dependency  upon  something  non-intellectual,  upon  the  so- 
called  material  relations  of  economic  life  so  that,  according  to  this  inter- 
pretation,  the  intellectual  sphere  is  directly  derived  from  the  economic'. 
23 
Adler  inject  argues  that  Marxism  is  not  primarily  materialist  in  the  single 
sense  of  material  determination  but  is  concerned  with  intellectual  relations 
within  material  relations  in  that 
'economic  relations  are  not  something  factual 
that  confronts  human  beings  as  alien  but 
rather'that'they  are  their  own,  that  is,  also 
intellectual  relations,  their  work  and  inter- 
action  relations  under  which  they  live.  In 
this  manner,  Marxism  represents  social  life 
as  a  system  of  continuous  intellectual  activity. 
.r 
Marxism,  Adler  argues,  does  not  maintain  a  dualism  of  economy  and 
ideology  in  which  the  former  is  alien  to  the  intellect  but  rather  asserts 
that  'the  economic  relations  are  themselves  already  intellectual  relations'. 
This  version  of  Marxism,  although  it  is  an  implicit  critique  of  the  parody 
of  Marxism  in  German  sociology,  can  only  be  understood  in  the  light  of 160  iI4' 
Adler's  neo-Kantian  Marxism  which  he  sees  as  providing  the  basis  for 
a  sociology  of  knowledge. 
Adler  argues  that  there  are  two  senses  in  which  one  can  speak  of  a 
sociology  of  knowledge  (Wissen)  and  cognition  (Erkenntnis).  There 
is  a  sociology  of  knowledge  that  is  concerned  with  the  manner  in  which 
'historically  given  knowledge  is  determined  by  the  social  structure  of  the 
group  in  which  it  arises'.  In  a  very  different  sense)one  can  speak  of  a 
sociology  of  knowledge  when  one  is  concerned  with  the  fact  that  'already 
before  all  historically  determined  development  of  intellectual  life,  this 
life  consists  in  its  very  nature  completely  of  socialized  nature  '. 
24 
In 
the  light  of  these  two  senses  of  a  sociology  of  knowledge,  Adler  maintains 
that  the  former  embodies  'merely  a  historical  sociology  whereas  this 
latter  provides  the  foundation  of  sociology'  .  Although  Adler  does  not 
make  this  point,  it  is  clear  that  he  here  raises  the  dual  claims  for  a 
sociology  of  knowledge  that  have  stood  at  the  centre  of  the  controversy 
which  surrounds  it:  namely,  the  conception  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge 
as  a  branch  of  the  sociology  of  culture  or  historical  sociology  and  a  con- 
0 
ception  which  sees  it  as  a  undational  discipline,  (Begründungswi  ssen- 
schaft)  .  It  is  in  fact  this  latter  project  which  particularly  interests  Adler 
but  he  suggests  that  since  Scheler  interpreted  the  sociology  of  knowledge 
in  the  first  sense  he  is  unable  to  develop  the  second  meaning  further.  In 
his  reply  to  Scheler,  Adler  merely  states  that  it  is  concerned  with  the  fact 
that  'the  cognitive  process  itself,  although 
it  takes  place  only  within  the  individual, 
is  nonetheless,  in  accordance  with  its 
transcendental  preconditioning  thoroughly 
social  and  socialized.  )  have  termed  this 
cognitive-critical  character  the  transcen- 
dental-social  aspect  of  experience  and 
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shown  that  as  a  social  apriori  it  still 
also  belongs  to  the  forms  of  all  ex- 
perience  in  the  same  way  as  space, 
time  and  categories.,  25 
This  version  of  a  sociology  of  knowledge  is  developed  elsewhere  by  Adler, 
not  merely  in  his  early  work  Kausalität  und  Teleologie  im  Streite  um  die 
Wissenschaft26  but  in  his  contemporary  writings  such  as  Kant  und  der 
Marxismus  and  his  essay'Soziologie  und  Erkenntniskritik'. 
7 
As  a 
version  of  neo-Kantian  Marxism)it  was  the  subject  of  considerable  crit- 
icism,  for  example,  by  Siegiried  Marck 
28 
and  Herbert  Marcuse. 
29 
As 
such  is  not  merely  represents  a  Kantian  foundation  for  Marxism  but  also 
for  sociology  with  its  'concept  of  the  transcendental  social  formation  of 
the  individual  consciousness.  With  Kant  and  Marx  we  are  erecting  the 
structure  of  modern  critical  sociology'  . 
30 
This  critical  sociology  also 
appears  to  be  one  that  is  firmly  rooted  in  German  sociology.  Adler 
concurs  fully  with  Max  Weber's  insistence  upon  the  'value-freedom  of 
all  objective  science  ...  Marxism,  too,  stands  decisively  on  the  basis 
of  value-free  science'  and  is  not  based  upon  'arbitrar'ily  or  unconsciously 
presupposed  evaluation.  1 
31 
Similarly  -  though  not  mentioned  in  his 
reply  -  Adler  was  very  favourably  Impressed  with  Simmel's  'epistemol- 
ogical  investigation  of  a  science'  of  social  relationships. 
32 
However,  when  Adler  addresses  himself  to  the  role  of  science  he  locates 
his  remarks  within  the  context  of  the  first  version  of  the  sociology  of 
knowledge  that  is  concerned  with  the  social  determinants  of  modes  of 
thought.  Adler  argues  that  there  are  two  currents  of  science  in  the  pre- 
sent  period  that  can  be  characterised  as  stationary  and  evolutionary  or 
bourgeois  and  proletarian,  both  of  which  'are  determined,  even  though 1s2`°fl 
largely  unconsciously',  by  class  interests  in  the  last  instance  '; 
3Adler 
seeks  to  avoid  the  terms  bourgeois  and  proletarian  science  and  attempts 
to  counter  the  hostility  to  his  remarks  at  this  point  with  an  argument  on 
the  unitary  nature  of  science.  He  asserts  that 
'there  are  no  Marxists  who  would  con-, 
sider  asserting  that  scientific  truth 
is  one  thing  for  the  proletariat  and 
another  for  the  bourgeoisie  but  rather 
only  that  each  class  holds  something 
different  for  the  truth.  These  exists 
only  a  single  science  but  there  are 
results  of  that  science  which  do  not 
possess  the  same  significance  and  34 
the  same  acceptability  for  everyone.  ' 
Similarly,  Adler  rejects  the  dualism  of  the  natural  and  social  sciences 
most  strongly  asserted  in  neo-Kantian  circles  since 
'the  social  sciences  too  can  oriy  be  con- 
structed  on  the  same  epistemological 
and  logical  foundations  as  natural 
science,  namely  on  the  basis  of  a 
I  aw-like  conformity  of  being  and 
causality.  Social  science,  too, 
isa  causal  science  of  existence 
(Seinswissenschäft)  and  not  a 
normative  science  of  ends  (Zweck 
wissenschaft).  Nonetheless,  the 
distinction  between  natural  and  social 
science  emerges  in  the  type  of  existence 
and  causality  that  exists  in  the  sphere 
of  social  phenomena.  '  35 
Whereas  nature  stands  estranged  from  man  and  quite  outside  man's 
'socialized  and  goal  directed  strivings',  society  consist  precisely  of 
Ithe  latter.  Unfortunately,  Adler  does  not  develop  this  standpoint  further 
in  his  reply  but  merely  expands  slightly  upon  his  distinction  between 
stationary  and  evolutionary  science.  The  former  remains  'confined  to 
within  bourgeois  society'  as  a  naturally  given  milieu,  the  latter  is  able 
to  go  beyond  it.  Unlike  Lukäces  analysis  in  Geschichte  und  Klassen 
bewusstsein,  however,  no  satisfactory  account  of  why  this  is  so  is  pro- 
vided. Even  from  this  brief  summary  of  Adler's  reply  to  Scheler,  it  is  clear 
. 
that  this  'debate'  is  yet  another  instance  of  opponents  talking  past  one 
another.  However,  Adler's  reply  does  illustrate  the  extent  to  which, 
even  in  the  early  stages,  the  discussion  of  the  nature  of  the  sociology 
of  knowledge  very  quickly  moved  in  the  direction  of  the  nature  of  social 
scientific  knowledge.  This  is  not  merely  another  instance  of  the  extent 
to  which  the  debate  surrounding  the  sociology  of  knowledge  can  be  seen 
as  an  extension  of  the  Methodenstreit  and  possibly  also  the  Werturteil- 
sstreit  within  one  sphere  of  sociology..  It  also  testifies  to  the  very 
restricted  nature  of  the  definition  of  what  is  to  constitute  'knowledge' 
for  sociology  of  knowledge.  That  is,  the  field  of  study  can  very  quickly 
-become  another  kind  of  discussion  of  the  nature  of  social  scientific  know- 
ledge  within  some  form  of  neo-Kantian  parameters.  In  this  way,  one 
strand  of  the  discipline  can  be  seen  as  a  sociological  extension  of  the  pre- 
First  World  War  neo-Kantian  discussion  of  the  logical  and  philosophical 
foundations  of  the  distinction  between  natural  and  social  science. 
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Indeed,  this  ambiguity  on  the  nature  and  aims  of  a  sociology  of  knowledge 
was  sensed  by  a  number  of  the  participants  at  this  sociological  congress. 
This  was  taken  up  most  dramatically  and  misleadingly  by  Dunckmann  in 
the  following  manner  when  he  argued  that, 
'if  we  claim  that  all  science  is  somehow 
dependent  upon  the  social  structure  then 
it  is  also  certain  that  alI  science  depends 
upon  sociology.  There  then  emerges  the 
problem  that,  in  my  opinion,  is  the  de- 
cisive  one  -  and  one  that  has  not  been 
dealt  with  here  by  either  of  the  two 
speakers.  How  is  sociology  as  a 
science  possible  if  all  science  depends 
upon  sociology?  From  whence  does 
sociology  take  its  standard  as  a  science 
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if  all  other  sciences  (i.  e.  in  art,  religion, 
morality,  law  and  even  metaphysics  and 
philosophy)  depend  upon  the  social  struct-  37 
ure,  that  is,  are  sociologically  determined?  ' 
Were  Dunckmann  to  develop  this  argument  fully  then  we  would  be  faced 
with  a  perfect  example  of  sociologism.  Indeed,  later  commentators  on 
the  sociology  of  knowledge  did  in  fact  denounce  the  sociology  of  know- 
O 
ledge  as  socio^gism.  Like  most  of  his  a)ntemporaries,  Dunckmann  goes 
on  to  exclude  'science,  mathematics,  logic,  or  we  can  think  of  statistics, 
that  are  not  dependent  upon  social  structures'  . 
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With  regard  to  the  two 
speakers,  Dunckmann  argues  that  Scheler's  analysis  is  limited  to  a 
theory  of  drives  and  a  notion  of  spiritual  creators  and  that  Adler's  analysis 
of  bourgeois  and  proletarian  science  begs  the  question  of  how  sociology 
as  a  science  can  exist  in  such  a  way  as  to  transcend  class  distinctions. 
On  the  problem  of  sociology  as  a  science,  Sulzbach  argues  that  Scheler, 
though  he  spoke  of  three  interests  in  knowledge,  failed  to  ask  whether 
different  types  of  understanding  exist,  whether  these  differences  derive 
from  the  social  structure  and  hence  may  be  understood  by  sociology.  The 
possible  diversity  of  sociological  standpoints  was  also  noticed  by  Salin  when 
he  suggests  that  'today's  lectures  have  shown  us  how  impossible  it  is 
C6 
up  to  now  to  speak  ofhunified  science  of  sociology.  What  has  been  given 
to  us  is  at  most,  in  so  far  as  it  was  sociology  at  all,  different  sociologies: 
Max  Scheler's  sociology,  that  of  Max  Adler  and,  besides,  that  of  the 
discussants  .t 
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However,  what  is  also  of  interest  in  this  discussion  is  the  response  to 
Marxism  since  it  gives  some  indication  as  to  why  so  little  attention  was 16571. 
subsequently  paid  to  Adler's  sociology  of  knowledge.  Further,  it  shows  how 
little  the  influence  of  Lukäcs0  Geschichte  und  Klassenbewusstsein  was  a 
year  after  its  publication.  Alfred  Weber,  in  his  contribution,  rejects  both 
stationary  and  evolutionary,  bourgeois  and  proletarian  modes  of  apprehen- 
sion.  More  significantly,  Weber  states  his  case  against  Marxism  as 
follows: 
'what  separates  us  from  those  who  today 
call  themselves  Marxists,  although  they 
are  perhaps  best  called  quarsi-Marxists, 
is  that  they  are  rationalists  and,  in  fact, 
pure  rationalists.  They  treat  everything 
in  this  manner  and  in  this  sense  they  are 
'progressives'  and  cannot  be  anything  else. 
In  this  sense,  they  must  be  evolutionists; 
since  for  a  rationalist  there  exists  no 
historical  movement  other  than  progressive 
evolution.  What  separates  us  from  their 
completely  rational  approach  and  the  attempt 
to  explain  everything  by  this  rationality 
i  s..  ..  above  all  a  pre-war  experience  from 
the  time  when  things  were  still  going  very 
wel  I  for  us  and  one  could  sti  II  count  us 
economically  amongst  the  'bourgeois'  and 
not  primarily  a  war  or  post-war  experience 
since  which  things  have  gone  badly.  ' 
If  we  pass  over  the  somewhat  obscure  use  of  the  term  'rationalist'  in 
this  context  -  which  only  serves  to  point  to  Weber's  lack  of  knowledge  of 
Marx's  work  -  then  what  is  striking  about  this  passage  is  the  rejection- 
of  the  evolutionary  perspective  on  Marxism  common  to  many  members 
of  the  Second  International  and,  apparently,  to  Max  Adler  even  in  the 
post  war  period  as  Bottemore  has  recently  indicated. 
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it  is  also  an 
w 
indication  of  the  changed  nature  of  German  society  and  the  recognition 
of  the  need  for'another  way'  and  'another  perspective'  since  'progress' 
can  no  longer  be  presupposed.  Also  worth  bearing  in  mind  ät  this  point 
is  that  Weber  at  this  time  was  quite  possibly  a  significant  influence 
upon  Mannheim.  This  challenge  of  a  new  situation  is,  of  course,  much 166 
more  fully  worked  out  in  Mannheim's  later  work  and  especially  in 
Ideologie  und  Utopie. 
The  other  discussants  exhibited  a  varied  response  to  Marxism.  Dunck- 
mann  suggests  that  he  did  not  understand  what  a  'materialist  interpre- 
tation  of  history'  was.  Michels,  in  his  brief  remarks,  makes  no  reference 
to  Marxism  except  to  suggest  that  Adler  should  not  overlook  that  there 
exists'not  only  a  bourgeois  but  also  a  proletarian  human  type'  .  Of  the 
discussants,  only  Alfred  Meusel  refers  to  specific  Marxist  works  relating 
generally  to  the  sociology  of  knowledge.  Significantly,  Meusel  criticizes 
both  Scheler's  and  Adler's  papers  on  the  grounds  that  it  does  not  suffice 
'to  show  how  a  specific  social  group  is 
impelled  towards  specific  ways  to 
knowledge  and  kinds  of  knowledge  on 
the  basis  of  its  concrete  set  of  interests 
but,  over  and  above  that,  -to  allude  to  the 
close  affinity  of  form  and  structural  iden- 
tification  between  economic  base  and 
intellectual  superstructure  -  in  the-very 
same  manner,  cfor 
instance,  as  Georg 
Lukacs  in  Geshichte  und  Klassenbewusst- 
tsein.  '  41  A 
At  least  in  raising  this  kind  of  issue,  Meusel  argues  that  'Professor 
Scheler  has  shown  himself  to  be  a  better  Marxist  than  Professor  Adler. 
On  different  grounds,  Meusel  also  rejects  Adler's  discussion  of  a  static 
and  dynamic  sociology.  But  perhaps  of  greatest  interest  in  the  context 
/ 
of  the  reception  of  Marxism  within  the  sociology  of  knowledge  is  the 
contribution  by  Arthur  Salz  who  accepts  that  he  has  'a  "vulgar"  inter- 
pretation  of  Marxism'  I. 
Salz  attempts  to  locate  the  need  to  confront  the  Marxist  standpoint  in 
the  changes  that  have  taken  place  in  German  society.  He  argues  that 167 
'There  seems  to  me  to  be  no  doubt  that 
we  have  been  drawn  much  closer  to  the 
materialist  interpretation  of  history  which 
is  the  foundation  of  Marxist  philosophy  of 
history,  in  recent  decades  than  earlier, 
than  in  the  decades  before  the  war  and 
that  we  experience  the  need  for  a  con- 
frontation  with  this  doctrine  and  the 
questions  it  raises  much  more  immed- 
iately  and  in  a  completely  different 
manner  than  previously;  in  fact  this  is 
not  the  result,  for  instance,  of  an  in- 
tellectual  development  that  we  have 
passed  through  in  the  meantime  but, 
rather  the  result  of  political  and  econ- 
omic  events  which  we  have  laid  the 
course  for  in  our  own  lives.  Quite 
simply,  it  is  the  result  of  the  fact 
that,  to  state  it  briefly,  the  pro- 
letarian  prime  experience  has  become 
the  national  consciousness  b  us  Ger- 
mans,  that  today  the  whole  nation  or 
large  parts  of  it  have  internationalised 
their  role  in  the  social  whole  that  pre- 
viously  only  the  proletarian  class 
occupied,  that  this  proletarian  feeling 
is,  in  fact,  'socialized'  . 
That  polar- 
isation  of  society,  of  which  Marx  spoke, 
and  which  he  saw  as  the  basic  fact  of 
capitalist  society,  that  disintegration 
of  society  into  the  exploiting  wealthy 
and  the  exploited  prcpertyless  has  taken 
possession  of  nations  themselves  and 
any  sociological  perspective  on  the 
present  that  does  not  start  out  from  this 
fact,  that  in  this  sense  there  exist 
today  proletarian!  zed,  enslaved  peoples, 
is  doomed  to  failure.  '  42 
This  sense  of  universal  proletarianization  and  its  extension  from  the  pro- 
etariat  to  the  whole  of  society  is  certainly  a  central  theme  of  Max 
Scheler's  wartime  and  post-war  writings.  The  polarisation  within 
German  society  -  and  not  the  polarisation  of  nations  in  which  Germany  is 
proletarianized  as  Salz  argues  -  was  later  to  become  a  central  theme  of 
Mannheim's  analysis  of  society  and  its  attendant  conflicting  ideologies. 168  1ý 
- 
i 
But  the  core  of  Salz's  contribution  lies  elsewhere.  It  lies  in  a  restate- 
ment  of  some  of  the  issues  thrown  up  by  Lukäcs.  Salz  indeed  refers  to 
dialectical  method  as  having  been  developed  'from  Hegel  and  Marx  to 
Lukäcs'.  It  is  this  dialectical  method  which  he  sees  as  'the  core  of 
the  materialist  interpretation  of  history'  and,  like  Lukäcs,  he  criticized 
orthodox  Marxism  for  itself  being  undialectical.  Salz,  too,  refers  to 
the  argument  that  commodity  relations  are  the  basis  of  forms  of  objecti- 
fication  and  reification.  However,  he  argues  strongly  against  'the 
mythologization  of  the  proletariat'.  Thus,  however  unsympathetic  Salz 
may  have  been  to  the  Marxist  standpoint,  his  contribution  is  the  only  one 
to  refer  in  any  detailed  manner  to  Lukäcs'  position.  Indeed  this  is  the 
only  instance  of  Lukäcs'  central  arguments  in  Geschichte  und  Klassen- 
bewusstsein  being  taken  up  at  a  sociology  congress  in  this  period.  How- 
ever,  it  must  be  emphasised  that  even  though  Lukacs'  arguments  are 
taken  up,  their  fruitfulness  for  a  sociology  of  knowledge  or  a  critique  of 
ideology  are  not  developed  by  Salz  at  any  point  in  his  contribution. 
In  his  closing  remarks  to  this  session,  Adler  again  returns  to  his  central 
thesis  'that  the  assumption  of  objective  knowledge  is  itself  class- 
determined  in  its  possibility  and  totality'. 
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Adler  counters  the  view 
that  'progress  never  starts  out  from  the  masses  but  only  always  from  in- 
dividuals;  that  culture  is  something  creative  whereas  the  proletariat  is 
not'.  However  this  should  not  be  taken  to  mean  that  bourgeois  or  pro- 
letarian  thought  is  that  of  'the  average  thought  of  the  individual  bourgeois 
or  proletarian.  Rather)it  is  a  characterization  of  the  'motives,  tasks 
and  limits  of  thought'.  And  in  answer  to  Dunckmann's  posing  of  the 
problem  of  the  determination  of  sociology  and  science,  Adler  argues that  he  did  not  state  that 
'science  is  dependent  upon  sociology,  which 
is  certainly  itself  a  science,  but  is  depend- 
ent  upon  the  social  structure;  and  the  presen- 
tation  of  this  dependency  is  primarily  the 
task  of  sociology.  When  Professor  Dunck- 
mann  argues  further,  that  there  must  certain- 
ly  be  a  pure  sociology  that,  like  mathematics 
or  mechanics  does  not  consist  of  a  merely 
partisan  truth,  then  V  gladly  concur  fully 
with  him.  '  44 
We  know  from  his  other  writings  that  Adler  has  in  mind  as  a  basis  for 
a  pure  sociolbgy  that  of  Georg  Simmel,  even  though  Adler's  version  is 
one  which  combines  Kant  and  Marx. 
In  terms  of  the  development  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge,  this  first 
public  'debate'  points  to  a  number  of  features  of  the  discipline  that  run 
throughout  later  confrontations.  Firstly,  that  Scheler's  discussion  of 
the  relationship  between  science  and  social  structure  is  not  taken_up  and 
developed  in  this  period.  Indeedjthe  development  of  natural  scientific 
knowledge  is  seldom  raised  as  a  theme  at  all,  except,  as  we  have  seen, 
in  Mannheim's  unpublished  essays  and  even  there  it  seems  to  rest  largely 
upon  Lukäcs'  earlier-account  in  Geschichte  und  Klassenbewusstsein. 
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Secondly,  it  is  the  case  that  the  Scheler-Adler  debate  does  raise- 
particularly  in  Adler's  contribution-  the  question  as  to  the  foundations 
, 
of  sociology  itself  as  a  discipline.  This  certainly  remains  atheme  with- 
in  the  sociology  of  knowledge  even  to  the  extent  that  we  can  see  it  as 
taking  up  earlier  issues  from  the  Methodenstreit  and  the  Werturteilsstreit. 
This  aspect  will  be  examined  in  more  detail  in  the  next  chapter.  Finally, 
the  debate  indicates  the  extent  to  which  the  Marxist  perspective  is  ever- 
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present  as  a  background  to  the  discussion  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge. 17Ö 
But  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  this  often  takes  the  form  of  a  caricature 
of  the  orthodox  Marxism  of  the  Second  International  and  hardly  ever  con- 
fronts  the  more  penetrating  version  of  writers  like  Lukacs  which,  at  least 
potentially,  had  considerable  relevance  for  reconstructing  a  critique  of 
ideology.,  if  not  for  the  sociology  of  knowledge  broadly  conceived.  In 
the  immediate  context  of  the  Schaler-Adler  debate,  it  must  also  be  pointed 
out  that  Adler's  version  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  found  almost  no 
resonance  whatsoever  amongst  later  writers.  In  subsequent  sociological 
'debates',,  it  was  to  be  Mannheim's  presumed  assimilation  of  the  Marxist 
perspective  that  was  to  the  focus  of  attention.  This  indeed  was  the  case 
at  the  Sixth  German  Sociological  Congress  hold  in  Zürich  in  September, 
1928  and  it  is  to  this  second  debate  that  we  must  now  turn. 
Mannheim's  paper  on  'The  Significance  of  Competition  in  the  Intellectual 
Sphere'  at  the  Sixth  German  Sociological  Congress  sparked  off  an  inter- 
esting  discussion  amongst  the  participants. 
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It  also  stimulated3sub- 
sequently,  two  papers  on  themes  raised  at  the  conference:  one  by  Alexander 
von  Schelting 
which 
was  wide-ranging  and  sympathetic  to  Alfred  Weber's 
position  who,  as  we  shall  see,  was  hostile  to  Mannheim  even  though  he 
had  been  one  of  his  assessors  for  his  Habilitationsschrift  at  Heidelberg  in 
1926,  and  a  further  much  briefer  discussion  of  the  conference  by  Alfred 
Meusel. 
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Although  unconnected  with  the  actual  theme  of  this  session 
of  the  conference,  it  is  also  worth  examining  briefly  Mannheim's  comments 
on  Sombart's  paper  on  'Understanding'  at  the  same  congress. 
49 it  will  be  recalled  that  when  discussing  Mannheim's  paper  on  competition 
it  was  treated  under  the  broad  heading  of  an  instance  of  his  application  of 
the  sociology  of  knowledge  to  specific  areas  of  social  life.  In  fact,  this 
is,  in  part,  misleading  since  Mannheim's  aim  was  to  deal  with 
'two  comprehensive  groups  of  problems 
(which  are  closely  related  to  one  another) 
...  First  of  all  itis  intended  to  make 
more  concrete  the  problem  of  competition 
and  secondly  it  is  intended  as  a  contri- 
bution  to  a  sociological  theory  of  the  mind.  '50 
Not  surprisingly,  in  the  discussion  of  Mannheim's  paper  both  intentions 
were  commented  upon  but  especially  his  contribution  to  the  discussion  of 
the  Seinsverbundenheit  of  knowledge.  In  fact,  Mannheim  himself  provided 
a  summary  of  the  issues  he  was  to  deal  with,  together  with  some  specific 
questions  which  he  thought  participants  might  particularly  take  up  (neither 
were  translated  into  English). 
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discussion  were: 
The  questions  Mannheim  submitted  for 
*a  Does  the  phenomenon  of  existentially  bounded 
knowledge  exist? 
b  Does  the  competition  of  strata  asserted  here 
have  significance  for  our  contemporary  intellectual 
situation? 
c  Which  areas  of  the  humanities  and  social  sciences 
(esp.  sociology)  are  not  to  be  considered  as  exist- 
entially  bounded  knowledge? 
d  Can  one  draw  an  exact  line  between  where  exist- 
entially  bounded  knowledge  ends  and  'exact' 
timelessly  valid  knowledge  commences? 
e  Must  one  unconditionally  evaluate  existentially 
bounded  thought  negatively?  Is  it  not  because 
of  a  too  one-sided  orientation  of  epistemology 
(predominantly  on  the  basis  of  the  paradigm  of 
the  exact  natural  scientific  image  of  knowledge) 
that  one  does  not  deal  justly  with  the  innermost 
quality  of  this  mode  of  thought?  '  52 
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It  is  these  kind  of  questions  rather  than  the  discussion  of  competition 
between  intellectual  strata  that  were  the  focal  point  of  the  subsequent 
debate  at  the  congress.  In  fact  it  marks  the  first  discussion  at  a 
sociology  congress  in  Germany  of  those  issues  which  lie  at  the  heart 
of  the  German  tradition  in  the  sociology  of  knowledge. 
Alfred  Weber,  the  first  speaker  to  comment  on  Mannheim's  paper,  agreed 
with  what  he  took  to  be  Mannheim's  substantive  theses,  namely,  that 
competition  is  a  general  sociological  category,.  that  it-  is  apparent  'within 
the  sphere  of  existentially  bounded  thought',  that  it  play  'a  co-constitutive 
role'  there,  that  Mannheim's  four  categories  of  consensus,  monopoly, 
atomised  competition  and  concentration  can  be  fruitfully  applied  there 
and  finally  that  Mannheim  correctly  characterized  the  present  intellectual 
situation.  However,  with  regard  to  Mannheim's  'epistemological 
problematic',  Weber  had  major  reservations.  This  is  particularly  true 
of  the  extent  of  the  'reIationizing  of  thought'.  On  the  one  hand,  Weber 
argues, 
/' 
I  stand  completely  on  the  foundation  of 
the  existence  of  a  thoroughgoing  relation- 
ling  of  thought.  I  believe  that  we  sti 
have  hardly  any  idea  as  to  how  our 
thought  is  relationized,  that  probably 
we  or  each  of  us  who  has  worked  on  the 
historical  and  the  sociological  and  really 
attempted  intellectually  to  enter  into  the 
spirit  of  strange  historical  phenomena  is 
horrified  at  how  relationized  human  thought 
in  fact  is.  1  53 
What  Weber  has  in  mind  here  seems  to  be  different  national  traditions 
(e.  g.  Greek,  Indian)  of  thought.  On  the  other  hand,  he  states 
'I  believe  that  it  is  really  hardly  necessary 
to  express  the  fact  that  there  exists  a  realm 
of  thought  and  knowledge  that  is  not  relation- 
al,  a  universally  compulsory  mass  of  cog- 1u 
'- 
Iý  t 
nitions,  at  the  same  time  a  catogorial 
element  of  a  conceptual  -  intuitive 
identity  that  is  followed  by  alI  human 
beings  ...  '  54 
This  universal  sphere  of  knowledge  is  quite  separate  from  existentially 
determined  thought.  It  is  the  sphere  that  is  common  to  all  human  beings 
and  appears  to  be  similar  to  the  Kantian  apriori  categories  of  thought, 
though  this  is  by  no  means  clear  from  Weber's  statement.  However, 
Weber  continues,  the  fact  that 
'these  categories,  that  have  grown  out  of 
the  universal  human  positions  vis-a-viz 
nature  and  the  necessity  to  dominate 
nature,  that  are  embodied,  above  all  in 
natural  science  -  though  not  solely  in 
natural  science  -  that  are  today  in  fact 
parts  of  human  knowledge-which  are 
universally  valid  and  necessary  can 
i  ndeed  hardly  be  contested.  '  55 
Thus,  once  more,  the  problematic  relationship  between  the  natural  and 
social  sciences  finds  its  resonance  in  the  exclusion  of  natural  scientific 
from  social  determination.  Perhaps  it  is  this  aspect  of  the  sociology 
of  knowledge  that  continually  required  a  confrontation  with  the  natural/ 
cultural  sciences  debate. 
For  Weber  it  is,  apparently,  metaphysical  thought  that,  at  least  as  far 
as  its  content  is  concerned,  is  the  most  existentially  bounded  form  of 
knowledge  since 
'everything  that  we  term  metaphysically 
anchored  concepts,  cognitions  and  values 
associated  with  them,  are  all  things  of 
which  we  must  immediately  concede  that, 
in  accordance  with  their  total  contents, 
they  possess  their  historically  partial 
quality  in  the  closest  existential  bounded- 
ness.  Every  sociologist  must  see  this, 
otherwise  he  cannot  carry  out  any  historical 
sociology.  '  56 174' 
Weber  argues  that,  for  Mannheim,  there  exists  an  'intermediate  area' 
between  metaphysical-value-laden  knowledge  that  is  existentially  de- 
termined  and  the  sphere  of  universally  valid  knowledge.  Within  this 
intermediate  area,  Mannheim  wishes  to  speak  of  styles  of  thought  which 
give  rise  to  different  objects  of  cognition.  What  Weber  objects  to  is  the 
absence  at  this  level  of  a  distinction  between  the  contents  of  knowledge 
and  their  meaning  since  'cognition  is  a  processual  concept.  Style  of 
thought  is  a  formal  concept.  Knowledge  is  an  ontological  concept.  ' 
Weber  sees  Mannheim  as  advancing  the  position  that  styles  of  thought 
produce  different  objects,  thereby  presumably  challenging  the  ontological 
foundation  of  knowledge  as  Weber  understand  it.  Weber  takes  the  example 
of  class  perspectives  on  capitalism  and  argues  that 
'Capitalism  is  a  quite  definite,  unique,  clear 
-object.  I  simply  take  here  its  empirical, 
historical-positivistic  reality.  In  my  opinion, 
there  can  only  be  a  different  approach  and  a 
different  illumination  here  of  the  same  object 
but  it  is  impossible  for  there  to  be  different 
objects  and  a  different  knowledge  of  it. 
Rather,  there  exists  only  one  object  and  one 
complete  knowledge.  '  57 
It  is  clear  from  what  Weber  goes  on  to  say  at  this  point  that  what  is  at 
issue  here  for  him  is  not,  for  example,  a  critique  of  a  phenomenological 
standpoint  that  can  undoubtedly  be  found  in  Mannheim's  work  but  rather 
a  critique  of  the  kind  of  position  Lukäcs  puts  forward  in  Geschichte  und 
j, 
Klassenbewusstsein  with  respect  to  class  knowledge  -a  position  which 
Weber  presumably  views  Mannheim  as  adhering  to. 
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This  is  made  clear  when  Weber  continues  with  what  is  'perhaps  the 
decisive'  point  in  Mannheim's  argument,  namely 
'that  out  of  these  different  existentially 
bounded  knowledge  -  or  better  cognitive 17  57 
or  intellectual  positions  -  you  seem  to 
to  wish  to  continually  draw  positions  of 
the  will  (Willens:  positionen).  We 
would  perhaps  say  -  you  call  this  another 
standpoint  -  the  ideals  of  specific  classes,  you 
appear  to  identify  them  with  interpretations 
of  existence  as  you  indeed  put  it:  a  public 
statement  concerning  existence,  a  public 
interpretation  of  existence.,  58 
Although  not  wishing  to  extend  the  discussion  further,  Weber  sees  this 
position  as  at  least  raising  the  question  of  value  freedom.  Apparently, 
this  arises  for  Weber  out  of  the  introduction  of  certain  assumptions 
associated  with  the  materialist  interpretation  of  history.  What  Weber 
specifically  misses  in  Mannheim's  paper  is 
'the  recognition  of  the  intellectually  creat- 
ive  as  the  foundation  of  action  and  of  classes, 
for  example.  What  I  reject  is  the  reduction 
of  all  these  things  ultimately  to  intellectual 
categories  with  the  addition  of  some  =  if  you 
will  excuse  me-  of  the  sociological  cate- 
gories  that  belong  to  the  old  materialist 
interpretation  of  history.  You  have  spoken 
of  positions  of  social  power,  of  intentions 
that  flow  from  them,  of  a  public  interpre- 
tation  of  existence  that  is  combined  with 
these  positions  of  power  and  intentions, 
of  further  factors  in  this  context:  What  is 
this  but  a  materialistic  interpretation  of 
history  advanced  once  more  with  extra- 
ordinary  refinement  and  brilliance?  '  59 
Weber  concludes  that  this  'sublimated  intellectualism'  can  only  lead 
to  the  same  results  as  'the  vulgarised  intellectualism  that  is  adhered 
Jo  by  the  old  materialist  interpretation  of  history'. 
"  However,  the  notion  that  Mannheim  is  committed  to  the  materialist 
interpretation  of  history  is  contested  by  Werner  Sombart,  the  next 
,,,  speaker,  who  argues  that  Mannheim 17 
'  is  no  longer  influenced  by  the  materialist 
interpretation  of  history  ...  and  indeed 
so  detached  from  it  that  he  does  not  make 
the  objectivity  of  existence  dependent 
upon  the  subjects  of  knowledge  -  that  is 
what  is  decisive  -  and  that,  above  all,  he 
does  not  dispute  the  reality  of  the  mind. 
For  the  materialist  philosophy  of  history 
there  is  no  reality  of  the  mind;  this  is 
only  a  reflection  of  the  economy.  If  I  have 
correctly  understood  the  referent,  then  he 
firmly  maintains,  in  contrast  to  the  mater- 
ialist  interpretation  of  history,  firstly  that" 
there  is  an  objectivity  of  existence  and  secondly 
that  there  exists  a  reality  of  the  mind.  Is 
that  the  case?  (Dr.  Mannheim  agrees).  '  60 
But  though  Sombart  agrees  broadly  with  the  Seinsverbunderiheit  argument 
he  has  reservations  about  the  problem  of  the  universal  validity  of  know- 
ledge.  Indeed  he  suggests  that  'one  of  the  most  essential  achievements 
of  our  age'  is  that  'it  has  separated  the  problem  of  objectivity  and  that 
of  universal  validity  which  we  see  in  Kant  to  be  still  bound  together'. 
Sombart  points  to  two  attempts  to  solve  the  problem  of  universal  validity 
in  the  present  period.  The  first  attempt,  the  philosophical  one,  starts 
out  from  the  conviction  that 
'the  world  is  knowable  and  that  there  exists 
an  objective  determinate  -entity,  hence  a 
specific  object  of  knowledge  and  is  con- 
vinced  that  knowledge  of  this  object  -  the 
world  -  can  be  approached  from  different 
sides.  And  these  sides  are  the  personal 
standpoint  of  the  individual  thinker.  '61 
This  accounts,  Sombart  argues,  for  the  diversity  of  philosophical  systems. 
The  second  attempt  to  solve  the  problem  of  universal  validity  occurs  in 
the  modern  natural  sciences.  In  Sombart's  view  the  modern  natural 
sciences  'do  not  seek  to  know  the  essence  of  things  but  rather  ...  they 
seek  to  order  phenomena  ...  according  to  functional  and,  in  part., 
fictional  considerations'.  Hence,  they  merely  seek  to  create  an  order- 177 
ing  system  I.  This  is  perhaps  another  indication  of  the  astonishing 
ignorance  of  the  natural  sciences  among  social  scientists  in  this  period, 
an  ignorance  that  is  all  the  more  remarkable  in  view  of  the  widespread 
discussion,  for  instance,  far  beyond  the  confines  of  science.,  of  the  theory 
of  relativity.  Sombart's  presentation  of  the  philosophical  'solution' 
to  the  problem  of  universal-validity,  on  the  other  hand,  finds  its  echo 
in  Mannheim's  perspectivism,  which  is  perhaps  most  pronounced  in 
Ideologie  und  Utopie  (Mannheim  had  finished  writing  this  volume  by 
the  time  this  conference  took  place  in  September,  1928). 
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Sombart's  main  concern,  however,  is  with  the  cultural  sciences  and 
i 
his  remaining  argument  concerns  the  role  of  values  there.  Sombart  takes 
up  a  positivist  position  on  the  role  of  values  by  asserting  the  impossibility 
of  evaluations  even  achieving  universal  validity  and  in  his  assertion  that 
the  cultural  sciences  must  commence  from  the  postulate  of  value-freedom 
since 
'consideration  of  values  is  ultimately  a 
personal  matter.  The  postulate  of  value- 
f  reedom  has  nothing  to  do  with  a  relativi- 
zation  of  values.  Values  remain  absolute, 
they  are  objective.  Evaluations,  however, 
are  personal  and  hence  socially  and  histor- 
63  ically  determined  and  lack  universal  validity.  ' 
This  does  not  mean,  Sombart  continues,  that  we  should  not  recognise 
i 
'that  the  choice  of  problems  is  value-determined  or  that  our  object  of 
study  contains  values.  The  relevance  of  this  whole  argument  for 
Mannheim's  paper  is  that  Sombart  argues  that  Mannheim  has  contributed 
to  the  'psychology  of  value-freedom'  in  so  far  as  he  asserted  that  'the 
standpoint  of  value-freedom  is  ultimately  an  emanation  of  liberal  con- 
victions  I.  But  Sombart  argues  that  even  when  he  himself  adopted  a 178  ;ý 
Marxist  position  he  also  took  up  a  value-free  position. 
Related  themes  were  taken  up  by  Wilbrandt,  the  next  contributor.  Firstly, 
Wilbrandt  suggests  that  the  audience  were  astonished  to  find  Mannheim 
advancing  an  argument  which  increasingly  replaced  philosophy  with  the 
social  sciences.  Wilbrandt  suggests  that  Mannheim's  paper  reminded 
him  of  Schmol  ler's  contribution  to  the  Werturteilsstreit.  The  struggle 
of  values,  one  with  another,  was  for  Schmoller  'a  kind  of  Darwinism  on 
the  intellectual  level'  .  It  occurred  to  WiIbrandt  that  Mannheim's  argu- 
ments  concerning  competition  between  different  world  interpretations 
must  refer  to  hostile  and  not  to  peaceful  competition  since  the  purpose 
is  surely  the  hegemony  of  one  world  interpretation  over  another.  Mannheim 
at  this  point  objects  that'compromise  situations'  exist. 
Secondly,  Wjlbrandt  attempts  to  clarify  Mannheim's  relationship  to 
historical  materialism  since  he  had  been  both  accused  of  being  a  historical 
materialist  and  applauded  for  distancing  himself  from  it.  In  fact, 
Wilbrand  suggestsymost  significantly,  that  'in  a  private  conversation 
this  lunchtime,  Mannheim  has  spoken  about  this  and  stated  that  Marx 
has  Influenced  him  but,  as  he  said,  in  association  with  Dilthey's  spirit'. 
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Wilbrandt  argues  that  what  Mannheim  shares  with  Marx  is  the  notion 
that  man  does  not  think  for  himself  alone  but  in  a  social  situation  and 
thinks  differently  according  to  the  social  situation. 
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In  his  remarks  on  Mannheim's  paper,  Jerusalem  -  perhaps  the  most  sig- 
nificant  adherent  of  a  positivist  sociology  of  knowledge  in  Germany  -  Is 
extramely  brief.  He  argues  that  Mannheim  has  raised  some  of  the  most 179  11 
important  issues  affecting  sociology  as  a  discipline.  He  then  goes  on  to 
interpret  what  Mannheim  has  said  in  terms  of  his  own  perspective  and  in 
particular,  in  contrast  to  von  Wiese,  in  terms  of  his  notion  of  a  collectivity  - 
that  form  of  I  ife  where  human  beings  as  bearers  of  a  collective  mind  are 
bound  together  mentally'  .  However,  illuminating  this  may  be  for  Jerusa- 
lems  own  position,  he  hardly  addresses  himself  to  Mannheim's  paper. 
Singer,  in  his  comments  on  Mannheim's  paper,  first  of  all  takes  up  a 
substantive  issue,  namely  whether  his  analysis  of  competition  of  world 
views,  taken  as  it  is  from  a  market  model  of  society,  is  not  thereby  limited 
in  its  application  and  whether  the  notion  of  'social  strata'  employed  by 
Mannheim  is  as  unambiguous  as  he  seems  to  believe.  However,  Singer 
does  agree  that  the  decisive  question  is  what  the  social  determination'of 
a  world  view  says  about  its  validity.  At  this  level,  Singer  argues, 
sociology  must  be  philosophical  -  in  contrast  to  these  who  seek  to  ex- 
clude  such'issues  from  sociology. 
Emil  Lederer,  Mannheim's  colleague  in  Heidelberg,  defends  him  against 
Weber's  attack  by  arguing  that  Mannheim  excluded  the  sphere  of  validity 
from  his  analysis  and  that  the  notion  of  creativity  and  its  source  has 
nothing  to  do  with  Mannheim's  assertions.  At  the  substantive  level, 
Lederer  argues  that  'a  certain  competition  amongst  strata  is  the  basis  and 
f 
precondition  for  intellectual  productivity  itself  I.  Further,  he  claims  that 
this  productivity  and  creativi  ty  is  not  something  arbitrary  but  rather  'it 
must  have  quite  concrete  preconditions  for  its  existence  and  realisation'  . 
w The  three  succeeding  commentaries  by  Adolf  Löwe  (a  friend  of 
Mannheim's),  Alfred  Meusel  and  Norbert  Elias  all  take  up  central  issues 
in  Mannheim's  sociology  of  knowledge.  Löwe  argues  that  the  existen- 
tial  boundedness  of  knowledge  'exists  in  all  periods'-but  the  recognition 
of  this  determination  has  taken  on  a  distinctive  form  in  our  present  age. 
Is 
Furthermore,  one  can  be  more  specific  and  argue  that  it^  the  sociological 
boundedness  of  knowledge'  which  is  not  only  peculiar  to  our  present  age 
180 
but  that.,  in  its  self-consciousness.,  it  constitutes  'revolutionary  knowledge'  - 
'through  it,  the  real  dynamics  of  social  phenomena  are  grasped  in  the  realm 
of  knowledge￿a  social  and  political  tension  is  carried  over  into  the  theoret- 
ical  sphere'  I.  Löwe  goes  so  far  as  to  suggest  that  it  is  revolutionary  in  a 
further  sense  that  it  'restructures  not  only  the  theoretical  world  image  but 
also  social  reality  itself,  whose  tension  has  destroyed  the  time-honoured 
stasis  of  thought.  165 
This  sense  of  a  revolutionary  change  in  our  approach  to  the  social  world 
also  permeates  Elias'  contribution  who  argues  that  Mannheim's  thought 
is  'in  a  quite  specific  manner,  revolutionary,  not  in  the  sense  of  a 
socialist  or  social  revolution  but  in  the  sense  of  an  intellectual  revolution. 
These  thoughbar3  the  expression.  of  a  shattering  of  that  intellectual  posit- 
ion  which  has  hitherto  been  the  dominant  one.  ' 
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Mannheim's  paper 
represents  not  merely  a  new  theory  but  is  the  expression  of  a  specific 
feeling  of  life  (Lebensgefahl).  Hence)Mannheim's  notion  of  the  'con- 
sensus'  of  an  age  signifies  that  we  experience  nature,  for  example,  in 
a  distinctive  way  and  cannot  do  otherwise.  This  is  over  and  above  that 
naive  notion  of  consensus  concerning,  for  example,  the  fact  that 
2x2=4. g  18  1 
A  somewhat  more  critical  contribution  is  provided  by  Alfred  Meusel  who 
takes  up  Mannheim's  relationship  to  Marx  and  the  contradiction  between 
Weber's  and  Sombart's  views  on  that  relationship.  In  contrast  to  the 
latter  speakers,  Meusel  argues  that  one  of  the  strengths  of  Mannheim's 
paper  is  precisely  that  it  is  influenced  by  Marx.  However,  against 
Mannheim's  view,  Meusel  argues  that  Marx  looked  at  the  question  of  how 
'correct,  adequate  knowledge  of  social  existence'  was  possible  given  the 
social  boundedness  of  thought,  i.  e.  anything  but  an  interest-free  approach. 
Mouse  l  goes  on  to  argue  that  Marx  located  this  'correct'  and  'adequate' 
knowledge  within  a  specific  group  in  society  whose  subjective  values  and 
objective  situation  were  identical.  Nonetheless,  Meusel  concludes  by 
praising  Mannheim's  paper  and  his  other  works  in  this  area. 
The  two  final  contributions  to  the  discussion  by  Jonas  and  Eppstein  con- 
centrate  upon  the  philosophical  and  methodological  aspects  of  Mannheim's 
paper.  Of  central  importance  Is  Jonas's  contribution.  Jonas  raises 
three  problems  associated  with  Mannheim's  paper  and  the  ensuing  dis- 
cussion.  He  asks  whether  Mannheim's  position  is,  as  Alfred  Weber 
argues,  one  of  intellectualism.  In  reply,  Jonas  maintains  that 
r 
'The  idea  of  an  existentially  bounded 
knowledge,  knowledge  concerning  the 
existential  boundedness  of  intellectual 
positions,  "  as  such  certainly  implies  the 
functionalisation  of  knowledge  in  terms 
of  the  totality  of  human  beings,  of  exist- 
ence  in  the  totality  of  their  involvements 
with  reality  -  indeed  not  solely  in  material 
reality  ...  Functionalisation  in  terms  of 
the  real  situation  thus  implies  in  fact  the 
replacement  of  the  old  concept  of  the 
"theoretical  subject",  of  the  abstractness 
of  "consciousness  as  such"  which  is 
nothing  other  than  a  pure  cognitive  subject with  a  comp  l  ete  ly  new  agent  of  know- 
edge  which  is,  in  contrast,;  the  whole, 
historical  human  being  and  for  whom 
the  Ideal  of  the  absolute  universal 
validity  of  knowledge  -  precisely  In  the 
sense  in  which  Sombart  has  developed 
it  -  Is  no  longer  conceivable  at  all.  '  67 
Theoretical  forms,  as  partial  phenomena,  are  thus  to  be  related  back  to 
the  'total  facticity  of  human  beings'.  The  whole  of  this  argument  advanc- 
ed  by  Jonas  in  support  of  Mannheim  is,  as  we  have  seen,  developed  in 
detail  in  Mannheim's  two  unpublished  essays  discussed  earl  i  er. 
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Jonas  continues  by  raising  the  question  concerning  the  relevance  of  this 
11  i 
functionalisation  of  thought  for  the  validity  of  knowledge.  A  relativistic 
reductionism  is  possible,  Jonas  maintains, 
'  if  the  concern  is  with  a  one-sided  function- 
alisation  in  terms  of  the  economic-material 
situation,  ultimately  in  terms  of  the  mere 
givenness  of  drives-  and  hence  estranged 
from  the  mind  -  rather  than  in  terms  of 
the  total  situation:  then,  in  fact,  the  actual 
claim  to  truth  of  intellectual  forms  as 
mere  "ideological  superstructure"  are  at 
the  same  time  annulled  by  this  relativisation. 
But  the  concern  is  with  the  total  situation, 
In  which  the  intellectual  cosmos  itself,  as 
a  moment  of  the  total  facti  ci  ty,  is  already 
associated  with  it  as  an  initial  precondition.  '69 
Hence,  rather  than  reducing  intellectual  phenomena  to  a  material  base, 
it  is  possible  to  view  them  as  co-constituents  of  the  totality.  By  means 
of  their  relativisatlon  to  the  total  situation  their  validity  is  not  destroyed 
but  rather  their  absolute  claim  to  truth  is  qualified  by  the  historical, 
" 
social  total  context.  With  regard  to  the  annulment  of  absolute  truth 
claims,  Jonas  argued  that 
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'This  annulment,  carried  out  in  the  form 
of,  the  arrangement  of  one-sided  partial 
aspects  in  a  comprehensive  synthesis that  transcends  their  exclusiveness  ... 
is  possible 
-  this  annulment  of  a  necessar- 
ily  "false"  absolutization  through  its 
functionalization  in  terms  of  a  historical 
actual  situation  is  thus,  to  a  certain  extent, 
in  fact  a  preservation  of  the  truth  content 
of  a  temporally  and  socially  conditioned 
theory  and  in  no  way  its  negation., 
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This  interpretation  of  the  truth  contents  of  a  theory  in  terms  of  their 
relationship  to  a  total  synthesis,  is,  of  course,  subsequently  extended  by 
Mannheim  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie  to  ideologies.  Here,  however,  Jonas 
does  not  alludo  to  ideologies. 
Finally,  Jonas  asks  where  the  existential  boundedness  of  a  system  of 
knowledge  is  particularly  obvious.  On  much  less  firm  ground,  Jonas 
argues  that  there  exists  in  any  world  view  an  'unavoidable  excess'  of 
assertions  that  go  beyond  what  can  be  factually  asserted.  Here,  he  argues, 
we  are  confronted  with  the  apriori  assertions  of  metaphysics.  A  sociolo- 
gy  of  knowledge  can,  he  argues,  also  annul  the  absolute  nature  of  the 
dogmatic  apriori  by  revealing  its  social  basis.  These  aspects  of  the 
world  view,  thus  'purified' 
,  can  be  made  fruitful  by  the  researcher  who 
'belongs  to  the  "free-floating"  intellectual  strata  that  is  not  itself  en- 
gaged  in  group  confl1cts'  . 
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Jonas's  contribution  is  significant  in  that,  at  least  as  far  as  the  first  two 
problems  are  concerned,  he  raises  issues  in  the  sociology  of  knowledge 
that  have  remained  central  to  subsequent  controversies  surrounding  its 
status.  Though  not  specifically  referring  either  to  a  mechanistic  Marx- 
ism  or  to  Scheler's  sociology  of  knowledgehe  does  point  to  the  reduction- 
183 
ism  that  is  evident  in  both  positions  and  indeed  to  the  implicit  alienation of  the  mind'  thesis.  Againsin  the  second  issue  which  he  raises,  Jonas 
41 
points  to  a  possible  way  out  of  this  reductionism.  However,  with  regard 
to  his  third  problem,  his  conception  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  as  a 
neutral  purifier  of  world  views,  whilst  not  dissimilar  to  that  presented  by 
Mannheim,  retains  these  positivist  presuppositions  about  the  relation- 
ship  between  fact  and  values  that  were  incorporated  into  subsequent  positiv- 
ist  critiques  of  ideology  as  advanced  by  such  writers  as  Geiger. 
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Unlike  Jonas,  Eppstein's  comments  do,  in  part,  touch  upon  the  role  of 
ideology  in  Mannheim's  paper.  Eppstein  suggests  that  'Mannheim  com- 
bines  phenomenological  vision  with  dialectical  method;  his  methodolo- 
184 
gicai  position  is  a  synthesis  of  phenomenological  observation  and  dialectical- 
dynamic  thought'  . 
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This  enable  Mannheim  to  overcome  the  weakness  of 
a  'statically  conceived  phenomenology'.  Eppstein's  major  concern,  how- 
ever,  is  with  the  problem  of  attributing  partiality  to  'relativised  (relation- 
Ized)  perspectives  and  standpoints'  and  then  taking  this  partiality  to  be 
the  constituent  feature  of  the  ideologization  -  of  thought.  Eppstein 
argues  that  one  does  not  need  to  take  the  partial  aspect  itself  to  be  ideolo- 
gical. 
In  his  concluding  remarks  to  the  discussion,  Mannheim  himself  takes 
up  methodological  issued  associated  with  the  sociology  of  knowledge  as 
well  as  attempting  to  confront  some  of  the  controversy  surrounding  his 
paper.  Mannheim  suggests  at  the  outset  that  the  major  questions  which 
his  paper  raised  were  thrown  into  the  background  in  the  ensuing  dis- 
cussionnbut  not  because  there  was  already  a  consensus  surrounding  them. 
Within  the  context  of  sociology  itself)Mannheim  argues  that  he  tried  to 185 
deal  with  strictly  sociological  issues  for  a  specific  reason: 
It  is  indeed  to  be  recommended  that  the 
methodological,  voluntaristic,  evaluative, 
metaphysical  and  epistemological,  on  the 
one  hand,  be  separated  from  the  purely 
sociology  on  the  other,  not  because  they 
are  separated  in  the  objective  world  (in 
reality  they  are  ...  connected  together) 
but  because,  in  the  clarification  of  problems￿ 
a  provisional  separation  of  these  spheres 
Is  perhaps  advisable.  '  74 
However,  Mannheim  goes  on  to  suggest  that,  nonetheless,  these  evaluative, 
metaphysical  questions  'are  today  for  us  in  fact  perhaps  the  decisive  ones'. 
As  an  instance,  Mannheim  attempts  to  answer  the  question  as  to  whether 
his  own  position  is  basically  a  materialist  or  idealist  one.  From  his 
paper  it  should  be  clear,  Mannheim  argues, 
'that  I  hold  the  synthetic  in  a  specific  relation- 
ship  to  be  the  best  of  what  occurs  In  the  historic- 
al  process,  that  I  am  6f  the  opinion  that  precisely 
in  the  synthesis  tensions  will  suddenly  be  relative- 
ly  overcome  that  were  still  untranscendable  for  a 
previous  epoch,  i.  e.  that  a  third  aspect  is  found 
where  one  suddenly  realises  that  in  fact  these 
distinctions:  matter-spirit,  freedom-determination 
etc.  cannot  be  absolutised.  This  cannot  imply 
that  both  parties  and  both  aspects  are  in  the  right 
but  rather  that  somewhere  in  the  social  process 
and  intellectual  system  one  can  be  free  to  realise 
certain  synthetic  insights.  Perhaps  you  wi  II  be 
dissatisfied  when  I  say:  I  am  neither  a  material- 
Ist  nor  an  idealist  but  rather  I  still  believe  in  the 
creative  freedom  within  the  absolute  sphere  in 
an  exclusively  material  determination.  '  75 
Mannheim  suggests  that  what  concerns  him  as  a  sociologist  of  knowledge 
Is  why  people  should  wish  to  view  the  world  within  these  polarities.  In 
order  not  to  absolutize  such  polarities,  Mannheim  seeks  a  synthesis  of 
what  is  valuable  in  a  mechanistic  and  an  idealist  model:  'The  solution, 
which  I  have  provisionally  found,  consists  in  the  fact  that  each  of  the 
conflicting  parties  hypostatizes  a  partial  aspect'.  The  mechanistic 186 
viewpoint  hypostatizes  an  objective  reality,  the  idealist  viewpoint  hypo- 
statizes  the  subject  of  knowledge  (perhaps  in  the  form  of  a  free  moral 
, 
decision). 
In  methodological  terms,  this  duality  lies  at  the  centre  of  the  dis- 
cussion  of  the  relationship  between  the  natural  and  human  sciences. 
Here  Mannheim  argues  that 
'the  justification  of  duality  (or  plurality) 
of  intellectual  methods  does  not  lie  in 
the  sphere  of  the  object  but  rather  that 
there  already  exists,  for  example,  in 
the  intellectual  sphere  itself  a  specific 
sphere  that  is'  free'  ,  that  is  not  apprehen- 
dable  by  'mechanistic'  models,  but  is 
another  sphere  that  is  still  subject  to  a 
specific  mechanism.  '  76 
However,  for  Mannheim,  the  deterministic  and  free  elements  that  co- 
exist  in  the  intellectual  realm  do  not  allow  him  'to  seek  only  understand- 
ing,  only  freedom  in  the  intellectual  realm  and  perhaps  erect  the  com- 
parisons:  nature  =  necessity,  mind  =  freedom'.  Rather,  Mannheim 
points  to  the  danger  in  the  human  sciences  in  Germany  of  reducing  every- 
thing  to  interpretation,  to  a  'deeper  meaning'  -a  danger  that  he  sees 
existing  in  politics  too.  In  terms  of  methodology,  one  must  sometimes 
use  formal  concepts  to  deal  with  intellectual  phenomena  -  even  though 
they  may  not  perfectly  fit  the  phenomena  as  it  appears  to  us  -  since 
1there  exists  in  intellectual  things  too,  structures  that  are  subject  to  a 
"mechanical  apparatus"  and,  when  it  is  a  matter  of  apprehending  them, 
then  one  must  apply  formalised  concepts'.  This  is  the  source  of  the  two 
major  attacks  upon  the  sociology  of  knowledge:  that  it  is  too  formalised 
and  that  it  introduces  the  functionalization  of  ideas  in  terms  of  other 
mechanisms.  But,  Mannheim  argues,  '  if  I  wish  to  explain  functional 187  1 
connections  in  the  intellectual  sphere  thrin  I  must  formalise;  if  I  only 
wish  to  understand  them  then  I  can  rest  content  with  historical,  individ- 
ual,  intuitive  concepts'  I.  What  this  implies  for  the  debate  surrounding 
Verstehen  is)for  Mannheim,  'that  understanding  justifiably  exists  in  fact 
in  a  specific  sphere  of  the  intellectual  realm  and  represents  a  method 
sui  generis  but  that  in  the  humanities  it  is  not  merely  to  be  understood 
but  also  to  be  explained'  . 
What  Mannheim  in  fact  hopes  for  from  the  sociology  of  knowledge  is  that 
it  will  synthesize  the  two  approaches  which  he  sees  at  present  as  being 
polarised: 
'what  I  have  in  mind  is  a  synthetic  situ- 
ational  analysis  which  ...,  viewed  from 
the  social  and  intellectual  movement  of 
forces,  is  at  least  as  possible  and 
necessary  as  the  polarisation  itself.  Thus, 
I  aspire  -  to  put  it  briefly  -  to  give  life 
once  more  to  the  basic  desire  for  value- 
freedom.  Not,  however,  in  order  to  real- 
I  se  with  a  single  blow  scientific  object- 
i  vity  in  the  humanities  and  social  science 
in  the  old  all  too  intellectualised  manner 
(which  will  not  succeed)  but  rather  in 
order  to  gradually  bring  this  objectivity, 
on  the  basis  of  an  exact  scientific  analysis 
that  focuses  upon  it,  whose  problems  and 
methods  we  must  first  investigate  step  by 
step,  closer  to  solution.  '  77 
Here,  perhaps  more  clearly  than  in  his  published  works,  Mannheim  reveals 
the  close  connection  between  his  programme  fora  sociology  of  knowledge 
and  the  disputes  surrounding  methodology  and  value-judgments.  Mann- 
heim  sees  the  sociology  of  knowledge  as  gradually  affording  a  solution 
to  both  disputes. Though  these  are  Mannheim's  concluding  remarks  on  the  discussion  of 
his  paper,  it  is  worthwhile  pursuing  his  views  on  methodology  a  little 
further  since  on  the  following  day  he  himself  contributed  to  the  dis- 
cussion  of  Werner  Sombart's  paper  on  'Das  Verstehen'  .  His  remarks 
there  in  many  ways  constitute  a  continuation  of  some  of  the  issues  he 
himself  had  raised  in  his  concluding  comments  on  the  previous  day. 
Mannheim  views  the  discussion  of  the  problem  of  understanding  to  have 
been  more  fruitfully  advanced  by  individual  researchers  in  the  humantities 
and  socialkciences  than  by  philosophers  since  the  latter  are,  he  argues, 
thoroughly  caught  up  in  a  pregiven  system  of  thought.  Hence  the  value 
of  Sombart  Is  paper  as  one  who  works  on  actual  interpretative  social  re- 
search.  However,  Mannheim  sees  a  number  of  difficulties  arising  from 
Sombart's  presentation.  The  first  is  his  apparently  sharp  separation 
between  'rrmoti  ve'  and  'ideal.  Without  entering  into  the  content.  of 
Sombart's  paper,  it  is  still  instructive  to  follow  Mannheim's  critique  at' 
this  point  since  he  raises  general  issues  concerning  the  problem  of  inter- 
pretation.  The  problem  associated  with  the  separation  of  (ideal  and 
mot  i  ve  '  ties  in  the  fact  that 
'on  the  one  handpne  provides  an  objectivated 
(which  implies  a  desubjectivated)  context 
of  the  creations  of  the  mind  that  are  to  be 
understood  through  it  and  a  principle  resting 
upon  it,  a  principle  that  develops  out  of 
itself,  the  '  idea'  ;  on  the  other,  however, 
purely  subjective  processes  and  an  infinite 
number  of  subjective  motivations.  Both 
of  these  two  discrepant  groups  of  phen- 
omena,  however,  are  related  to  one  another 
and  yet  nonetheless  cannot  be  brought  to- 
gether  in  our  theories.  1  78 
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The  reason  for  this  persistent  separation  has  been  the  'completely  diverse intellectual  paradigms'  for  dealing  with  each  of  them.  Max  Weber,  for 
example,  attempted  to  throw  out  the  'idea'  and  operate  only  with  'sub- 
jectively  intended  meaning'  ('motive'  in  Sombart's  sense).  In  con- 
trast,  Mannheim  sees  Sombart  as  attempting  to  preserve  the  'idea'  as 
something  timeless,  perhaps  as  an  eternal  Platonic  essence.  But  ideas 
are  never  timeless.  Mannheim  takes  'the  spirit  of  capitalism'  as  an 
instance  of  an  'idea'  in  sociological  research.  The  problem  here  is  not, 
Mannheim  argues,  that  such  a  'spirit'  exists  but,  rather  'in  what  kind  of 
existence  this  phenomenan  exists',  in  its  'specific  mode  of  existence'. 
An  extreme  nominalist  like  Max  Weber  will  only  allow  the  existence 
of  this  spirit  in  inverted  commas;  one  cannot  apprehend  this  'spirit'  if 
one  starts  out  from  'subjectively  intended  meaning,.  This  spirit 
remains  even  though  subjectively  intended  meanings  change  and  even 
though  it  is  manifested  through  them.  On  the  other  hand,  one  should  not 
be  tempted  to  accept  the  converse  -  precisely  what  Weber  sought  to  avoid  - 
namely,  that  the  'idea'  can  be  formulated  as  'something  pre-existent, 
pre-formed'.  An  undue  emphasis  upon  either  pole  prevents  us  from 
adequately  describing  the  relationships  between  'the  so-called  "real" 
and  "ideal"  factors  of  history'  .  One  may  indeed  be  led  to  intarpret 
new  phenomena  inadequately  in  a  conservative  manner  in  the  sense  that 
they  are  always  interpreted  in  terms  of  the  past  and  not  as  the  phenomena 
are  actually  experienced. 
It 
Mannheim  offers  a  new  paradigm  for  dealing  with  the  'idea',  one  that 
does  not  have  to  choose  between  'psychologically  apprehendable,  sub- 
jectively  intended  meaning,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  existentially  trans- 
1ßy' 
cendent  timeless,  'ideal  that  can  be  apprehended  only  in  ideation',  on 190 
the  other.  The  predominant  relationships  must  be  examined  as  far  as 
their  genuine  qualities  are  concerned  until  we  can  detect  their  relevance 
in  subjectively  intended  meaning.  At  the  same  time,  one  must  avoid 
any  'illusion  as  to  pre-existence  and  pre-formation'  of  the  'idea'  in 
order  to  preserve  the  genuine  objectivity  of  the  idea.  Mannheim  is  quite 
clear  that  'the  objective  "spirit"  of  an  epoch  cannot  be  reduced  to  the 
sum  of  the  subjective  intentions  of  isolated  individuals'. 
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Mannheim 
bases  this  model  of  interpretation  upon  Fiedler's  theory  of  art  in  which 
the  'idea'  that  an  artist  works  with  is  not  pregiven  but  'emerge  s  in.  the 
creative  process'  .  It  emerges  as  the  artist  works  upon  his  materials. 
Such  a  model  for  interpretation  was  already  evident  in  Mannheim's  un- 
published  essays.  It  is  also  reminiscent  of  LukäcsI  discussion  in  his 
'Heidelberger  Philosophie  der  Kunst'  and  especially  in  his  essay 
'Geschichtlichkeit  und  Zeitlosigkeit  des  Kunstwerks', 
80 
which,  as  we 
have  seen,  Mannheim  had  long  been  acquainted  with. 
If  we  take  the  debate  over  Mannheim's  paper  and  his  contribution  to  the 
discussion  of  Sombart's  paper  at  the  same  conference  together,  what  is 
their  significance  for  the  development  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  in 
Germany?  The  1928  debate  at  the  Zürich  congress  constituted  the 
major  public  sociological  discussion  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  in 
Weimar  Germany.  As  in  the  earlier  Scheler-Adler  discussion,  the 
relationship  between  the  sociology  of  knowledge  and  Marxism  is  taken  up 
i 
by  many  participants  and  is  the  focal  point  of  Alfred  Weber's  attack  on 
Mannheim.  But  interestingly  enough,  this  aspect  of  the  discussion  does 
not  take  the  form  of  a  contrast  between  the  sociology  of  knowledge  and 
the  Marxist  critique  of  ideology.  This  discussion  only  commenced  in 191 
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earnest  after  the  publication  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie  in  the  following  year  - 
though  Mannheim  had  already  completed  the  writing  of  the  volume  by  the 
time  he  gave  his  paper  on  competition.  Instead,  the  discussion  on 
Marxism  again,  as  in  1924,  takes  the  form  of  an  attack  upon  some  naive 
notion  of  historical  materialism.  It  does  not  confront  the  positions  of 
writers  like  Lukäcs  and  Korsch. 
More  obviously  than  the  1924  discussion,  the  debate  surrounding  Mannheim's 
paper  centres  around  the  relationship  between  the  sociology  of  knowledge  and 
the  Methodenstreit  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  the  Werturteilsstreit.  This  is, 
in  part,  the  result  of  Mannheim's  explicit  attempt  in  his  paper  to  illustrate 
the  relevance  of  the  Seinsverbundenheit  thesis  for  the  social  sciences. 
But  as  is  clear  from  the  comments  of  some  of  the  participants,  the  sociol- 
ogy  of  knowledge  was  seen  as  forging  nothing  less  than  an'intellectual 
revolution  in  the  social  sciences  and  humanties.  ,  It  was  seen  asa  new 
mode  of  interpretation  of  phenomena  which  relied  not  merely  upon  tradtion- 
al  hermeneutic  methods  but  also  empirical  social  science.  In  this  respect, 
it  could  be  seen  as  forming  a  significant  bridge  between  the  natural  and 
cultural  sciences  as  understood,  for  example,  by  neo-Kantian  philosophers. 
It  was  thus  clearly  viewed  by  some  as  bringing  about  a  paradigm  shift  in 
the  humanties  and  social  sciences.  In  Mannheim's  remarks  on  the 
problem  of  understanding,  too,  this  is  quite  explicit. 
The  new  and  challenging  significance  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  is  also 
the  theme  of  an  article  published.  in  1929  by  Alexander  von  Schelting:  'Zum 
Streit  um  die  Wissenssoziologie'  At  the  very  start  of  the  article,  von 
Schelting  proclaims  that  'the  sociology  of  knowledge  ... 
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stands  at  the  forefront  of  sociological  cognitive  interests'  and  that  this 
interest  will  be  'even  more  lively'  as  a  result  of  the  Zürich  conference 
discussion  which  itself  'also  forms  the  starting  point  for  the  following 
remarks  I. 
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However,  von  ScheltingIs  paper  is  largely  concerned  with  an  exposition 
of  Alfred  Weber's  contribution  to  the  sociology  of  knowledge  which  is  not 
our  concern  here.  Indeed,  although  von  Schelting  makes  out  a  case  for 
the  significance  of  Alfred  Weber's  sociology  of  culture,  it  is  difficult 
to  see  how  it  played  a  major  role  in  the  sociology  of  knowledge  in  this 
period.  Indirectly,  we  can  see  Weber's  influence  upon  Mannheim's  early 
Heidelberg-writings  and  von  Schelting  in  fact  argues  that  the  basic  cate- 
gories  in  Mannheim's'Historismus'  article  are  grounded  in  Alfred  Weber's 
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work.  Later1  in  the  following  decade,  the  study  by  Norbert  Elias  of  the 
process  of  civilization  utilizes  Weber's  categories  of  culture  and  civil- 
ization.  But  these  categories  are  not  peculiar  to  Weber  and  were  indeed 
shared  by  many  other  writers  in  the  pro-First  World  War  era  and  constitute 
part  of  the  social  philosophical  presuppositions  of  much  Lebensphilosophie 
in  that"  period. 
Von'Schelting  seeks  to  argue  that  Alfred  Weber's  sociology  of  culture 
provides  a  middle'  ground  between  the  ahistorical  immanent  interpretation 
of  cultural  phenomena  and  a  deterministic  sociologism.  In  particular, 
Ir 
he  highlights  the  dangers  of  the  Marxist  thesis  of  'the  ideological  chara- 
der  of  all  intellectual  forms'  which  results  in  an  unreconcilable  conflict 
between  a  'bourgeois'  and  a  'proletarian'  explanatory  context'.  On  the 
other  hand,  he  takes  the  essence  of  the  sociological  standpoint  as'that 193 
of  a  'concern  with  the  "totality"  of  historical-social  events,  that  it  does 
not  isolate  historical  phenomena  but  rather  has  to  interpret  them  in  their 
"placement"  or  "embeddedness"  in  the  total  context  of  an  age,  a  culture, 
the  "living  whole"  of  a  society  etc.  184However,  the  precise  relationship 
to  these  totalities  is  most  varied  and  sociology  has  hardly  clarified  it 
successfully.  In  this  context,  then,  it  is  all  the  more  surprising  that 
von  Schelting  should  go  on  to  explicate  Alfred  Weber's  contribution  to 
this  area  since  the  vagueness  of  his  categories  of  culture  and  civilization 
could  themselves  hardly  clarify  the  relationship  between  historical  phen- 
omena  and  the  totality  within  which  they  are  to  be  located.  In  the  light 
of  these  reservations  and  von  Schelting's  failure  to  take  up  directly  Mann- 
heim's  competition  papershis  own  contribution  will  not  be  dealt  with 
further  at  this  point. 
The  second  subsequent  article  on  Mannheim's  competition  paper  by  Alfred 
Meusel  -  who  had  already  commented  briefly  at  the  1928  congress  -  does 
explicitly  discuss  Mannheim's  contribution 
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Meusel  agrees  with  Mann- 
heim  that  in  the  study  of  cultural  phenomena  'the  interpretation  cannot 
remain  purely  ideological,  it  must  become  a  sociological  one'.  None- 
theless,  Meusel  suggests  that  Mannheim  did  not  extract  all  that  he  could 
from  his  theme  since  he  starts  out  from  problems  of  intellectual  history 
6r  philosophy  and  not  from  economics  or  another  social  science.  This 
would  lead  him  into  a  concern  not  merely  with  a  sophisticated  philo- 
4 
sophical  viewpoint  but  also  with  'practical  everyday  life'.  Since  he 
cannot  adequately  deal  with  the  latter  he  bridges  the  two  spheres  'with 
the  emergency  bridge  of  a  mere  assertion  concerning  their  inner  connection  '. 
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In  contrast,  Meusel  argues  that  it  is  necessary  to  investigate  why  the 
competition  between  strata  leads  to  compEtition  of  intellectual  positions. 
Mannheim  possesses  too  great  a  desire  for  synthesis  such  that,  Meusel 
argues,  it  is  too  easy  to  say  that  every  intellectual  direction  provides  us 
with  a  partial  aspect  of  reality.  Instead,  we  need  to  look  at  the  wider 
context  of  competition  and  contrasting  intellectual  viewpoints.  In  the 
capitalist  epoch,  the  economy  forms  an  ens  reatissimum  that  sociology 
must  examine.  Mannheim  is  therefore  correct  in  investigating  the  'deep 
voluntaristic  anchoredness  of  every  theory'  in  the  economy.  But,  Meusel 
contends,  this  requires  us  to  think  out  the  problem  of  value-freedom  again 
since 
'Insight  into  the  existential  boundedness  of 
thought  indeed  indicates  that  individual 
directions  are  not  merely  distinguished 
from  one  another  in  their  programmatic  in- 
tentions  that  are  external  in  origin,  but  in 
fact  in  the  manner  in  which  things  are 
approached  ... 
The  personal  element, 
however,  that  the  supporter  of  value- 
freedom  saw  as  being  located  In  value- 
judgments  and  that  one  could,  as  a  rule, 
easily  excude  if  onefnerely  clearly  dis- 
tinguished  the  presentation  of  the  exist- 
ence  (Sein)  from  that  of  the  desire 
(Sollen)  of  particular  wishes,  penetrates 
knowledge  in  a  much  deeper,  more  basic, 
indeed  more  dangerous  manner  than  was 
accepted  at  the  time  of  the  debate  over 
value-judgments.  '  87 
This  requires  us  to  think  beyond  the  confines  of  Max  Weber's  solution, 
It  requires  'a  "demythologizing"  cognitive  sociology  (the  social  science 
"  counterpart  to  Friedrich  Nietzsche's  "demythologizing"  Psychology)'  . 
If  this  is  accepted  then  we  need  to  deal  with  the  problem  that  Mannheim 
merely  raised,  namely  that  of  universal  validity. 195 
Meusel  is  highly  critical  of  the  attempts  by  Alfred  Weber  and  Werner 
Sombart  to  deal  with  this  question.  He  points  to  the  inconsistency 
between  Weber's  acceptance  of  the  Seinsverbundenheit  thesis  in  relation 
to  a  contrast  botween  Indian  and  European-American  modes  of  thought 
but  its  rejection  when  the  issue  of  "capitalism"  as  a  single  object  is  con- 
cerned.  Similarly,  Meusel  argues  that  Sombart  too,  like  Weber,  adopts 
a  position  which  'has  led  to  the  abandonment  of  existential  determination 
and  a  return  to  the  value-freedom  Iine'. 
In  contrast  to  these  attempts  to  examine  the  relationship  between  the  exist- 
ential  boundedness  of  thought  and  the  universal  validity  of  knowledge. 
Meusel  suggests  that  Marx's  neglected  contribution  to  cognitive  sociology 
should  be  re-examined.  This  involves  the  recognition  that  those  in  a 
dominant  position  in  society  or  with  an  interest  in  its  preservation  will 
seek  to  avoid  recognizing  the  reality  of  its  development  and  that  'divergent 
social  classes  have  divergent  cognitive  chances'.  Meusel,  however, 
raises  two  problems  associated  with  such  a  position:  firstly,  that  Marx 
underestimated  the  strength  of  illusions  within  the  subordinate  class  and 
secondly  that  the  notion  of  development  presupposes  the  existence  of  a 
strata  that  can  anticipate  this  development  from  a  non-existentially  bounded 
position.  Ironically,  these  are  also  two  central  issues  in  Mannehim's 
Ideologie  und  Utopie  which  he  attempts  to  solve  by  presupposing  a 
'relatively  free-floating  intelligentsia'. 
I 
Hence  we  can  again  legitimately  suggest  that  von  Schelting's  and  Meusel:  's 
contributions  both  attest  to  the  widespread  recognition  that  the  Seins- 
verbundenheit  thesis  advanced  by  the  sociology  of  knowledge  must  challenge 196 
the  foundations  of  sociology  itself  and  that,  especially  in  Meusel's 
comments,  the  sociology  of  knowledge  must  have  as  one  of  its  central 
tasks  the  opening  up  of  the  methodologocal  disputes  which  raged  in 
Germany  before  the  First  World  War.  Both  the  extent  to  which  the  sociol- 
ogy  of  knowledge  rendered  problematic  the  bases  of  social  scientific 
thought  and  the  extent  to  which  the  sociology  of  knowledge  itself  held  a 
problematic  position  within  the  social  sicences  were  amongst  the  persistent 
themes  of  the  reception  of  Mannheim's  Ideologie  und  Utopie  which  forms 
the  third  'debate'  and  to  which  we  must  now  turn. 
IV 
Despite  the  extensive  nature  of  the  reviews  of  Mannheim's  Ideologieund 
Utopie,  they  possess  a  number  of  important  characteristics  which  suggests 
that  certain  groups  were  particularly  interested  in  his  work.  Furthermore, 
despite  the  wide  scope  of  many  of  the  reviews,  Mannheim  himself  only 
replied  directly  to  one  of  the  earlier  and  more  hostile  reviews,  that  of 
Curtius.  Between  1929  and  1932  no  less  than  five  articles  appeared  in 
Die  Gesellschaft  -a  left-wing  Social  Democratic  journal  founded  by 
Rudolf  Hilferding  -  which  dealt  with  Mannheim's  Ideologie  und  Utopie, 







and  two  others  (by  Kleinberg 
91 
and  Speier 
92 
which  took 
up  aspects  of  his  work.  Three  other  reviews  by  Wittfogel 
93 
and  Fogarasi 
94 
constituted  the  relatively  orthodox  Marxist  response  to  Ideologie  und 
Utopie.  Another  Marxist  review  was  provided  by  Ernst  Lewalter. 
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The 
major  sociology  journals  also  contained  reviews  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie I  Vf 
by  Plessner 
96, 
(Kölner  Vierteljahreshefte  für  Soziologie 
,  Fritz  Stern 
97 
(Archiv  für  Sozialwissenschaften)  Julius  Kraft 
98  (Zeitschrift  für  Völker- 
"psychologie  und  Soziologie)and  Karl  Dunckmann 
99  (Archiv  für  angewandte 
Soziologie).  Critiques  of  Mannheim's  work  were  also  published  by 
Siegfried  Marck 
100 
and  by  Landshut  in  his  Kritik  der  Soziologie,  101 
The 
early  Frankfurt  School  provided  a  critique  by  Max  Hokheimer 
102 
and  the 
already-mentioned  review  by  Marcuse  (though  he  was  not,  strictly  speaking, 
a  member  of  the  group  until  later).  Adorno's  critical  comments  on  Mann- 
heim  are  scattered  in  his  early  works  (e.  g.  his  Antrittsvorlesung  in  1931 
103 
). 
What  is  noticeable  about  these  reviews  is  that  only  Helmuth  Plessner  can 
lay  claim  to  having  been  a  contributor  to  the  sociology  of  knowledge  in 
Germany. 
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Thus,  aside  from  the  philosophical  reviews  of  Mannheim's 
work  and,  occasionally,  the  by  a  social  scientist  (e.  g.  Landshut),  the 
remainder  of  the  reviews  came  from  writers  within  the  Marxist  tradition. 
Nor  could  one  say  that  these  reviews  were-vulgar  critiques  of  Mannheim's 
position.  Most  of  them  took  Mannheim's  arguments  in  Ideologie  und 
Utopie  very  seriously  and  felt  it  necessary  to  critically  confront  them. 
This  may  be  interpreted  either  as  the  result  of  the  fact  that  Mannehim 
provided  a  convincing  critique  of  the  Marxist  position  that  had  to  be  ans- 
wered  or  that  Mannheim  utilized  many  of  the  arguments  already  employed 
by  Marxists  (e.  g.  Lukdcs)  within  the  context  of  a  radical  reorientation  of 
the  social  sciences  which  challenged,  necessarily,  the  basis  for  a  Marx- 
4 
ist  social  science.  Although  many  of  these  writers  recognised  the  value 
of  Mannheim's  work  -  and  especially  in  its  relation  to  contemporary 
theoretical  and  practical  problems  --this  did  not  prevent  them  from  remain- 
ing  highly  critical  of  it.  Because  of  the  continuation  of  their  tradition, 193  - 
this  is  most  obvious  in  the  case  of  key  members  of  the  Frankfurt  School 
who,  from  the  very  outset  when  Mannheim  was  himself  at  Frankfurt  from 
1930  to  1933,  consistently  opposed  the  whole  project  of  a  sociology  of 
knowledge  -  however  close  it  might  be  in  some  respects  to  their  own 
tradition  and  central  themes. 
A  further  consequence  of  the  wide  Marxist  interest  in  Mannheim's  work 
is  that  It  would  ensure  that  one  of  the  central  issues  taken.  up  in  relation 
to  Ideologie  und  Utopie  was  the  relationship  between  the  sociology  of 
knowledge  and  the  critique  of  ideology  -  especially  as  Mannheim  argued 
that  the  former  had  superceded  the  latter.  This  is  true  not  merely,  as 
one  would  expect,  from  critiques  by  authors  like  Hork.  heimer,  but  also 
for  the  penetrating  review  by  Plessner  who  could  by  no  means  be  termed 
a  Marxist.  The  relationship  between  the  sociology  of  knowledge  and  the 
critique  of  ideology  has,  in  fact,  remained  one  of  the  central  areas  of 
dispute  surrounding  the  sociology  of  knowledge  and  must  be  examined 
further  in  the  next  chapter. 
For  the  moment,  it  is  useful  to  examine  one  of  the  earliest  reviews  of 
Ideologie  und  Utopie  -  that  by  Ernst  Curtius  -  since  it  was  the  only  review 
to  which  Mannheim  replied.  Curtius'  critique  -  entitled  'Soziologie  -  und 
105 
-  is,  as  its  title  suggests,  concerned  to  restrict..  ihre  Grenzen' 
d 
sociology's  intervention  in  the  Geisteswissenschaften.  It  is  also  written 
from  a  radical  conservative  standpoint.  Curtius  starts  out  by  hoping  that 
German  sociology  will  not  play  the  same  radical  political  and  ideological 
role  that  it  did  in  France  during  the  Third  Republic  since  it  would  be  dis- 
credited  as  a  legitimate  individual  discipline.  However,  what  specifically 199 
concerns  Curtius  is  that  Mannheim  seeks  to  transform  this  particular 
discipline  into  a  universal  science  which  will  give  a  new  meaning  to  the 
totality  of  historical  events.  Ideologie  und  Utopie  raises  'nothing  less 
than  the  question  of  the  function  of  the  mind  in  the  present  world'  , 
106 
since 
it  asks  how  it  is  possible  to  think  and  live  once  the  problem  of  ideology 
and  utopia  has  been  radically  confronted.  But,  Curtius  argues,  this  is 
merely  'a  variant  of  ...  European  nihilism,  Le.  a  state  of  mind  of  up- 
rooted  intellectual  strata  that  has  already  been  described  by  Nietzsche'. 
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Hence,  rather  than  see  Mannheim's  work  as  something  historically  specific 
and  new,,  it  is  merely  'a  temporally  bounded  form  of  scepticism  that  belongs 
to  the  constants  of  intellectual  history'. 
Nonetheless,  Curtius  maintains  that  Mannheim's  views  must  be  countered 
since  he  falsely  evaluates  change  (as  positive)  and  stasis  (as  negative) 
'in  the  wake  of  modern  philosophies  of  life'.  Mannheim's  views  are  a 
danger  to  'German  youth';  a  critique  of  sociologism  is  essential  to  pre- 
serve  German  science  and  universities.  We  must  insist,  Curtlus  argues, 
upon  the  importance  of  the  'unique  person'  when  we  examine  from  various 
directions  the  'essential  determination  of  human  beings'.  Curtius  irfact 
favours  the  development  of  a  philosophical  anthropology  along  the  lines 
already  advanced  by  Max  Scheler  -  presumably  because  it,  too,  is  concer- 
ned  with  essences  and  metaphysics..  This  is  in  contrast  to  Mannheim's 
position  which  Curtius  sees  as  resting  upon  the  'irrational  experience'  of- 
Kierkegaard  and  mysticism.  Ultimately,  Curtius  views  Mannheim's 
argument  as  one  that  seeks  to  replace  philosophy  with  sociology  and  to 
provide  'a  theory  and  metaphysics  of  knowledge'. 200 
But  there  is  one  area  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie  which  particularly  impresses 
Curtius,  namely,  his  'outstanding  analysis  of  the  sociological  problem  of 
the  intelligentsia'.  The  analysis  of  the  free-floating  intelligentsia,  how- 
ever,  cannot  remain  at  the  sociological  level  but  must  return  to  an  idealist 
standpoint.  In  other  words, 
'The  sociological  analysis  of  the  intellectual 
stratum  must  be  completed  by  a  philosophy 
of  the  mind.  The  mind  can  only  recognise 
itself,  however,  in  the  collective  display 
of  its  forms.  Temporally,  it  is  rooted  in 
the  past.  Yet  to  the  consciousness  of  the 
mind  itself  it  is  given  as  the  eternal  present. 
Hence  it  is  neither  ideological  nor  utopian  to 
believe  that  the  intellectual,  if  he  understands 
himself,  must  experience  this  transcendence 
as  reality  and  prove  it  in  this  existence.  '  108 
However  one  may  judge  Mannheim's  account  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie,  it  is 
certainly  directed  against  such  intellectualist  absolutization  of  the  mind. 
But  as  Ringer  has  shown,  views  such  as  those  of  Curtius  were  common 
among  the  German  'mandarins',  especially  in  the  Geisteswissenschaften. 
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i  Mannheim's  reply  to  Curtius  in  a  later  issue  of  the  same  journal  is, 
in  part,  an  attempt  to  locate  the  problems  of  German  sociology  within  a 
social  and  historical  context  -  and  is,  quite  possibly,  a  reworking  of  his 
unpublished  Habilitationsvorlesung  of  1926  -  as  well  as  a  detailed  critique 
of  Curtius'  attack.  The  earlier  section  of  this  article  has  already  been 
referred  to  in.  the  opening  chapter  and  need  not  concern  us  here.  In  his 
remarks  specifically  addressed  to  Curtius's  review,  Mannheim  does  con- 
cede  that  the  sociology  of  knowledge  is  indeed  concerned  with  the  irration- 
al  since  it  seeks  to  show 
'by  means  of  empirical  research  those  positions 
in  alI  tendencies  of  thought  in  the  humanities, 
social  sciences,  and  in  politics  which  have 
their  roots  in  the  irrational  and,  by  means  of 201 
conclusive  analysis,  of  pursuing  the 
question  how  taking  such  positions' 
comes  throug;  öven  in  the  categorial 
apparatus.  1  1 
This  irrational  element  is  thus  responsible  for  'the  inevitable  nature  of  the 
element  of  Weltanschauung  as  to  a  certain  extent  a  structural  determinant 
of  apart  icular  area  of  thought:  so-called  "existence-related  thinking"'. 
In  turn,  his  'existentiality'  is  seen  as  'a  determinant  stemming  from 
irrationality  and  Weltanschauung'  .  Finally,  these  features  taken  to- 
gether  are  presumably  responsible  for  'the  one  sidedness  of  certain  aspects 
of  all  points  of  view  and  of  all  parties'  and  this  must  be  revealed  by  a 
sociology  of  knowledge. 
I 
Secondly,  Mannheim  seeks  to  counter  Curtius'  charge  of  nihilism  by  con- 
trasting  his  own.  'dynamic  reiationism'  which  'invites  every  position  for 
once  to  call  itself  in  question  and  to  suspend  the  self-hypostatization  that 
is  a  habit  of  though  self-evident  to  everybody'  . 
111 
As  a  result,  the 
sociology  of  knowledge  and  the  analysis  of  ideology  will  be  able  to  demon- 
strate  that  'almost  all  historical  and  social  positions  can  be  shown  up  in 
their  existentiality.  '  This  radical  thinking  through  and  Cartesian  question- 
ing  is,  Mannheim  argues,  neither  the  nihilism  nor  'spiritual  spineless- 
ness'  that  Curtius  claims  it  to  be. 
Finally,  on  the  question  of  the  relationship  between  sociology  and  philo- 
4  sophy,  Mannheim  expressly  claims  that  he  does 
'not  wish  to  replace  philosophy  by  sociology 
... 
I  am  not  only  not  against  but  expressly 
for  metaphysics  and  ontology,  and  even  teach 
their  indispensability  for  an  existence- 
related  empiricism  ...  I  am  only.  Opposed 202 
to  the  presence  of  metaphysics  which  is 
not  recognised  and  thus  can  serenely 
absolutizo  particulars.  1  112 
Indeed,  Mannheim  specifically  praises  Heidegger's  ontology  as  'one  of 
the  most  decisive  achievements  of  contemporary  philosophy'.  In  the  end, 
Mannheim  is  perhaps  most  opposed  to  the  notion  of  pure  autonomy  of 
philosophy,  as  if  other  disciplines  cannot  take  up  its  problems,  for  in- 
stance,  for  fear  of  being  accused,  in  the  case  of  sociology),  of  sociologism. 
On  no  other  occasion  did  Mannheim  publicly  reply  to  his  critics.  Had  he 
done  so,  he  would  certainly  have  had  more  difficulties  with  some  of  the 
other  reviews  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie  since  they  are  much  more  concerned 
with  a  detailed  critical  analysis  of  his  work  than  is  Curtius'  attack  on 
Mannheim.  However,  Curtius'  review  does  illustrate  what  was  probably 
a  by  no  means  untypical  response  from  conservatives  in  the  humanities. 
Mannheim's  reply  is  also  significant  in  that  he  again  shows  clearly  the 
ultimately  scientistic  element  of  his  programme  for  a  sociology  of  know- 
ledge  that  by  empirical  analysis,  will  reveal  and  presumably  correct 
'irrationality',  Weltanschauung'  and  'existential  i  ty'  in  intellectual 
standpoints. 
However,  the  present  task  is  to  examine  the  various  responses  to  Ideologie. 
und  Utopie.  In  so  doing,  it  will  not  be  possible,  for  reasons  of  space,  to 
examine  all  those  reviews  which  merely  touch  upon  specific  aspects  of 
4 
Mannheim's  work  such  as  Speier  on  the  intelligentsia  or  Kleinberg  on  his 
sociology  of  culture.  Rather,  the  philosophical,  sociological  and  Marx- 
ist  reception  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie  will  be  broadly  examined,  even 
though  the  boundaries  between  these  areas,  particularly  where  the  sociology 203 
of  knowledge  is  concerned,  are  difficult  to  draw.  The  three  'philosophical' 
reviews  examined  are  those  of  Hannah  Arendt,  Siegfried  Marck  and  Paul 
Tillich,  the  three  'sociological  I  reviews  are  those  of  Günther  Stern,  Julius 
Kraft  and  Helmuth  Plessner,  and  the  three  'Marxist'  reviews  are  those  of 
Ernst  Lewalter,  Adalbert  Fogarasi  and  Karl  Wittfogel.  Finally,  the  'neo- 
Marxist'  reviews  of  Herbert  Marcuse  and  Max  Horkheimer  will  be  discussed. 
Though  this  list  of  reviews  is  not  exhaustive,  it  does  hopefully  cover  the 
most  significant  responses  to  Mannheim's  Ideologie  und  Utopie. 
Hannah  Arendt  Is  review 
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specifically  sets  out  to  examine  the  philosophical 
aspects  of  Mannheim's  work  and.  the  implications  it  has  for-philosophy. 
Mannheim's  central  thesis  of  the  Standortgebundenheit  of  thought  and  his 
lack  of  commitment  to  anyone  of  these  Standorten  immediately  raises  the 
question  as  to  the  possibility  of  Standortlosigkeit  as  such.  After  destroying 
various  philosophies'  absolute.  claims  to  validity  and  indeed  those  of 
theories  about  the  world,  Mannheim's  sociology  goes  in  search  of  reality, 
of  what  is  useful  for  orientation  towards  the  world  ('Brauchbare  zur 
Weltorientierung).  But  as  Arendt  points  out, 
'the  striving  for  world  orientation,  however, 
signifies  from  the  outset  insight  into  the 
relevance  of  the  intellectual  sphere;  a- 
decision  for  lack  of  standpoint,  knowledge 
about  the  possible  fruitfulness  of  neutrality. 
In  any  case,  this  decisively  distinguishes 
Mannheim's  position  from  that  of  Georg  Lukacs 
who  certainly  also  destroys  the  intellectual 
sphere's  absolutist  claim  but  from  a  part- 
I  cular  standpoint,  that  of  the  proletariat 
and  who  thereby  unnoticed  and  without 
reflection.,  substitutes  the  concept  of  inter- 
est  that  is  correctly  valid  there  (and  is 
114 
very  fruitful  in  concrete  interpretation). 
Instead,  what  Mannheim  does  is  to  inquire  into  the  reality  that  lies  beh  i  nd 204 
i 
the  intel  Iectual.  sphere,  into  'the  possible  genuine  origin  of  the  intel  Iect- 
ual  sphere'  I.  Secondly,  he  sees  all  standpoints  and  all  'interpretations 
of  existence'  as  orientations  to  a  specific,  historically  given  world.  In 
other  words,  Mannheim  is  concerned  at  this  level  with  the  relationship 
between  the  ontic  and  the  ontological.  This  Arendt  sees  as  being  a  con- 
cern  that  is  also  paramount  in  the  contemporary  philosophies  of  Heidegger 
(the  concern  with  the  Sein  des  Seienden)  and  Jaspers  (concern  with 
Existenz),  except  that  Mannheim's  sociology  is  concerned  'with  the 
emergent  existence  (das  Seiende)  that  lies  at  the  root  of  this  "interpret- 
ation  of  existence"  (Seinsauslegung)' 
.  However,  Mannheim's  approach 
destroys  the  absolute  distinction  between  the  ontic  and  the  ontological;  the 
destruction  of  the  absolutization  of  thought  not  merely  takes  place  through 
its  relativization  but  through  its  refutation:  'its  refutation  is  the  demask- 
ing  of  consciousness  derived  from  the  unconditional  as  ideology  (in  the 
sense  of  "total  ideology")  '.  This  has  an  important  implication  for 
philosophy  since, 
'viewed  sociologically,  philosophy  is  thus 
no  longer  the  reply  to  the  question  of  the 
existence  of  the  emergent  (Sein  des  Seiendsn) 
but  now  only  exists  itself  as  enchained  and 
confined  to  the  world  of  the  emergent  and 
its  possibilities  for  motivation,  as  one  emer- 
gent  entity  amongst  other  ...  its  claim 
to  unconditional  i  ty  rests  upon  the  fact  that 
115 
it  has  forgotten  its  historical  rootedness.  ' 
Such  a  sociology  thus  radically  questions  those  philosophies  which  are 
also  concerned  with  the  search  for  'reality',  with  'existence'. 
f 
Indeed,  sociology  moves  in  the  opposite  direction  to  such  philosophies. 
It  is  not  concerned  with  'Being-in-the-world'  (In-der-Welt-sein)  as 
'a  formal  structure  of  human  existence  as  such'  but  with  'the  respective 205 
historically  determinate  world  in  which  man  lives  at  a  certain  time'.  In 
itself  this  distinction  between  philosophical  and  sociological  concerns  is 
'apparently  harmless'  unless  sociology  claims  that  philosophy  cannot  or 
is  unable  to  examine  this  'formal  structure  of  human  existence.  '  But  at 
we. 
this  poin  ^are  confronted  with  a  version  of  the  'powerlessness  of  the  mind' 
thesis  that  Arendt  sees  as  most  evident  in  Scheler's  work. 
However,  whereas  Scheler  was  concerned  with  the  powerlessness  of  the 
mind,  Mannheim  is  concerned  with  the.  homelessness  of  the  mind.  This 
comes  about,  according  to  Arendt,  in  the  following  manner: 
'Everything  spiritual  is  interpreted  either  as 
ideology  or  utopia.  Both,  ideology  just  as 
much  as  utopia,  "transcend  existence",  both 
arise  from  a  consciousness  "that  does  not 
find  itself  in  accord  with  the  existence  that 
surrounds  it.  "  The  mistrust  of  the  mind  that 
'i  s  observable  in  sociology  and  Its  attempt 
at  destruction  is  the  source  of  the  homeless- 
ness'to  which  the  mind  is  condemned  in  our 
society.  This  homelessness  and  apparent 
uprootedness  ("free-floating  intelligentsia") 
makes  everything  intellectual  suspicious 
from  the  very  outset;  a  reality  is  sought 
after  that  is  more  basic  than  the  mind  its- 
elf  and  al  I  intellectual  products  are  to  be 
interpreted  or  destroyed  in  relation  to  it. 
Here,  destruction  [Destruierung]  does  not 
simply  mean  destruction  [Zerstörung]  but 
the  reduction  of  a  claim  to  validity  to  that 
situation  from  which  it  has  emerged'  . 
116 
Arendt  finds  this  destruction  of  the  intellectual  sphere  to  be  not  disimilar 
to  that  undertaken  in  psychoanalysis  except  that  Mannheim's  sociology  of 
4  knowledge  still  leaves  the  situationally-bounded  validity  of  the  spiritual 
infact  to  a  certain  extent  and,  what  is  more  decisive,  the  reality  to  which 
the  intellectual  sphere  is  reduced  is  a  historical  one  which  man  creates  or 
has  created.  But  both  sociology  and  psychology 206 
'require  a  fundamentally  different  mode 
of  understanding  than  is  recognized  in 
the  humanities:  not  a  direct  understand- 
i  ng  that  the  interpreter  takes  to  be  what 
exists,  not  an  immediate  confrontation 
but  a  diversion  via  a  reality  that  is  taken 
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by  the  interpreter  to  be  more  fundamental.  ' 
Even  though  the  reality  to  which  psychoanalysis  refers  is  more  estranged 
from  the  mind  than  that  which  concerns  sociology,  both  conceive  of  the 
mind  es  primarily  'secondary,  estranged  from  reality'. 
The  reduction  of  the  intellectual  sphere  to  a  secondary  status,  and  the 
tracing  back  of  its  objects  to  a  prior  historical  reality  prompts  Arendt 
to  inquire  into  the  nature  of  this  reality  and,  since  it  is  historical,  into 
the  competence  of  sociology  to  carry  out  historical  research.  The  reality 
to  which  the  mental  sphere  is  traced  back  is,  for  Mannheim,  the  'concrete 
existent  order  of  Iife"  that  is  most  clearly  observable  in  particular  types 
of  'economic-power  structures'  .  Mannheim  even  sees  in  this  exist- 
ential  boundedness  a  'chance  for  knowledge'  in  that  knowledge  does  not 
remain  unlocated  in  some  void.  This  reality  to  which  the  mind  is  reduced 
is  a  'public  existence'  that  is  taken  tobe  the  world  by  its  members.  Only 
this  existence  can  be  historical  since  any  other  (birth,  death,  etc.  )  relates 
only  to  natural  facts.  But  again,  this  reduction  of  the  mind  to  a  historical 
reality  can  only  lead  to  its  alienation  since 
'In  that  sociology  destroys,  it  already  takes 
the  mind  to  be  homeless,  i.  e.  as  living  in 
a  world  that  is  fundamentally  estranged 
from  it.  The  mind  transcends  this  strange  118 
world  and  becomes  ...  ideology  and  utopia.  ' 
Hence  the  interpretation  of  the  intellectual  sphere  as  ideological  or  utopian 
assumes  that  'Geist,  as  such,  first  exists  when  consciousness  is  no  Iden- 
tical  with  the  existence  in  which  it  is  created. 
'  False  consciousness  there- 207 
fore  arises  when  the  categories  for  orientation  to  the  world  are  not  appro- 
priate;  that  is,  ideology  and  utopia  are  distinguished  by  their  relevance 
for  reality.  Arendt  concludes  from  this  discussion  of  the  'reality'  that 
sociology  appeals  to  that  it  is  not  concerned  'simply  with  reality  but 
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rather  with  the  reality  that  has  power  over  the  mind'  .9 
The'second  question  Arendt  raises,  that  of  sociology's  status  -  or  at  least 
that  of  Mannheim's  sociology  of  knowledge  -  can  be  seen.  in  the  light  of 
the  preceding  analysis.  As  Arendt  points  out,  'sociology  claims  to  be 
a  "central  science"  (Zentralwissenschaft)  because  it  alone  is  in  a  position 
to  disclose  the  determinants'  of  thought.  But  this  claim,  paradoxically, 
gives  it  'a  remarkable  marginal  character'  since  the  mind  (as  ideology 
and  utopia)  is  from  the  outset  given  as  something  homeless  in  the  world 
and  its  possible  freedom  'can  only  come  to  exist  outside  historical  inter- 
action',  i.  e.  ahistoricalIy.  Geist  therefore  exists  as  an  'ultimate  residue' 
that  is  transcendent  and  ahistorical  since  'the  reality  of  history  is  so 
understood  that  there  remains  no  actual  place  for  it  within  it'  I.  From 
this  Arendt  concludes  that  sociology  too  has 
its  historically  bounded  place  at  which  it 
could  first  of  alI  emerge:  namely  where 
a  legitimate  mistrust  of  the  mind  was 
awakened  out  of  the  homelessness  of  the 
mind.  Hence,  as  a  historical  science, 
there  is  a  quite  definite  limit  to  its 
historical  competence.  The  interpret- 
ation  of  the  intellectual  sphere  as  Its 
destruction  into  ideology  and  utopia 
first  justifiably  emerges  where  the  econ- 
omic  sphere  has  extended  itself  so  far 
that  the  mind  can  and  must  factually 
become  "ideological  superstructure".  ' 
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The  mind  thus  becomes  homeless  when  its  position  is  secured  not  by  tred- 
ition  (intellectual?  )  but  by  its  reliance  upon  the  economic  sphere.  As -77 
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Arendt  points  out,  Mannheim  speaks  specifically  only  of  the  homelessness 
of  the  mind  in  the  modern  world. 
Siegfried  Marck,  too,  starts  out  from  the  problem  of  the  existential  bound- 
edness  of  thought  and  this  is  indeed  the  title  of  his  article. 
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This  ex- 
i  stenti  al  boundedness  implies  the  dependency  of  thought  upon  some  real 
existence  and  stated  in  its  simplest  form  can  also  imply  a  kind  of  epistem- 
ological  determinism.  The  problems  associated  with  this  thesis  have  been 
more  radically  stated  in  sociology  with,  the  introduction  of  the  concept  of 
ideology.  -  Marck  refers  back  to  Mannheim's  paper  on  competition  and 
argues  that  his  introduction  of  the  particular  and'total  concepts  of  ideology 
has  deepened  the  understanding  of  the  Marxist  interpretation  of  history. 
Marck  attempts  to.  show  that  what  both  Marxism  and  Mannheim's  position 
have  in  common  is: 
'The  thesis  that  specific  knowledge  and  specific 
value  -  positionsare  to  be  functionalised  in 
terms  of  a  real  human  subject,,  that  in  a  specific 
sphere  social  life-co-constitutes  knowledge,  that 
the  mutually  conflicting  ideologies  of  a  period 
compete  for  "possession  of  the  public  interpretation 
of  existence"  -  these  are  the  common  assertion  of 
the  most  modern  type  of  sociology  and  of  Marxism.  ' 
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But  Mannheim's  analysis  of  ideologies  is  to  be  distinguished  from  a 
Marxist  one  in  that  his  conception  refers  to  a  value  viewpoint  (particular 
ideology)  and  to  a  world-view  (total  ideology).  In  the  first  case,  we  have 
a  'polemic  against  class-and  domination-determined,  ethical  and  political 
value  standpoints',  in  the  latter  a  'more  theoretical  attempt  at  the  causal 
derivation  of  knowledge  and  especially  of  culture  from  economically  given 
phenomena'.  Marxism's  polemical  stance,  Marck  argues,  prevents  it 
from  reflecting  upon  its  own  ideology  and  applying  its  concept  to  itself. 209 
This  Marck  sees  as  having  been  performed  by  Mannheim  to  the  extent  of 
removing  Marxism  from  its  monopolistic  position  in  relation  to  ideological 
critique.  In  another  respect,  too,  MannheimIs  position  differs  from  the 
Marxist  standpoint,  namely  in  being  concerned  only  with  'political, 
historical  thought,  knowledge  in  the  humanities  and  social  sciences  as 
well  as  everyday  thought'  and  not  with  natural  scientific  knowledge. 
In  another  respect,  however,  'close  connections  exist  between  the  method- 
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ology  of,,  sociology  of  knowledge  and  the  problem  of  dialectics'  . 
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Both 
seek-to  relativize  absolutist  claims  through  the  relativization  of  the  contents 
of  knowledge  as  elements  of  a  systematic  totality.  In  the  discussion  of 
politics  in  Ideolgie  und  Utopie,  Mannheim  sees  the  boundedness  of  stand- 
points  as  a  source  of  creative  insights  but  they  produce  only  partial-truths 
that  must  be  corrected  in  a  dialectical  synthesis;  that  is,  they  are  only 
partial  moments  of  truth  and  the  totality.  Hence,  Marck  characterises 
the  sociology  of  knowledge  and  of  culture  as  a'dialectical  perspectivism'  . 
However,  unlike  Hegel,  the  dialectical  synthesis  is  not  a  fundamental 
law  of  the  mind  but  is  rather  the  attempt  to  search  out  chances  of  synthesis 
in  the  present  social  situation.  Again,  Marck  sees  this  as  particularly 
true  of  Mannheim's  article  on  competition  and,  in  a  different  way,  in  his 
attempt  to  secure  'a  possible  autonomy  of  the  mind  over  against  its 
socially  manifested  forms'  via  the  intelligentsia. 
But  in  an  important  respect,  Mannheim's  affinity  with  a  dialectical 
approach  is  only  apparent.  Despite  Mannheim's  claims,  '  Marck  argues 
that  his  theory  of  the  existential  boundedness  of  thought  in  fact  has  affinities 
with  sociologism  as  well  as  dialectics.  In  contrast,  Marck  argues  that 210 
'the  law  of  dialectics  represents  a  dynamic 
basic  law,  that  thereby  the  justification  of 
i  deal  dialectics  is  asserted,  that  in  this 
sphere  there  exists  only  a  decision  concerning 
the  primacy  of  ideal  and  real  dialectics. 
However,  a  real  dialectics  that  does  not 
recognise  such  a  primacy,  in  fact  no  longer 
means  a  dialectics  but  transforms  the  dialect- 
ical  law  into  sociological  -causality.  '  124 
As  we  have  seen  earlier,  Marck  argues  that  this  argument  and  the  con- 
sequent  acceptance  of  a  powerlessness  of  the  mind  thesis  can  be  applied 
to  Mannheim  as  well  as  to  Scheler. 
At  a  more  substantive  level,  Marck  is  critical  of  Mannheim's  dis- 
Unction  between  ideology  and  utopia.  One  cannot  distinguish  between  the 
two  merely  in  terms  of  a  distinction  between  immanence  and  transcendence 
since,  as  far  as  their  existential  determination  is  concerned,  both  are  taken 
into  account  and  'transcendence  by  consciousness  is,  in  the  sociological 
method,  in  -fact  related  to  immanent  social  existence'.  If  this  is  true, 
then  utopia  is 
'not  in  fact  characterised  by  its  timelessness, 
its  essential  absolute  character,  its  separation 
from  existence.  Hence,  however,  the  dis- 
tinction  between  ideology  and  utopia  is  relativised. 
If  evolutionary  ideology  realistically  orientates 
itself  towards  seizure  of  domination  and  power, 
then  already  prepared  elements  of  opportunistic 
ideology  are  included  in  this  utopia.  The  con- 
t  rast  between  both  structures,  the  criterion  for 
their  differentiation  is  then,  in  fact,  merely 
abandoned  to  the  future.  '  125 
This  is  indeed  the  option  favoured  by  Mannheim  who  states  that  'the 
S 
criterion  for  ideology  and  utopia  is  realisation.  '  In  this  respect,  Marck 
argues,  Mannheim's  argument  comes  very  close  to  that  of  Marx  and 
Lukäcs  and  'the  future  becomes  the  undisputed  judge  of  the  content  of 
contemporary  consciousness  I. 211 
Paul  Tillich's  review  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie126  which,  like  Arendt's, 
also  appeared  in  Die  Gesellschaft  and,  In  fact,  alongside  Marcuse's 
review,  is  a  largely  positive  account  of  Mannheim's  work.  Tillich  sees 
the  book  as  of  fundamental  importance  to  sociologists  and  philosophers 
and,  above  all,  socialists.  Like  Marck,  however,  he  has  serious  reser- 
vations  concerning  Mannheim's  distruction  between  ideology  and  utopia 
in  terms  of  their  transcendence  of  existence  since  it  'is  in  both  cases 
something  so  different  that  it  is  only  the  sound  -  and  not  the  meaning  of 
the  word-which  creates  an  identity'.  On  the  other  hand,  Tillich  finds  the 
relationship  between  absolute  and  relative  utopias  a  fruitful  distinction. 
More  problematical  for  Mannheim's  theory,  Tillich  argues,  is  the  notion 
of  a  total  and  general  concept  of  ideology.  Tillich  suggests  that  the 
concept  of  ideology  is  not  'total'  if  one  thesis  is  taken  as  being  free  from 
its  rootedness  in  the  ideological  sphere.,  namely  the  thesis  of  a  concrete 
dynamic  truth.  Nor  can  there  be  a  'general'  concept  of  ideology  if  one 
strata  -  the  intelligentsia  -  is  excluded  from  its  existential  boundedness. 
In  terms  of  Mannheim's  overall  problematic,  Tillich  is  favourably.  impressed 
and  he  suggests  five  areas  of  Mannheim's  argumentation  that  should  be  ex- 
tended  further  -  that  the  concept  of  ideology  should  retain  'its  concrete- 
political  conflict-laden  character'  and  that  'the  particular  and  special 
concept  of  ideology  should  not  be  elevated  into  the  general'  ;  that  one  must 
ask  how  much  ideology  lies  in  one's  own  political  theory,  i.  e.  a  plea  for 
great  self-criticism;  that  the  dynamic  notion  of  truth  should  be  developed 
further  but  this  cannot  be  done  without  there  being  presupposed  'at  one 
point  an  absolute  standpoint  in  existence  and  hence  in  thought';  that  the 
latter  may  be  developed  out  of  the  concept  of  'cognitive  chancel  though this  may  not  necessarily,  as  in  Mannheim's  case,  be  the  intelligentsia 
but  might  still  be  the  proletarian  social  situation;  finally,  thät  one  should 
not  treat  the  ideological  problem  as  something  general  and  intellectual 
but  as  rooted  in  concrete  social  existence  itself. 
This  brief  overview  of  some  of  the  philosophical  reviews  of  Ideologie  und 
Utopie  should  indicate  the  extent  to  which  in  this  period  philosophers  were 
prepared  to  treat  the  problems  raised  by  Mannheim's  sociology  of  know- 
ledge  in  a  serious  manner  and  did  not  find  it  too  threatening  to  do  so.  How- 
ever,  it  is  significant  that  Arendt  and  Marck  should  point  to  the  persistent 
weakness  in  this  tradition,  namely  the  tendency  to  uphold  a  thesis  on  the 
powerlessness  of  the  mind  when  advancing  propositions  concerning  the 
existential  boundedness  of  thought.  The  concept  of  powerlessness  was, 
of  course,  explicitly  advanced  by  Scheler  but  Arendt  also  points  to  the  im- 
portance  of  the,  homelessness  of  the  mind  thesis  for  Mannheim's  analysis. 
The  'sociological'  reviews  that  will  be  examined  are  those  of  Günter  Stern, 
Julius  Kraft  and  Helmuth  Plessner.  Of  these  three  articles,  the  review  by 
Julius  Kraft  entitled  'Sociology  or  Sociologism'  is  the  most  hostile  to 
Mannheim's  work. 
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Indeed,  he  starts  out  by  asking  whether  the  sociolo- 
gy  of  knowledge  as  a  discipline  is  possible  at  all  since  'sociology  is  cert- 
ainly  the  (or,  at  least,  a)  theory  of  social  phenomena  and  knowledge  is 
in  and  for  itself  not  a  social  phenomenan  but  a  psychic  one'  .  On  the 
basis  of  this  remarkable  argument,  Kraft  argues  both  that  the  distinction 
between  sociological  and  psychological  phenomena  is  crucial  and  that  this 
is  the  source  of  the  persistent  danger  of  sociologism,  of  the  reduction  of 
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social  phenomena  to  social  facts,  etc.  Nor  is  Kraft  certain,  in  the  case  of 213 
the  sociology  of  knowledge  whether  'what  is  at  issue  is  a  new  empirical 
science  or  a  new  philosophy'. 
On  the  problem  of  ideology,  Kraft  suggests,  without  any  grounds,  that 
instead  of  a  distinction  between  the  particular  and  total  concept  of  ideology, 
Mannheim  should  'distinguish  between  a  psychological  and  an  epistemolo- 
gical  principle  of  ideology'.  More  seriously,  he  argues  that  Mannheim 
does  not  satisfactorily  solve  the  problem  of  recognising  the  ideological 
nature  of  all  standpoints.  Kraft  suggests  that  Mannheim's  relationism 
is  also  a  form  of  relativism.  Indeed  he  sees  it  as  emanating  from  Scheler's 
'functional  isation'  of  basic  'interpretations  and  agrees  with  Curtius  that 
Mannheim's  own  standpoint  here  is  a  fundamentally  nihilistic  one.  Kraft 
goes  even  further  and  suggests  that  Mannheim's  position  represents  the 
'dethroning  of  science  and  the  enthroning  of  mysticism:  What  is  real  lies 
in  the  "extra-historical-es  Mannheim's  pciition  is  contradictory 
in  that  he  wishes  to  proceed  in  a  value-free  manner  whilst  at  the  same  time 
seeing  to  provide  a  'sociological  diagnosis  of  the  times'  that  will  ultimately 
lead  to  'evaluation  and  to  ontological  decision'.  Certainly  Mannheim  does 
have  considerable  problems  with  his  'diagnosis  of  the  times'  but  they  are 
not  resolved  merely  by  pointing  to  this  contradiction. 
i 
At  the  substantive  level,  Kraft  vehemently  denies  that  politics  is  not 
already  a  science,  thereby  rendering  redundant  the  second  chapter  of 
Ideologie  und  Utopie.  Kraft  also  challenges  the  manner  in  which  Mannheim 
draws  up  the  various  political  positions  in  that  chapter  and  sees  in  his 
attempt  to  synthesize  political  styles  an  instance  of  'Kantian  Marxism'. 
In  short,  at  the  end  of  his  review,  Kraft  argues  that  there  can  be  no assamam 
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sociology  of  knowledge  either  at  a  philosophical  level  nor  at  the  level  of 
an  empirical  science,  again  on  the  grounds  of  its  inherent  reductionism. 
More  significant  and  fruitful  as  a  critique  of  Mannheim's  position  is 
Günther  Stern's  review  entitled  'Concerning  the  so-called  "existential 
boundedness"  of  consciousness'. 
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Stern  seeks  to  extract  some  con- 
sequences  of  the  existential  boundedness  of  thought  thesis  that  Mannheim 
has  overlooked.  For  instance,  if  we  assert  the  dependency  of  thought 
upon  existence  or  situation, 
'then  in  so  doing  something  is  indirectly 
asserted  about  existence,  about  the  situ- 
ation.  Now,  from  the  outset,  consciousness 
or  self-interpretation  etc.  must  conversely 
be  taken  into  account  as  contributory  factors 
in  existence,  in  the  situation,  etc.  This  purely 
formal  statement  asserts:  If  consciousness 
is  advanced  as  a  function  of  the  existential 
situation,  then  it  can  no  longer  be  compared 
with  it  or  judged  to  be  'false'  in  the  Iight  of 
it  -  for,  the  situation  is  nothing  without  this 
consciousness.  '  130 
Mannheim,  Stern  argues,  does  not  see  this  consequence  but  instead 
operates  with  a  dual  notion  of  ideology  that,  on  the  one  hand,  refers  to  the. 
.  situational  and  relational  dependency  of  thought  and,  on  the  other,  refers 
to  false  consciousness.  This  prompts  Stern  to  ask  whether  the  concept  of 
consciousness  that  Mannheim  operates  with  is  inadequate  for  his  proble- 
matic  and  whether  the  discrepancy  between  situation  and  consciousness 
actually  represents  a  discrepancy  between  existence  and  consciousness. 
i  In  part,  the  latter  is  a  historical  problem. 
Stern  suggests  that,  in  itself  the  eiCamination  of  consciousness  in  the 
light  of  'the  basic  situation  and  the  specific  existence  of  human  beings' 215 
says  nothing  against  historical  method.  However,  historicism  immed- 
lately  becomes  dangerous  if  it  is  the  case 
'that  the  existential  concept  of  historicism- 
"historical  existence'Lrepresents  an 
i  (legitimate  absolutization,  that,  despite 
the  fundamental  freedom  of  human  beings 
in  relation  to  history,  it  allows  it  to  become 
unhistorical,  hence  a  human  existence  that 
cannot  be  conceived  of  historically  and  an 
unhistorical  human  world.  '  131 
If  this  is  conceded  then  we  have  here  a  fundamental  philosophy  of  history 
thesis  that  mäy  well  be  embedded  in  the  sociology  of  knowledge.  In  other 
words,  what  Mannheim  fails  to  examine  is 
'whether  the  existential  base,  to  which  one 
relativizes  (in  this  case,  in  fact,  history) 
is  itself  absolute;  whether  it  is  not  ... 
for  its  part,  a  specific  situation  and  repre- 
sents  only  a  specific  mode  of  human  exist- 
ence  that  is  somehow  fundamentally  to  be 
distinguished  from  the  unhistorical  exist- 
ence  of  human  beings.  1  132 
Stern  examines  this  problem  in  the  light  of  an  analysis  of  the  present 
(Heute),  the  'today'  that  is  so  important  in  Mannheim's  'diagnosis  of 
the  times'.  For  the  historicity  of  human  beings  does  not  reside  in  their 
living  in  an  'unequivocal  present'  but  rather  that  they  appear  'to  be  with 
one  foot  already  hero  and  with  another  still  there,  i.  e.  to  have  an  equivocal 
present'  I.  What  this  implies  is  that  the  reduction  of  consciousness  to  a 
specific  situation  overlooks  history  itself  since  'consciousness  itself,  gua 
existentially  bounded,  also  represents  an  emergent  or  an  existent  factor 
that  also  takes  part  in  the  making  of  the  historical  situation  against  which 
itis  to  be  measured'  .  Secondly,  the  problem  of  the  plurality  of  present 
times  in  which  people  exist  raises  the  question  as  to  which  ono  is 
'genuine',  which  one  is  the  norm  for  knowledge  of  the  present  for  'there 
exists  many  presents,  many  present  existences  "simultaneously"  side  by 216 
side,  and  because  of  the  simultaneity  of  generations,  in  partial  conceal- 
ment'.  The  incongruence  between  consciousness  and  existence  must 
therefore  be  viewed  in  a  different  light.  It  cannot  be  that  consciousness 
is  merely  incongruent  to  a  group  of  people  but  that  their  existence  is  incon- 
gruent  (Stern  gives  the  example  of  the  'unhistorical'  peasant  threatened 
by  emergent  machine  production  and  argues  that  it  is  not  his  consciousness 
that  is  incongruent  but  his  existence).  More  significantly,  this  analysis 
of  the  'present'  shows  us  when  ideology  emerges  -  in  'situations  without 
a  present',  in  situations  in  which  forces  or  worlds  with  their  own  history 
confront  other  worlds  in  an  ingenuine  present.  Here  there  emerges  the 
notion  of  a  plurality  of  truths.  In  'historically  adverse'  situations 
ideologies  provide  us  with  a  false  present.  Again,  what  is  false  is  'not 
consciousness  of  the  present  ...  but  the  present  "is  false",  in  so  far 
as  it  makes  a  claim  to  historical  dignity'  .  Though  he  does  not  specifically 
state  the  problem,  what  Stern  pinpoints  here  is  a  crucial  feature  of  Mann- 
helm's  philosophy  of  history  embodied  in  his  theory  of  ideology  and  utopia  - 
the  philosophy  of  the  absent  present. 
In  the  light  of  Stern's  argument  concerning  the  'present',  one  can  see 
that  history  itself,  which  plays  such  a  crucial  role  in  Mannheim's  argument, 
becomes  problematical.  As  Stern  puts  it, 
'history,  that  appeared  for  Mannheim  as  the 
destroyer  of  every  absolute  truth-claim,  as 
the  genuine  emergent,  as  the  basis  of  des- 
tructions,  seems  sub  specie  the  unhistorical 
situation,  which  in  a  real  sense  is  not  one 
situation  and  not  being  a  single  one  is  not  in 
a  real  sense  emergent,  to  be  itself  problematical, 
ltself.  an  absolutization.  '  133 
Thus,  whilst  the  argument  that  Mannheim's  position  is  nihilistic  is  in  no 217 
way  valid  since  it  rests  upon  'the  secure  basis  of  "history"  whose  ex- 
istence  he  never  doubts',  the  claim  is  valid  for  the  above  argument  since 
it  is  never  clear  'in  what  existential  medium  history  is  realised'.  Cer- 
tainly  Mannheim  sees  a  discrepancy  between  reality  and  history  but 
whether  this  justifies  a  new  task  for  sociology,  Stern  seriously  doubts. 
What  Stern  in  no  way  doubts,  however,  is  the  presence  in  Mannehim's 
work  of 
'the  relativisation  of  history  itself  or  its 
cFaim  to  be  the  absolute  medium  of  alI 
that  occurs.  And  the  evidence  that 
Mannheim's  appeal  to  history,  that 
originally  had  had  a  viewpoint  which 
merely  relativized  validity,  must  its- 
elf  become  the  absolutisation  of  history. 
More  plausible  than  by  means  of  the 
analysis  of  the  ingenuine  present  is  the 
legitimation  of  such  relativisations  by 
reference  to  positive  unhistorical  forms 
of  existence.  '  134 
Ultimately,  Stern  views  the  study  of  ideology  as  based  upon  'a  metaphysics 
of  history'  that  is  itself  rooted,  paradoxically,  in'a  vote  of  mistrust  against 
history'.  This  metaphysics  Stern  formulates  as  follows: 
'Although  nothing  exists  other  than  history, 
history  is  its  own  history  of  concealment, 
it  is  the  flight  from  its  own  existence,  that 
moves  in  other  modes  of  existence  only 
located  in  the  superstructure.  In  so  far  as 
it  lives  in  other  modes  of  exi  stence.  such 
as  transcendence,  validity,  etc.,  then  it  is, 
despite  itself,  in  the  wrong.  '  135 
Here.  then  perhaps  lies  an  important  clue  to  one  of  the  sources  at  least 
of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  in  Weimar  Germany,  at  least  in  its  radical 
0 
historicist  version  if  not  in  that  advanced  by  Scheler. 
It  is  a  different  historical  perspective  that  is  taken  up  by  Plessner  in  his 
article  'Modifications  of  the  notion  of  ideology',  which  has  already  been 218 
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referred  to  in  the  opening  chapter. 
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Though  not  merely  a  review  of 
Mannheim's  Ideologie  und  Utopie,  it  does  pay  sufficiently  great  attention 
to  his  work  -  as  one  of  the  transformations  of  the  concept  of  ideology  -  to 
merit  its  inclusion  here.  Plessner  seeks  to  show  how  the  notion  of  ideol- 
ogy  has  been  transformed  from  its  inception  in  Marx's  work,  through  its 
extension  in  historicism,  to  its  restriction  within  the  sociology  of  knowledge. 
The  first  'fateful  metamorphosis'  of  the  concept  of  ideology  occurred  with 
its  historicist  generalisation.  Whereas  the  original  concept  in  Marx  is 
both  'weapon  and  concept,  political  means  and  sociological  reality'  and  has 
I 
reference  to  concrete  historical  class  formations  and  forms  of  class  domination, 
its  basic  features  can  be  taken  out  of  this  context  and  generalised.  In  other 
words,  the  notions  of  base  and  superstructure  and  their  correspondence  can 
be  retained  and  extended  in  the  direction  of  a  'universal  comparative  sociolo- 
gy,  and  a  comparative  history  of  culture.  In  so  doing,  however,  Plessner 
argues  that  it  loses 
'1  its  unequivocal  reference  to  a  single  develop- 
ment  becomes  indifferent  to  true  and  false  or 
genuine  and  ingenuine;  it  loses 
2  its  unequivocal  reference  to  the  concept  of 
social  class  and  economic  political  interest 
.  Ideology  becomes  ...  a  pure  epiphenomenon 
of  a  vital  lower  stratum  which  ultimately  can 
only  still  appear  as  an  irrational  limiting  sum 
without  any  kind  of  positive  determination  in 
the  "study  of  ideology".  '  137 
The  humanities  and  sociology  have  both  sought,  Plessner  suggests,  to 
move  away  from  the  nineteenth  century  concept  of  development  (and 
4  indeed  to  view  it  as  an  ideology).  Instead  they  have  sought  to  exclude  their 
own  value  position  and  treat  it  as  being  as  objective  as  any  other  (e.  g.  17th 
century  France).  The  consequence  of  this  procedure  is  far-reaching: 219 
'The  thus  determined  levelling  of  one's  own 
standpoint  at  the  level  of  objectivity  ... 
is  continued  with  a  radical  reserve  in  re- 
I  to  the  validity  -  claims  of  values  in 
every  particular  value-sphere  of  every 
particular  cultural  circle.,  '  138 
This  methodological  relativism  also  goes  hand  in  hand  with  a  transformation 
of  the  concept  of  false  conciousness  which  now  becomes  that  of 
'consciousness  that  stands  in  relation  to 
a  specific  human  existence  and  standpoint. 
This  consciousness  is  not  false  because  it 
does  not  yet  possess  the  truth  that  it  can 
have  but  because  it  cannot  be  detached  from 
it  and  cannot  secure  a  truth  as  an  independent 
one.  What  is  correct  for  one  state  of  con- 
sciousness  must  be  incorrect  for  another. 
Thus,  consciousness  stands  indifferent  to  the 
true  and  the  false  in  its  particular  relation- 
ally  valid  perspective.  '  139 
Hence,  consciousness  now  becomes  false  precisely  because  it  is  derived 
from  a  specific  existential  basis,  and  this  'falseness'can  no  longer  be 
corrected  by  human  intervention  since  'the  possibility  is  absent  of.  measur- 
ing  the  particular  "worlds"  in  which  social  forms  live  in  terms  of  something'  . 
The  notions  of  superstructure  and  base  are  also  transformed  in  this  histori- 
cist  generalisation  of  the  notion  of  ideology.  The  superstructure  -  as 
religion,  art  etc  -  now  stands  in  relation  toipractical  or  natural  vital  "inter- 
ests"  '  or  a  'psychophysical  base'  and  in  itself  'its  claims  have  no  basis. 
They  are  merely  an  expression  of  Iife  that  it  needs  in  order  to,  live'.  The 
whole  world  becomes  ideological  and  man  himself  'an  ideological  animal'. 
d  Similarly,  the  base  is  no  longer  an  economic  situation,  a  social  class  as 
a  historical  subject  but  merely  'a  piece  of  nature  ...  -  Iife'.  In  other 
words, 
Ithe  base,  the  ideological  destruction  declines  to  the  level  of  the  sub- 
human,  the  animal-like  and  ultimately  ...  to  the  level  of  naked  vitality'. 220 
Similarly,  the  relation  between  base  and  superstructure  moves  in  the  direct- 
ion  of  'a  radical  historicism'.  Plessner  is  scepticaYof  recent  attempts  to 
deal  with  this  principle  of  correlation.  He  argues  that  Weber  sought  to 
observe  this  correlation  and  yet  leave  open  the  question  of  the  ultimate 
validity  of  values  that  stood  in  relation  to  social  interests.  In  a  different 
mode,  Plessner  views  Scheler's  attempt  to  anchor  values  transcendentally 
whilst  recognising  this  correlation  a  failure. 
Against  the  background  of  this  historicist  enlargement  and  extension  of  the 
concept  of  ideology  and  as  a  counter  to  charging  one's  own  critique  with 
being  ideological  (so  that  Marxism..  itself  is  explained  as  the  ideology  of 
the  proletariat),  a  restricted  concept  of  ideology  leading  to  the  sociology  of 
knowledge  emerged.  Mannheim,  taking  up  the  radical  argument  that  all 
positions  are  ideological,  sees  'the  chance  for  a  new  objectivity:  out  of 
the  mere  study  of  ideology  the  sociology  of  knowledge  will  emerge'.  But 
Mannheim  seeks  to  introduce  an  evaluative  concept  of  ideology  in  contrast 
to  the  historicist  one.  He  wishes  to  move  to  a  diagnosis  of  viewpoints 
through  a  correct  understanding  of  them.  Hence,  Mannheim  returns  to  the 
notion  of  false  consciousness  as  a  critical  concept  and  to  an  evaluative 
dynamic  concept  of  ideology.  The  concept  of  reality  is  also  opened  up 
once  more  and  it  seems  as  if  Mannheim  is  returning  to  the  original  Marxist 
problematic. 
R 
But  Plessner  points  to  the  significant  differences  that  remain  between  the 
Marxist  concept  and  its  variant  in  the  sociology  of  knowledge.  In  short, 
the  sociology  of  knowledge  concept  of  ideology  lacks  three  of  its  original 
features: 221 
1  'For  the  sociology  of  knowledge  there  is 
no  progressive  development  of  history. 
There  exists  there  only  events  taking 
place  without  reference  to  a  comprehen- 
sive  goal,  also  without  an  unequivocal 
gradient  that  results,  independently 
of  any  expectation,  from  dialectical  con- 
straint  ...  Ideology  is  here  ...  the  ever 
possible/solidificationfin  a  state  of  con- 
sciousness  that  has  been  surpassed:  the 
poor  accord  with  the  times  of  what  has 
lagged  behind.  ' 
2  'Similarly,  the  sociology  of  knowledge's 
notion  of  ideology  lacks  the  unequivocal 
reference  to  class  interest  and  hence 
political  unequivocalness.  In  its  place 
is  the  formalised  "group  interest" 
... 
a  category  that  was  earlier  characteristic 
of  the  historicist.  line  of  thought.  It  can 
be  applied  to  the  most  diverse  social 
forms  ...  ' 
3  'Finally,  this  concept  of  ideology  lacks 
the  clear,  specifiable  criterion  of  true/conscious- 
ness  ...  Thus,  a  consciousness  is  true 
which  stands  In  existential  accord  or  equilib- 
rium  with  praxis.  A  criterion  for  this,  especia- 
IIy  in  Mannheim's  sense,  does  not  exist  ... 
We  never  know  when  and  what  the  present 
(Heute)  is.  It  is  the  essence  of  the  present 
(Gegenwart)  to  remain  secret.  '  140 
In  all  these  respects,  Plessner  argues,  the  new  concept  of  ideology  is 
radically  different  from  that  of  Marx.  But  these  are  not  the  only  problems 
facing  Mannheim's  sociology  of  knowledge  since  he  is  also  making  other 
claims  for  it.  Foremost  amongst  Mannheim's  claims  would  appear  to  be 
that  sociology  can  solve  many  of  philosophy's  problems.  Plessner  sees 
a  tendency  to  identify  philosophy  with  'acceptance  of  absolution  and  a 
i  fixation  with  transcendental  questions'.  In  contrast,  Plessner  argues  that 
the  concept  of  ideology  itself  rests  upon  basic  philosophical  presuppositions 
concerning  the  historical  nature  of  human  existence.  But  this  does  not 
mean,  Plessner  argues,  that  sociology  should  take  up 
t^ 
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philosophical  anthropology;  rather  it  should  remain  neutral  towards  it. 
In  conclusion,  Plessner  argues  that  sociology  should  recognise  that  it 
differs  substantially  from  Marxism,  however  important  it  has  been  in  the 
past  development  of  sociology: 
'For  neither  research  nor  politics  has  an  interest 
in  the  false  peace  betwIen  sociology  and  Marx- 
ism  which  brings  about 
means 
of  more  or  less 
conscious  change  in  the  value  and  meaning  of 
the  concept  of  ideology,  its  transformation  into 
a  category  of  empirical  sociology.  A  decontam- 
inated  "ideology",  reduced  to  a  category,  to  a 
principle  of  investigation,  a  "tension  between 
base  and  superstructure"  that  has  been  reduced 
to  a  general  human  mode  of  existence  is  con- 
tained  in  a  Marxist  orientated  sociology  and  is 
eternalised  in  its  particular  "revolutionary  - 
materialist"  theses  without  burdening  itself 
ý4ý 
with  the  risks  and  consequences  of  Marxism.  ' 
Plessner  goes  on  to  suggest  that  Marxism  has  played  the  role  that  Darwin- 
ism  played  in  the  development  of  zoology.  But  this  false  peace  between 
sociology  and  Marxism  is  to  the  detriment  of  both.  He  detects  a  tendency 
to  transform  elements  of  Marxism  with  'an  eternal  programme  for  sociology'. 
But  the  result  is 
'A  semi-Marxist  perspective  in  the  social  sciences 
and  precisely  because  of  this  a  gradual  blindness 
to  the  social  realities  to  which  Marxist  concepts 
actually  give  expression.  For  there  exists  situ- 
ations,  for  which  the  strategic  instrumentarium, 
outlined  by  Marxism,  In  the  sense  of  its  revolution- 
ary  polemic  possesses  an  empirical,  sociological 
truth  valise  ...  But  what  is  of  concern  here  is  in 
fact,  specific  situations  and  not,  as  fashion  would 
have  it,  constants  of  every  previous  or  even,  over  142 
and  above  that,  every  possible  human  situation.  ' 
Though  Plessner  is  nowhere  specific  here  as  to  who  he  is  referring,  there 
can  be  little  doubt  that  he  pinpoints  one  of  the  central  features  of  the  sociot- 
ogy  of  knowledge's  problematical  relationship  to  Marxism  and,  especially, 223 
to  the  concept  of  ideology,  regardless  of  whether  it  is  a  sociology  of 
knowledge  advanced  by  Scheler  or  Mannheim. 
Not  surprisingly,  the  manifestly  Marxist  reviews  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie 
also  saw  the  central  part  of  their  critique  of  Mannheim's  position  as  lying 
in  the  problematical  relationship  between  his  sociology  of  knowledge  and 
Marxism.  This  is  true  of  the  reviews  by  Lewalter,  Fogarasi  and  Wittfogel 
but  perhaps  less  true  of  the  neo-Marxist  critiques  by  Marcuse  and  Horhhoimer. 
However,  it  is  with  the  first  three  that  we  are  for  the  moment  concerned. 
Wittfogel's  brief  review  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie  exists  within  the  context 
of  a  more  comprehensive  review  of  recent  literature  on  the  sociology  of 
knowledge. 
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The  whole  of  this  tradition  -  Wittfogel  includes  Troeltsch 
and  Weber  within  it  -  is  seen  as  part  of"a  wider'crypto-Marxist  'movement 
which!  though  relying  on  Marx's  work,  has  nothing  to  do  with  Its  political 
element  and  which  seeks  to  avoid  in  a  scientific  manner  the  'one-sided- 
ness'  and  'exaggerations'  of  his  work.  In  Mannheim's  case,  Wittfogel 
does  discern  '  left'  tendencies  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie  such  as  the  emphasis 
on  the  crisis-ridden  nature  of  the  world,  the  play  with  Marxism  and  with  the 
notion  of  a  revolutionary  solution  to  the  crisis.  But  his  relativisation  of 
Marxism  results  merely  'from  the  standpoint  of  a  formalistic  eclecticism'. 
Similarly,  despite  Mannheim's  use  of  the  notion  of  the  class-boundedness 
of  knowledge,  he  always  falls  back-upon  'highly  vulgar  categories  from  the 
0 
realm  of  parliamentarism  and  from  the  sphere  of  circulation'  such  as 
'opposition'  and  'Competition'.  144 
Indeed,  in  the  latter  case,  Mannheim 
has  no  conception  of  class  limites  to  knowledge  and  Instead  merely  speaks 
of  class  competition.  In  short,  for  Wittfogel,  the  destruction  of  *the  class 224 
basis  of  Marx's  concept  of  ideology  becomes  manifest  in  Ideologie  und 
Utopie  with  Mannheim's  reluctance  to  raise  the  question  of  'which'  stand- 
point  is  the  basis  for  correct  knowledge.  Instead,  with  respect  to  both 
ideology  and  utopia  it  is  merely  a  question  of  'when'  they  appear  which 
determines  their  truth  value.  What  this  implies  is  that  competition  be- 
tween  ideologies,  for  example,  takes  place  'within  the  same  cognitive  level' 
and  'structural  diverse  cognitive  processes'  that  take  place  on  'diverse 
social  class  levels'  are  ignored.  Even  where  Mannheim  does  refer  to 
social  classes  his  analysis  is  purely  external,  unconcerned  with  their  roots 
in  the  production  process. 
Though  Mannheim  is  always  reluctant  to  locate  his  own  position,  it  is 
revealed  in  his  notion  of  the  free-floating  intelligentsia,  in  the  evolution- 
ary  goals  of  the  S.  P.  D.  to  which  Mannheim  subscribes  and  in  his  ultimate 
'decision  in  favour'of  the  dynamic  centre'  .  In  short,  'the  great  fashion  of 
bourgeois  social  science,  the  sociology  of  knowledge,  has  nothing  at  all 
to  say  to  Marxism'  . 
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On  the  other  hand,  Wittfogel'a  Marxist  review, 
behind  all  the  invective,  does  accurately  point  to  the  source  of  Mannheim's 
political  and  economic  categories  in  parliamentarism  (it  will  be  recalled 
here  that  Scheler  saw  this  as  the  social  source  of  relativism)  and  the 
circulation  process  (competition). 
0  A  more  interesting  orthodox  Marxist  review  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie  is 
provided  by  Adalbert  Fogarasi  in  his  essay  entitled  'The  sociology  of  the 
intelligentsia  and  the  sociological  intelligentsia'  ￿146  Fogarasi  argues 
that  a  fundamental  critique  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  is  necessary 2257 
'since  the  issue  is  not  merely  an  abstract  methodological  school,  but  a 
tendency  that  has  a  deep  social  and  political  significance'. 
147, 
The  fundament  point  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie  is,  Fogarasi  argues,  the  trans- 
cendence  of  Marxism  in  that  its  theory  of  ideology  may  be  applied  to  itself. 
This  prompts  Fogarasi  to  ask  what  it  means  to  apply  a  proposition  to  itself 
in  both  logical  and  dialectical  terms,  whether  this  problem  was  unknown  to 
e 
Marx  and  whAher  Marxism  is  itself  an  ideology.  Formal  logic,  Fogarasi 
argues,  has  already  refuted  scepticism  on  the  grounds  that  its  assertion 
4 
that  all  truths  are  open  to  doubt  is  itself  not  open  to  doubt.  More  interest- 
ingly,  Forgarasi  argues  that  the  application  of  concepts  and  categories  to 
themselves  has  led  to  the  development  of  a  'philosophy  of  philosophy' 
(Croce  or  Bergson)  a  a'Iogic  of  philosophy'  in  the  case  of  Emil  Lask.  It 
is,  he  continues,  a  kind  of  self-destruct  ion'of  philosophy  (e.  g.  Lask's 
logic  of  the  'logic  of  logic')  that  Mannheim  himself  participates  In  both 
in  his  epistemology  of  epistemology  ('Structural  Analysis  of  Epistemology'), 
developed  under  the  influence  of  Lask  and  Luk,  fcs  which  'relativizes  all 
individual  tendencies'  and,  more  recently,  with  his  sociology  of  sociology 
(presumably  in  Ideologieund  Utopie).  But 
'The  consequence  of  this  critique  of  epistem- 
ology  was  clear  in  its  masters  -  Mannheim, 
Zalai,  Lukäcs  just  as  much  as  Lask.  Zalai, 
Lukäcs  and  Lask  strove  to  move  from  epistem- 
ology  to  metaphysics.  They  wished  to  trans- 
cend  epistemology  in  order  to  replace  it  with 
metaphysics.  Mannheim  is  less  explicit  on 
this  but  his  tendency  is  nonetheless  precisely 
the  same.  This  must  be  asserted  in  order  to 
clearly  recognise  the  character  of  his  critique 
of  Marx.  1  148 
For  Fogarasi,  however,  scepticism  and  idealism  are  not  transcended  by 
formal  logic  but  by  praxis.  Instead  what  Mannheim  does  is  to  engage 226 
in  'a  tedious  empty  play  with  formulae'  that  he  applies  to  Marx's  argu- 
ment  in  order  to  refute  them.  Fogarasi  also  argues  that  this  universal 
application  of  formal/logic  and  universalisation  of  the  social  boundedness 
thesis  does  not  confront  Marx's  theory  at  all.  Its  social  boundedness  is 
completely  different  from  the  social  boundedness  of  bourgeois  ideology. 
Thought  becomes  ideological  in  a  capitalist  society  'not  because  it  is 
determined  as  such  but  because  it  is  determined  by  the  antagonistic  relat- 
ions  of  production  in  capitalist  society'  and  by  the  fetishism  of  commod- 
ities  and  the  illusions  it  creates.  In  contrast,  Mannheim's  analysis  of 
Ideology  is  that  of  a  kind  of  'critical  critique'  which  treates  all  social 
1 
boundadness  alike.  For  instance, 
'bourgeois  ideology  is  not  therefore  false  con- 
sciousness  because  it  is  a  class  standpoint 
as  such  but  in  fact  because  it  is  a  specific 
class  standpoint,  the  capitalist  class  stand- 
point  and  because  from  this  standpoint  reality 
necessarily  appears  inverted.  '  149 
Similarly,  social  classes  have  an  interest  in  supporting  or  transcending 
certain  forms  of  consciousness  but  Mannheim's  analysis  also  excludes 
such  interests. 
When  Fogarasi  comes  to  consider  Mannheim's  sociology  of  knowledge  in  the 
light  of  his  presumed  transcendence  of  Marx's  theory  of  ideology,  he  argues 
that  it  represents  a  'a  kind  of  sociological  intellectual  history'  that  erron- 
eously  believes  in  some  neutral,  position  from  which  it  can  judge  the  whole. 
i  Mannheim's  sociology  of  knowledge  seeks  to  overcome  the  deep  Intellect- 
ual  crisis  of  the  times  from  'the  standpoint  of  eclecticism'  by  synthesiz- 
Ing  the  partial  truths  of  all  other  standpoints.  In  other  words  it  seeks 
'to  ovorcome  ideology  purely  ideologically. 227 
It  interprets  the  crisis  of  bourgeois  ideology 
as  a  purely  intellectual  crisis  and  does  not 
see  that  this  relativistic  intellectual  crisis 
is  merely  the  reflection  of  the  deeper  crisis 
of  the  capitalist  system  itself  ...  The 
first  fundamental  illusion  and  self-illusion 
i  es  in  the  fact  that  one  can  overcome 
ideology  through  abstract  considerations 
upon  the  relativity  of  all  ideology  ... 
The  second  fundamental  error  is  the  eclectic 
viewpoint  that  one  can  group  a  specific  part 
of  reality  from  each  standpoint.  '  150 
But  this  procedure  merely  leads  one  to  argue  that  what  is  wrong  with  ideology 
is  merely  its  one-sidedness  rather  than  its  distortion  of  reality.  Secondly, 
Fogarasi  argues  that  the  synthesis  derived  from  eclecticism,  the  Zusammen- 
schau,  is  associated  with  the  irrational,  anti-intellectualism  of  modern 
bourgeois  philosophy  (e.  g.  the  phenomenological  school)  and  represents 
merely  a  mechanical  addition  of  parts  of  knowledge  and,  ultimately,  a  re- 
nunciation  of  scientific  knowledge.  By  this  means  it  is  impossible  to  grasp 
the  totality  which  is  a  dialectical  not  a  mechanistic  concept. 
If  the  guiding  thread  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie  is  the.  intellectual  crisis  then, 
Fogarasi  argues,  this  is  in  itself  nothing  new.  It  does  not  differ  greatly 
from  what  Simmel  saw  as  the  'crisis  of  modern  culture'  .  But  this  crisis 
is  that  of  a  specific  capitalist  society.  The  Weltfremd  manner  in  which 
philosophy  takes  up  this  crisis  leaves  room  for  Mannheim  to  see  the  crisis 
as  capable  of  being  solved  scientifically  by  a  sociology  of  the  intelligentsia. 
The  agents  of  this  synthesis  must  be  above  party  and  class  and  Mannheim 
finds  them  in  the  relatively  detached  intelligentsia,  a  classless  stratum. 
But  Fogarasi  suggests  that  if  we  examine  the  composition  of  this  stratum 
then  we  can  see  that  it  does  have-a  political  significance.  It  is  composed 
of  the  free  professions,  state  officials  (Fogarasi  views  this  as  significant for  social  fascism),  those  in  the  middle  who  do  not  constitute  a  class  and 
are  therefore  not  class  concious  but  nonetheless  are  conscious  of  their 
task,  and  those  engaged  in  partyless  politics  in  universities  and  political 
schools.  If  a  political  decision  has  to  be  made  then  it  will  be  'a  decision 
for  the  dynamic  centre'  .  Fogarasi  dismisses  this  theory  of  the  'Heidel- 
berg  sociological  school'  as  a  mask  for  bourgeois  ideology,  as  linked  with 
the  social  fascism  of  the  social  democrats. 
0 
In  contrast,  the  most  thorough  attempt  to  analyse  the  relationship  between 
Mannheim's  sociology  of  knowledge  and  Marx's  theory  of  ideology  is  the 
detailed  article  by  Ernst  Lewalter  entitled  'The  sociology  of  knowledge 
and  Marxism'  . 
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Lewalter  sees  German  sociology  as  having  changed  its 
response  to  Marxism  after  the  First  World  War  from  one  of  'ignoring'  or 
'refuting'  Marxism  to  'overcoming'  it.  This  now  position  he  sees  as 
being  best  represented  by  Mannheim's  work  and  especially  his  attempt  to 
go  beyond  Marx's  critique  of  ideology. 
-After  outlining  Marx's  theory  in 
some  detail,  Lewalter  goes  on  to  critically  examine  Ideologie  und  Utopie 
chapter  by  chapter. 
"  He  commences  with  Mannheim's  notion  of  the  ideological  nature  of  thought. 
Whereas  Marx's  notion  of  ideology  contains  two  elements  -  the  degree  and 
character  of  ideology  is  correlated  with  the  particular  stage  of  social  exist- 
ence  and  the  possibility  of  the  development  of  theory  is  largely  limited  to 
dominant  classes  in  society  -  these  are  reduced  in  much  modern  sociology 
to  the  vulgar  Marxist  correlation  of  ideology  with  specific  social  classes. 
Mannheim,  however,  with  his  distinction  between  total  and  particuar 
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ideology  come  close  to  Marx's  distinction  between  concrete  and  ideological 229 
consciousness  but  they  differ  in  that 
'for  Marx  "concrete  consciousness"  i  s,  in 
principle,  first  possible  after  the  "commun- 
ist  revolution";  for  Mannheim  it  is  ... 
already  contained  in  the  individual's 
"existential  experience"  and  only  requires, 
in  some  respects,  prudent  self-critical 
further  development.  ' 
Mannheim's  notion  of  particular  ideology  also  differs  from  Marx's  in  that 
the  'standpoint.  boundedness'  of  thought  contains,  for  Mannheim,  not  merely 
a  negative  side  (its  limited  validity)  but  a  positive  side  (it  contains  a 
section  of  the  total  truth).  Thus,  Mannheim  is  rightly  opposed  to  the 
absolutization  of  thought  but,  according  to  Lewalter  his  'brilliant  analysis 
and  deductions'  are  subject  to  considerable  erroneous  assertions.  For 
instance,  how  can  historical  materialism  be  imputed  to  the  proletariat-in 
the  same  manner  as  classical  political  economy  is  imputed  to  the  bourgeoisie? 
The  notion  of  imputation  is,  Lewalter  argues,  totally  inappropriate  here. 
In  any  case,  Lewalter  continues,  a  clear  statemgnras  to  'how  far  Marxism 
is  the  "ideology  of  the  proletariat"  and  hence  only  a  "particular"  truth  is 
missing'.  Perhaps  part  of  the  problem  lies  in  Mannheim  taking  up 
elements  that  he  thinks  belong  to  Marx's  concept  of  ideology  but  which  do 
not  do  so,  such  as  a  presumed  prevalence  of  praxis  over  theory,  an  econo- 
mistic  interpretation  and  a  presumed  determinism.  Indeed,  Lewalter  sugg- 
ests  that  Mannheim  is  much  more  deterministic  than  Marx  since 
'The  "existential  boundedness"of  thought  ... 
contains  a  strong  deterministic  element.  . 
If 
"I"  am  really  bound  up  with  my  thought  in  my 
"standpoint  In  the  sociological  sphere",  then 
in  fact  this  thought  appear  in  fact  to  be  so  much 
determined  that,  to  a  certain  extent,  I  can  only 
think  "as  a  citizen",  "as  a  worker",  "as  an 
academic",  "as  a  politician",  etc.  and  that  the 
posibility  of  ideology-free  thought  in  principle  is 
not  present  so  long  as  the  "sociological  sphere" 230 
is  not  homogeneous,  I  e.  as  long  as  classes 
are  not  transcended.  The  two  claims  that 
Mannheim  provides  -  the  propositicm  of  class 
boundedness  as  a  social-psychological  deter- 
minant  of  every  system  and  the  proposition 
of  the"striving  for  totality"  -  stand  as  it  were 
right  in  the  way  of  access  to  his  "dynamic 
relationism".  1  153 
One  of  the  problems  here,  according  to  Lewalter,  is  that  Mannheim  tends  to 
misinterpret  the  notion  of  existence  determining  consciousness  as  referring 
to  'the  "social-vital"  boundedness  of  the  individual  thinker  to  his  "stand- 
point"'  .  But,  as  Lukafcs  strongly  argued,  Marx's  theory  cannot  be  psycholo- 
gized  in  this  manner.  Lewalter  concludes  by  suggesting  that  the  existential 
boundednsss  thesis  is  one  of  correspondence  for  Marx  and  one  of  deter- 
mination  for  Mannheim. 
Lewalter  goes  on  to  argue  that  more  than  the  concept  of  ideology  seems  to 
have  been  taken  by  Mannheim  from  Marxism.  The  second  chapter  of 
Ideologie  und  Utopie  is  concerned  with  praxis,  with  'politics  as  political 
praxis'  and  'action  in  a  still  not  regulated  situation'.  When  Mannheim 
outlines  five  major  tendencies  of  political  thought  in  relation  to  the  notion 
of  praxis,  he  fails  to  see,  in  Lewalter's  view,  that  it  is  the  Marxist  one 
which  in  fact  comes  closest  to  his  notion  of  dynamic  relationism.  Instead, 
he  moves  on  immediately  to  the  question  of  synthesizing  political  perspect- 
ive  through  the  intelligentsia.  Here,  Lewalter  suggests  that  the  assump- 
tion  that  the  possession  of  education  can  lead  to  group  solidarity  is  actually 
a  hypostatization  of  intellectuals  themselves.  With  regard  to  Mannheim's 
ultimate  'decision'  for  dynamic  relationism,  Lewalter  sees  it  as  'a  form 
of  active  resignation,  a  "diagnosis"  of  the  present  that  is  directed  towards 
an,  in  principle,  unrecognisable  future,  an  extreme  attempt  to  hold  as  value free  what  is  necessarily  value-laden'  . 
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One  might  imagine,  Lewalter  suggests,  that  as  one-moves  on  to  the  third 
chapter  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie  one  moves  on  to  the  most  significant  aspects 
of  Marxism,  having  already  been  through  the  'economistic'  image  in  the 
first  chapter  and  the  'theory-praxis  philosophy"of  Lenin  and  Lukäcs  in  the 
second.  Indeed,  the  question  that  the  discussion  of  utopia  prompts  Lewalter 
to  ask  is  whether  historical  materialism  or  dynamic  relationism  has  a 
deeper  insight  into  the  principles  of  historical  development. 
to  be  certain  affinities  in  that  both  are, 
'1  individualising  theories  of  history  ...  Hence 
both  reject  "generalising" 
,  "causal  i  st  i  c"  and 
"deterministic"  theories  since  they  rob  the 
specific  present  moment  of  its  existential 
significance. 
2  Activistic  theories  of  history  Inso  far  as  the 
study  of  its  principles  is  to  serve  the  "thera- 
-  peutic"  via  the  "diagnosis".  Hence  both 
reject  "contemplative  theories"  (cf.  for  in- 
stance  Marx  against  Feuerbach,  Mannheim 
against  Scheler's  doctrine  of  the  "pre- 
existence  of  the  superstructure")  . 
3  Ontic  theories  of  history  insofar  as  they  claim 
to  reveal  the  "essence"  of  historical  develop- 
ment  in  "historical  time"  ... 
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Here  there  seem 
4  Dialectical  theories  of  history  insofar  as  they  make 
the  growth  of  theories  out  of  existence  ...  into 
an  axiom.  '  155 
However,  Lewalter  points  out  that  it  is  at  the  level  of  the  determinants  of 
historical  ontics  that  the  difference  between  Mannheim  and  Marx-  is  greatest 
since,  in  Mannheim's  case,  there  is  almost  no  evidence  to  suggest  what 
the  basis  of  his  theory  is.  But  often,  Lewalter  argues,  Mannheim's  reser- 
vation  about  Marxism  is  'a  purely  sceptical  one'  .,  But  if  we  agree  with  this, 
then  we  are  likely  to'argue  either  that  the  basic  motive  of  his  position  is Marxist  or  that  his  scepticism  enclosed  as  perspectivism  does  indeed  lead 
beyond  Marxism.  Lewalter  argues  that  the  last  section  of  Mannheim's 
book  would  lead  one  to  believe  that  'this  scepticism  is  absolute. 
If  we  turn,  finally.  to  the  reception  of  Mannheim's  Ideologie  und  Utopie  by 
the  'Frankfurt  School'  then,  as  with  the  more  orthodox  Marxist  review  a 
common  response  is  not  at  all  evident.  This  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that 
the  reviews  by  Herbert  Marcuse  and  Max  Horkheimer  represented  very 
different  positions,  not  merely  because  Marcuse  was  not  yet  a  member  of  the 
Institut  fUr  Sozialforschung  but,  more  significantly,  because  his  Marxism 
was  still  very  much  mediated  by  Heidegger's  philosophy. 
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Perhaps  for 
this  reason  it  is  not  surprising  that  Marcuse's  review  is  much  more  favour- 
able  than  Horkheimer's,  especially  in  view  of  Mannheim's  affinities  with 
phenomenology.  One  may  note  in  passing  that  Adorno's  response  to 
Mannheim's  work  in  this  period  was  also  much  closer  to  Horkhelmer's  than 
Marcuse's. 
Marcuse,  in  his  review, 
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sees  `the  whole  problematic  of  our  present  scien- 
tific  situation  (which  is  itself  the  problematic  of  present  human  existence)' 
"  as  being  presented  in  a  dramatic  fashion  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie,  namely, 
'the  universal  historicity  of  human  existence  and  the  questionable  nature 
of  the  traditional  separation  of  real  and  ideal  being  that  springs  from  it.  1158 
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Marcuse  states  that  he  will  concentrate  his  remarks  upon  one  of  its  problems: 
f 
'the  truth  of  historical  existence'  .  The  sociological  method  of  inter- 
preting  intellectual  phenomena  itself  emerges  out  of  the  scientific  know- 
of  universal  historicity.  Mannheim  presents  a  radical  interpretation  ledge 
of  this  thesis  with  his  notion  of  the  existential  boundedness  and  ideological nature  of  thought,  including  Marxism  itself.  Hence  for  Mannheim,  Marx- 
ism  too  is  seen  as  the  ideology  of  a  particular  social  class'-  the  proletariat. 
Marcuse  sees  a  positive  gain  in  this  interpretation  of  Marxism  since  it 
views  Marxism  as  a  theory  that  relates  back  to  the  social  existence  of  the 
proletariat  and  can  only  be  understood  in  this  manner.  This  is  in  contrast 
to  both  revisionism  and  the  transcendental  -sociological  interpretation  of 
Marxism  (by  Adler)  both  of  which  obscure  this  fact.  -. -  Marcuse  also  sees 
the  advantages  of  this  perspective  as  being  that  it  recognizes  Marxist  theory 
as  a  concrete  theory  of  political  praxis  and  that  this  theory  refers  to  the 
concrete  actuality.  But  Marcuse  goes  on  to  ask  whether  there  are  not 
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dangers  in  this  relativisation  of  Marxism.  in  fact  he  suggests  that  one  could 
it 
counter  with  the  argument  that  'the  concrete  historical`  determination  of  a 
theory  ... 
does  not  say  anything  at  all  about  the  truth  and  validity  of'this 
theory'.  But  Mannheim  shows  that"  the  question  of  the  truth  and  validity  of 
a  ,  historical  theory  cannot  be  solved  by  the  traditional  concept  of  truth  that 
presupposes  an  'ideal,  universal,  timeless  system  detached  from  history  its- 
elf.  What  Mannheim  does  is  to  raise  the  problem  of  the  historical  nature 
of  theories  that  are  a  function  of  the  social  existence  from  which  they  emerge. 
He  provides,  Marcuse  argues,  two  solutions  to  the  problem  of  historical 
"  truth:  that  of  'true  and  false  consciousness'  and  that  of  the  'dynamic 
totality'.  Marcuse  critically  examines  both. 
Mannheim's  first  solution  is  to  suggest  that  consciousness  is  false  when 
f 
it  is  not  in  accord  with  its  realisation  at  a  given  stage  of  existence.  But 
where,  Marcuse  asI  ,  are  the  grounds  for  its  realisation?  Sociology  ig- 
norec  two  aspects  of  the  existential  nature  of  events.  Mannheim,  Marcuse 234 
argues,  'takes  the  particular  historical  stage  of  existence  as  the  ultimate 
datum  that  is  irreducible  and  necessary  for  the  sociological  method'.  But 
if  one  takes  'apparently  stable,  rigid,  unequivocal  stages  of  existence', 
such  as  feudalism  or  early  capitalismjit  is  clear  that  when  one  examines 
them  further  in  their  concrete  actuality  and  not  merely  as  abstract  concept- 
ions,  then  they  appear  as  'in  themselves  dynamic,  fluctuating,  equivocal 
Secondly,  the  sociological  method  ignores  the  'intentional  'element  of  all 
events',  in  the  sense  that  modes  of  existence  are  related  to  something;  % 
historical  situations  realise  something  . that  must  already  be  given  to  them. 
Marcuse  draws  two  implications  for  the  problematic  of  historical  truth 
from1these  considerations.  Firstly,  that  'the  sociological  method  cannot 
take  up  the  historical  stage  of  existence  (Seinstufe)  as  merely  a  given 
foundation  and  make  it  into  the  concrete  instance  for  a  decision  'as  to  truth', 
not  least  because  the  particular  consciousness  is  itself  a  constituent  of 
that  existence.  Secondly,  and  this  is  particularly  important  for  Marxism, 
it  should  be  remembered  that  'the  political-social  stage  of  existence  is 
itself  not  something  ultimate  but  as  a  historical  necessity  can  and  must 
be  transformed'  . 
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In  short,  Mannheim's  first  solution  cannot  be  devel- 
oped  any  further  than  this  point. 
The  second  solution,  that  of  a  'dynamic  synthesis',  maintains  that  each 
particular  theory,  as  an  existentially  bounded  theory,  contains  a  partial 
aspect  of  the  truth.  Hence  a  possible  criterion  for  truth  is  the  compre- 
hensive  synthesis  that  'realises  the  historically  possible  optimum  of  the 
total  view'.  Marcuse  asks  what  the  concrete  presuppositions  are  for  such 
a  synthesis.  These  are  that 235 
'the  theories  dealt  with  were  historically  prior 
and  that  the  new  standpoint  was  historically 
so  situated  that  it  made  possible  the  compre- 
hensive  pe`spective.  Both  presuppositions 
again  represent  the  given  stage  of  existence 
as  the  ultimate  decisive  instance.  The 
second  approach  therefore  leads  back  to  the 
first.  Only  by  presupposing  that  the  partic- 
ular  historical  stage  of  existence  is  also  eo  ipso 
the  historically  "true"  stage  of  existence  can  160 
such  a  synthesis  guarantee  the  optimum  of  truth.  1 
In  contrast,  Marcuse  argues  that  the  historical  stage  of  existence  is  not 
given  as  an  ultimate  foundation  but  also  'transcends  itself'.  However, 
this  in  turn  implies  that  one  cannot  remain  content  merely  with  an  evalu- 
ation  of  consciousness  since,  'in  the  realm  of  history  it  is  not  only  a  con- 
sciousness,  a  line  of  thought,  a  theory  that  is  true  or  false  but  also  a 
concrete  situation  i  tse  If  and  its  mode  of  Ii  fe'  .  Thus  both  consciousness 
and  historical  situations  are  not,  with  reference  to  truth  or  falsity,  of  'equal 
value'.  Valuations  are  already  contained  within  a  particular  historical 
situation  and  its  form  of  life.  In  other  words,  a  historical  situation  already 
contains  valuations  of  it  that  extend  beyond  it  to  what  is  not  immanent  to  it. 
Hence,  once  more,  we  are  confronted  with  the  fact  that  we  can  never  take 
a  particular  mode  of  organising  life  as  a  mere  facticity. 
In  conclusion,  Marcuse  argues  tha  the  problems  that  Mannheim  raises  for 
historical  truth  cannot  be  concluded  as  swiftly  as  Mannheim  does  but  have 
to  be  examined  in  greater  depth.  But  at  least  Mannheim  has  raised  the 
i 
problem  and  been  prepared  to  develop  it  in  all  its  uncertainty. 
In  contrast  to  Marcuse's  critical  but  not  unsympathetic  review,  Horkheimer's 
attack  on  Mannheim's  concept  of  ideology  leaves  little  than  can  be  salvaged 
from  Ideologie  und  Utopie 
16  like 
Plessner,  Horkheimer  is  concerned  with 236 
the  inversion  and  distortion  of  Marx's  original  concept  of  ideology  in  Mann- 
heim's  sociology  of  knowledge.  In  Marx's  case, 
'the  purpose  of  his  science  was  not  knowledge 
of  a  "totality"  or  a  total  and  absolute  truth, 
but  the  transformation  of  specific  social  cir- 
cumstances.  In  connection  with  this  purpose, 
philosophy  too  was  criticised  but  without  putti 
a  new  metaphysics  in  the  place  of  the  old.  ' 
This,  Horkhe  i  mer  later  seeks  to  show,  is  precisely  what  Mannheim  intends- 
though  one  may  note  in  passing  here  that  the  critique  of  the  centrality  of 
the  totality  is  Also  an  imp  licit  criticism  of  Lukäcs. 
Horkheimer  argues  that  Mannheim  radicalizes  and  generalises  the  concept 
of  ideology  in  -the  direction  of  a  'correspondence'  between  group  situation 
and  modes  of  cognition,  evaluation  and  action  (i.  e.  not  merely  the  'content' 
of  thought).  Similarly,  whereas  the  original  total  concept  of  ideology  was 
bound  up  with  the  political  particular  concept,  for  Mannheim  the  concept  of 
false  consciousness  is  generalised.  This  new  'value-free'  application  of 
the  concept  of  ideology  leads  to  'a  new  separation  of  intellectual  systems 
with  reference  to  their  truth'.  Their  degree  of  agreement  with  the  existing 
stage  of  reality  is  the  norm  for  deciding  their  truth-value.  Hence,  tho  con- 
temporary  crisis  lies  in  the  fact  that  each  competing  'system  of  life'  is 
'particular',  even  though  each  claims  to  represent  the  totality. 
This  'new'  concept  of  ideology  operates  within  a  totally  different  context 
It  when  compared  with  Marx  Is  concept  since 
'Marx  wished  to  transform  philosophy  into  a 
positive  science  and  into  praxis,  the  sociology 
of  knowledge  pursues  a  philosophical'  final 
purpose.  The  problem  of  absolute  truth,  its 
form  and  its  content,  disturbs  it;  it  sees  its mission  in  its  illumination.  The  ever- 
deeper  insight  into  the  change  in  all  meta- 
physical  decisions  ...  itself  becomes  a 
metaphysical  procedure.  1  163 
Horkheimer  here  suggests  that  Mannheim's  preoccupation  with  the  change 
237 
in  intellectual  forms  as  'the  essence  of  man'  indeed  restores  a  metaphysical 
intnetion  that  is  reminiscent,  as  we  have  seen,  of  Dilthey's  philosophy  of 
history.  But  ultimately  Mannheim  has  recourse  to  ahistorical  elements 
such  as  '  ecstacy'  ,  to  a  metaphysics  of  history  which  his  own  theory  of 
ideology  would  negate  as  being  ideological.  Marx's  critique  of  ideology, 
on  the  other  hand,  was  directed  against  metaphysics,  against  viewing  the 
'essence',  man,  as  the  subject  of  history  and  against  viewing  history  as 
a  harmonious  totality.  Rather  Marx  viewed  history  as  the  result  of 
'processes  that  grow  out  of  the  highly  contradictory  relationships  in  human 
society'  and  not  as  composed  of  competing  world  views.  At  the  root  of 
Mannheim's  sociology  of  knowledge,  however,  lies  an  'idealist  convict- 
ion'  which  results  in  the  restoration  of  the  metaphysics  of  history. 
This  is  the  context  within  which  Mannheim's  radicalisation  of  the  concept 
of  ideology  can  be  understood.  There  is  little  doubt  that  the  concept  has 
been  so  generalised  as  to  no  longer  have  any  specific  content.  It  has  also 
been  removed  from  the  realm  of  political  critique.  It  no  longer  refers  to 
, 
'individual  theories  and  evaluations  of  opposing  parties  but  Immediately 
to  the  whole  of  consciousness'.  Mannheim's  notion  of  ideology  replaces 
It  any  psychology  of  interests  by  a  structural  analysis.  -  But  what  this 
analysis  consists  of  is  unclear.  Systems  of  world-views  are  presumably 
viewed  as  developing  not  out  of  'the  real  life-situation  of  human  beings' 
but  as  being  bound  up  with  'specific  social  strata'  .  In  a  similar  vein, 238 
the  system  of  world-views  also  includes  a  specific  'economic  intention' 
(Wirtschaftswollen)  but  there  is  never.  any  suggestion  that  social  or  econ- 
omic  processes  determine  the  intellectual  totality.  RatherýMannheim 
searches  'for  "correspondence  of  form"  between  the  social'situation  and 
the  world-view  totality  conceived  roughly  in  the  sense  of  . an  "ideal  type"  I. 
For  Horkheimer,  this  notion  of  totality  is  also  problematical  since  he 
suggests  that  Mannheim  conceives  of  it  in  the  form  of  'a  superficial  con- 
cept  of  Gestalt'.  This  implies  that  one  can  understand  a  world  view  in  terms 
of  its  intellectual  form  in  an  immanent  and  intuitive  manner.  This,  Hork- 
heimer  argues,  is  an  'idealist  illusion'. 
In  turn,  this  raises  the  question  of  the  nature  of  the  existential  boundednoss 
and  the  nature  of  this  'existence'  itself  in  Mannheim's  sociology  of  know- 
ledge.  For  instance,  despite  Mannheim's  insistence  that  the  intellectual 
sphere  is  closely  bound  up  with  social  classes, 
'still  his  idealist  endeavour  to  think  of  intellect- 
ual  processes  untarnished  by  the  crude  power 
struggles  of  real  human  beings  is  so  strong  that 
each  indefinite  connection  between  being  and 
consciousness  actually  appears  as  a  merely  ex- 
ternal  juxaposition,  even  as  fateful  submission. 
For  him  there  exists  the  crude  struggles  of  the 
historical  every  day  world  and  also  alongside 
them  the  conflicts  between  "systems  of  world- 
views".  '  164 
This  can  only  be  because  Mannheim  lacks  a  comprehensive  theory  of  the 
concrete  structuring  of  society  that  can  locate  this  'being'  and  these 
0  'world  views'.  Otherwise,  'without  such  a  theory,  the  expression 
Sei  nsgebunden  remains  completely  without  content'.  Mannheim  does 
make  reference  to  specific  groups  in  society  but  an  account  of  their  deter- 
mination  in  turn  remains  unclear. 239 
Obviously,  this  has  consequences  for  his  notion  of  truth  -  the  criteria  can 
now  only  be  whether  thought  is  appropriate  to  its  'times'.  But,  Hork- 
heimer  argues,  this  is  a  completely  arbitrary  standard  since  there  exists 
no  means  of  deciding  whether  thought  is  appropriate  to  its  times,  i.  e. 
whether  it  is  Zeitgemässig.  This  is  all  the  more  remarkable  in  view  of 
Mannheim's  intention  of  providing  a  'diagnosis  of  the  times'  which,  based 
as  it  is  on  idealist  presuppositions, 
'must  provide  a  highly  one-sided  picture: 
it  certainly  advances  the  claim  that  from 
it  "our  total  existential  and  intellectual 
situation"  will  be  grasped  "in  a  cross  sect- 
ion",  but  this  cross  section  leaves  the 
most  important  parts  of  social  reality  un- 
disturbed.  '  165 
Even  where  Mannheim  does  take  up  a  specific  mode  of  thought  and  attempt 
to  locate  it  socially  and  historically--  as  in  his  essay  on  conservative 
thought; 
'few  indications  are  to  be  found  as  to  the  conn- 
ections  between  the  intellectual  group  categories 
as  "conservative"  and  social  reality.  The 
historical  circumstances  of  the  agents  of  his 
thought,  their  relations  to  other  social  strata 
and  the  total  political  situation  are  only  occas- 
ionally  sketched  out,  as  if  the  "conservative" 
world  image  were  intellegible  at  all  without 
the  most  careful  study  of  these  states  of  affairs. 
The  whole  work  limits  itself  almost  exclusively 
to  "phenomenological  -  logical  analysis  of  style", 
"immanent  analysis  of  world-views",  analysis 
of  "experience",  analyses  of  the  common 
currents  of  diverse  intellectual  styles  and  simi- 
lar  sounding  analyses  of  intellectual  forms.  '  166 
In  conclusion,  Horkheimer  argues  that  Mannheim's  sociology  of  knowledge, 
whilst  utilizing  'a  highly  "radical"  language  and  Marxist  intellectual  means' 
ultimately  leads  to  the  transformation  of  'existing  contradictions  into  the 
oppositions  of  ideas,  "intellectual  styles"  and  systems  of  world  views'. 240' 
It  should  be  apparent  from  this  brief  overview  of  Marxist  and  neo-Marxist 
responses  to  Ideologie  und  Utopie  that  all  the  reviewers  felt  the  necessity 
for  a  serious  confrontation  between  Marxism  and  Mannheim's  sociology 
of  knowledge  and  especially  his  introduction  of  a  'new'  concept  of  ideal- 
ogy.  Perhaps  more  surprising  is  the  fact  thatwriters  like  Lewalter  and 
Marcuse,  despite  substantial  criticisms,  should  feel  that  the  sociology 
of  knowledge  does  have  something  valuable  to  contribute  to  an  understand- 
ing  of  problems  already  raised  within  the  Marxist  tradition.  That  is,  some 
reviewers  saw  Mannheim's  work  as  containing  something  more  than  a  Mark- 
ist  rhetoric. 
Within  the  Marxist  tradition  itself,  what  is  noticable  about  these  reviews 
is  the  relative  absence  of  references  to  the  work  of  Luk9cs  (and  Korsch) 
on  ideology.  One  might  have  expected  that  their  accounts  would  be  taken 
up  in  defence  of  a  radical  critique  of  ideology.  In  the  case  of  orthodox 
Marxist  reviews  this  is  less  surprising  since  both  writers  were  not  in  fav- 
our  in  this  period.  Hence,  from  the  orthodox  Marxist  standpoint  of  Fogarasi, 
for  example,  it  is  possible  to  link  Lukacst  work  with  the  general  proble- 
matic  within  which  Mannheim  himself  operates.  But  there  is  hardly  a 
suggestion  that  a  Marxist  account  of  ideology  might  deal  with  the  problem 
of  reification  and  commodity  fetishism,  even  within  the  neo-Marxist  camp. 
This  is  indeed  all  the  more  surprising  in  view  of  the  subsequent  concen- 
tration  upon  commodity  exchange  as  a  central  motif  in  the  critique  of  cul- 
tune  by  members  of  the  Frankfurt  School.  However  that  may  be,  a  key 
feature  of  these  reviews  must  remain  the  reluctance  to  take  up  the  critique 
of  ideology  from  Lukacs'standpoint  as  a  counter  to,  or  alternative  to  the 241 
sociology  of  knowledge.  Hence,  when  reviewers  in  the  Marxist  tradition 
took  up  Mannheim's  theory  of  ideology  hey  compared  it  not  with  Lukäcs' 
account  but  with  that  of  Marx.  Al  I  of  them,  to  a  greater  or  lesser  degree, 
found  substantial  differences  between  Mannheim's  and  Marx's  accounts  of 
ideology.  Only  an  inadequate  knowledge  of  Marx's  work  could  therefore 
promp  Otto  Neurath  to  characterise  Mannheim's  work  as  'bourgeois  Marx- 
ism' 
167_ 
an  epithet  that  has  also  been  used  subsequently  to  describe 
the  work  of  many  other  writers  and  even  sociology  itself. 
V 
In  conclusion,  it  seems  plausible  to  argue  that,  despite  the  extent  to  which 
most  of  the  writers  on  the  sociology  of  knowledge  both  had  a  poor  knowledge 
of  Marx's  work  and  very  often  distanced  themselves  from  it,  nonetheless 
the  'ghost  of  Marx'  was  present  at  al  I  three  debates'  This  is,  of  course, 
most  obvious  in  the  case  of  the  reviews  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie  but  also 
true  of  the  Scheler-Adler  debate  and  the  discussion  of  Mannheim's  paper 
on  competition.  The  opposition  between  the  sociology  of  knowledge  and 
the  critique  of  ideology  -  most  consistently  advanced  by  members  of  the 
Frankfurt  School  -  can  also  be  seen  in  the  light  of  the  reviews  of  Ideologie 
und  Utopie,  to  be  not-  their  sole  preserve.  Indeed,  it  would  be  possible  to 
construct  of  devastating  critique  of  Mannheim's  work  -  even  Ironically, 
in  the  spirit  of  his  yearning  for  a  synthesis  -  by  bringing  together  all  the 
critical  comments  made  in  the  reviews  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie.  Interest- 
ingly  enough,  Mannheim  very  quickly  abandoned  his  'Marxist'  rhetoric 
after  1929.  His  subsequent  writings  do  not  betray  those  traces  of  Marxist 242  ýý; 
terminology  that  no  doubt  prompted  his  reviewers  to  pose  the  question  of 
the  relationship  between  the  sociology.  of  knowledge  and  Marx's  critique 
of  ideology.  Nonetheless,  the  fact  remains  that  the  interest  in  the 
sociology  of  knowledge  in  Weimar  Germany  reached  a  peak  in  the  period 
1929-32-  if  reviews  and  contributions  are  any.  indication  of  interest.  This 
interest,  of  course,  coincides  with  the  development  in  Germany  of  a  crisis 
that  was  more  deep-rooted  than  Mannheim's  'intellectual  crisis'.  But 
the  manner  in  which  Mannheim  posed  some  of  the  problems  in  the  sociology 
of  knowledge  -  of  the  competition  and  then  concentration  of  ideologies, 
for  example  -  did  coincide,  firstly,  with  the  increased  fragmentation  of  pol- 
itical  parties  and  ideologies  and  then,  after  1929,  with  an  increased  polar- 
isation  of  political  parties  and  ideologies.  Similarly,  many  commentators 
have  pointed  to  the  striving  for  a  synthesis  of  perspectives  in  the  humanities 
and  social  sciences,  the  proliferation  of  'paradigms'  in  philosophy  through- 
out  the-Weimar  period  and  especially  after  the  'relative  stabilization'  of 
German  society  from,  1924  until  1929.  It  was  in  this  latter  period,  Lukäcs 
later  argued,  that  Scheler's  sociology  of  knowledge  found  its  greatest 
168 
resonance. 
"  However,  all  this  seems  to  suggest  that  contributions  to  the  sociology  of 
knowledge  were  merely  provided  by  Scheler  and  Mannheim.  Whilst  it  Is 
true  that  they  remain  the  two  central  figures  in  Weimar  Germany  responsible 
for  stimulating  an  interest  in  this  area,  many  other,  writers  did  make  sig- 
nificant  contributions.  Unfortunately,  it  is  not  possible  to  give  an,  account 
of  all  the  various  studies  in  this  field  but  a  brief  mention  of  some  of  them 
should  at  least  suffice  to.  show  that  there  was  considerable  interest  in  the 
problems  raised  by  the  sociology  of  knowledge.  This  interest  was  dis- 243 
played  in  a  variety  of  fields  and  directions.  In  the  early  period  of  Euro- 
pean  crisis  down  to  1923,  several  contributions  appeared  on  the  problem 
of  ideology.  Most  noteworthy  are  Szende's  article  on  'Masking  and  De- 
masking', 
169 
which  tends  to  take  a  psychological  standpoint  in  relation 
to  ideology;  Otto  Bauer's  'World  Image  of  Capitalism' 
170 
which  is 
written  from  the  Austro-Marxist  standpoint  and  Korsch's  'Marxism  and 
Philosophy' 
171 
essay.  Szende  was  also  one  of  the  few  writers  to  take  up 
.  the  relationship  between  natural  science  and  social  structure  with  articles 
on  scientific  systems, 
172 
the  theory  of  relativity 
173 
and  an  attempt  at  a 
sociological  theory  of  abstraction. 
174 
The  discussion  of  the  problem  of 
i 
ideology  prior  to  Mannheim's 
_Ideologie 
und  Utopie  can  also  be  found  in 
Gottfried  Salomon's  study  of  the  relationship  between  historical  material- 
ism 
175 
and  the  study  of  ideology  and  in  Ziegler's  article  on  ideology, 
176 
the  only  article  in  the  period  and  in  this  area  which  makes  substantive  use 
of  Pareto's  account  of  ideology.  One  source  of  a  variety  of  contributions 
to  the  sociology  of  knowledge  is,  of  course,  Scheler's  edited  collection 
published  in  1924.177  As  an  indication  of  the  variety  of  works  it  contain- 
ed  we  may  cite  Jerusalem's  study  of  the  sociological  determination  of 
thought 
178_ 
perhaps  the  only  orthodox  positivist  standpoint  which  makos 
reference  to  French  work  in  the  Durkheim  school  -,  Plessnerts  study  of  the 
organisation  of  modern  research 
179 
and  Paul  Honigsheim's  various  con- 
tributions,  for  example,  on  the  unity  of  styles  in  economic  and  intellect- 
ual  culture. 
180 
Contributions  to  the  sociology  of  knowledge  did  not  merely 
come  from  sociologists  and  those  in  the  Marxist  tradition.  Sometimes 
philosophers  themselves  ventured  into  this  field.  Here  the  most  notable 
instance  is  Landsberg's  outline  of  a  sociology  of  epistemology. 
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These  and  other  contributions,  together  with  the  'debates'  surrounding 
the  sociology  of  knowledge  in  this  period,  should  indicate  the  extent  to 
which  this  area  of  study  attracted  considerable  interest  within  sociology 
and,  often,  outside  its  boundaries.  Perhaps  this  interest  outside  sociol- 
ogy  was  itself  an  indication  of  the  problematical  position  of  the  sociology 
of  knowledge  itself  which  many  saw  as  not  merely  another  branch  of 
sociology  (like  the  sociology  'of'  the  family  or  'of'  industry)  but  also  as 
a  more  fundamental  area  of  study  -  even  as  a  Grundwissenschaft.  It  is  to 
the  role  and  significance  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  that  we  must  now 
turn. 
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CHAPTER  SIX- 
In  the  course  of  the  final  chapter  of  this  study,  it  will  not  be  possible  to 
examine  alI  the  problems  raised  by  the  German  tradition  in  the  sociology  of 
knowledge.  Rather,  an  attempt  will  be  made  to  bring  together,  and  into 
sharper  focus,  some  of  the  issues  that  are  either  present  in  the  works  of  the 
major  writers  in  this  tradition  -  and  especially  in  Mannheim's  works  -  or 
which  were  raised  by  their  contemporaries.  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  one 
must  remain  restricted  by  their  problematics  but,  as  we  shall  see,  some  of 
the  key  issues  raised  by  later  commentators  do  indeed  have  their  origin  in 
contemporary  discussions. 
In  the  previous  chapter,  which  sought  for  survey  some  of  the  contributions  to 
the  various  debates  and  controversies  surrounding  the  sociology  of  knowledge 
in  Weimar  Germany,  a  number  of  issues  were  raised  which  require  further  ex- 
amination.  It  has  already  been  shown  that  the  relationship  between  the 
sociology  of  knowledge  and  Marxism  was  raised  not  only  in  the  debates  at 
the  German  Sociological  Association  congresses  of  1924  and  1928  but  that, 
when  we  examined  the  reviews  of  Mannheim's  Ideologie  und  Utopie,  this 
issue  received  a  firmer  focus.  in  particular,  the  relationship  between  the 
sociology  of  knowledge  and  Marx's  theory  of  ideology  was  raised  not  merely, 
as  one  might  expect,  by  writers  already  committed  to  a  Marxist  position  but 
0 
also  by  many  others  too.  In  part,  this  is  a  necessary  consequence  of  Mann- 
heims  own  claims  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie  to  have  replaced  Marx's  theory 
of  ideology  with  a  sociology  of  knowledge.  Much  more  indirectly,  Scheler, 
too,,  sought  to  demonstrate  the  superiority  of  his  sociology  of  knowledge  to 255 
what  he  took  to  be  a  critique  of  ideology  that  was  very  restricted  in  its  scope. 
In  his  study  of  the  reception  of  Marx's  work  in  the  sociology  of  knowledge, 
Lenk  seeks  to  expose  the  differences  between  the  sociology  of  knowledge  and 
the  critique  of  ideology,  not  just  by  a  confrontation  of  the  sociology  of  know- 
ledge  with  Marx's  own  critique  of  ideology  but  also  by  means  of  an  exam  i  n- 
ation  of  theMarxism  of  the  Second  International. 
1 
In  the  course  of  his 
study,  -Lenk  fails  to  examine  two  areas  of  concern  in  this  connection.  Firstly, 
he  ignores  the  relationship  between  Mannheim's  sociology-and  Lukacs'  criti- 
que  of  ideology.  -  This  may  possibly  be  because  he  assumes  Lukäcs  I  work 
to  be  a  genuine  extension  of  Marx's  critique  of  ideology.  But  as  we  have 
already  seen,  there  are  many  aspects  of  Lukäcs'  work  which  have  their  origin 
not  in  Marx's  work  but-in  that  of  contemporary  German  sociologists  and  phil- 
osophers:  }  More  recent  Iy,  -however,  Kett  Ier  has  suggested  that  Mannheim's 
sociology  of  knowledge  may  be'seen  in  general  terms  as  a  confrontation  with 
Lukäcs'  critique  of  ideology. 
2 
Even  more  specifically,  'Huaco  has  sought 
to  draw'the  parallels  between  Lukdcs'  Geschichte  und  Klassenbewusstsein 
and  Mannheim's  Ideologie  und  Utopie. 
3 
Other  writers  such  as  Gabel4  and, 
5 
on  occasion,  Goldmann,  have  sought  to  argue  not  for.  the  confrontation  of 
the  two  traditions  but  rather  their  similarities.  The  relationship  between 
Lukäcs  and  Mannheim  must,  therefore,  be  re-examined. 
In  contrast,  Horkheimer's  review  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie  was  merely  the 
first  of  a  series  of  articles  and  references  to  Mannheim's  sociology  of  know- 
ledge  from.  the  standpoint  of  the  Frankfurt  School  that  aimed  to  argue  for  the 
4 
radical  opposition  between  the  sociology  of  knowledge  and  Marx's  critique 
6 
of  ideology.  Lenk's  study,  as  he  himself  admits,  falls  within  this  tradition. 256 
However  -  and  this  is  the  second  of  Lenk's  ommi  ssi  ons  -  he  fails  to  quest- 
ion  Marx's  own  critique  of  ideology.  Instead,  this  is  taken  as  a  given 
starting  point  that  seems,  for  Lenk,  to  be  completely  unproblematical. 
7 
What  this  implies  for  his  interpretation  of  Marx's  critique  of  ideology  is  that 
he  adheres  to  the  earlier  Frankfurt  School  tradition  of  Horkheimer  and  Adorno 
which  tended  on  occasion  to  take  Marx's  critique  of  political  economy,  for 
example,  as  a  model  of  critical  theory  and,  more  importantly  as  an  unproble- 
matical  model,.  More  recently,  and  still  -  questionably  -  within  the  broader 
confines  of  the  tradition  of  critical  theory,  writers  like  Habermass  and  Apel 
have  sought  to  reconstruct  the  methodological  foundations  of  the  notion  of 
critique  itself.  In  particular,  they  have  sought  to  re-examine  the  relation- 
ship  between  a  critique  of  ideology  and  hermeneutics. 
8 
Within  this  context 
and  this  tradition,  B6hler,  for  example,  has  attempted  a  'metacritique'  of 
Marx's  critique  of  ideology. 
9 
If  we  at  least  accept  for  the  moment  the 
plausibility  of  this  re-examination  of"the  foundations  of  a  critique  of  ideology, 
then  it  raises  the  issue  -  in  terms  of  our  present  concerns  -  as  to  whether  one 
can  simply  compare  the  sociology  of  knowledge  with  a  critique  of  ideology 
(Marx's)  that  can  be  taken  as  an  unquestioned  given.  Therefore,  the  second 
task  of  this  chapter  will  be  to  investigate,  within  this  wider  context,  the 
relationship  between  the  sociology  of  knowledge  and  a  'Marxist'  critique  of 
ideology. 
0 
In  the  course  of  this  investigation,  we  shall  be  confronted  with  a  third  issue 
that  has  already  suggested  itself  in  our  discussion  of  Mannheim's  work  in 
particular.  At  least  in  their  intentions,  most  writers  within  this  tradition 
of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  -  and  Wilhelm  Jerusalem  is  the  only  promin- 
ent  exception  -  adopted  an  anti-positivist  stance.  This  is  true  of  Scheler 257 
and  Mannheim  -  again,  in  terms  of  their  intentions  at  least  -  as  well  as 
Lukäcs,  if  one  is  to  include  him  here.  More  specifically,  Mannheim,  at 
various  stages  in  his  development,  advanced  the  view  ,  that  the  sociology  of 
knowledge  could  also  contribute  towards  a  new  methodology  in  the  social 
sciences.  Indeed,  at  times,  he  even  went  so  far  as  to  suggest  that  the 
sociology  of  knowledge  itself  constituted  a  new  foundational  discipline  for 
the  social  sciences.  As  we  have  seen,  Mannheim's  attempt  to  develop  an 
alternative  methodological  framework  was  evident  not  merely  in  his  earlier 
writings  on  problems  of  interpretation  (in  particular,  the  analysis  of  world- 
views)  but  also,  and  above  all,  in  the  second  of  his  two  unpublished  studies, 
Eine  soziologische  Theorie  der  Kultur  und  ihrer  Erkennbarkeit.  There,  Mann- 
heim  quite  explicitly  set  out  to  locate  his  sociology  of  knowledge  within  the 
context  of  the  Methodenstreit.  In  the  course  of  the  development  his  altern- 
ative  methodological  programme  for  the  human  sciences  within  this  study, 
Mannheim  sought  to  develop  the  rudiments  of  a  theory  of  conjunctive  and 
communicative  knowledge  that,  in  soma  respects  at  least,  is  not  dissimilar 
from  recent  work  by  Habermas.  and  Apel  in  this  area.  An  examination  of  the 
methodological  and  foundational  aims  and  claims  of  the  sociology  of  know- 
ledge  is  not  merely  important  in  its  own  right  but  also  forms  a  link  with  the 
second  of  the  issues  that  must  be  examined  in  more  detail. 
Within  a  wider  context,  it  is  possible  to  argue  that  the  sociology  of  knowledge 
in  Weimar  Germany  is  not  merely  a  confrontation  with  alMarxist'  critique 
of  ideology,  but  is  also  a  continuation,  in  a  different  form,  of  the  Methoden- 
streit  and  Werturteitsstreit  within  the  social  sciences  in  Germany.  In  some 
of  its  aims,  at  least,  and  in  some  of  the  questions  that  it  posed,  this  trad- 
ition  in  the  sociology  of  knowledge  has  affinities  with  the  kind  of  projects  in 258 
this  area  that  have  been  more  recently  attempted  in  Germany.  The  mode 
of  posing  these  questions,  however,  must  be  placed  within  the  context  of 
the  sociology  of  knowledge's  wider  meta-theoretical  aims. 
One  need  not  seek  out  the  opinions  of  subsequent  commentators  in  order  to 
confirm  Lukäcs'  significance  for  Mannheim's  development  of  a  sociology 
of  knowledge.  Aside  from  the  references  to  his  work  -  the  Heidelberger 
Ästhetik  in  his  earlier  writings  and  Geschichte  und  Klassenbewusstsein  after 
1923'-  we  have  Mannheim's  own  estimation  of  Lukacs'  contribution  to  the 
sociology  of  knowledge  in  his  article  on  'Wissenssoziologie'  published  in 
1931.10  There,  Mannheim  gives  prominence  to  only  two  contemporary  writers 
-  Max  Scheler  and  Georg  Lukäcs  -  as  being  significant  for  the  development 
of  a  sociology  of  knowledge.  Of  Lukäcs'  contribution,  Mannheim  writes: 
'The  sociology  of  knowledge  method  was  refined  ... 
through  Lukäcs  who  adheres  to  Marx  and  who  articulates 
the  fruitful  Hegelian  elements  in  his  work  and  in  this 
manner  arrived  at  a  very  fertile,  constructive  and  dog- 
matised  solution  to  the  problem,  but  one  that  suffers 
from  the  one-sidedness  and  dangers  of  a  specific 
philosophy  of  history  conception.  Lukäcs  remained 
fully  within  Marx's  conception  in  sofar  as  he  failed 
to  separate  the  problem  of  unmasking  ideologies 
from  the  sociology  of  knowledge.  '  11 
Despite  Mannheim's  criticism  of  Lukäcs  here,  it  remains  true  that  he  saw 
Lukacs  as  a  significant  contributor  to  the  development  of  the  sociology  of 
knowledge.  However,  what  is  at  issue  here  is  not  so  much  the  fact  that 
Mannheim  is  indebted  to  Lukäcs  but  whether  his  own  work  on  ideology  is 
an  attempt,  specifically,  to  go  beyond  LukäcsI  position  in  Geschichte  und 
Klassenbewusstsein.  One  need  not  argue  that  Mannheim  is  engaged  upon 259 
the  same  kind  of  project  as  Lukacs  in  order  to  maintain  that  his  own  Ideologie 
und  Utopie  represents,  in  part,  a  confrontation  with  Lukäcs'  work. 
This  has  been  argued  most  forcibly  by  Huaco12  who  takes  as  his  point  of 
departure  for  the  thesis  that  Mannheim's  major  work  is  a  confrontation  with 
Lukacs'  the  argument  from  Lichtheim's  account  of  the  development  of  ideology. 
There,  Lichtheim  argues  that 
'Ideology  and  Utopia  (1929)  was  the  positivist's' 
rejoinder  to  History  and  Class  Consciousness  (1923). 
Mannheim  ...  adapted  what  he  could  use  for  his 
own  purpose,  which  was  frankly  "theoretical"  in 
the  contemplative  sense  condemned  by  Lukäcs  ..  .' 
Ideology  and  Utopia  is  full  of  passages  which  reflect 
its  author's  awareness  of  the  issues  Lukäcs  had 
stirred  up  a  few  years  earlier  ...  Mannheim's 
position  can  be  defined  very  precisely  as  an  amal- 
gam  ...  of  Weber  and  Lukäcs.  '  13 
Though  Lichtheim  does  not  substantiate  this  claim,  an  attempt  is  made  by 
Huaco  to  outline  the  similarity  'at  a  formal'  between  the  two  works.  Huaco 
proceeds  to  outline  what  he  takes  to  be  the  central  arguments  of  the  two 
writers.  In  Lukäcs'  case,  Huaco  argues  that 
'1  He  merges  Marx's  theory  of  ideology  and  Engel's 
doctrine  of  false  consciousness.  In  this  merger, 
he  suggests  that  "false  consciousness"  is  a  typical 
case  of  "ideology". 
2.  He  replaces  Marx's  theory  of  truth  as  correspondence 
or  empirical  verification  with  Hegel  's  doctrine  that 
"the  truth  is  the  Whole"  ... 
3  Lukdcs  adds  Hegel  Is  doctrine  that  the  "truth"  or 
"whole"  is  a  historical  emergent. 
4...  the  "false"  component  of  "false  consciousness" 
...  Is  generalised  illegitimately  :  All  knowledge 
in  all  class  societies  in  history  is  declared  to  be  false. 
5..  '.  the  statement  that  all  knowledge  in  bourgeois 
society  is  false  includes  LukIcs'  statement  to-that 
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6...  each  historical  class  has  less  "false  con- 
sciousness"  than  the  previous  class.  But  only 
the  "last  class"  -  the  proletariat  -  has  access 
to  the  "whole"  or  "truth".  Therefore  only  the 
proletariat  has  the  potential  capacity  to  transc- 
end  "false  consciousness".  .. 
7...  this  potential  capacity  to  transcend  "false 
consciousness"  (or  "ideology")  is  not  actualized 
in  proletarians  as  such,  but  only  in  party  intell- 
ectuals  such  as  Lukäcs.  '  14 
The  difficulties  inherent  in  Huaco's  account  of  Lukäcs'  argument  in  History 
and  Class  Consciousness  lie  in  his  own  acceptance  of  a  positivist  inter- 
pretati  on  of  Marx  and  Lukäcs  (having  already  castigated  Lichtheim  for  his 
gratuitous  use  of  the  notion  'positivist').  In  so  doing,  it  is  possible  to 
bring  Lukäcs  much  closer  to  Mannheim  than  is  the  case.  Nonetheless, 
H  uaco  does  point  to  some  central.  problems  in  Lukacs'  argument  and,  in 
particular,  his  attempted,  escape  from  a  position  of  total  reification  of  con- 
sciousness.  Huaco  also  points  to  the  diachronic  nature  of  Lukäcs'  argu- 
ment  as  opposed  to  the  synchronic  argument  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie  which, 
according  to  Huaco,  runs  as  follows: 
We  can  distinguish  the  "particular"  or  "purely 
psychological"  conception  of  ideology  from  a 
"more  inclusive"  or  "total"  version  ... 
2  Mannheim  erroneously  attributes  both  the  "particular" 
and  the  "total"  conception  of  ideology  to  Marx  ... 
3  Mannheim's  next  move  is  to  generalize  the  "total" 
conception  of  ideology  into  ...  the  "general"  or 
"general  total"  conception  ... 
4  Mannheim  escapes  the  paradox  of  the  Cretan  by 
shifting  his  allegiance  to  Hegel  's  version  of 
truth  as  logical  coherence,  and  by  appealing  to 
the  Hegelian  "totality"  or  "whole"  ... 
5...  only  the  "socially  unattached  intelligentsia" 
can  escape  ideology  and  know  the  "whole  truth" 
because  it  is  "relatively  classless"  ...  1  15 
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The  apparent  similarities  between  the  two  sets  of  arguments  advanced  by 
Lukacs  and  Mannheim  -  and  these  similarities  are  certainly  in  evidence  in 
this  reconstruction  -  hide  significant  differences.  Huaco  alludes,  as  we 
have  seen  'to  the  diachronic  and  synchronic  arguments  of  Lukäcs  and  Mann- 
heim  respectively.  The  dynamic  and  static  accounts  of  ideology  are  evident 
in  Lukäcs  and  Mannheim's  arguments.  But  Mannheim's  own  intention  was, 
as'  we  have  seen,  to  provide  a  dynamic  account.,  This  dynamic  element 
was  derived  from  the  meta-theoretical  philosophy  of  history  that  underlay 
his  theory  of  utopian  consciousness.  In  order  to  compare  Lukäcs'  and  3 
Mannheim's  accounts  of  ideology  more  fully,  it  would  be  necessary  to  in- 
elude  this  aspect.  Furthermore,  since  Huaco  relies  upon  the  English  trans- 
lation  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie,  he  does  not  point  to  the  strong  emphasis  upon 
the  problem  of  false  consciousness  in  the  original.  This  would,  in  fact, 
bring  Mannheim's  arguments  closer  thematically  to  those  of  Lukäcs.  But 
the  reduction  of  the  two  arguments  to  the  simple  propositions  outlined  by 
Huaco,  hides  both  the  manner  in  which  the  two  writers  arrive  at  these 
'propositions'  and  the  presuppositions  that  lie  behind  them.  For  instance, 
Huaco  assumes  that  both  Lukäcs  and  Mannheim  take  up  a  Hegelian  don- 
ception  of  totality.  But,  as  Schmidt  has  argued, 
'A  dominant  theme  ...  in  Mannheim's  work 
is  a  conception  of  a  social  totality  which  com- 
pletely  subordinates  each  of  its  parts  to  the 
whole  and  which  can  be  theoretically  recon- 
structed  only  by  a  surpassing  of  any  one  part 
by  the  series  of  remaining  parts.  The  meta- 
phor  which  Mannheim  employs  constantly  ... 
is  that  of  perspectives  opening  onto  an  object, 
an  adequate  perception  of  the  object  must  in- 
clude  as  many  perspectives  as  possible.  '  16 
This  is  overlooked  in  Huaco's  schematic  outline,  as  is  the  significance  of 
perspectival  knowledge  for  Mannheim. 262 
Nonetheless,  the  centrality  of  the  problem  of  false  consciousness  in  Ideologie 
und  Utopie  and  the  retention  of  the  notion  of  totality  -  even  though  reduced, 
in  fact,  to  a  static,  almost  quantitative  concept  -  do  suggest  that  Mannheim 
was  attempting  to  confront  Luk4cs'  earlier  arguments  and  go  beyond  them. 
Mannheim  did  maintain  that  his  sociology  of  knowledge,  which  was  to  be 
empirically  based,  transcended  the  narrow  boundaries  of  a  critique  of  ideol- 
ogy.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  equally  certain  that  Mannheim  had  other  aims 
in  Ideologie  und  Utopie  than  a  confrontation  with  Lukäcs.  He  did  assume 
that  he  was  contributing  to  the  construction  of  a  new  foundation  for  human 
scientific  knowledge  as  well  as  providing  the  basis  for  a  'diagnosis  of  the 
times'.  But  then  LukScs'  own  diagnosis  of  the  times,  and  especially  his 
assessment  of  the  revolutionary  potential  of  the  proletariat,  was  also  central 
-  even  if,  in  its  concrete  details,  it  remained  implicit  -  to  his  own  project. 
If  it  can  be  argued  that  Mannheim  confronted  Lukacs'  central  arguments  in 
Geschichte  und  Klassenbewusstsein  -  and  felt  compelled  to  confront  them  - 
in  order  to  develop  his  own  sociology  of  knowledge,  then  it  is  probably  no 
less  true  that,  in  some  areas  at  least,  the  early  Frankfurt  School  members 
used  Mannheim's  central  arguments  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie  as  a  point  of 
confrontation  with  which  to  develop  their  own  theory  of  ideology.  It  has 
already  been  seen  that  Horkheimer,  for  example,  provided  a  highly  critical 
review  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie  in  1930.17  In  the  same  year,  and  less  wel  i 
known,  Horkheimer  published  a  short  study  of  the  origins  of  the  bourgeois 
philosophy  of  history. 
18 
This  brief  study,  the  preface  to  which  was  written 
in  January  1930  (i.  e.  not  long  after  the  publication  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie), 
is  in  many  ways  a  confrontation  with  Mannheim's  Ideologie  und  Utopie  but, 
unlike  the  review  article  of  the  same  year,  within  the  context  of  Horkheimer's 
own  concerns. 263  1 
Within  the  context  of  a  study  of  the  philosophy  of  history  of  Machiavelli, 
Hobbes,  Vico  and  strands  of  utopian  thought,  Horkheimer  often  seeks  to 
develop  his  own  theory  of  ideology  and  utopia.  In  the  preface  to  his  study, 
Horkheimer  declares  that 
'the  problem  of  ideology,  of  a  specific  funtion  in 
the  social  struggle  ...  stands  at.  present  in  the 
centre  of  philosophical  and  sociological  discussion. 
If  ideology  produces  illusion  then,  in  contrast, 
utopia  is  the  dream  of  the  "true"  and  just  order  of 
life..  In  this  sense,  it  takes  part  in  every  philo- 
sophical  judgment  of  human  society.  Ideology 
and  utopia  should  be  conceived  as  the  standpoints 
(Haltungen)  of  social  groups  from  the  total  social 
reality.  '  19 
Horkheirner's  reference  to  the  contemporary  nature  of  this  discussion  of 
ideology  is  surely  made  with  Mannheim's  work  in  mind.  But  Horkheimer 
takes  up  a  standpoint  vis-a-viz  ideology  that  is  distanced  from  Mannheim's 
theory  of  ideology  in  some  respects.  With  reference  to  ideology,  Hork- 
heimer  writes, 
'The  theory  of  the  historical  relativity  (Bedingtheit) 
of  intellectual  structures  does  not  lead  to  historical 
relativism.  The  relativity  of  a  statement  and 
Ideology  is  of  two  kinds.  The  limit  to  that  which 
we  may  rightly  term  ideology  indeed  defines  the  con- 
temporary  state  of  our  knowledge.  '  20 
Horkheimer,  following  Marx,  argues  that  ideology  does  not  derive  from 
accepting  'socially  effective  illusion'  that  diverges  from  the  science  of  a 
period  but  in  hypostatizing  the  state  of  knowledge  as  a  whole  as  'eternal 
reason',,  instead  of  'recognising  it  as  a  moment  of  the  social  total  process 
that  in  the  progress  of  history  is  submitted  not  merely  to  analysis  but  also 
verification  and  under  circumstances  of  change'.  Hence,  for  Horkheimer, 
'insight  into  the  historical  relativity  of  a  theory  is  never  identical  with  the 
assertion  that  it  is  ideological'  I. 264 
In  a  similar  vein,  Horkheimer  also  develops  his  own  theory  of  utopia: 
'Utopia  has  two  sides;  it  is  the  critique  of  that  which 
exists  and  the  representation  of  that  which  should  be. 
The  significancgbasically  lies  enclosed  in  the  first 
element.  '  21 
This  critical  element  of  utopia  is,  as  we  have  seen,  absent  from  Mannheim's 
conception  of  utopia.  Whether  Mannheim  provides  a  critique  as  opposed  to 
a  theory  of  ideology  must  also  be  doubted.  In  an  essay  written  two  years 
later,  Horkheimer  also  states  the  crucial  problem  of  the  autonomy  of  the 
mind  when  he  maintains  that 
'The  mind  can  neither  recognize  itself  again  in 
nature  nor  in  history  since  if  the  mind  is  not  to 
'  be  merely  a  questionable  abstraction,  it  cannot 
be  identical  with  reality.  '  22 
The  reduction  of  the  mind  and  the  'superstructure'  to  the  base  (as  'drives', 
'life',  etc.  ),  however,  that  is  a  central  thesis  in  much  of  the  sociology  of 
knowledge  of  Weimar  Germany,  in  fact  proclaims  this  identity  of  the  mind  with 
reality.  In  other  words,  it  proclaims  its  total  alienation. 
In  other  respects,  however,  the  early  writings  of  members  of  the  Frankfurt 
School,  and  particularly  those  of  Horkheimer  reveal  a  kind  of  sociologism 
that  is  perhaps  also  characteristic  of  some  of  Mannheim's  work.  This  is 
particularly  true  of  his  early  accounts  of  science.  In  a  recent  discussion 
23 
of  science,  Apel  has  pointed  to  the  sociologism  present  In  Horkheimer's 
position  when  he  states 
.ý 
'that  understanding  the  significance  of  natural 
science  is  fundamentally  and  hence  primarily 
a  matter  of  a  social  history  of  modern  capitalism, 
so  that,  instead  of  philosophical  epistemology, 
social  history  could  adequately  account  for  the 
cognitive  validity  of  science  by  reducing  it  to 
being  just  a  moment  in  the  rationalised  social 
process  that  belongs  to  the  economic  system 
of  capitalism.  I  think  one  may  fully  recognize 265 
that  modern  capitalism  was  a  crucial  empirical 
condition,  i.  e.  external  causal  stimulation  for 
the  rise  of  a  technologically  relevant  natural 
science,  and  yet  nonetheless  reject  Horkheimer's 
position  as  a  sociologistic  -  historistic  over- 
statement  which  jeopardizes  the  universal  truth- 
claim  of  science  and  hence  also  of  Marxist 
social  history  as  a  science.  '  24 
This  'sociologistic-historistic  overstatement'  is  also  to  be  found,  as  we 
have  seen,  in  Mannheim's  account  of  science  and  especially  where,  in 
turn,  he  is  drawing  heavi  Iy  upon  Luk-dcs'  earlier  account. 
25 
Although  it  is  not  possible  here  to  develop  the  various  positions  taken  up  by 
the  early  Frankfurt  School,  or  their  critical  attitutde  towards  Lukäcs,  the 
above  remarks  should  suffice  to  introduce  at  least  a  cautionary  note  to  those 
interpreters  who  wish  to  draw  too  sharp  a  dividing  line  between  Mannheim's 
German  work  and  the  early  Frankfurt  School. 
26 
As  with  the  relationship 
between  Mannheim  and  Lukäcs,  so  here  the  relation  between  Mannheim  and 
the  early  Frankfurt  School  would  seem  to  be  the  latter's  confrontation  with 
Mannheim  in  order  to  develop  their  own  position  just  as  Mannheim  felt 
obliged  to  confront  Lukäcs'  work.  But.  this  confrontation  need  not  rule  out 
the  possibility  that  certain  affinities  remain. 
Whereas  few  contemporary  commentators  upon  the  sociology  of  knowledge 
in  Weimar  Germany  referred  to  the  relationship  between  Mannheim's 
sociology  of  knowledge  and  Lukäcs'  critique  of  ideology,  there  is  abundant 
evidence  of  questions  concerning  the  relationship  between  the  sociology  of 
knowledge  and  Marx!  s  critique  of  ideology.  However,  it  has  already  been 266 
suggested  that  such  a  comparison  cannot  merely  commence  from  Marx's 
critique  of  ideology  as  an  unproblematical  given.  Rather,  it  must  start 
out  from  the  broader  context  of  the  presuppositions  for  the  possibility  of 
a  critique  of  ideology.  This  is  necessary  because  of  the  context  within 
which  the  sociology  of  knowledge  was  located  within  Weimar  Germany  and 
because  of  our  own  contemporary  concern  to  re-examine  the  foundations  of 
a  critique  of  ideology.  In  Weimar  Germany,  the  sociology  of  knowledge 
was  certainly  viewed  as  something  more  than  a  mere  branch  of  sociology, 
such  as  the  sociology  of  industry  or  of  the  family.  In  view  of  its  subject 
matter,  it  was  seen  as  a  methodology  for  the  examination  of  social  thought 
as  a  whole  and  also  as  a  means  of  grounding  social  sc(entific  knowledge 
that.  took  account  of  its  specific  nature.  However,  it  is  ne  ssary  to  exam- 
i  ne  what  the  sociology  of  knowledge  was  not  particularly  concerned  with  in 
order  to  highlight  its  specific  approach  to  the  critique  of  social  thought. 
To  anticipate  our  subsequent  discussion  of  this  problem,  we  can  already 
suggest  on  the  basis  of  our  existing  knowledge  of  this  tradition  that  it  was 
not  concerned  with  the  role  of  language'as  such  and  that,  except  In  Mann- 
helm's  second  unpublished  study,  it  was  also  not  concerned  either  with  the 
problem  of  the  communication  of  ideologies  and  other  forms  of  social  thought 
or  with  human  communication  as  the  presupposition  for  social  scientific 
knowledge.  Furthermore,  aside  from  the  occasional  reference  to  Pareto's 
sociology  of  knowledge,  as  in  Ziegler  Is  article, 
27little 
attention  was  paid 
to  the  psychological  dimension  of  a  potential  critique  of  ideology  or  its  role 
within  the  sociology  of  knowledge.  Of  course,  Scheler's  sociology  of  know- 
ledge  is  grounded  in  a  theory  of  drives  that  can  be  interpreted  in  a  psycholo- 
gical  and  biological  manner.  But  it  hardly  raises  the  kind  of  issues  that 267 
are  present  either  in  Reich's  account  of  class  consciousness  or  in  the  Frank- 
furt  School's  studies  of  the  social-psychological  bases  of  authoritarianism 
and  fascism.  -  Nor,  because  of  its  virtual  ignoring  of  the  problem  of 
communication,  does  it  come  anywhere  near  the  examination,  for  example, 
of  what  Habermas  has  termed  'systematically  distorted  communication.  ￿28 
Perhaps  most  obviously  of  all,  the  sociology  of  knowledge  in  Weimar  Ger- 
many  appears  to  systematically  and  consistently  avoid  the  issue  of  the 
truth  claims  of  knowledge,  either  by  means  of  a  phenomenological  'brack- 
eting'  of  them  or  by  reducing  them  to  a"simple  social  determination. 
Yet  tke  relationship  between  the  sociology  of  knowledge  in  Weimar  Germany 
and  the  critique  of  ideology  raises  other  important  issues  even  within  the 
context  of  the  former's  own  intentions  and  claims.  In  order  to  go  beyond 
or  transcend  the  critique  of  ideology,  the  sociology  of  knowledge  must  pre- 
sumably  be  able  to  cover  at  least  the  issues  dealt  with  by  a  critique  of 
ideology.  In  order  to  be  -superior  to  it,  the  sociology  of  knowledge  must 
deal  with  the  critique  of  ideologie's  object  domain  and  provide  not  merely 
a  more  acceptably  account  of  it  but  also  cover  issues  that  it  is  incapable  of 
dealing  with.  In  Ideologie  und  Utopie,  at  least,  Mannheim  seems  to  be 
suggesting  that  his  sociology  of  knowledge  performs  precisely  these  tasks. 
But  as  we  have  seen,  the  sociology  of  knowledge  in  Weimar  Germany  develop- 
p 
ed  a  critique  of  ideology  that  located  ideology  world-views  and  social  thought,  ' 
in  general  firmly  within  the  superstructure.  The  base-superstructure  mcdel 
is  a  consistent,  though  in  its  contents  diverse,  feature  of  both  Scheler's 
and  Mannheim's  sociology  of  knowledge.  In  contrast,  Btihler  has  suggested 
that  the  critique  of  ideology  in  Marx's  account  at  least  has  a  different  intention. 268 
He  argues  that 
'The  historicist  sociology  of  knowledge  and  positivistic' 
misunderstanding,  which  even  Marxists  often  indulge 
in,  is  pre-critical  and  pre-Marxist  insofar  as  it  sees 
the  critique  of  ideology  as  being  concerned  merely 
with  theory,  with  world-views  and  with  "superstructure!  ". 
Marx's  critique  of  ideology  was  always  concerned 
, 
with  theory  and  practice  and,  in  fact,  from  the  stand- 
point  of  an  enlightened  theory  -  praxis  mediation.  '  29 
The  most  articulated  critique  of  ideology  within  the  German  sociology  of 
knowledge  tradition  is  that  of  Mannheim.  Is  it  the  case  that  his  version 
of  the  critique  of  ideology  can  also  be  seen  to  suffer  from  these  weaknesses? 
As  we  have  already  seen,  those  of  Mannheirn's  contemporaries  who  compared 
his  sociology  of  knowledge  and  critique  of  ideology  with  that  of  Marx  argued 
that  Mannheim's  account  had  serious  shortcomings.  This  is  not  surprising 
in  the  case  of  orthodox  Marxists  such  as  Wittfogel  and  Fogarasi.  But  per- 
haps  the  most  interesting  critique  of  Mannheim's  position  came  from  Pless- 
ner's  analysis  of  the  changes  in  the  concept  of  ideology  from  Marx  to  Mann- 
heim.  Plessner  argued  that  the  sociology  of  knowledge  signified  a  new 
development  towards  the  restriction  of  the  notion  of  ideology  after  its  histor- 
icist  universal  isation  and  trivialization.  In  part,  Plessner  argued,  Mann- 
heim's  concept  of  ideology  constituted  a  partial  return  to  Marx's  concept 
of  ideology  in  that  Mannheim  reintroduced  the  concept  of  false  conscious- 
ness  (which  implied  an  evaluative  dynamic  concept  of  ideology)  and  the 
problem  of  reality  itself  (in  the  form  of  a  diagnosis  of  the  times).  With 
regard  to  Böhler's  criticism  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge,  in  fact,  Plessner 
seems  to  suggest  that  Mannheim's  position  advances  beyond  the  historicist 
reductions  of  ideology  to  'a  pure  epiphenomenon'.  It  is  doubtful,  however, 
whether  Mannheim  successfully  escaped  the  'fateful  metamorphosis'  of  the 
concept  of  ideology  into  its  historicist  variant.  What  Plessner  takes  to  be 269 
its  'radical  reserve  in  relation  to  the  validity-claims  of  values',  its 
indifference  to  the  true  and  false'  and  its  reduction  to  'an  expression  of 
life'  can  also  be  found  in  Mannheim's  theory  of  ideology.  It  will  also  be 
recalled  that  Plessner  suggested  that  substantial  differences  remained  be- 
tween  Marx's  concept  of  ideology  and  Mannheim's  sociology  of  knowledge. 
In  the  latter  case,  there  was  -'no  progressive  development  of  history',  no 
'unequivocal  reference  to  class  interest  and  hence  political  unequivocalness' 
I 
and  no  'clear,  specifiable  criterion  of  true  consciousness'  .  These.  and  other 
differences  between  Marx's  and  Mannheim's  notions  of  ideology  would  seem 
to  place  Mannheim  outside  the  Marxist  tradition  of  a  critique  of  ideology  and 
I 
more  Ifirmly  within  a  historicist  generalisation  of  the  concept. 
Nonetheless,  if  we  take  the  minimal  preconditions  for  the  possibility  of  a 
critique  of  ideology  that  have  been  outline  by  Böhler'in  relation  to  Marx's 
concept  of  ideology;  then  we  may  be  able  to  focus  more  clearly  upon  the 
distinctive  features  of  Mannheim's  version  of  the  critique  of  ideology.  At 
the  start  of  his  reconstruction  of  Marx's  critique  of  ideology,  Böhler  high- 
lights  'the  major  aspects  of  an  emancipatory  *critique  of  ideology  in  the 
service  of  a  "mediation  of  theory  and  practice"  . 
30 
We  rray  take  these 
aspects,  for  the  moment,  to  be  necessary  dimensions  of  such  a  critique 
of  ideology.  This  may  seem  a  somewhat  arbitrary  procedure  but  since 
Mannheim  nowhere  systematically  develops  his  own  dimensions  of  a  cri- 
Aw  I 
tique  of  ideology  it  may  be  useful,  initially,  to  take  as  our  starting  point 
a  reconstruction  of  Marx's  critique  of  ideology  that  is  not  confined  to  an 
orthodox  mechanistic  interpretation  of  that  critique  or  to  its  transform- 
ation  in  the  sociology  of  knowledge. 
31 
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The  first  dimension  of  any  critique  of  ideology  is  that  of  an  'immanent 
understanding'  of  the  ideology  in  question  and  specifically  of  the  way  in 
which  '  it  is  understood  by  human  beings  who  participate  in  it'  .  An  ideoi- 
ogy  possesses  its  own  meaning  content  that  must  be  understood  hermeneuti- 
cally.  That  is,  any  ideology  must  first  be  rendered  intelligible  in  relation 
to  its  own  normative  framework.  Ideological  discourse,  for  instance,  is 
one  way  of  rendering  the  world  intelligible  to  its  participants  and  can  be 
considered  as  one  restricted  form  of  communication  between  members  of 
society.  To  ignore  this  hermeneutic  dimension  of  a  critique'of  ideology  is 
to  remove  any  possibility  for  the  relatively  autonomy  of  ideology  and  to 
open  up  the  possibility  of  reducing  it  to  the  status  of  a  mere  illusion  or  epi- 
phenomenon.  Böhier  points  to  the  consequences  for  any  critique  of  ideol- 
ogy  that  ignores  this  dimension  when  he  argues  that 
If  it  is  not  to  reduce  society  to  an  objective  causal 
mechanism  and,  in  accordance  with  this  prior 
decision,  to  conceive  of  meaning  content  as  the 
mere  product  of  material  relations,  but  instead  to 
take  account  of  intentional  communicative  action 
as  such,  then,  indeed,  it  not  merely  implicitly 
presupposes  hermeneutics  but  is  explicitly  de- 
pendent  upon  hermeneutic  methods.  '  32 
Hence,  any  critique  of  ideology  that  employs  a  reductive  strategy  with  regard 
to  its  object  does  not  so  much  ignore  the  hermeneutic  dimension  but  rather 
transposes  it  or  reduces  it  to  another  level  of  analysis  (e.  g.  class  deterrnin- 
ation).  In  short,  the  hermeneutic  dimension  must  reveal  how  ideologies 
come  to  be  intelligible  to  their  adherents  and  how  they  are  interpreted. 
However,  a  critique  of  ideology  could  not  be  confined  to  this  hermeneutic 
aspect  since  this  would  presuppose.  that  the  critique  of  ideology  was  in  fact 
superfluous. 
33 
Bohler  maintains  that  a  second  dimension  of  any  critique 
of  ideology,  but  one  which  is  most  often  identified  as  constituting  the  key 271 
element  of  a  Marxist  critique  is  the  'critique  of  ideology  as  the  analysis  of 
interests  in  the  broadeA  sense  '. 
34 
Such  analysis,  however,  is  not  always 
conceived  as  an  inquiry  into  the  material  societal  interests  that  generate 
specific  conceptions  and  solutions  to  practical  problems.  One  could  con- 
ceive  of  a  critique  of  ideology  that  interpreted  these  interests  in  an  idealist 
manner  (as  a  set  of  historically  invariant,  biological-psychological  drives). 
More  commonly,  however,  the  analysis  of  interests  sets  out  to  reveal  the  in- 
sufficiency  of  a  hermeneutic  understanding  of  our  interpretations  and  theories 
in  relation  to  historical  and  social  practice.  What  this  implies  is  that  the 
critique  of  ideology  would  be  superfluous  if  human  beings  could  perfectly 
understand  their  own  and  others'  meanings  and  theories  in  relation  to  the 
historical  and  social  context  in  which  they  are  located.  It  is  precisely 
because  we  do  not  yet  consciously  make  our  own  history  (as  Mannheim 
pointed  out  at  the  end  of  his  chapter  in  utopia  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie)  that 
we  must  examine  the  preconditions  under  which  any  suchproject  becomes 
possible.  In  the  course  of  the  development  of  the  critique  of  ideology, 
e 
the  analysis  of  interests  has  often  taken  the  form  of  a  theory  of  domination- 
not  merely  social  but  also  psychological  and  even  biological.  A  social 
theory  of  domination,  however,  necessarily  presupposes  the  engagement  of 
man  in  the  social,  world.  '  ý' 
This  engagement  already  suggests  that  we  cannot  merely  treat  the  analysis 
of  interests  in  an  objectivistic  manner  and  reduce  them  to  a  social-economic 
and  sociologistic  basis.  It  rresuoses  that  we  are  not  merely  concerned 
with  an  analysis  of  material  intersts  that  underlie  ideologies.  Insofar  as 
our  concern  is  with  a 
. 
critique  of  ideology,  it  presupposes 
'a  critical  emancipatory  interest  that  is  directed 
towards  the  overcoming  of  social  "opacity", 272 
"unreasonableness"  and  "alienation"  in  a 
"transparent",  "unalienated"  society  that 
is  directed  by  the  collective  "reason"  of 
human  beings.,  35 
The  grounds  for  its  own  existence  necessarily  presuppose  engagement  in 
society.  In  terms  of  its  relation  to  the  second  dimension,  an  analysis  of 
interests  would  itself  be  insufficient  without  some  theoretical  and  practical 
notions  of  how  it  is  possible  to  overcome  ideology.  Conversely,  the  mere 
assertion  of  a  critical  emancipatory  interest  is  insufficient  when  that 
interest  lacks  'any  concrete  context. 
Fourthly,  Böhler  argues  that  where  the  analysis  of  interests  and  society  is 
not  confined  to  a  mechanistic  coneption  of  society  as  merely  a  system  of 
production  but  also  an  ideological  sphere,  it  is  necessary  for  a  critique  of 
36 
ideology  to  be  conceived  as  a  'reworking  of  tradition  (and  secularisation).  ' 
This  dimension  is  important  for  any  attempt  to  provide  not  merely  an  under- 
standing  of  meanings  and  theories  in  relation  to  socio-economic  practice 
but  to  provide  a  critique  of  the  tradition  within  which  such  understanding  is 
at  all  possible.  The  history  of  the  tradition  in  which  ideology  is  located 
.  must  itself  be  rendered  problematic. 
The  fifth  dimension  of  a  critique  of  ideology  is  that  of  'social  situational 
research'  .  Any  critique  of  tradition  presupposes  an  understanding  of  a 
contemporary  situation  (in  Mannheim,  the  'diagnosis  of  the  times'  perhaps), 
a  postulate  which  has  been  the  source  of  considerable  difficulty  in  the 
development  of  hermeneutics.  Köhler  suggests  the  need  for  this  dimension 
as  follows: 
'A  critique  of  tradition  which  is  not  arbitrary  but 
seeks  to  be  grounded  and  maintain  the  claim  to 
scientific  rationality  and  clarity  (Durchsichtigkeit) 273 
refers,  for  its  part,  to  the  necessity  for  social 
situational  research.  The  critic  of  tradition 
commences  apriori  from  his  understanding  of 
a  contemporary  situation.  '  37 
In  this  way,  the  critique  of  tradition  is  made  concrete  and  is  rendered  cap- 
able  of  correction.  This  dimension  not  merely  refers  back  to  the  need  for 
a  concrete  location  of  the  hermeneutic  dimension  of  meaning,  but  is  necessary 
for  the  realisation  of  the  critical  emancipatory  interest  in  that  such  social 
situational  research  can  point  to 
'which  traditional  value-conceptions  and  orien- 
tations  to  action  can  possess  a  concrete  eman- 
cipatory  function  in  the  present  and  in  the  for- 
seeable  future  of  a  society.  '  38 
In  this  context,  '  B6hler  points  out  that  the  mediating  dimension  of  commun- 
ication  has  usually  been  ignored  in  social  scientific  research  insofar.  as  this 
fifth  dimension  has  reduced  the  critical  emancipatory  interest  and  the  cri- 
tique  of  tradition  to  an  analysis  of  domination  and  labour.  By  eliminating 
emancipatory  self-reflection  and  communication  mediated  through  tradition, 
such  research  has  provided  an  unsatisfactory  mode  of  integrating  the  critique 
of  ideology  into  social  and  historical  practice. 
Finally,  Bähler  argues  that  the  practical  claims  of  the  critique  of  ideology 
a. 
must  also  presupposeAtheory  of  action  and  praxis  in  order  for  critique  to  be 
translated  into  practice.  One  might  add  here,  however,  that  a  theory  of 
action  must  ready  be  presupposed  in  any  theory  of  ideology  since  it  is  often 
characterised  as  preventing  'real',  'true'  or  'appropriate'  action  in  a 
given  situation-'  In  Mannheim's  critique  of  ideology,  the  manner  in  which 
ideology  prevents  appropriate  'adjustment'  to  the  existing  present  situation 
a. 
must  also  implicitly  presuppose  a  theory  of  action. 274 
In  the  light  of  these  dimensions  of  a  critique  of  ideology,  does  the  sociology 
of  knowledge  in  any  way  approximate  to  this  critique,  both  in  its  intentions 
end  in  its  actual  result?  The  hermeneutic  dimension  is  certainly  present 
In  Mannheim's  earlier  writings  on  the  sociology  of  culture.  In  his  analysis 
of  the  problems  faced  when  interpreting  world-views,  Mannheim  comes 
down  in  favour  of  the  examination  of  documentary  meaning  as  the  most  fruit- 
ful  for  their  interpretation.  Any  cultural  product  may  be  given  to  us  immed- 
iately  or  mediately.  In  the  latter  case,  the  mediating  role  is  a  function  of 
expression,  on  the  one  hand,  or  documentation  or  evidence  on  the  other.  A 
cultural  product  has  an  objective  meaning  that  'can  be  fully  grasped  without 
knowing  anything  about  the  "intentional  acts"  of  the  individual  "author"  1., 
39 
whereas  expressive  meaning  is  to  be  grasped  authentically  as  it  appeared  to 
its  creator.  In  contrast,  documentary  meaning  derives  from  the  objectificat- 
ion  of  our  own  and  others  actions  and  is-realised  in  signs  and  forms  that-can 
be  interpreted  by  the  'spectator'.  In  this  case,  documentary  interpretation 
can  employ  constmcts  -  collective  subjects,  ideal  types,  etc  -  and  is,  as 
Mannheim  later  puts  it,  a  form  of  'extrinsic  interpretation'.  Unlike  the  other 
two  forms  of  interpretation,  it  must  be  performed  anew  in  each  epoch  and  is 
'the  only  one  a  dynamically  changing  subject  can  have  of  a  dynamically 
40 
changing  object.  '  But  as  we  have  already  seen  in  the  examination  of 
Mannheim's  unpublished  manuscripts,  this  extrinsic  interpretation  or  'funct- 
ional  meaning'  of  cultural  phenomena  Is  in  terms  of  the  life-experiences  of 
a  particular  group  of  individuals  within  which  a  world-view  is  rooted.  The 
plurality  of  group  life-experiences  and  the  dynamic  nature  of  these  experien- 
ces  makes  it  difficult  to  attain  a  perspective  of  the  whole  epoch.  It  is 
probably  this  transition  to  the  historicist  problematic  that  accounts  for  Mann- 
heim's  abandonment  of  his  earlier  hermeneutic  Interests  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie. 275 
Here  we  are  provided  with  any  account  of  how  we  can  have  access  to  the  ex- 
pressive  meaning  of  ideologies.  This  is  important  since  any  analysis  of 
ideology  must  start  out  by  predicating  its  intelligibility  or  plausibility  for 
its,  adherents.  One  might  suggest,  for  example,  that  an  ideology  resolves 
artifically  certain  contradict  ior-Itin  the  situation  and  relationshipsof  certain 
social  groups.  -That  is,  we  can  argue  that  the  contradictions  in  their  relation- 
ship  to  other  groups  are  not  resolved  except  at  the  level  of  ideology.  Mann- 
heim,  however,  in  predicating  the  ideological  nature  of  all  social  thought  as 
a  result  of  its  social  embeddedness  also  introduces  the  immunizing  strategy 
that  is  so  common  to  ideological  discourse;  namely,,  that  viewpoints,  argu- 
ments,  etc,,  can  be  denounced  as  merely  a  function  of  those  who  offer,  them, 
therby  preventing  any  examination  of  the  validity  of  their  truth-claims. 
Truth-claims  can  only  be  considered  either  as  a  functionof  the  superiority  of 
one  of  these  positions  (world-views,  life  experiences,  etc.  )  or  as  a  function 
of  a  synthesis  of  what  is  valuable  in  these  positions.  In  either  case,  access 
to,  truth-claims'is  blocked. 
. 
Therefore,  it  Is  difficult  not  to  conclude  that 
. although  Mannheim  was  certainly  sensitive  to  the  hermeneutic  problems  of 
interpretation,  as  Bauman  has  recently  shown, 
41 
these  problems  tend  to  dis- 
appear  in  his  later-analysis  of  ideology. 
. 
The,,  second  dimension  of  a  critique  of  ideology  that  Böhler  isolated  -  the 
analysis  of  interests  -  appears  in  Mannheim's  account  of  ideology  only  as 
the  need  of  certain  groups  to  control  the  public  interpretation  of  reality. 
0 
Precisely  why  they  have  this  need  or  interest  remains  obscure.  Even  in 
the  chapter  on  utopia  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie  which,  as  we  have  seen,  is 
predicated  upon  a  model  of  society  that  is  dichotomous  -  in  terms  of  domi- 
nant.  and  subordinate  groups  -  there  is  very  little  reference  to  concrete  social 276 
and  political  interests  in  domination.  More  to  the  point,  Mannheim's  anal- 
ysis  does  not  show  how  it  is  that  access  to  'knowledge'  or  'truth'  is  block- 
ed  as  a  means  of  reinforcing  this  subordination.  There  is  a  suggestion  that 
Increased  rationalisation  prevents  the  development  of  social  and  political 
utopias  but  this  process  of  rationalisation  remains  unlocated.  When  com- 
pared  with  Lukäcs'  analysis  of  the  role  of  reification,  Mannheim's  account 
of  the  reasons  for  the  necessity  of  utopian  consciousness  can  only  be  ex- 
tracted  from  the  meta-theoretical  presuppositions  of  his  philosophy  of  history. 
In  turn,  however,  this  already  suggests  that,  at  least  implicitly,  Mannheim 
retains  a  notion  of  the  need  for  a  critique  of  ideology  since,  as  he  himself 
states  at  the  opening  to  Ideologie  und  Utopie,  in  ideology  and  utopia  we  ex- 
perience  the  possibility  of  false  consciousness.  This  false  consciousness 
exists,  for  Mannheim,  in  relation  to  our  inability  to  relate  adequately  to  the 
present.  That  is,  this  false  consciousness  it  manifested  in  both  ideology 
(which  orientates  us  towards  the  past)  and  utopia  (which  orientates  us  to- 
wards  the  future).  One  might  imagine  at  first  glance  that  the  emancipatory 
interest  in  Mannheim's  sociology  of  knowledge  was  located  at  the  level  of 
the  need  for  engagement  in  the  present.  But  this  engagement  is  not  con- 
ceived  of  in  terms  of  activity  or  praxis  but  as  adequate  adjustment  to  the 
present.  The  emancipatory  potential  -  at  least  at  the  meta  theoretical  level 
of  his  philosophy  of  history  -  lies  with  utopian  consciousness.  This  contra- 
diction  between  the  avowed  aims  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  (a  diagnosis 
of  the  present  times)  and  the  meta-theoretical  philosophy  of  history  (utopia 
supplies  the  dynamic  -  i.  e.  activity  -  to  history)  is  subsequently  resolved 
by  Mannheim  in  favour  of  the  abandonment  of  utopian  consciousness  and 
greater  emphasis  upon  sociology  of  knowledge  analyses  that  can  provide 277 
greater  'control'  of  our  action  and  remove  'errors'  . 
Böhler's  fourth  dimension  of  the  critique  of  ideology  -  the  reworking  of  trad- 
ition  and  the  recognition  of  the  quasi-autonomy  of  the  tradition  from  which 
an  ideology  emerges  and  which  it  itself  develops  -  is  hardly  present  in  Mann- 
helm's  analysis  of  ideologies  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie.  Where  Mannheim 
does  examine-the  traditions  within  which  ideologies  are  located,  his  per- 
sistent  use  of  ideal  type  analysis  tends  to  reduce  traditions  to  mere  types 
of  thought  or  consciousness.  -Moreover,  we  have  already  suggested  that 
Mannheim's  analysis  of  ideologies  blocks  access  to  a  critique  of  the  trad- 
ition ition  within  which  an  understanding  of  the  meaning  of  an  ideology  is  possible. 
The'fifth  aspect  of  a  critique  of  ideology  -  that  of  social'  situational  research  - 
possesses  a  paradoxical  status  within  Mannheim's  theory  of  ideology.  On 
the  one  hand,  it  is  relatively  easy  to  extract  from  Ideologie  und  Utopie  and 
his  later  German  works,  many  assertions  as  to  the  need  for  empirical  social 
research  into  ideologies  and  other  forms  of  social  thought.  Certainly,  in  his 
period  at  Frankfurt,  Mannheim  sought  to  encourage  empirical  studies  of  aspects 
of  social  knowledge  and  institutions  (e.  g.  the  press).  Similarly,  a  central 
aim  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie,  made  more  urgent  by  the  ideological  and  utopian 
obscuring  of  the  present,  was  a  'diagnosis  of  the  times'.  Mannheim  did 
indeed  commence  from  his  understanding  of  the  contemporary  situation  but, 
paradoxically,  we  are  provided  with  almost  no  social  analysis  of  that  situ- 
ation.  We  are  tdd  that  it'  is  a  period  of  deep  'intellectual  crisis'.  We 
know  from  his  earlier  account  in  his  essay  on  competition  that  Mannheim 
saw  the  ideological  situation  of  his  times  as  one  of  increasing  polarisation 
of  ideologies.  But  actual  concrete  social  analysis  of  this  'crisis  situation' is  largely  absent  from  Ideologie  und  Utopie  even  though  this  is  probably  the 
most  overtly  political  and  contemporary  of  Mannheim's 
. 
German  writings. 
One  could,  of  course,  interpret  his  aim  as  not  being  that  of  providing  'a  con- 
trete  social  analysis  or  a  'diagnosis  of  the  times'  but  as  providing  the  tools 
for  such  an  analysis  in  the  form  of  an  evaluative  sociology  of  knowledge. 
Then,  however,  one  would  have  to  question  to  what  extent  the  sociology  of 
knowledge,  as  Mannheim  conceived  it,  was  capable  of  providing  such  an 
analysis.  His  analysis  of  ideologies  hardly  approaches  the  level  of  an 
account  of  them  that  would  provide  us  with  a  contemporary  diagnosis  of  the 
times.  The  'relatively  detached  intelligentsia'  are  also  hardly  in  a  position 
to  provide  it  either,  particularly  in  the  later  years  of  the  Weimar  Republic. 
As  has  been  pointed  out,  Böhler  argues  that  a  critique  of  ideology  must,  as 
acritique,  presuppose  a  theory  of  action  and  a  theory  of  how  that  critique 
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can,  be  translated  into  practice.  Here,  Mannheim  assumes  that  the  sociology 
of  knowledge,  by  providing  its  analyses  and  thinking  the  crisis  through  to  its 
limits,  enables  individuals  to  reach  a  more  rational  d';  cision  to  what  their 
own  course  of  action  should  be.  Subsequently,  (e.  g.  in  the  essay  on'Aner- 
ican  Sociology)  Mannheim  assumed  that  his  sociology  of  knowledge,  as  'an 
organ  of  critical  self-control',  had  indeed.  '  succeeded  in  detecting  and  sub- 
jecting  to  control  important  groups  of  sources  of  error'  . 
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The  critique  of 
ideology  in  the  form  of  the  evaluative  sociology  of  knowledge  was  to  impli- 
p 
ment  its  critiques  presumably  on  the  basis  of  the  persuasiveness  of  its  anal- 
ysc.  At  the  level  of  social  action,  the  removal  of  ideological  and  utopian 
limitations  to  social  thought  would  permit  more  'adequate'  forms  of  conscious- 
ness  appropriate  to  the  present  situation. 279  " 
It  can  be  seen,  therefore,  that  Mannheim's  theory  of  ideology-and  sociology 
of  knowledge  does,  on  Böhler's  criteria,  retain  elements  of.  all  the  dimensions 
of  a  critique  of  ideology  as  he  outlines  them..  But  whether  Mannheim  provides 
a  critique  of  ideology  as  opposed  to  a  theory  of  ideology  and  whether  it  is  an 
emancipatory  interest  that  lies  behind  his  sociology  of  knowledge  must  remain 
open  to  question. 
IV 
The  sociology  of  knowledge  in  Weimar  Germany  was  not  merely  a  confront- 
ation  with  the  Marxist  critique  of  ideology  and  the  various  ways  in  which  it 
had  been  interpreted  in  the  Second  Internation  and  in  German  sociology.  It 
was  also  a  contribution  to  the  discussions  surrounding  the  methodological 
foundations  of  the  social  sciences  that  had  taken  place  in  Germany.  since 
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the  original  Schmoller-Menger  Methodenstreit.  More  specifically,  Scheler 
contributed  to  the  so-called  Wissenschaftsstreit44  surround  Max  Weber  Is 
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'Wissenschaft  als  Beruf'  lecture.  As  Bracht  has  argued,  Scheler's 
sociology  is  fundamentally  concerned  with  the  problem  of  values  and  value- 
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relativism.  It  is  plausible  to  argue  that,  in  part,  Scheler's  sociology  of 
knowledge  is  an  attempt  to  retain  an  order  of  valuesjdespite  the  arguments 
against  such  strategies  in  the  earlier  Werturteilsstreit.  Mannheim,  for  his 
part,  takes  up,  both  directly  and  indirectly,  all  these  controversies  in  his 
"  work.  His  early  reliance  upon  the  work  of  Dilthey  is  manifested  not  merely 
in  his  early  writings  on  problems  of  interpretation  but  also  in  his  examination 
of  the  'sociological  determination  of  methodology'  (die  soziologische 
Bedingtheit  der  Methodenlehre)  in  his  unpublished  study,  Eine  soziologische 
Theorie  der  Kultur  und  ihrer  Erkennbarkeit.  Just  as  Dilthey  set  out  to  establish 280 
the  foundations  for  the  critique  of  historical  knowledge,  so  Mannheim  may 
be  seen  as  locating  his  sociology  of  knowledge  within  the  framework  of  the 
reconstruction  of  the  foundations  of  social  scientific  knowledge.  In  his 
later  work,  the  centrality  of  the  problem  of  competing  world-views  and 
ideologies  that  reaches  its  peak  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie  can  also  be  viewed 
as  an  extension  of  some  of  the  issues  already  raised  In  the  Werturteilsstreit. 
Finally,  the  chapter  on  politics  as  a  science  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie  refers 
explicitly  to  Weber's  own  views  on  the  possibility  of  politics  as  a  science 
and  hence,  indirectly,  takes  up  issues  from  the  Wissenschaftsstreit. 
The  very  existence  of  these  controversies  and  their  inter-relationship  already 
suggests  the  extent  to  which  the  foundations  of  sociology  were  not  merely 
disputed  but  were  also  viewed  as  part  of  a  more  pervasive  intellectual  crisis. 
The  possibility  of  science  as  such,  the  existence  of  competing  methodolo- 
gical  paradigms,  the  plurality  and  relativism  of  value  standpoints,  and  the 
crisis  of  historicism  all  combined  to  transform  earlier  'debates'  into  intell- 
ectual  'crises'.  Certainly  in  post-First  World  War  Germany,  these  'intell- 
ectual"crises  took  on  a  new  significance  in  the  context  of  the  polarisation  of 
German  society,  and  the  apparently  radical  destruction  of  the  whole  social 
and  political  structure  of  the  pre-war  period.  Military  defeat,  revolution 
and  persistent  internal  unrest  all  combined  to  radicalise  earlier  problems  and 
controversies.  After  the  uneasy  'relativ  Stabilizierung'  between  1924  and 
1929,  Weimar  Germany  was  again  the  battleground  of  conflicting  social  and 
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political  tendencies  as  well  as  economic  collapse.  Only  with  considerable 
detachment  could  Mannheim  look  back  upon  it  as  a  kind  of  'second  Peri- 
cle4ge'" 281 
Nor  could  these,  crises  be  viewed  as  merely  those  of  the  'mandarins,  '  in  the 
Geisteswissenschaften. 
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The  crises  permeated  the  natural  sciences,  too, 
as  Forman's  recent  study  of  the  scientific  community  in  Germany  has  shown. 
48 
Nonetheless,  the  sociology  of  knowledge,  with  its  ambitious  intentions  and 
claims,  and  its  pre-occupation  with  these  crises,  in  however  muted  a  form, 
may  surely  be  viewed  as  highlighting  in  the  most  radical  manner  the  crisis 
of  intellectual  endeavour  itself,  a  crisis  that  is  epitomised  in  Scheler's 
'powerlessness  of  the  mind'  thesis  and  in  Mannheim's  'homelessness  of 
4t  the  mind'.  It  is  also  encapsulated  in  what  Gur'witsch  recognised  in  the 
sociology  of  knowledge  a  'mistrust  of  the  mind'  (Misstrauen  gegen  den 
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Geist).  Out  of  this  radical  questioning  of  the  foundations  of  social 
scientific  knowledge  and  even  of  scientific  endeavour  itself,  the  sociology 
of  knowledge  emerged  as  a  significant  element  of  German  sociology  in  the 
Weimar  Republic. 
The  intervention  off  the  sociology  of  knowledge  in  the  methodological  de- 
bates"surrounding  the  social  sciences  commenced  with  Scheler's  contri- 
but  ion  to  the  Wissenschaftsstreit.  In  order  to  clarify  the  sociology  -of  know- 
ledge's  role  here  it  is  necessary  to  return  to  that  debate  and  its  context. 
The  debate`that  succeeded  Weber's  'Wissenschaft  als  Beruf'  lecture  of  1919 
is  located  by  Wittenberg  -  in  one  of  the  few  attempts  to  examine  this  debate  - 
within  the  context  of  the  heightened  tension  between  the  belief  in  an  autono- 
mous,  timeless  reason  and  a  'unique'  historical  life  that  resulted  from  ex- 
rience  of'the  World  War. 
50 
peHowever,  this  very  emphasis  upon  the  unique- 
ness  and  specificity  of  the  historical  world  had  already  been  stated  by 
Dilthey,  Windelband  and  others  well  before  the  war.  Wittenberg  suggests 
that  the  experience  of  the  war,  of  a  'unique'  historical  event  without  any 282 
foundation  in  previous  experience  produced  a  profound  shock  to  the  belief 
in  universal  reason.  In  particular,  he  argues  that  this  was  felt  specifically 
by  the  younger  generation, 
'for  they  found  themselves  at  the  end  of  the  world 
war  at  the  graveyard  of  their  hopes;  never  before 
had  a  generation  of  youth  experienced  such  a 
distinctive  destruction  of  all  values,  sciences 
and  arts;  never  before  was  the  distance  so  great 
and  unbridgable  between  the  credulous  hope  with 
which  the  youth  went  onto  the  battlefield  and  the 
hard  and  cold  reality.  '  51 
Kracauer  points  to  the  'hatred  of  science'  felt  by  'the  best  part  of  present- 
day  academic  youth' 
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as  a  result  of  its  apparent  barrenness  and  inability 
to  grasp  basic  experiences.  In  the  human  sciences,  it  constituted  a 
reaction  to  conceptual  formalism  and  the  naive  collection  of  facts,  to  a  re- 
Iativism  that  arises  out  of  and  induces  a  profound  scepticism. 
Against  this  background,  Wittenberg  terms  Weber's  'Wissenschaft  als 
Beruf'  lecture  'a  last  high-point  of  a  rational  foundation'  that  recognises  the 
'disenchantment  of  the  world',  whilst  firmly  asserting  the  objectivity  of  science 
and  the  goal  of  scientific  progress  against  a  notion  of  science  as  achieving 
the  'absolute'  or.  'true  being'  I.  Instead,  the  world  of  thought  in  the  form 
of  academic  disciplines  and  the  world  of  action  are  to  be  strictly  separated 
and  science  is  to  be  necessarily  excluded  from  producing  the  ideals  of  life. 
Similarly,  in  'Politik  als  Beruf'  Weber  'requires  of  the  politician  exactly 
the  same  qualities'  as  those  of  the  scientist:  'Politics  is  made  with  the 
head  but  not  with  other  parts  of  the  body  and  the  soul'.  The  politician,  too, 
should  be  concerned  with  the  truth  and  factual  objectivity  by  means  of  a 
systematic,  unpartisan  testing  of  facts.  Both  activities  are  to  be  based  on 
purposive  rational  action. 283 
More  specifically,  Weber  seeks  to  establish  the  separation  of  science  and 
politics,  personality'and  objects  and  science  and  religion.  Above  all,  he 
Insists  upon  the  separation  of  facts  and  standards,  and  science  and  world- 
views.  From  the  standpoint  of  science,  all  value-decisions  are  relative  and 
cannot  be  rationally  grounded.  It  is  here  that  the  sociology  of  knowledge 
takes  up  Weber's  position  on  science  and  politics  from  a  number  of  directions. 
Both  Scheler  and  Mannheim  recognise  the  need  for  value-free  science.  Both 
apparently  take  up  the  social  relativity  of  world-views  but  Scheler  seeks  to 
maintain  essential  values  from  social  determination.  Indeed,  where  Sche- 
ler  explicitly  concerns  himself  with  Weber's  central  argument  important 
differences  emerge. 
Scheler,  like  Weber,  emphasizes  the  growing  intellectualisation,  special- 
isation  and  bureaucratisation  in  the  organisation  of  modern  science.  But 
whereas  Weber  sees  this  an  an  unavoidable  fate, 
'Scheler  sees 
In  these  symptoms  evidence  of  a  crisis  of  western 
culture  that  can  no  longer  rest  solely  upon  a 
scientific  basis.,  53 
Scheler  insists  upon  the  existence  of  three  forms  of  knowledge  -  salvational, 
educational  and  knowledge  for  domination  -  that  exist  in  all  periods  including 
the  present. 
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'Thus,  according  to  Scheler's  interpretation,  Weber's 
concept  of  science  encompasses  only  the  small  and 
restricted  zone  of  purposive  knowledge,  but  in  no  way 
provides  a  true  picture  of  the  reality  of  the  situation 
'of  science  in  the  past  and  the  present.  1  54 
Indeed,  "  in  his  sociology  of  knowledge,  Scheler  no  longer  holds  knowledge 
of  reality  to  be  possible  merely  on  the  basis  of  science  as  such  since  it  too, 
as  one  form  of  knowledge  amongst  others,  is  also  socially  determined. 
Scheler  departs  even  further  from  Weber  here  since,  as  we  have  seen,  the 284 
'human  existence'  that  'directs'  this  knowledge  is  not  merely  social  but 
also  biological  and  psychological. 
At  the  practical  level,  Scheler  insists  upon  the  separation  of  research  and 
vocational  study  and  maintains  that  the  gulf  between  the  two  is  unbridgable. 
His  solution  is  to  call  for  the  foundatiori  of  Bildungsakademien  in  which  the 
major  synthesizers  of  knowledge  will  teach.  In  contrast,  Volkshochschulen 
will  be  reserved  for  the  non-academic  majority.  Wittenberg  summarizes  the 
theoretical  and  practical  consequences  of  Scheler's  poisition  as  follows: 
'with  the  triple  division  of  all  knowledge,  Scheler 
breaks  with  the  central  claim  of  German  idealism 
of  the  possibility,  meaningfulness  and  value  of 
a  single  genuine  knowledge.  Scheler's  doctrine 
of  the  sociological  determination  of  all  knowledge 
likewise  arrives  at  the  pronouncement  of  the  end 
of  science  as  such.  Scheler's  degradation  of 
universities  into  pure  technical  schools  would 
reduce  academics  to  technicians,  make  science 
into  a  means  of  production  and  place  the,  who  le 
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of  knowledge  in  the  service  of  external  progress.  1 
What  Wittenberg  fails  to  grasp  with  regard  to  the  last  consequence  of  Scheler's 
position  is  that  Scheler  is  unwittingly  referring  to  changes  that  have  taken 
place  in  higher  education  and  which  had  already  been  referred  to  by  writers 
such  as  Veblen. 
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Despite  this,  Wittenberg  does  indicate  the  extent  to 
which  Scheler's  sociology  of  knowledge  directly  takes  up  key  aspects  of 
Weber's  position  in  'Wissenschaft  als  Beruf'  . 
It  may  be  worthwhile  pointing  out  here  that  Scheler's  reduction  of  science 
to  knowledge  for  domination,  in  one  respect,  has  the  same  result  as  a 
positivist  reduction  of  science  to  technique  in  which,  as  Habermas  argues, 
'The  social  potential  of  science  is  reduced  to  the 
powers  of  technical  control  -  its  potential  for 
enlightened  action  is  no  longer  considered.  The 285 
empirical,  analytical  sciences  produce  technical 
recommendations,  but  they  furnish  no  answers 
to  practical  questions.  '  57 
That  is,  the  critical  dimension  of  science-is  ignored.  This  further  dis- 
tances  Scheler  from  Weber  who  at  least  argues  that  the  function  of  science 
is  'to  render  problematic  what  is  given  as  conventionally  self-evident'.  In 
Weber's  case,  however,  the  separation  of  the  'completely  heterogeneous 
problems'  of  securing  facts  and  grounding  normative  judgments  together 
with  the  absence  of  a  critique  of  ideology  makes  it  difficult  for  him  to  attain 
this  goal  . 
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For  S'cheler,  the  problems  are  quite  different,  though  he  too  accepts  the 
plurality  of  values  in  'relatively  natural  world-views',  as  well  as  the  prin- 
ciple  of  value-freedom  for  the  sociology  of  knowledge.  In  his  earlier  work, 
and  especially  in  Der  Formalismus  in  der  Ethik  und  die  materiale  Wertethik, 
Scheler  sought  to  show  how  values  constituted  the  'practical  world'  "  Further- 
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more,  as  Bracht  has  shown,  Scheler  sought  also  to  secure  an  objective 
order  of  values  and  since,  for  Scheler￿humanf 
'drive  is  value-determined,  he  asserted  a... 
convergence  between  the  human  structure  of 
drives  and  the  objective  order  of  values.  The 
values,,.  which  direct  the  drive,  are  objective 
even  when  they  are  in  fact  only  found  in  human 
beings.,  60 
But,  as  Bracht  shows,  -these  values  which  direct  the  drives  are  also  relative. 
The  values  of  life  are  also  'relative'  values  that  can  only  be  'objective'  if 
they  are  grounded  in  higher  values.  There  exists,  then,  for  Scheler  -  in 
his  ethics  at  least  -a  distinction  between  absolute  intellectual  values  and 
relative  values.  The  relevance  of  this  for  Scheler's  sociology  of  know- 
ledge  is  that  the  concept-of  value  is  the  source  of  the  separation  of  'real'  , 
and  'cultural  I  sociology.  Again,  to  cite  Bracht, 286 
'The.  separation  between  mind  and  reality,  culture 
and  nature,  ideal  factor  and  real  factor,  group 
spirit  and  group  soul,  value  and  drive  in  sociology 
are  the  result  of  the  already  mentioned  difference 
between  relative  and  absolute  values,  that  Scheler 
merely  ...  juxtaposes  with  one  another  as 
immediated  facts.  '  61 
That  is,  the  concepts  of  value  and  value  orders  are  transposed  from  his 
earlier  ethics  into  the  historical  dimension  of  his  sociology  of  knowledge. 
But  the  sociology  of  knowledge  is  to  deal  with  the  plurality  of  values  and 
world-views  and  the  changes  in  corresponding  forms  of  knowledge.  The 
problem  then  becomes  one  of  realising  these  values  since 
'Scheler  makes  his  concept  of  value  into  the  inter- 
pretative  model  for  historical  change  as  such. 
The  insoluble  problem  that  thereby  emerges  is 
the  problem  of  the  realisation  of  diverse  types 
of  value  by  means  of  an  identical  subject, 
whether  it  is  the  group  or  the  individual;  for62 
the  types  of  value  contradict  one  another.  ' 
As  we  have  already  seen,  Scheler's  sociology  of  knowledge  rests  upon  his 
philosophical  anthropology  and  metaphysics.  The  resolution  of  the  problem 
of  value,  if  indeed  it  can  be  resolved  in  the  manner  in  which  Scheler  formu- 
Tates  it,  cannot  be  found  in  his  sociology  of  knowledge  but  in  a  metaphysics 
that  ultimately  secures  the  objectivity  of  values  by  positing  the  possibility 
of  God  as  an  ens  realissimum.  It  is  a  manifestation  of  the  peculiar  com- 
bination  of  a  'thorough  eclectic'  who,  as  Kracauer  argued,  can  combine 
Catholicism  and  relativism. 
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In  his  writings  in  Weimar  Germany,  Mannheim  too  confronts  the  problem 
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of  value-relativism  in  different  guises  both  in  his  earlier  work  an  histori- 
cism  and,  more  explicitly,  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie.  For  the  moment, 
however,  it  may  be  more  fruitful  to  re-examine  Mannheim's  explicit  con- 
tributions  to  the  Methodenstreit  since  they  are  every  bit  as  central  to  his I  287 
sociology  of  knowledge.  An  attempt  wi  II  therefore  be  made  to  outline 
some  of  the  salient  features  of  Mannheim's  contribution  to  the  methodolo- 
gical  dispute  surrounding  the  social  sciences. 
Whereas  in  his  brief  review,  'Zum  Problem  einer  Klassifikation  der  Wissen- 
schaften',  Mannheim  appears  to  argue  against  the  constitution  of  the  sciences 
in  terms  of  their  object  domain  or  their  methodology  and  in  favour  of  the 
intentionality  of  the  cognitive  subject,  he  is  by  no  means  clear  how  this 
comes  about.  Indeed,  at  one  point  in  his  argument,  he  appears  to  be  un- 
certain  as  to  whether  the  notion  of  intentionality  (i.  e.  consciousness  of  some- 
thing)  is  the  solution'at  all.  Nonetheless,  the  central  problem  which  con- 
fronts'hisilater  work  on  the  constitution  of  social  scientific  knowledge  is 
already  stated  in  this  review  as,  for  instance,  when  he  argues  that 
'if  we  concede  that  we  have  direct,  immediate 
experience  of  the  nature  of  an  object  or  an  object  - 
domain,  then  nonetheless  the  fact'remains  undis- 
puted  that  its  nature  theoretically  is  always 
apprehended  only  from  a  view  point  ...  a  classi- 
ficationfof  the  sciences?  DF]  can  only  result  on 
the  basis  of  a  viewpoint;  which  viewpoint  is  the 
most  adequate  is  decided  by  the  nature  of  the 
object;  the  nature  of  the  object,  however,  is 
theoretically  always  apprehended  only  from  a 
viewpoint;  the  whole  problem  therefore  seems 
to  move  in  a  circle.  '  65 
Even  at  this  early  stage  of  his  work,  Mannheim  is  already  confronted  with 
the  perspectivism  and  relativism  that  permeates  his  later  work.  But  he 
has  not  yet  developed  this  perspectivism  as  a  central  feature  of  human 
scientific  knowledge,  even  though,  as  we  saw  earlier,  this  was  also  sketched 
out  in  his  review  of  Lukäcs'  Die  Theorie  des  Romans. 
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However,  in  1922,  in  the  same  year  as  the  review  on  the  classification  of 
the  sciences  was  published,  Mannheim  also  commenced  his  Unpublished 288  ' 
study  Über  die  Eigenart  kultursoziologischer  Erkenntnis  which  starts  out 
from  the  differences  between  the  cultural  and  natural  sciences.  Though 
this  study  has  been  discussed  earlier,  its  relevance  for  Mannheim's  re- 
construction  of  the  foundations  of  the  human  sciences  must  be  briefly  out- 
lined  here.  Mannheim  starts  out  by  distinguishing  between  natural  and 
cultural  phenomena  on  the  grounds  that  the  former  are  If  ree  of  meaning  and 
value'  or  'value-indifferent'  whereas  the  latter  is  experienced  as  valuable' 
by  the  intentional  cognitive  subject.  Following  Dilthey,  Mannheim  argues 
that  the  cognitive  subject  in  the  cultural  sciences  is  not  a  transcendental 
ego  but  'the  whole  human  being'.  Furthermore,  since  the  cultural  sciences 
are  part  of  the  process  they  investigate,  the  subject  and  object  of  these 
sciences  coincide.  However,  Mannheim,  unlike  Lukacs,  does  not  con- 
centrate  his  attention  upon  the  subject-object  relation  as  a  means  of  explic- 
ating  the  specificity  of  social  knowledge  but  rather  upon  the  human  subject 
constitution  of  cultural  scientific  knowledge  through  their  attitude  (Einstellung) 
towards  their  object-domain.  Since  the  human  subject  is  a  part  of  the 
cultural  process  he  experiences,  he  has  'pre-theoretical'  access  to  his  object  - 
domain. 
I 
This  social  subject  of  cultural  knowledge  experiences  the  cultural  world  with 
other  human  subjects.  Cultural  -knowledge  thus  becomes  a  function  of  tex_ 
periental.  contexts'  and  is  to  be  understood  in  this  manner.  This  'socio- 
genetic  knowledge,  is,  in  turn,  pre-theoretical  in  origin  and  invites  attent- 
ion  to  'everyday  life-experience'  on  the  part  of  the  cultural  sciences.  In- 
deed,  the  socio-genetic  grounding  of  cultural  objectifications  does  not,  for 
Mannheim,  lie  in  such  entities  as  production  relations  or  class  positions  but 
in  'experiential  contexts'  (Erlebniszusammenhän  e).  These  experiential 289 
contexts  or  constellations  are  a  group  phenomenon  and,  when  structural 
connected  as  a  series,  they  constitute  a'world-view.  Individual  facts  are 
to  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  these  totalities  (i.  e.  world-views)  that  lie 
behind  them. 
In  this  early  attempt  to  formulate  a  theory  of  socio-cultural  knowledge  and 
to  define  the  distinctive  of  this  form  of  knowledge,  Mannheim  reveals  the 
meta-theoretical  intentions  that  lie  behind  his  sociology  of  knowledge  and 
culture.  That  is,  the  specific  proposition  oncerning  the  relationship  be- 
tween  knowledge  and  culture,  on  the  one  hand,  and  society,  on  the  other, 
can  only  be  fully  understood  in  the  light  of  the  meta-theoretical  assumptions 
concerning  the  constitution  of  knowledge  and  reality  itself.  At  the  end  of 
this  unpublished  study,  Mannheim  indicates  that  a  further  dimension  of 
cultural  knowledge  that  must  be  considered  is  its  historically  dynamic  nature. 
This  is  examined  in  his  essay  on  historicism.  But  the  most  explicit  attempt 
by'  Mannheim  to  confront  the  Methodenstreit  is  to  be  found  in  his  other  un- 
published  study,  Eine  soziologische  Theorie  der  Kultur  und  ihrer  Erkennbarkeit. 
Though  it  has  also  been  summarised  in  some  detail  earlier,  it  is  necessary 
to  indicate  briefly  those  aspects  of  this  work  that  directly  relate  to  the 
Methodenstreit.  It  will  be  recalled  that  in  the  first  section  of  this  study, 
Mannheim  maintains  that  methodological  issues  cannot  be  resolved  without 
a  sociological  orientation  since  forms  of  knowledge  vary  both  historically 
and  socially  and  because  a  plurality  of  methodologies  exist  whose  roots  can 
be  traced  back  to  underlying  social  factors.  More  specifically,  Mannheim 
raises  the  possibility  of  both  an  ontological  distinction  between  the  objects 
of  the  natural  and  human  sciences  (on  the-basis  of  their  'mode  of  existence') 290 
and  an  ontic  distinction  between  'nature  free  of  meaning'  and  'structures  of 
meaning  (culture)'.  Further,  he  poses  the  possibility  of  the  different  re- 
lationship  of  the  cognitive  subject  to  his  object  in  the  natural  and  human 
sciences. 
This  meta-theoretical  account  of  the  differences  between  the  natural  and 
human  sciences  also  contains  a  historical  dimension  in  so  far  as  these 
sciences  grew  out  of  different  philosophical  world-views  (Cartesianism  and 
Romanticism)  which  in  turn  have  their  roots  in  different  cognitive  interests 
('a  technical  yorientated  interest'  in  the  domination  of  nature  and  a  practical 
interest  in  understanding):  Historically  and  sociologically,  Mannheim  - 
following  Simmel,  LukScs  and  possibly  Weber  -  'imputes'  natural  scientific 
rationality  to  the  'capitalist  spirit'  and  the  specific  rationality  of  a'capitalist 
society.  '  Since  this  is  the  dominant  form  of  rationality  in  this  society,  its 
most  'appropriate'  form  of  knowledge  is  taken  to  be  the  model  for  alI  forms 
of  knowledge,  i.  e.  it  is  both  quantified  and  universalized.  It  is  both  based 
on  and  presupposes  the  al  i  enati  on  of  human  subjects  who  become  the  object 
of  calculation  and  quantification.  In  contrast,  social  and  political  knowledge 
is  'situationally  bounded',  qualitative  knowledge.  It  is  only  possible  from 
historically-formed  standpoints  and  it  is  a  partial  knowledge,  the  totality 
of  which  '  can  only  be  grasped  ina  synthesis'  . 
The  main  body  of  this  study,  however,  is  concerned  with  yet  another  way  of 
grounding  the  distinction  between  the  natural  and  human  sciences,  namely, 
in  the  distinction  between  'communicative'  and  'conjunctive'  knowledge  . 
Communicative  knowledge.  iýs  societalized  knowledge  that  aims  at  universal- 
isatton.  Its  concepts  are  supra-temporal.  It  is  usually  located  within 291 
the  natural  sciences.  Conjunctive  knowledge,  on  the  other  hand,  is  located 
in  and  bounded  by  an  existential  community  and  is  knowledge  for  interacting 
human  subjects  within  this  community.  Its  validity  is  limited  to  partici- 
pants  in  this  community.  'The  cognitive  subjects  of  the  two  types  of  know=" 
ledge  are  also  correspondingly  different.  Whereas  in  communicative  know- 
ledge,  the  cognitive  subject  is  a  static,  artificial  construct,  in  conjunctive 
knowledge  the  cognitive  subject  is  a  dynamic,  'whole  human  being'.  16 
the  case  of  the  latter,  the  human  subject  has  a  particular  perspective  deriving 
from  his  existential  community  or,  if  socially  mobile  or  confronted  with 
other  communities,  from  several  communities.  The  question  necessarily 
arises  as  to  whether  it  is  possible  to  transcend  the  perspectivism  of  conjunct- 
lye  knowledge.  Mannheim  argues  that  we  can  live  within  our  existential 
community  at  an  empathetic  level.  That  is,  we  understand  this  conjunctive 
knowledge  because  we  participate  and  interact  in  the  existential  community 
from  which  it  emerges.  This  is  the  level  of  pre-reflexive  knowledge.  But 
we  can  also  seek  to  understand  phenomenon  in  terms  of  the  context  from 
0 
which  they  emerge.  That  is,  this  form  of  understanding  presupposes.  not 
engagement  but  reflection,  notfnerely  living  in  the  existential  community  but 
also  being  distanced  from  it.  Mannheim  distinguishes  the  two  forms  of 
understanding  as  Verstehen  (pre-reflexive)  and  Begreifen  (reflexive).  It 
is  again  worthwhile  emphasizing  here  that  Mannheim.  's  role  fir  the  intelli- 
gentsia  as  synthesizers  can  only  be  fully  comprehended  in  the  light  of  these 
meta-theoretical  assumptions  concerning  the  social  nature  of  understanding 
at  the  level  of  conjunctive  knowledge. 
Though  the  terminology  is  different,  it  is  in  this  theory  of  conjunctive  know- 
"  ledge  that  we  can  find  some  affinities  with  more  recent  attempts  to  ground -  ----------  --------------X92 
social  knowledge  transcendentally.  In  particular,  Apel's  recent  attempts 
to  ground  the  preconditions  for  the  possibility  of  knowledge  at  the  pragmatic 
level  of  communication  communities  and  his  explication  of  the  role  of  en- 
gagement  and  reflection  appear  to  develop  similar  lines  of  argument-66  How- 
ever,  there  are  important  differences  aside  from  the  differences  in  termin- 
ology.  The  communication  community,  for  Apel,  is  the  presupposition  for 
all  knowledge  whether  social  or  natural  scientific  knowledge.  Furthermore, 
in  contrast  to  Mannheims  conjunctive  community,  it  is  presupposed  trans- 
cendentally  and  need  not  be  perfectly  realised.  The  interaction  between. 
engagement  and  reflection  in  the  generation  of  critical-knowledge  of  society 
does  not  lead  Apel  to  search  for  synthesizers  of&ngaged  knowledge  since 
engagement  and  reflection  are  features  of  all  knowledge.  Indeed,  ideologi- 
cal  distortion  can  be  seen  to  emerge  when  the  dialectical  relationship  be- 
tween  engagement  and  reflection  is  broken  off  or  blocked.  However,  to 
4 
pursue  further  the  apparent  affinities  between  Mannheim's  arguments  here 
and  recent  philosophical  developments  would  lead  us  away  from  the,  task  of 
examining  the  relationship  between  the  sociology  of  knowledge  and  the  method- 
ological  controversies  surrounding  the  social  sciences. 
To  return  to  Mannheim's  sociology  of  knowledge,  we  can  plausibly  argue 
that  the  stance  which  Mannheim  adopts  on  the  methodological  distinction 
between  the  natural  and  human  sciences  itself  presents  him  with  some  of 
the  problems  which  his  sociology  of  knowledge  must  f6ce.  Indeed,  Mann- 
heim's  sociology  of  knowledge  can  be  interpreted,  in  part,  as  precisely 
this  attempt  to  resolve  these  problems.  The  basic  subjectivism  of  social 
knowledge  that  is  located  in  diverse  and,  later,  competing  and  conflicting 
communities  of  experience  provides  the  meta-theoretical  basis  for  our 293 
understanding  of  his  theory  of  competing  world-views  and,  later,  ideologies, 
as  well  as  the  need  for  a  synthesis  once  their  total  partiality  has  been  pro- 
claimed.  One  can  also  detect  in  Mannheim's  methodological  incursions, 
the  tendency  to  reduce  social  scientific  knowledge  to  knowledge  of  world- 
views.  The  undifferentiated  use  of  the  notion  of  knowledge  as  meta-scientific 
knowledge,  normative  knowledge,  '  everyday  knowledge,  historical-philoso- 
phical  world  views  as  knowledge,  etc,  has  often  been  remarked  upon. 
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In  Ideologie  und  Utopie.,  it  is  not  so  much  the  methodological  dispute  that 
is  at  issue  for  Mannheim  but  rather  the  problems  raised  by  the  Werturteils- 
streit.  Mannheim's  account  of  the  ideological  nature  of  all  social  thought 
reveals  the  sociology  of  knowledge's  dual  position  as  the  scientific  basis 
for  the  destruction  (or  unmasking)  of  all  other  intellectual  positions  and 
as  the  basis  for  their  constructive  synthesis.  It  is  as  if  a  'value-free' 
position  is  adopted  for  the  critique  of  values  embedded  in  world-views  and 
ideologies  and  then  an  evaluative  position  is  adopted  for  their  synthesis 
and  for  a  'diagnosis  of  the  times'.  The  radical  historical  relativization  of 
values  clearly  has-Its  origins  in  histori6ism.  Ideologies  thus  become  of 
equal  value  at  this  level.  But  Mannheim  also  introduces  a  qualitative 
evaluative  consciousness  of  value  insofar  as  some  aspects  of  some  stand- 
points  are  more  adequate  than  others  in  relation  to  the  historical  present. 
It  Is  here  that  the  notion  of  false  consciousness  as  'inadequate  to  exist- 
ence'  Is  located. 
In  these  two  intentions  -a  scientific  critique  of  standpoints  and  a  diagnosis 
of  the  times  by  means  of  a  synthesis  of  standpoints  -  one  can  see  Mann- 
heirn  attempting  to  mediate,  as  Hofmann  suggests,  between  the  philoso- 294 
phical  margins  of  the  discussion  surrounding  value-judgments  and  the  pract- 
ical  margins  of  a  social  politics  of  values. 
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In  the  case  of  the  phi  loso- 
phical  debate  surrounding  the  role  of  value-judgments  in  science,  Mann- 
heim  adopts  a  value-free  position.  This  standpoint,  in  turn,  contains  a 
central  neo-Kantian  separation  of  Sollen  and  Sein  that  has,  an  important  episte- 
mological  consequence.  As  Hofmann  argues. 
'Behind  the  demand  for  the  absence  of  value- 
judgments  in  science  there  stands  an  episte- 
rylological  conception:  value-judgments  are 
not  the  result  of  a  cognitive  act.  ,  69 
The  postulette  of  the  value-freedom  of  science  may  have  been  viewed  in 
this  light  as  the  result  of  a  practically  existent  value  pluralism  in  which 
science  is  not  able  to  distinguish  itself  without  becoming  a  party  to  a 
value  position.  Mannheim,  however,  does  not  shy  away  from  a  study  of 
these  non-cognitive  value-judgments.  He  does,  however,  on  occasion 
accept  that  they,  along  with  the  most  important  areas  of  social  life,  are 
still  $anchored  in  the  irrational'.  One  of  these  areas  is,  for  Mannheim, 
the  political  sphere  and  the  question  as  to  the  possibility  of  politics  as  a 
science  that  is  raised  in  the  central  chapter  of  Ideologie  und  Utopie  forces 
-  Mannheim  to  adopt  a  social  -poll  tical  analysis  of  values.  Here,  too,  we 
are  confronted  with  the  context  within  which  the  role  of  the  intelligentsia  as 
synthesizers  of  value-laden  standpoints  become  intelligible.  In  terms  of 
the  options  open  to  the  sociology  of  knowledge's  study  of  politics,  Mann- 
heim  recognizes  the  value-free  stance  that  removesIthe  evaluative  stand- 
I  point'  and  'impulsive  element'  from  forms  of  knowledge  as  of  only  limited 
validity.  He  himself  favours  a  'decision'  In  favour  of  anex  posýynthesls 
of  value-laden  standpointsin  order,  subsequently,  to  be  able  to  'predict 
approximately  the  ideological  reactions  of  social  strata'.  Ultimately,  how- 
ever,  this  'decision'  rests  upon  the  responsible  individual  researcher  and 295'. 
does  not  depart,  markedly,  from  Weber's  notion  of  Verantwortungsethik. 
In  conclusion,  it  is  plausible  to  argue  that  the  sociology  of  knowledge  in 
Welmar  Germany  represents  an  extension  of  both  the  debates  surrounding  the 
methodology  of  the  social  sciences  that  had  already  developed  before  the 
First  World  War  and  the  controversies  surrounding  the  role  of  value-judgments 
In  science  and  even  the  role  of  science  itself.  In  the  latter  case,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  sociology  of  knowledge  radicalised  the  problemg  of  value-judg- 
ments  and  the  role  of  science  to  the  point  of  accentuating  the  'crisis  situ- 
ation  of  thought'  that  Mannheim  pointed  to  at  the  very  start  of  his  analysis 
in  Ideologie  und  Utopie.  One  can  also  maintain  that  the  methodological 
standpoints  in  the  sociology  of  knowledge  are  part  of  a  crucial  meta-theor- 
etical  basis  for  the  understanding  of  its  propositions.  This  meta-theoretical 
basis  is  also  constituted,  especially  in*Mannheimis  case,  by  a  distinctive 
philosophy  of  history.  That  the  two  levels  are  connected  can  be  seen  in 
the  extent  to  which  Mannheim's  methodological  reflections  are  insolubly 
linked  with  his  practical  intention  of  providing  a  'diagnosis  of  the  times' 
within  th,.  -  context  of  the  restrictions  imposed  by  the  past  (ideology)  and  the 
future  (utopia).  In  short,  the  methodological  reflections  are  intended  - 
in  Ideologie  und  Utopie,,  at  least  -  to  terminate  in  an  analysis  of  the  absent 
present. 
v 
I  hm  It  has  been  necessary  to  reconstruct  the  presupposition  and  meta-  theoretical 
Intentions  that  lay  behind  the  sociology  of  knowledge  In  Weimar  Germany  in 
0 295  - 
order  to  render  the  whole  theoretical  and  practical  project  comprehensible. 
In  the  examination  of  the  debates  surrounding  the  sociology  of  knowledge 
and,  in  particular,  the  reception  of  Mannheim's  Ideologie  und  Utopi  ,  it  was 
found  that  contemporaries  readily  understood  the  theoretical  and  practical 
issues.  that  this  project  confronted.  To  a  greater  or  lesser  extent,  they 
shared  its  preoccupations  or,  at  least,  could  conceive  of  them  as  real  and 
also  as  urgent.  Hence,  as  NeusUss  argues  in  relation  to  Mannheim's  work, 
'For  present  day  awareness,  the  reaction  to  Mann- 
h6im's  sociology  of  knowledge.  in  the  social 
sciences  and  humanities  at  the  close  of  the 
Weimar  Republic  can  therefore  only  be  completely 
comprehended  if  the  specific  intellectual  and 
political  atmosphere  is  recalled  in  which  the 
problems  of  relativism  and  historicism,  of  the 
autonomy  of  the  human  mind  over  against  all 
political  and,  social  determinations  and  the  in- 
dependence  of  "culture"  over  against  a  threat- 
ening  "mass  civilization"  were  still  burning 
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existential  questions  for  intellectual  strata.  I 
As  we  have  seen,  all  these  issues  were  Present,  to  a  greater  or  lesser  degree, 
In  the  sociology  of  knowledge  of  this  period"  and  especially  in  Mannheim's 
work  which,  Eisermann  argues,  is  'perhaps  the  most  specific  contribution 
that  German  sociology  has.  contributed  to  the  whole  construction  of  this 
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discipline  I.  But  it  is  not  merely  the  case  that  the  sociology  of  know- 
ledge  took  up  all  these  issues.  Rather,  it  presented  them  In  a  radical  form 
as  theoretical  and  practical  problems.  For  Instance,  it  was  not  merely  the 
case  that  al  I  the  philosophies  which  the  sociology  of  knowledge  took  up  also 
raised  the  problem  of  relativism.  The  fact  that  these  competing  philoso- 
phies  were  seen  to  exist  within  the  same  temporal  sphere  also  heightened 
the  sense  of  relativism.  More  importantly,  however,  the  sociology  of 
knowledge,  in  reducing  these  philosophies  to  the  status  of  world-views 
(a  project  already  commenced  by  Dilthey)  and,  in  turn,  in  reducing  world- 
vieNks  to  systems  of  II  fe,  transformed  relativism  into  a  practical  Issue  that 297 
had  to  be  resolved  not  merely  theoretically  but  also  practically.  This  was 
particularly  urgent  if,  at  the  same  time,  one  had  already  called  into  question 
the  possibility  of  'theoretical  I  solutions  by  reducing  the  'superstructure,  of 
society  to  the  status  of  epiphenomena.  'The  crisis  of  consciousness,  in 
very  different  forms,  is  at  the  root  of  the  work  of  Luk6cs,  Scheler  and  Mann- 
heim.  Whereas  for  Lukacs  the  problem  is  that  of  the  transformation  of 
consciousness  out  of  its  reified  state,  for  Scheler  it  is  the  'powerlessness 
of  the  mind'  and  for  Mannheim  the  'homelessness  of  the  mind'  that  are 
central  issues.  In  al  I  cases,  again  in  very  different  contexts,,  sone  can  speak 
of  the  centrality  of  the  alienation  of  the  mind. 
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Simi  larly,  the  historicist  problematic  was  not  confined  to  questions  re- 
lating  to  how  one  can  interpret  cultural  phenomena,  though  the  hermeneutic 
I  ntent  i  on  was  part  i  cul  ar  Iy  st  rong  1n  both  Luklcs  I  and  Mannhe  1mIs  work. 
Rather,  the  presupp  osition  of  a  historically  dynamic  flux  within  which  cul- 
tural  objectification  were'located  and  to  be  understood,  combined  with  the 
conflict  between  'cultures'  In  the  sense  of  system  of  life  called  forth  a 
desire  for  synthesis.  Again,  this  was  not  confined  to  the  sociology  of 
knowledge  but  was,  often  to  be  found  In  these  traditions  which  the  sociology 
of  knowledge  took  up.  "  Troeltsch,  for  example,  saw  his  work,  Der  Historismus 
und  seine  Probleme,  as  being  not  merely  concerned  with  the  historical  em- 
ergence  of  modern  thought  but  as  itself  'a  historical-phi  losophical  theme  I. 
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In  the  preface,  he  writes  that 
'My  fundamental  notion.  is  ...  di  rected  towards 
the  formation  of  a  contemporary  cultural  synthesis 
out  of  the  historical  inheritances,  for  which  task  it 
is  unimportant  whether  one  belongs  to  the  emergent 
or  declining  branch  of  cultural  development.  1  72 298 
For  Mannheim,  however,  at  least  by  the  time  of  the  publication  of  Ideologie 
und  Utopie,  the  demand  for  a  synthesis  had  become  not  merely  cultural  but 
also  political.  The  sociology  of  culture  had  become  the  sociology  of  politi- 
cal  ideologies.  Furthermore,  it  now  mattered  for  Mannheim  where  one  was 
located  within  the  totality  of  historical  development:  one  had  to  be  located 
in  the  progressive  historical  flux.  In  short,  however,  the  problem  of 
historicism  had  also  taken  on  a  practical  and  political  urgency. 
The  immediate  aspects  of  the  philosophy  of  history  within  this  tradition 
Mannhe*  M 
were  also  significant  in  that  for  LukacsAanU,  to  a  lesser  extent,  Scheler  - 
j 
in  their  different  ways  -a  'philosophy  of  history  with  a  practical  intent' 
(Habermas)  was  of  considerably  urgency.  Lukdcs  saw  the  progressive 
decline  of  capitalism  as  not  bringing  about  a  revolutionary  consciousness 
in  the  proletariat.  His  concern  was  to  retain  this  consciousness  as  an 
'objective  possibility'  and,  later,  to  embody  it  within  the  political  party. 
Lukacs  I  orientation  was  sti  II  towards  the  f  uture.  Scheler,  in  contrast, 
viewed  the  disintegration  of  post-war  society  and  the  threatening  collapse 
of  what  he  took  to  be  essential  values  with  dismay.  In  this  sense,  his 
orientation  is  towards  the  past  insofar  as  his  intention  is  the  preservation 
of  essential  values.  Mannheim,  too,  was  preoccupied  with  social  and 
political  disintegration  and  the  consequent  lack  of  orientation.  His  response 
Is  to  seek  to  develop  a  'diagnosis  of  the  times  i.  e.  an  orientation  towards 
the  present  . 
In  this  respect,  Lenk's  characterisation  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  as 
embodying  a  'tragic  consciousness'  is  strictly  speaking,  most  accurate 
for  his  original  analysis  of  Scheler.  73 
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division  and  their  Insoluble  opposition,  combined  with  the  laws  of  the  relation- 
ship  between  the  two,  lead  to  a  'powerlessness  of  the  mind'  thesis  and  a 
'tragic  consciousness'.  For  Lukacs  -  whom  Lenk  does  not  discuss  -  the 
gap  between  reified  consciousness  (the  description  of  which  does  contain 
elements  of  tragic  consciousness,  especially  in  the  case  of  the  bourgeoisie) 
and  the  'objective  possibility'  of  revolutionary  consciousness  can  be  over- 
come  through  both  political  activity  and  political  reflection.  For  Mannheim, 
the  thomelessness.  of  the  mind'  is  resolved  by  locating  it  within  the  relative- 
ly  detached  intelligentsia  and,  by  implication,  the  sociology  of  knowledge 
itself.  Each,  in  their  different  ways,  is  concerned  with  the  alienation  of 
consciousness. 
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This  study  of  the  development  of  the  sociology  of  knowledge  in  Germany  has 
concentrated  upon  the  work  of  three  writers  -  Max  Scheler,  Karl  Mannheim 
and  Georg  LukScs  -  who  directly  or  (in  Lukacs'  case  )  indirectly  contributed 
to  its  emergence  in  Weimar  Germany.  It  has  been  argued  that  earlier  attempts 
to  dismiss  the  sociology  of  knowledge  as  dealing  merely  with  pseudo-problems 
or  being  hopelessly  caught  up  in  the  relativist  problematic  have  resulted  in 
taking  attention  away  from  the  aims  and  problems  which  this  tradition  raised. 
Furthermore,  those  who  argue  that  some  of  the  problems  if  was  concerned  with 
-  e.  g.  the  problem  of  ideology  -  are  now  of  merely  historical  interest  and  that 
those  who  dealt  witlý  them  are  merely  precursors  of  a  more  sophisticated  social 
theory  of  knowledge  Ignore  the  extent  to  which  the  problems  that  the  German 
tradition  raised  -  though  probably  not  its  solutions  -  remain  central  to  recent 
discussion,  on  the  methodology  and  foundations  of  the  social  sciences.  In 
this  context,  the  present  study  has  merely  suggested  rather  than  systematically 
analysed  the  connections  between,  say,  Mannheim's  contribution  to  the-,. 
12 
methodological  dispute  and  recent  discussions  by-Apel  and  Habermas. 
S'Imilarly,  contemporary  discussion  surrounding  the  foundations  of  a  critique 
of  ideology  can  be  seen  to  be  retracing  some  of  the  issues  raised  earlier  by 
Luka"cs  and  Mannheim.  -  The  inadequacy  of  hermeneutics  alone  as  a  basis  for 
interpretation  in  the  social  sciences  and  the  need  for  a  critique  of  ideology  is 
argued  not  merely  In  recent  works  by  Apel 
3 
and  Habermas 
4 
but  also  by  Manin- 
helm.  However,  a  fuller  examination  of  these  connections  would  have  taken 
us  away  from  the  central  focus  of  this  study  which  has  been  the  emergence  of 
the  sociology  of  knowledge  in  Germany  during  the  Weimar  Republic. 
This  more  explicitly  historical  study  has  led  to  a  critical  examination  of  the 
contbxt  within  which  these  subsequent  connections  must  be  placed.  For 305 
Instance,  it  is  certainly  true  that  Mannheim  Is  and,  to  a  lesser  extent, 
Lukacs'  early  works  are  preoccupied  with  an  elucidation  of  hermeneutic 
problems  of  interpretation.  But  these  concerns,  even  in  Mannheim's  early 
works,  must  be  seen  in  the  light  of  his  ettempt  to  develop  a  sociology  of  cul- 
ture  that  moved  increasingly  in  the  direction  of  a  historicist  mode  of  inter- 
pretation.  In  his  later,  German  works,  Mannheim's  attempt  to  develop  a 
sociology  of  knowledge  and  a  theory  of  ideology  that  is,  ultimately,  super- 
ceded  by  this  new  discipline  often  appears  to  be  one  that  ignores  his  earlier 
Insights  Into  the  role  of  Interpretation.  '  Similarly,  it  has  been  argued  that 
his  tr 
i 
eatment  of  the  central  themes  in  Ideologie  und  Utopie  can  only  be  under- 
i 
stood  in  the  light  of  his  meta-theoretical  intentions'and  his  philosophy  of 
history.  In  short,  the  attempt  to  extract  the  contemporary  relevance  of  say, 
Mannheim's  work  -  which  certainly  does  exist  -  must  follow  from  a  detailed 
examination  of  Mannheim's  work  and  its  context  and  not  commence  with  a 
re-reading  of  It  in  the  light  of  current  concerns.  This  would  appear,  In  part; 
5 
to  be  the  weakness  of  Simonds'  otherwise  illuminating  study. 
If  we  return  to  the  sociology  of  knowledge  of  the  Weimar  period  then  we  can 
see  thatIfor  three  central  figures,  the  sociology  of  knowledge  or  the  critique 
of  ideology  (in  Lukacs'  case)  is  to  be  located  within  a  sociology  of  culture 
and  a  critique  of  culture.  In  different  ways,  one  theme  of  this  sociology 
or  critique  of  culture  is  the  alienation  of  that  culture  from  human  purposes  and 
#  control.  -  This  is  the  source  of  the  'powerlessness'  or  'homelessness'  of  the 
mind.  In  Lukeks'  case,  It  is  the  , -,,  ource  of  his  attempt  to  reconstitute  a 
critical  consciousness  in  the  face  of  an  all-pervasive  reification  of  social 
relations. 306 
But  whereas  in  the  early  period  of  the  Weimar  Republic,  the  sociology  of 
knowledge  is  firmly  rooted  within  a  sociology  of  culture  (most  obviously 
in  Scheler's  contribution),  by  the  end  of  the  Weimar  Republic  it  is'seen 
as  possessing  a  more  independent  existence.  However,  this  is  not'the 
only  change  that  has  taken  place  in  the  interveping  period.  If  the  theme 
of  ideology  was  not  taken-up  except  by  Luka"cs  in  the  early  period,  this  was 
no-longer  true  after  1928,  and  especially  after  the  publication  of  Ideologie 
und  Utopie  in  the  following  year.  Both  the  ideological  and  political  dimen- 
sions  of  a  sociology  of  knowledge  had  come  explicitly  to  the  fore,  as  the 
reviews  of  Mannheim's  key  work  testify.  These  reviews  and  the  earlier 
I 
debates,  along  with  other  contributions  to  the  sociology  of  knowledge,  do 
suggest,  as  some  commentators  argued,  that  the  sociology  of  knowledge  had 
become  much  more  central  to  sociology  itself.  In  part,  this  may  be  due 
to  the  fact  that  the  i  ssues  rai  sed  by  the  Methodenstrei  t  and  Werturtei  I  sstrei  t 
before  the  First  World  War  were  now  taken  up  in  a  different  manner  in  the 
Weimar  period.  In  particular,  the  sociology  of  knowledge,  and  especially 
Mannheim's  contribution,  can  be  seen  as  incorporating  and  continuing  those 
earlier  debates. 
However,  what  contributed  to  the  sociology  of  knowledge's  impact  in  this 
period  was  not  merely  the  continuation  of  methodological  debates  but.  the 
practical  aims  of  the  discipline.  This  has  been  almost  completely  over- 
looked  by  those  Anglo-American  critiques  of  the  whole  enterprise  of  a 
I 
sociology  of  knowledge  that  have  concentrated  upon  its  epistemological 
claims.  The  sociology  of  knowledge  was  not  merely  another  theoretical 
branch  of  sociology.  It  also  often  had  quite  explicit  practical  Intentions. 
Whereas  today  it  Is  commonly  viewed  as  an  abstract  discipline,  it  was  seen 307 
by  its  central  adherents  in  Weimar  Germany  as  raising  the  relationship 
between  theory  and  practice  and  as  having  an  important  pedjagogic  role. 
These  practical  intentions,  however,  were  made  all  the  more  urgent  not 
merely  by  the  crises  of  Weimar  Germany  but  by  the  crisis  of  the  alienated 
mind  or  consciousness  that  lay  at  the  heart  of  the  new  discipline's  meta- 
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